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Abstract 
This thesis examines historiography in modern Saudi Arabia. Many students of modern Arab 
historiography have focused on the development of historical professions and the 
historiographical legitimation of regimes. In contrast, this thesis seeks to explain the 
emergence of a plurality of historical narratives in the kingdom in the absence of formal 
political pluralism. It thus pays special attention to amateur and unofficial histories. Since the 
1920s, texts about local, tribal and Shiite communities emerged that diverged from, and 
contested, the histories focusing on the royal family. They emphasized the communities’ 
historical independence from the Al Saud or asserted the communities’ importance in Saudi 
national history. Since the 1970s, distinct social and economic histories also developed. 
These histories described important historical events as the result of wider social and 
economic factors rather than the actions of individual rulers or communities. 
The thesis argues that this narrative plurality was the product of the building and 
expansion of the Saudi state in the context of globalization. The state subsidized not only 
dynastic histories, but also many texts on local, social and economic history. It also provided 
an increasing number of its citizens with education and employment in the expanding public 
sector. It thus empowered a variety of previously illiterate and relatively poor sections of 
Saudi society, including former Bedouin tribespeople, to produce conformist, but also 
dissenting histories. Globalization not only facilitated narrative plurality by putting Saudi 
historians in contact with different ideologies, methodologies, and source material from 
abroad, it also allowed authors to publish their works abroad and online beyond 
governmental censorship. But state expansion and globalization have not been restricted to 
Saudi Arabia, and this thesis suggests that these processes may also have led to narrative 
plurality in Arab historiography more generally, even under the conditions of 
authoritarianism.  
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Note on Transliteration, Translation and References 
In writing Arabic names, I have tried to use forms that are recognizable or can be looked up 
easily in encyclopaedias and on the internet. When a common Romanization or translation 
of the names of Saudi individuals and institutions exists, I follow it. This is the case with 
many Saudi rulers and governmental agencies. I thus write, for instance, ‘King Faisal’ 
instead of ‘King Fayṣal’ and ‘King Saud University’ instead of ‘King Suʿūd University’. When 
authors have a preferred way of spelling their names in Latin characters, for instance, in 
their publications in European languages, I follow this preference. I thus write, for example, 
Abdullah al-Askar instead of ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿAskar. For common Arabic terms and place 
names that entered the English language (like ulema, Eid ul-Fitr and Riyadh), I use the 
forms in The Oxford Dictionary of English.1 
For the bibliographical details, I broadly follow the Romanization standard of the 
American Library Association and the Library of Congress (ALA-LC).2 I hope that this will 
allow readers to find literature easily in library catalogues. I use the same standard for the 
transliteration of proper names that do not have a common Romanized form and for Arabic 
terms that have not entered The Oxford Dictionary of English. All translations, unless 
otherwise acknowledged, are my own. Unless declared otherwise, I have been the 
interviewer in the interviews cited in the footnotes. All amounts given in dollars are in US 
dollars. Citations broadly follow the notes and bibliography citation style in the Chicago 
Manual of Style.3
                                                   
1 Stevenson, The Oxford Dictionary (2010). 
2 Library of Congress, “ALA-LC Romanization” (2010). I transliterate the personal suffix –hu/i as –hū/ī, e.g. 
in lahū, following standard Arabic phonology. Abjad numerals, as in page numbers of introductions, are 
transliterated ‘ʾ’, ‘b’, ‘t’, ‘th’, ‘j’, etc. I follow vocalizations as they appear in the Arabic texts themselves. In most 
cases, I thus write ‘suʿūd’ instead of ‘saʿūd’. 
3 University of Chicago Press, The Chicago Manual (2010), 660–784. 
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1. Introduction 
Between the mid-1980s and the early 2000s, a series of books on the history of the southern 
province of Asir appeared in Saudi Arabia. These books offered an entirely different view of 
the history of the kingdom than that provided by official textbooks. The most controversial 
works in the series were The Entertainer’s Pleasure: Supplement to the Spectator’s Delight 
and The History of Asir. Their alleged authors were followers of the Āl ʿĀʾiḍ, the former rulers 
of Asir, whom the Saudis had ousted in the 1920s.1 Both works presented a glorious history 
of Asir and the Āl ʿĀʾiḍ over more than a thousand years. This was in contrast to official 
textbooks, which mentioned the dynasty only briefly in the context of twentieth-century Saudi 
expansion.2 
In glorifying the Āl ʿĀʾiḍ, The Entertainer’s Pleasure and The History of Asir turned 
textbook notions of the history of Arabia on their head. The works rejected widespread 
arguments that a religious ‘age of ignorance’ or jāhilīyah had preceded the start of the 
Wahhabi mission in the eighteenth century.3 The History of Asir stated that ‘Islam had not 
been erased from the region, neither from others.’ It claimed that the works by Asiri scholars 
‘praise the religiosity of the region’s inhabitants, the rise of preachers and religious 
instructors and the appearance of judges and religious scholars’.4 The Entertainer’s 
Pleasure and The History of Asir also argued that an Asiri prince had already established a 
‘consultative council’ or majlis al-shūrá in the ninth century, a measure that the Saudis 
                                                   
1 Al-Dūsarī, Imtāʿ (1984). Al-Ḥifẓī, Tārīkh [1992/93]. 
2 E.g., al-ʿUthaymīn, Tārīkh al-mamlakah al-ʿarabīyah al-suʿūdīyah: lil-ṣaff al-thālith (2007), 78–79. 
3 The Wahhabi mission is a religious reform movement associated with the teachings of Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792). Its followers have mostly rejected the label ‘Wahhabi’. They have preferred to call 
themselves ‘Muslims’ or muwaḥḥidūn ‘professors of God’s unity’. Since the early twentieth century, they have also 
more frequently referred to themselves as ‘Salafis’, followers of the way of the first generations of Muslims’ (salaf). 
Other revivalist movements, however, also used this concept. Commins, The Wahhabi Mission (2006), vi, 215. 
Following Commins, I speak of the ‘Wahhabi mission’ rather than of the ‘Wahhabi movement’ or ‘Wahhabism’. This 
is closest to a common term in Saudi Arabia, ‘Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s mission’ (daʿwat al-shaykh 
muḥammad ibn ʿabd al-wahhāb). On the concept of ‘Salafi’, see also Lauzière, “The Construction” (2010). 
4 Al-Ḥifẓī, Tārīkh [1992/93], 44. 
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undertook only in the twentieth century.5 Using terms that official texts reserved for Saudi 
rule, The History of Asir contended that Asir lived in ‘security’ (amn) and ‘stability’ (istiqrār) 
under the Āl ʿĀʾiḍ due to this consultative council.6 Finally, the works also portrayed the Āl 
ʿĀʾiḍ as heroes in the fight against colonialism. 
Perhaps more controversial than the books’ narratives about Asir’s glorious past were 
their genealogical claims. The Entertainer’s Pleasure traced the lineage of the Āl ʿĀʾiḍ back 
to an Umayyad prince, who had allegedly fled persecution from the Abbasids in 750 CE and 
established an independent principality in Asir. This descent from the Umayyads, and 
thereby from the Prophet Muhammad’s tribe, Quraysh, elevated the Āl ʿĀʾiḍ to a status of 
nobility higher than the Saudi royal family, the Al Saud.7 
The Entertainer’s Pleasure and The History of Asir sparked heated debates in Saudi 
Arabia. Official commentators denounced them as ‘forgeries’, and as a foreign attack on 
Saudi national history. They suggested that the real author of The Entertainer’s Pleasure 
was ‘a mercenary from outside the country’, who did not understand the ‘glories’ that the 
people of Asir had gained under the Saudis.8 Unable to stop the circulation of the work, 
however, the main governmental historical research institute, the King Abdulaziz Foundation 
for Research and Archives, took an exceptional decision. It issued its own edition of the work 
in two volumes in 1998 and 2006.9 In the introductions and footnotes of these official 
editions, commentators sought to refute the text’s alleged ‘lies, allegations, and errors’.10 
The publication of The Entertainer’s Pleasure through the King Abdulaziz Foundation 
for Research and Archives only drew attention to the work. It made the unofficial versions 
even more attractive.11 Fuelling the controversy, other authors came out to defend the work 
                                                   
5 Al-Dūsarī, Imtāʿ (2006), 49. 
6 Al-Ḥifẓī, Tārīkh [1992/93], 58. 
7 Al-Dūsarī, Imtāʿ (1998), 11. 
8 Ibid., 10. 
9 Al-Dūsarī, Imtāʿ (1998); Imtāʿ (2006). 
10 Al-Dūsarī, Imtāʿ (1998), 9. 
11 Al-Zākī, “Kitāb” (2002), 284. 
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and argued more broadly for the inclusion of former local dynasties into national history. In a 
newspaper article in 1999, Muḥammad al-Asmarī, an Asiri writer, accused the official 
commentators of ‘insulting one of the regions of Saudi Arabia, the region of Asir’.12 He 
argued that the ‘unification of the nation’ by King Abdulaziz Al Saud (r. 1902–53) ‘does not 
invalidate the political entities, which were scattered across the territory of the present 
kingdom, like the principalities of the Āl Rashīd in Ḥāʾil, the Āl ʿĀʾiḍ in Asir, and the Sharifs in 
the Hejaz’. Al-Asmarī added that ‘one cannot ignore them in history, nor the leaders and the 
people’s braveries in fighting the foreigners who had invaded all the regions mentioned’. 
According to the writer, ‘the leaders of the struggle, who were exiled, killed and whose 
capitals were burned down, are heroes of the nation in history’.13 
Narrative plurality 
The controversy surrounding The Entertainer’s Pleasure and The History of Asir forms part 
of a considerable plurality in Saudi writings about the past. This plurality is the central theme 
of my thesis. I focus on the production of different textual historical narratives and thus 
speak of ‘narrative plurality’. In order to explore the full extent of Saudi narrative plurality, I 
employ a broad definition of historical narratives based on two criteria. First, historical 
narratives are stories ‘which frame and give meaning to academic and popular 
understandings of the past in relation to the present’.14 Second, historical narratives aim ‘to 
be truthful—to reconstruct reality in a “factual” way, that is, to be free from fictivity’.15 
With such a broad definition, I assume that historical narratives are not restricted to 
so-called ‘narrative histories’, that is, the event-based histories from which the French 
Annales historians and other proponents of ‘analytical’, ‘scientific’ histories sought to 
                                                   
12 Al-Asmarī, “Imtāʿ” (2002), 272. 
13 Ibid., 271. Another commentator took the controversy surrounding The Entertainer’s Pleasure as an 
occasion to assert that Asir ‘is an important historical landmark’. Al-Zākī, “Kitāb” (2002), 284. 
14 Duara, “Historical Narratives” (2008), 99. 
15 Waldman, Toward a Theory (1980), 17. 
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distance themselves.16 Instead, I follow an approach within scholarship on Arabic 
historiography that argues for the existence of narrativity in a wider range of historical texts, 
including chronicles.17 I thus postulate that stories about the past that aim to be meaningful 
and truthful exist in a broad range of Saudi texts. They include works in historical sociology 
as well as social and economic histories that comprise seemingly non-narrative elements, 
such as statistics. My premise is that the historical narratives in different texts can be 
compared and contrasted in terms of the strategies behind their employment, their patterns 
of argumentation, and their main protagonists, sources and terminology. 
I examine narratives in several groups of writings on the history of Saudi Arabia and 
its various communities. These groups of writings include histories of the Al Saud, or 
dynastic histories, as well as local, tribal and Shiite histories, and, finally, social and 
economic histories. Almost by definition, these different histories widely diverge in their 
contents. However, in order to examine the precise nature of Saudi narrative plurality, I pay 
special attention to narratives about certain key periods and processes. These periods and 
processes allow for an examination of how different histories may agree or conflict in their 
respective treatments of common topics. These shared periods and processes that stand in 
the centre of my analysis are the period before the Wahhabi mission, the foundation and 
development of the first, second and third Saudi states and the associated Saudi conquests. 
They are arguably similar to the lieux de mémoire described by Pierre Nora in the French 
context, that is, sites or realms where collective memory ‘crystallizes’ or is condensed.18 
                                                   
16 Richard Evans, In Defence (2000), 336–37, preferred such a narrow definition of ‘narrative histories’. For 
an overview of definitions of narrative histories, see Rigney, “Narrativity” (1991). 
17 Hirschler, Medieval Arabic Historiography (2006); “The ‘Pharao’ Anecdote” (2010). Al-Azmeh, “Histoire” 
(1986). Waldman, Toward a Theory (1980). While Waldman builds on Hayden White, she also criticizes him for 
failing to see the strategies of ‘ordering, juxtaposition, selection, association, and omission’ as parts of a chronicle’s 
implicit narrativity. Waldman, “‘The Otherwise” (1981), 786. 
18 Nora, “Between Memory” (1989), 7. Nora associates the lieux de mémoire with ‘la république’, ‘la nation’ 
and ‘Les France’, categories that—with the possible exception of the ‘nation’—have no equivalent in the Saudi 
context. Nora, Les lieux (1997). 
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My focus on the pre-Wahhabi period and the Saudi states does not mean, however, 
that narrative plurality is necessarily restricted to writings about the period from the 
seventeenth century onwards. Future research could investigate, for instance, to what extent 
writings about the more distant past might have been less subject to censorship and 
characterized by greater plurality. However, narratives about important and sensitive areas 
of modern and contemporary history, like the Saudi conquests between the eighteenth 
century and the twentieth, provide us at least with the minimum plurality that emerged in 
Saudi historiography. 
In analysing these different histories, I have mostly worked inductively. That is, I have 
tried to develop my own arguments from my reading of the texts rather than applying 
theories about other historiographies deductively to Saudi texts. However, I have also used 
previous research on a variety of historiographies to inform my reading. In selected 
instances, I have found theories and observations in secondary literature that fitted my initial 
readings of Saudi histories and sharpened my view of them. The result of this back and forth 
between readings of Saudi historical texts and theories of historiography has been that I 
have found several different theoretical approaches to the study of historical narratives 
useful for understanding different parts of Saudi historiography, and other approaches I have 
not. Some of these approaches have hardly ever been explicitly used in the study of modern 
Arab historiography. 
For my analysis of dynastic histories, I have found John Breuilly’s distinction between 
‘nation-as-frame’ or national histories on the one hand and ‘nation-as-historical agent’ or 
nationalist histories on the other hand particularly useful. In this distinction, a history can be 
dynasty-focused and national at the same time. In a national history, kings and princes form 
the main actors while the nation is the main framework, within which actions are ordered.19 
This is in contrast to Prasenjit Duara’s definition of ‘national’ history as being anti-dynastic, 
                                                   
19 Breuilly, “Nationalism” (2007), 18; “Historians” (2009), 55.  
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which is informed by the Chinese case. In national history, according to Duara, ‘the nation 
appears as the newly realized, sovereign subject of History embodying a moral and political 
force that has overcome dynasties, aristocracies, and ruling priests and mandarins, who are 
seen to represent merely themselves historically’.20 In the context of my discussion of 
dynastic historiography, I thus ask when and how Saudi dynastic histories became ‘national’ 
in Breuilly’s sense, adopting a Saudi national frame while keeping the Al Saud at the centre. 
For my analysis of local as well as tribal and Shiite histories, I found an observation by 
Felix Driver and Raphael Samuel particularly fruitful. According to them, some local histories 
may appear as ‘a deeply conservative project, mired in a particularistic and introverted vision 
of the past of places’.21 While I do not use the potentially value-laden labels of conservatism 
or introversion, I have found the idea of ‘particularistic’ local histories useful. I have tried to 
combine this idea with an approach to the study of women’s histories. Gerry Holloway 
conceives of two groups of women’s histories: one group studies women on their own terms; 
the other group are a ‘women’s contribution history’ that emphasizes ‘women’s contribution 
to male-dominated organizations’.22 I take this ‘own terms’/‘contribution’ distinction from the 
context of Western gender studies and apply it to my own consideration of local, tribal and 
Shiite histories. I will thus discuss to what extent Saudi local, tribal and Shiite histories are, 
on the one hand, ‘particularistic’ and mainly concerned with their communities on their own 
terms or, on the other hand, ‘contribution histories’ that assert their communities’ 
participation in national history.23 
For my analysis of social and economic histories and their relation to dynastic as well 
as local and tribal historiographies, I have used parts of Hayden White’s approach in his 
                                                   
20 Duara, Rescuing (1995), 4. 
21 Driver and Samuel, “Rethinking” (1995), v. 
22 Holloway, “Writing” (1998), 180. Holloway relied on Gerda Lerner. For her view, see Lerner, “Placing” 
(1975). 
23 The assertion of the place within the nation can also take the form of an emphasis of its ‘authenticity’ as 
an indigenous group of Saudi Arabia. Madawi Al-Rasheed has convincingly shown such a ‘search for cultural 
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seminal work Metahistory.24 Two of White’s modes of explanations are relevant to my own 
study: the ‘formist’ and the ‘contextualist’ modes. The formist mode makes the ‘uniqueness’ 
of certain agents central to the inquiry.25 The contextualist mode, in contrast, explains events 
within the ‘context’ of their occurrence.26 I will thus investigate to what extent Saudi social 
and economic histories can be distinguished through their usage of the contextualist mode. 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of narratives in Saudi historiography, I will 
also examine whether certain ‘paradigms’ underlie some of these historical narratives. I 
understand ‘paradigms’ as scholarly worldviews in the sense of ‘articulate theoretical 
frameworks based on an explicit set of assumptions of ‘how the world works’’.27 I have found 
Yoav Di-Capua’s work particularly relevant for my thesis. Di-Capua describes a ‘founder 
paradigm’ in Egyptian historiography. This paradigm viewed Muhammad Ali (r. 1805–48) as 
the founder of the modern Egyptian nation on top of a corrupt Ottoman order. In the first half 
of the twentieth century, the Egyptian monarchy contributed to the emergence of this 
paradigm by establishing an archive and sponsoring historical works that privileged the 
history of Muhammad Ali’s dynasty and excluded Ottoman and subaltern pasts.28 I will argue 
that the Saudi government contributed to the establishment of a similar paradigm through its 
support for archives and sponsorship of historical texts. However, I will also show that the 
Saudi ‘founder paradigm’ differed from the Egyptian ‘founder paradigm’ as the two 
developed in very distinct historical and historiographical contexts. 
Within a given paradigm, there is space for plurality, originality, and creativity. And, 
unlike Di-Capua’s research on Egypt, I do not assume that one paradigm dominates, or is at 
                                                   
24 White, Metahistory (1973). 
25 Ibid., 14.  
26 Ibid., 18. White’s two other modes of explanation, the ‘Organicist’ and the ‘Mechanistic’, seem to have not 
been frequently used by Saudi writers. 
27 Fulbrook, Historical Theory (2002), 34. In her elaboration of ‘paradigms’ in historical research Fulbrook 
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the basis of, most Saudi historical writing.29 While I will trace the emergence of paradigms, 
especially in dynastic histories, I will also show how local, tribal, Shiite and social and 
economic histories diverged from these paradigms in terms of arguments, terminology and 
usage of primary source materials. 
However, rather than merely describing the different narratives that make up Saudi 
narrative plurality, the main aim of this thesis is to provide a deeper understanding of the 
emergence of this plurality. In answering the question, why and how narrative plurality 
emerged in the Saudi case, I hope to contribute to research on modern Arab historiography 
generally. This research can be divided into three broad schools.30 The first has focused on 
the development of a modern historical profession and the transition from ‘traditional’ 
chronicles to ‘modern’ histories.31 Studies within this school have often dealt with a number 
of prominent individuals, such as the Egyptian historian Shafik Ghorbal (1894–1961). 
Students of historiography have viewed these figures as founders or representatives of 
indigenous schools of history, but have paid relatively little attention to diversity within these 
schools.32 
Especially in the 1950s and 1960s, a number of researchers within this first school 
conceived the professionalization of Arab historiography in terms of modernization and 
secularization under Western influences. They tended to favour modern ‘objective’ 
professional historians and criticised or dismissed writings by many amateurs as ‘biased’, 
                                                   
29 Here I follow again Fulbrook, Historical Theory (2002), 32, who sees a co-existence of a plethora of 
‘paradigms’ in history as well as other human sciences, as no single paradigm commands the field. Fulbrook not 
only differs from Kuhn, The Structure (1996), and Di-Capua, Gatekeepers (2009), but also from Haridi, Das 
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whole disciplines, such as economics or medicine, as ‘discourses’. Foucault, The Archaeology (2002), 71. 
30 In this division, I partly follow Gorman, Historians (2003), 1. For an overview of scholarship on Arab and 
Muslim historiography, see also Ammann, “Kommentiertes Literaturverzeichnis” (1997). 
31 E.g., Touati, “Algerian Historiography” (1997). 
32 Choueiri, Modern Arab Historiography (2003); “Arab Historical Writing” (2011). Gombár, “Modern Arab 
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‘unintellectual’ or ‘emotional’.33 In subsequent decades, scholars of modern Arab 
historiography produced more refined and sophisticated country studies. Yet, they also 
based their approach on a dichotomy between professional ‘scientific’ and politicized 
‘ideological’ histories. They thus overlooked many writings, such as local amateur histories, 
that did not appear as either representatives of ‘scientific’ or state-sponsored ‘ideological’ 
texts. While the scholars contributed a great deal to our understanding of modern Arab 
historiography, they did not engage with the full spectrum of historiographical plurality and 
were not explicitly concerned with its emergence.34 
A second broad school in the study of modern Arab historiography has focused on the 
political utility of historical writing in the service of revolutionaries, regimes and nation 
states.35 They have furthered our understanding by demonstrating the political rather than 
merely academic nature of historiography in the region. A number of texts produced since 
the 1960s have focused on the so-called ‘decolonization of history’,36 especially in the 
Maghrib. This was an attempt by intellectuals and new regimes to refute the arguments of 
colonial historians and justify the independence movements and newly independent states.37 
Other works on historiography have studied how governments tried to control historical 
production in order to legitimize themselves and achieve hegemony over society.38 Some 
studies have pointed out the malleability of historical representation, as different regimes 
                                                   
33 Chejne, “The Concept” (1967). Faris, “The Arabs” (1954). Sivan, “Modern Arab historiography” (1972). 
Ziada, “Modern Egyptian Historiography” (1953). 
34 Di-Capua, “The Professional Worldview” (2009); “‘Jabarti” (2004). Freitag, Geschichtsschreibung (1991). 
Havemann, Geschichte (2002). El Mansour, “Moroccan Historiography” (1997). Di-Capua, Gatekeepers (2009), 311, 
however, does to some extent consider historiographical plurality. 
35 Gorman, Historians (2003), 2, identified this second school. 
36 Sahli, Décoloniser (1965). 
37 Bellmann, “Das Geschichtsverständnis” (1981). Burke III, “Theorizing” (2000). Gellner, “The Struggle” 
(1961). McDougall, History (2006); “Martyrdom” (2006). Shinar, “The Historical Approach” (1971). Wansbrough, 
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38 Al-Rasheed, “Political Legitimacy” (1998). Lisa Anderson, “Legitimacy” (1991). Crabbs, “Politics” (1975). 
Davis, Memories (2005); “Theorizing” (1991). Freitag, “In Search” (1999). Sela, “Arab Historiography” (1991). Ṭaha, 
Mushkilat kitābat al-tārīkh (1992). 
  
23 
sought to legitimize themselves under changing political circumstances.39 Other studies 
have put greater emphasis on a related aspect, namely the creation of national identity and 
allegiances through history writing.40 In many cases, however, these researchers have 
focused on textbooks and other writings produced by state institutions or intellectuals who 
were part of, or close to, the regimes. The researchers have thus not been primarily 
interested in narrative plurality. Only occasionally have they used examples of 
historiographical divergence in order to show that state control over historical production was 
not complete. 
Finally, a third school in the study of modern Arab historiography has focused on 
historiographical contestation rather than on the development of a historical profession or 
historiographical legitimation. Studies within this school have often gone beyond the study of 
academic works and official textbooks in order to consider non-academic and unofficial 
texts. A number of students of historiography have analysed texts written by Marxist, 
Islamist, and feminist historians.41 Others have concerned themselves with histories of 
religious minorities and their conflicts with official national histories.42 Most recently, a few 
works have also paid special attention to local and tribal histories.43 However, this third 
school is probably the youngest and still the smallest within the study of modern Arab 
historiography. 
While the writings of the first two schools have informed my research, I situate my 
own thesis within this third school. However, rather than speaking of ‘contestation’, I see 
‘plurality’ as the main theme in Saudi historiography. Laying the emphasis on ‘plurality’ 
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permits the identification of historical narratives that do not overtly challenge each other or 
‘contest the nation’, to borrow a phrase from the title of Anthony Gorman’s book on Egypt.44 
As Saudi nationalism is a more recent phenomenon than Egyptian nationalism, 
‘particularistic’ local histories, for instance, might simply diverge from dynastic histories 
without overtly disputing, or even referring to, ‘national history’. 
I thus use plurality in Saudi historiography mainly in the sense of a multiplicity of 
divergent and sometimes contesting narratives. A plurality of histories does not imply that 
individual historians are committed to a philosophical view called ‘historical pluralism’. 
According to Hayden White, this view ‘presupposes either a number of equally plausible 
accounts of the historical past or, alternatively, a number of different but equally meaningful 
constructions of that indeterminate field of past occurrences which by convention we call 
“history”’.45 
I consider plurality in modern Arab historiography as an important topic of research, 
because of its relationship with authoritarianism, which has persisted in the Arab world.46 
The development of historiographical plurality in Arab countries in the twentieth century 
challenges common assumptions that under authoritarianism, a plurality of voices could only 
exist to a very limited extent or under severe constraints. Catherine Merridale, a historian of 
modern Russia, expressed such an assumption clearly: ‘The past is something that 
dictatorships do not leave to chance. They almost always control academic research. They 
limit public access to information.’47 Merridale points out that Stalin, for instance, personally 
read many historical works and ‘maintained strict censorship over the rest. Dissident 
historians were arrested and, occasionally, shot.’48 Such assumptions also fed into some 
                                                   
44 Gorman, Historians (2003). 
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Arab world. Because the political events are still in flux during the time of my writing, I refrain from discussing the 
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research about historiography in the Middle East, especially Iraq, where Saddam Hussein 
took a similar personal interest in historiography.49 Eric Davis argues that in ‘authoritarian 
states, political elites use state-sponsored historical memory to foster feelings of paranoia, 
xenophobia, and distrust’.50 Thus, in Iraq under the Baath Party ‘some intellectuals sold their 
souls to the state, while others chose outright resistance leading to exile, imprisonment, or 
worse’.51 
 The link between authoritarianism and control over historiography has its 
counterpart in a common association between historiographical plurality and political 
pluralism. Stefan Berger and others argue that in nineteenth-century Western Europe, the 
birth of the modern party system ‘and the competing national popular mobilisation by 
different political parties contributed a great deal to the pluralisation of competing historical 
discourses’.52 Piotr Wandycz observes that political pluralism in Poland since 1989 ‘has its 
counterpart in a divergence of historical approaches’.53 Similarly, Gerry van Klinken argues 
that after Suharto’s resignation as president of Indonesia in 1998, ‘a much freer publishing 
environment saw long suppressed historiographies reemerge’ and a ‘proliferation of 
historical debate in the public arena’.54 
This association between political and historiographical pluralism has also informed 
some research on the Arab world. Thomas Mayer postulates with reference to Egypt that 
‘the very existence of proliferation of additional historiographical interpretations depended on 
the regime’s tolerance of opposing political views’.55 Meir Hatina argues that the ‘political 
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and ideological pluralism’ initiated by Anwar al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak in the 1970s and 
1980s ‘nurtured numerous narratives competing for hegemony’.56 
I do not doubt that political pluralism facilitates historiographical plurality. Yet, the case 
of Saudi Arabia invites us to undertake deeper research into the roots of narrative plurality, 
as here we have a multiplicity of voices about the past that emerged in the absence of 
formal political pluralism. It has been argued that Saudi Arabia became authoritarian in the 
1960s, when the oil wealth allowed the government to massively expand its bureaucratic 
and technological means of controlling society.57 Since then, the kingdom has generally 
ranked among the least democratic and pluralistic countries even in the Arab world.58 In 
contrast to Egypt and many other Arab countries, Saudi Arabia lacked legal political parties, 
an elected parliament, and even trade unions. 
Forming part of Saudi Arabia’s authoritarian political system, the kingdom’s 
censorship laws remained strict for much of the twentieth century. In 1962, the Saudi 
government founded the Ministry of Information (since 2003 the Ministry of Culture and 
Information), to which authors and publishers had to submit their manuscripts for review. 
The ministry could give or refuse permission for publication or request changes. In 1965, a 
National Security Law banned ‘public criticism of the government in books or newspapers, or 
in any form that could be made available to others’.59 Although a Press and Publications 
Code in 1982 formally guaranteed ‘freedom of expression’, it prohibited any material 
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‘advocating destructive ideologies, disturbing or destabilizing public confidence, or sowing 
discord amongst citizens’.60 
In the 2000s, the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, one of the 
major institutional actors in the Saudi historiographical field, also began participating in 
censorship. In March 2001, a royal decree charged the foundation with ‘examining 
publications about the kingdom and contacting those publishing information on the kingdom 
in order to correct any errors’.61 The foundation’s secretary general since 1995, Fahd al-
Semmari, defended its role by asserting that his institution did not engage in ‘censorship’ 
(raqābah) but that it was a ‘guide’ (murshidah). Its role was to make history writing more 
‘exact’ and ‘improve’ it. It was rather the Ministry of Culture and Information that took the 
final decision whether to allow or forbid the publication of a given book.62 Yet, some Saudi 
historians expressed criticism of the foundation’s role. One complained that the foundation 
acted like ‘the police’. Others spoke of the foundation as ‘big brother’ and even of its 
‘dictatorship’ in the historiographical field.63 
Besides ‘correcting’ works, the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives 
also sent reviews of new books to its chair since the late 1990s, Prince Salman ibn 
Abdulaziz (b. 1939), who could request formal bans by the monarch himself. This was the 
fate of the book The Entertainer’s Pleasure. At the request of Salman, King Abdullah signed 
a memorandum in 2006 that banned The Entertainer’s Pleasure and its potential derivatives. 
The memorandum ordered Saudi governmental agencies to advise fellow ‘Arab censorship 
agencies not to permit the publication of any book quoting it or relying on it as a source’. The 
Saudi Historical Society, the main professional association of Saudi historians, and research 
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62 Interview, 3 November 2009. 
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centres in the Arab world and elsewhere should also ‘notify its members not to rely on this 
book, nor to refer to it in historical studies’ (figures 7 and 8 in the appendix). 
Historians did not only suffer from censorship, but sometimes also engaged in it 
themselves. Especially in the contentious field of tribal histories, some authors exploited 
governmental concerns about tribal conflicts by asking senior officials to ban the competing 
works of fellow historians. By arguing that these writings caused ‘fitna’ between the tribes,64 
they urged the rulers to take action according to their duty of preserving the harmony of the 
community.65 One tribal historian, who had suffered from the ban of one of his books, called 
this infighting among tribal writers ‘friendly fire’.66 
Despite various mechanisms of repression, however, most Saudi historians had 
relatively little to fear apart from a ban on the distribution of their works in Saudi Arabia and 
less possibility of cooperation with official agencies. To the best of my knowledge, no 
university-based historian has ever been imprisoned for his or her writings.67 Marcel 
Kurpershoek observes that there is no physical violence against tribal authors in Saudi 
Arabia. ‘The stubborn offender simply runs the risk that certain doors will remain closed to 
him, and the authorities will act with reservation towards him in a manner that will never be 
fully explained. He will disappear into the grey area of citizens whose welfare the 
bureaucracy and those in power are less concerned with.’68 Even, the formal ban of books 
and their derivatives only happened in isolated cases, like The Entertainer’s Pleasure. 
Similarly, the Saudi anthropologist Saad Sowayan explained in reference to professional 
historians and social scientists in the Middle East in 2009: ‘In the region, Saudi Arabia is a 
lenient place. The worst thing that happens is that you are being marginalized.’69 
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Sowayan added, ‘in the West you at least have your students who respect you. Here, 
you have no audience.’70 This quotation indicates that the relatively small number of authors 
and readers of academic historical writings in Saudi Arabia might have been a factor behind 
the regime’s ‘leniency’. The government has perhaps felt secure enough to ignore at least 
some dissident writings, especially if they were published abroad. However, the comparative 
‘leniency’ of the Saudi government regarding historiography might also be explained by the 
‘relatively soft, rent- and patronage-based authoritarianism’ in Saudi Arabia and other Arab 
oil monarchies.71 As Saudi Arabia has had a high ‘GDP per academic capita’,72 the Saudi 
government could attempt to co-opt rather than coerce its historians by providing them with 
employment and prizes. The King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives 
administered a number of such prizes, including, since 2005, the Prince Salman ibn 
Abdulaziz Prize and Scholarship for Studies. With about 900,000 riyals (about 240,000 
dollars) handed out in prize money in 2005 alone, it was the largest funding scheme 
exclusively for history in the kingdom, covering studentships as well as prizes for theses and 
articles.73 
Yet, despite censorship and the regime’s means of co-optation, the salient 
characteristic of Saudi historiography is not uniformity, but plurality. In order to explain the 
emergence of this plurality, my study will examine the influence of two processes on history 
writing: state expansion and globalization. In combination, they have never been studied 
extensively and explicitly in relation to Arab historiography. 
State expansion 
It would be tempting to explain the emergence of narrative plurality in Saudi Arabia by 
arguing that Saudi historians enjoyed considerable independence from the state or that the 
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state was ‘weak’—despite being ‘fierce’, as Nazih Ayubi put it.74 However, if anything, the 
Saudi state became more powerful and more resourceful from the middle of the twentieth 
century onwards. Until that time, King Abdulaziz Al Saud ruled most of the country mainly 
through ‘personal links with trusted lieutenants, local intermediaries, and clients’. Most of the 
departments at his court were ‘occupied with the logistics of the court itself and not with 
broader administration or public services’.75 In 1947, only three ministries existed—those of 
foreign affairs, finance, and defence.76 
The personalized state under Abdulaziz became more institutionalized and expanded 
from the middle of the twentieth century onwards. In the 1950s, the monarch and his son 
and successor Saud (r. 1953–64) created a number of new governmental agencies. This 
followed rapid increases in oil revenues after World War II. Moreover, a new generation of 
princes, who vied for power and prestige, drove the expansion of the state. In 1953, Saud 
created the ministries of education and agriculture and entrusted them to two of his half-
brothers, Fahd (r. 1982–2005) and Sultan (1929–2011).77 These measures brought millions 
of Saudis, for the first time, ‘into direct contact with representatives of the government’.78 
Considering the expansion of the state as one of the most important processes in 
twentieth-century Saudi history, I will investigate to what extent it has paradoxically 
contributed to narrative plurality. Some previous scholarship has already identified that 
authoritarian states may inadvertently provoke contestation of official texts by repressing or 
neglecting alternative accounts of the past. James Wertsch argues that in Soviet Estonia, 
state enforcement of a single, monolithic historical past and repression of alternative 
interpretations led to ‘prolonged resistance to official accounts of the past’. This resistance 
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‘resulted in a kind of clear, if not stark, opposition between it and unofficial histories’.79 
Similarly, in the Saudi case, Madawi Al-Rasheed argues that ‘narratives of the state’ 
provoked ‘alternative visions and counter-discourses that remain rooted in the historical 
imagination of the people in Saudi Arabia’. Specifically, ‘the neglect of regional history in the 
official historical narrative has encouraged the production of counter-narratives written by 
Saʿudi intellectuals from the regions. Their work celebrates local tradition and culture.’80 
While state repression and neglect probably played some role in instigating local 
histories specifically, an important way in which state expansion shaped historiography was 
paradoxically the state-financed establishment of an indigenous historical profession. In 
1957, the government founded the first Saudi university, King Saud University (KSU), based 
in Riyadh. This university educated and employed some of the first professional Saudi 
historians. In the following decades, the state established universities and colleges with 
departments of history in all provinces. Looking at the relationship between the 
establishment of a historical profession and narrative plurality, the question arises whether 
the Saudi state unintentionally opened a ‘Pandora’s box’ through its support of historical 
research. Nicola Miller has shown such a development in Cuba, where the state invested 
heavily in the training of a new generation of historians after the revolution in 1956. In the 
1990s, members of this very generation went on to criticize the ‘the regime's monopoly over 
Cuba’s past’.81 
Independent from the universities, the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and 
Archives has emerged as a new state agency in the expanding field of historiography since 
1972. Apart from providing library and archival services, the foundation also functioned as 
one of the most important publishers of historical works on the kingdom. By 2008, it had 
published more than 200 books, including monographs, textbooks, historical atlases, 
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editions of earlier Arabic chronicles, translations of European works on Arabia, and 
bibliographical guides.82 This was in line with the foundation’s official founding mission, 
namely ‘to serve the history, geography, literature, intellectual and architectural traditions of 
the kingdom particularly and of Arabia and the Arab and Muslim world generally’.83 
Apart from financing academic institutions, the expanding state also influenced 
historiography through the spread of primary literacy and education on a basic level. I will 
investigate, to what extent this expansion of education enabled amateurs from wide sections 
of society to engage in historiography. This point is worth pursuing, as Saudi public 
education budgets increased tremendously over the twentieth century: from about 28,000 
dollars in 1926 to 21.6 million in 1954–55, and 7.3 billion in 1983–84. Although education 
was not compulsory, the number of pupils in primary, intermediate, and secondary schools 
underwent a surge of similar magnitude: from 700 in 1926 to 8400 in 1948, and about 4.11 
million in 2000.84 It is because of this expansion of education that the literacy rate in Saudi 
society soared from an estimated 5 per cent in 1956 to 84.7 per cent among men and 70.8 
per cent among women in 2003.85 
 Moreover, the expansion of bureaucracy provided many Saudis with a share of 
increasing governmental revenues through relatively high salaries as well has other benefits. 
This may have allowed them to undertake private historical research. Already before the 
discovery of commercial quantities of oil in 1938, the bureaucracy grew in the Hejaz. In 
Jeddah, Mecca, Yanbuʿ, Medina, Umluj, Rābigh, and many other towns, servants paid by 
the central government collected fees and taxes under the Directorate of Fees (Mudīrīyat al-
Rusūm).86 After World War II, the civil service grew from a few hundred in the 1950s to 
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about 27,000 in 1962/63, 85,000 in 1970/71, and 245,000 in 1979/80.87 I will consider, of 
course, the possible effects of dependency on the state for employment on the production of 
historical narratives. However, I agree with Nicola Miller that ‘simply taking a job in public 
bureaucracy in order to scratch enough of a living to pursue a writing career is hardly being 
coopted’.88 
Globalization 
Although scholars have sometimes viewed the expansion of the nation state as the 
antithesis of globalization, the history of the Saudi state and its influence on historiography 
cannot be properly understood in isolation from this global process. Globalization or global 
integration here means the ‘development, concentration, and increasing importance of 
worldwide connections’.89 While this larger process is global, it also encompasses the 
emergence of many connections and smaller processes that do not span the globe, but are 
transnational and ‘translocal’.90 Although the term ‘globalization’ is recent, I do not consider 
the process a product of the end of the Cold War.91 I also do not understand it as driven by a 
neo-liberal ideology or project to Americanize the world economically, politically and 
culturally.92 Instead, I follow the view common among world historians that globalization as a 
process has occurred at least since the nineteenth century. 
When exactly globalization began is disputed among world historians. Anthony 
Hopkins and Christopher Bayly trace an ‘archaic globalization’ back to antiquity.93 David 
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Northrup sees the beginning of global integration around 1000 AD.94 Others argue that the 
first wave of globalization started in the late sixteenth century with the establishment of 
‘regular exchange of commodities around the world’.95 What is widely agreed upon, 
however, is that globalization accelerated with the technological revolution in the nineteenth 
century.96 This development was not linear however, as global integration also slowed down 
in some periods, such as the global economic crisis of the 1930s. Some scholars have thus 
argued that globalization has occurred in different waves. Marks, for instance, describes a 
first wave of globalization beginning in 1571, a second wave in the nineteenth century, a 
third wave after World War II and a fourth wave beginning in 1991.97 My thesis is not the 
right place to take the debate about the origins of globalization further. However, it seems 
certain that globalization has affected Arabian history since at least the early nineteenth 
century and has thus accompanied the building of the modern Saudi state in the twentieth 
century.98 
Although state building and globalization are introduced separately here, both 
processes were, in fact, intertwined. The establishment of the modern Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia occurred within a world system of new nation states.99 The administration in the 
Hejaz that the Saudi government took over in the 1920s had itself been the product of an 
Ottoman and Hashemite ‘defensive modernization’ against European global empires.100 The 
development of the early kingdom also relied principally on the influx of capital from abroad, 
including British and American subsidies, royalties from the oil concessions and dues levied 
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on imported goods and the pilgrim traffic.101 From the middle of the twentieth century 
onwards, the Saudi bureaucracy relied more on global demand for oil for its expansion. At 
the same time, Saudi Arabia, as one of the largest oil exporters, has provided some of the 
fuel for contemporary globalization. 
Globalization has shaped historiography in particular, because the development of 
education in the kingdom generally relied on the import of educated foreigners. Between the 
1940s and 1970s, large parts of the public education sector became ‘Egyptianized’, as the 
Saudi Ministry of Education hired numerous Egyptians as teachers, administrators and 
consultants.102 The Saudi government even hired the prominent Egyptian intellectual ʿAbd 
al-Wahhāb ʿAzzām (1894–1959) as the first director of King Saud University in 1957. Non-
Saudi Arabs also built up the departments of history at several universities, such as King 
Saud University and Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University (Imam University). Out of 
seventeen professors at KSU’s department of history in 1976, ten were Egyptians and only 
four were Saudis, with the remaining three coming from Iraq, Jordan and Sudan.103 
A further crucial component in globalization’s influence on historical writing, which my 
thesis will investigate, is the sending of Saudi students abroad. These student missions 
partly aimed at replacing Egyptians and other Arabs as teachers and administrators. Under 
Hafiz Wahba (1889–1967), who was ironically an Egyptian-born historian and official, the 
Saudi Directorate of Education decided to send a few dozen Hejazi students to Egypt in 
1928/29.104 With the increasing oil revenues after World War II, the government widened 
these programmes so that they comprised more than five hundred students in 1958/59.105 
Supported by a generous stipend, Abdul-Aziz Khowaiter (b. 1928), perhaps the first 
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professional Saudi historian, gained his PhD from SOAS in 1960.106 By 1976, the four Saudi 
professors teaching at KSU’s department of history had all obtained their doctorates from 
British universities.107 
Globalization also shaped historiography through the influx of foreign literature into the 
kingdom. This influx dramatically expanded the choice of readings available to Saudi 
historians. In the first half of the twentieth century, scholars confined themselves mainly to 
reading and copying the main local Najdi chronicles. In addition, ulema and notables read 
medieval Arabic historical works, including Ibn Kathīr’s (d. 1373) The Beginning and the End 
(Al-bidāyah wa-al-nihāyah) and Ibn al-Athīr’s (1160–1233) Complete History (Al-kāmil fī al-
tārīkh).108 With increasing oil revenues and the development of international postal services, 
however, Saudi libraries and individuals imported numerous modern books and journals. By 
1977, Saudi Arabia had become the largest consumer of foreign books in the Arab world, 
purchasing books worth about 31.8 million dollars that year. It had also become the largest 
Arab importer of American literature, of which it purchased an amount worth 2.4 million 
dollars.109 At the same time, Saudis benefitted from regulations that excluded ‘from 
censorship book imports to universities, libraries and other government bodies’. The only 
condition was that these institutions did not publicly display any prohibited publication.110 
Globalization not only facilitated the import of foreign books, but also gave Saudi 
historians increased access to publishers based abroad, whether in Cairo, Beirut or London. 
As the first press in Riyadh was only established in 1955,111 Saudis made use of foreign 
publishers to distribute their works in the first half of the twentieth century. My thesis will thus 
consider to what extent Saudis used foreign publishers to circumvent censorship. Finally, 
globalization also brought the introduction of public access to the internet in 1999. While the 
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government sought to centralize and censor internet availability, it also acknowledged ‘the 
necessity of internet access for economic and business development’.112 Since 1999, it is 
not only institutions of professional historiography, like the universities and the King 
Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, which have established an online 
presence.113 Amateurs also launched hundreds of websites concerned with local, regional, 
and tribal communities in the kingdom. By 2011, at least 390 websites of Saudi tribes 
existed.114 Moreover, many digitized texts on the kingdom became available online. In 2011, 
the Ukrainian file sharing service 4shared.com alone offered at least 590 books on Saudi 
Arabia.115 
Sources 
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of Saudi narrative plurality, this study is 
based on a wide reading of Saudi texts about the past. They comprise school and college 
textbooks, monographs, volumes for a general audience and texts in Riyadh’s National 
Museum. Previous scholars have analysed some of these texts. Yet, they have mainly 
focused on historical works produced in the 1990s and have thus paid less attention to 
longer historiographical developments.116 In order to gain further insights into debates 
among academic historians, I have read most issues of several specialized Saudi journals 
founded since the 1960s. They include al-ʿArab, al-Dārah, al-Dirʿīyah, al-Wāḥah, the Journal 
of the Saudi Historical Society, the Journal of the College of Arts, King Saud University, the 
Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Arts and Humanities, and al-Sāḥil. I have also gone 
through many issues of the cultural and literary journal al-Manhal. In order to investigate the 
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global connections of Saudi historiography, I have also considered a number of unpublished 
master and doctoral dissertations written by Saudis in the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Egypt, as long as the authors lived in the kingdom before and after their studies. Finally, 
I have examined numerous websites dedicated to the history of various local and tribal 
communities. Most of these websites have been unexamined by students of 
historiography.117 
In analysing Saudi historical texts, I restrict myself to non-fiction. To be sure, many 
fictional and historical texts are similar in style and tropes, and Hayden White even argues 
for the existence of ‘novelesque histories’.118 Moreover, historical novels not only formed 
part of a general plurality in narrations about the past. The government also took these texts 
seriously, to the extent that it banned Cities of Salt, one of the best-known Saudi novels, and 
stripped its author Abdelrahman Munif (1933–2004) of his Saudi citizenship. Cities of Salt 
provided a critical account of oil production in a fictional desert oasis. Yet, these fictional 
narratives do not aim at historical truthfulness as factual historical narratives do, or at least 
not at the same kind of truthfulness. Most historical novels have also not been understood 
as ‘history’ (tārīkh). Nor have they entered the formal historiographical debates in historical 
journals and at conferences.119 They are thus beyond the scope of my thesis. 
My study is concerned with historiography in Saudi Arabia in the sense that it 
concentrates on narratives produced by people based in Saudi Arabia. This means that I 
examine not only the works of indigenous Saudis but also those of foreigners, such as St 
John Philby (1885–1960), who spent extended periods in the kingdom. I exclude, however, 
texts by a few Saudi scholars who permanently resided abroad.120 Although the careers of 
these scholars are themselves evidence for the effects of globalization and authoritarianism 
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on Saudi historiography, they are less relevant for understanding plurality within the Saudi 
political system. 
Moreover, I confine myself to texts on the history of states and communities within the 
territory of the contemporary kingdom. Besides histories of the Saudi state and dynasty, I 
give special attention to local and regional histories that appeared throughout the kingdom. 
They narrate the past of Mecca and Medina, the Asir Mountains and the oasis of al-Aḥsāʾ, to 
name a few places. Moreover, I investigate tribal writings and the historiography dealing with 
the kingdom’s Shiite minority. Finally, I study distinct social and economic histories. I have 
been fortunate to have received many of these texts, including banned books, from the 
authors themselves during my fieldwork between 2009 and 2011. I accessed many others in 
the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, the King Fahd National Library, the 
King Abdulaziz Public Library, the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, as 
well as the libraries of Imam University, King Saud University, King Abdulaziz University 
(KAU), and King Khalid University. In Europe, I accessed the rich collections of the SOAS 
Library, the British Library, and the university libraries in Exeter and Tübingen. 
In order to investigate the reasons for the emergence of narrative plurality, I have not 
restricted myself to reading Saudi historical texts. I conducted semi-structured interviews 
with more than fifty Saudi historians as well as other intellectuals between 2009 and 2011. 
They include current and former history faculty members of KSU, Imam University, KAU, 
King Khalid University, Qassim University, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, 
King Khalid Military Academy, and Naif Arab University for Security Sciences. I also met 
several current and former employees of the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and 
Archives, and the Saudi Historical Society. In almost all of these cases, I took down notes 
rather than recorded the interview at the request of my interviewees. Finally, I interviewed 
several sons of deceased Saudi historians and two former American supervisors of Saudi 
students. 
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My stays in the kingdom also allowed me to witness contemporary debates between 
Saudi historians at a number of conferences in Riyadh. In 2008, I participated in a 
Conference on Documents of the Ottoman Archive at King Saud University and a 
conference on King Faisal (r. 1964–75) organized by the King Abdulaziz Foundation for 
Research and Archives. In January 2010, I attended the Seventh International Symposium 
on Studies in the History of Arabia. In October 2011, I attended a workshop on ‘The 
Teaching of National History in Public Education’ held at Imam University. Between 2007 
and 2008, I was also fortunate to have had the experience of working at a Saudi university 
myself, as I was teaching German at KSU in Riyadh. 
I also analysed ‘grey literature’, that is, publications with limited circulation, on the 
development of the historical profession in Saudi Arabia. These include numerous reports, 
newsletters, guides, and pamphlets by the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and 
Archives and the Saudi Historical Society. In addition, various administrative guides and 
reports by Saudi colleges and universities proved very useful. Annual reports post the 
budgets of higher education institutions over the years.121 Faculty and library guides detail 
the effects of changes in those budgets on salary schemes and acquisitions of literature.122 
Other guides comprise history curricula and give statistics about faculty members, students 
and graduates and lists of completed master and doctoral dissertations.123 Here, I found the 
sections of governmental publications at the libraries of King Saud University, Imam 
University and King Abdulaziz University to be a treasure trove. Besides, Saudi newspapers 
and magazines covered important historical conferences, jubilees and biographies of 
historians. I accessed a number of them on paper, microfilm and online, including Umm al-
Qurá, al-Riyāḍ, al-Jazīrah, al-Ḥaras al-Waṭanī, al-Waṭan, Okaz and al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ. In 
gathering information on prominent historians and officials, state celebrations and 
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censorship, I also benefitted from the published correspondences of British and American 
diplomats. 
Finally, I accessed the websites of Saudi universities, the King Abdulaziz Foundation 
for Research and Archives, the Saudi Historical Society and other organizations, which were 
launched since the introduction of public internet access to the kingdom in 1999. 
Departments of history have not only published their curricula and accounts of their own 
history online.124 Since about 2007, university administrators have also encouraged faculty 
members to put their CVs, lists of publications, and teaching material on the web to raise the 
national and international profile of their institutions.125 This greatly facilitated my enquiries 
into the biographies and working conditions of Saudi historians. 
Overview of the thesis 
On the basis of these sources and within the framework outlined above, I investigate the 
reasons for narrative plurality through an in-depth analysis of the development of a number 
of different currents in Saudi historiography. Chapter 2 analyses dynastic histories, a group 
of writings that concentrated on the Al Saud, the Saudi state and the Wahhabi mission. I 
trace the origins of these histories back to a series of Najdi chronicles written with support 
from two predecessors of the modern (or third) Saudi state—the first Saudi state (c. 1744–
1818) and second Saudi state (c. 1818–91). Subsequently, I focus on the further 
development of dynastic historiography under foreign-born authors and servants of the 
modern Saudi state until about the 1960s. 
Chapter 3 contrasts this dynastic historiography with the emergence of a loose group 
of local histories written between the 1920s and 1970s. I will pay special attention to how 
their narratives relate to those of dynastic histories. In seeking to explain the appearance of 
these histories, I will examine how the building of the modern Saudi state and globalization 
                                                   
124 E.g., Jāmiʿat al-Malik Suʿūd, “Barnāmaj” (2010). 
125 E.g., al-Muṭawwaʿ, “Al-sīrah” (2010). 
  
42 
provided new opportunities for education and employment in the provinces and thus fostered 
the emergence of a number of pioneering local authors. 
The three following chapters deal with the period since the 1960s and 1970s, in which 
both the expansion of the Saudi state and globalization have progressed rapidly. Chapter 4 
discusses the development of official dynastic historiography in the context of the 
emergence of Saudi nationalism and a Saudi historical profession. I scrutinize how state 
institutions and Saudi historians who had studied abroad fostered the development of Saudi 
national paradigms of foundation and development. 
A boom in writing about other communities accompanied the development of dynastic 
historiography from the 1970s. These communities included not only towns and regions, but 
also tribes and the Shiites. Chapter 5 investigates these new local, tribal and Shiite histories 
both in their relation to the ‘nationalized’ dynastic histories as well as earlier local histories. 
In order to explain the boom in these histories, I examine to what extent the expanding state 
incidentally fostered this non-dynastic historical production through the provision of mass 
higher education and the distribution of oil revenues. I also investigate to what extent local, 
tribal and Shiite historians made use of new opportunities to study and publish abroad. 
Chapter 6 discusses the development of a group of histories with distinctively social 
and economic approaches. It first describes the relationship between these histories and 
dynastic, local, tribal and Shiite histories. Subsequently, it analyses how the development of 
a historical profession and governmental scholarship programmes helped produce social 
and economic histories by connecting Saudi historians to social and economic 
historiography globally. The chapter then examines how a number of social and economic 
historians and historical sociologists challenged and diverged from dynastic as well as 
certain local, tribal and Shiite histories by offering new interpretations of the rise of the 
Wahhabi mission and the Saudi state. 
Finally, the conclusion brings together the findings of the core chapters and points out 
the limitations of these findings. Discussing again state expansion and globalization, I 
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summarize the main factors for the emergence of narrative plurality in Saudi historiography. 
Moreover, the conclusion discusses some implications that my case study on Saudi Arabia 
raises for the study of modern Arab historiography generally. Finally, an epilogue sketches 
the possibility for future narrative plurality through an observation of the effect of the Saudi 
‘opening’ in the 2000s on historiography.
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2. Histories of a Muslim Arab Dynasty, Early Beginnings to 
1960s 
In 1961, Suʿūd ibn Hadhlūl (1906/7–83), a Saudi provincial governor and member of the 
extended royal family, published a book entitled The History of the Kings of the Al Saud. It 
was one of the first elaborate histories of the Saudi dynasty written by one of its members. It 
gave the biographies of fourteen Saudi rulers, beginning with Saud ibn Muhammad ibn 
Muqrin, the eighteenth-century ancestor who lent his name to the Al Saud, ending with King 
Abdulaziz (r. 1902–53). However, Ibn Hadhlūl’s work was not the first dynastic history written 
in Saudi Arabia. A number of historians from the Arabian peninsula and outside of it 
preceded him. Indeed, one of Ibn Hadhlūl’s motivations was to ‘correct’ previous writings. In 
his introduction, he wrote, ‘I read most of the writings by contemporary historians on Najd 
and on the history of the royal Saudi family and think that many events were told either in a 
falsified or distorted way’.1 
Although Ibn Hadhlūl was critical of some aspects of previous dynastic historiography, 
he also relied on this historiography for his own account of the Al Saud. In this account, 
Arabian history effectively started with the appearance of the Saudi family in the eighteenth 
century. Ibn Hadhlūl wrote that ‘this Saudi house is the great pillar of the renaissance of the 
Arabian peninsula. No more testimony or evidence is needed than a reading of most 
historians’ writings. By reading this, it becomes very clear that Najd was not worth 
mentioning before the rule of the Al Saud.’ At the time, Najd ‘was a region whose people 
were torn apart by division. Hunger, bareness and illnesses killed them. It was completely 
stricken by ignorance, and its inhabitants only conspired against and killed each other.’ As 
for Islam, ‘it had absolutely no influence. Superstition spread, sins prevailed, and rocks and 
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trees were worshipped instead of God.’ ‘If we now compare the present of this nation with its 
past’, Ibn Hadhlūl went on, ‘we find that the difference is like the difference between day and 
night, heaven and earth. This is due to God and the glorious Al Saud, who supported the 
pure Islamic mission started by the Imam, the reformer and renewer, Sheikh Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab.’2 
Ibn Hadhlūl’s work thus constructed a glorious political and religious history centred 
on the Al Saud. The fall of the first and second Saudi states in 1818 and 1891 respectively 
interrupted this history only temporarily. The governor argued that ‘during the times, in which 
the rule of the Al Saud is overwhelmed by its enemies, is weak or suffers a setback, this 
country returns to its first condition. It becomes divided and is being brought down. Chaos 
rules, calamities spread, and relatives fight each other, until God sends someone from the Al 
Saud who renews the mission and unites the word. Then calm prevails, the country 
prospers, and matters become straight.’3 
In producing his narrative, Ibn Hadhlūl relied on, and formed part of, a tradition of 
dynastic histories that had its roots in the first Saudi state (c. 1744–1818).4 While many of 
these histories were entitled histories of Najd, Saudi Arabia or the Arabian peninsula, they 
tended to focus on the history of the Al Saud from the eighteenth century onwards. In this 
chapter, I describe how Saudi state building and globalization contributed to the 
development of three features of Saudi dynastic historiography from its early beginnings 
under the first Saudi state until the 1960s. These features are to some extent also present in 
Ibn Hadhlūl’s book. The first was a narrative describing the Al Saud as the only true Muslim 
dynasty, which spread Islam where it had been absent. The second feature was an 
exclusivism that disregarded historical events other than those related to the Saudi dynasty. 
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The third feature of dynastic histories emphasized the Arab character of the Saudi family, 
presenting it as leading the Arabs’ modern renaissance and their struggle for independence. 
The Ibn Ghannām School and the Saudi state 
Histories of the Al Saud first emerged at the turn of the nineteenth century within a new 
school of Najdi chronicles. The founder of this school was Ḥusayn ibn Ghannām (1739–
1810), a scholar from the oasis of al-Aḥsāʾ in eastern Arabia who entered the service of the 
first Saudi state. Saud ibn Abdulaziz (r. 1803–13), one of the princes of the Al Saud, invited 
him to teach Arabic in the first Saudi capital al-Dirʿīyah near Riyadh. There, Ibn Ghannām 
authored two major historical works at the order of either Saud ibn Abdulaziz or Muhammad 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi mission himself.5 Both were written in an 
elaborate rhymed prose (sajʿ). The first was entitled The Garden of Ideas and Concepts for 
Someone Exploring the State of the Imam (the imam referred to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab). It 
included a portrait of the situation in Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ before the Wahhabi mission, a 
biography of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and a comment on some of his letters to various 
dignitaries. The title of Ibn Ghannām’s second historical work was The Koranic Raids, the 
Divine Conquests, and the Reason for Them. It chronicled the Saudi expansion across 
Arabia from 1746 until 1797.6 
Although Ibn Ghannām was the pioneer of Saudi dynastic historiography, he was not 
the first chronicler in Najd. At least six scholars, who mainly worked as judges, preceded 
him. They included Aḥmad ibn Bassām (d. 1631), al-Manqūr (1656–1713), Ibn Rabīʿah 
(1654–1745), Ibn ʿUḍayb (d. c. 1747), Ibn Yūsuf (whose work reaches 1759/60) and Ibn 
ʿAbbād (d. 1761). This historiography was a local evolution that bore no explicit reference to 
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historical literature elsewhere in the Middle East. It recorded skirmishes, migrations, rainfalls, 
droughts, deaths of religious scholars and other events from the sixteenth century onwards. 
The chronicles probably emerged out of some sort of private diaries recording private and 
public events. Al-Manqūr, for instance, inserted a reference to the birth of a son, or his 
planting of an orchard, alongside killings and droughts.7 
In contrast to Ibn Ghannām’s works on Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the expansion of the 
Al Saud, the pre-Wahhabi Najdi chronicles focused on the small hometowns and regions of 
their authors. Moreover, they neither explicitly took side in conflicts nor explained the 
reasons for, and consequences of, certain events. Their statements were brief, usually 
ambiguous and put in the passive form. As Michael Cook notes, ‘in such-and-such a year, 
the chronicler will tell us, so-and-so was killed, the people of this settlement attacked the 
people of that, such-and-such a lineage migrated from here to there’.8 The chroniclers thus 
offered hardly any explicit support to states and empires outside of Najd. Ibn ʿAbbād, for 
example, even mentioned the Ottoman conquest of Baghdad in the seventeenth century 
only briefly. He stated, ‘In 1638, the battle of Baghdad happened, and Sultan Murād 
conquered it. Murād died after the conquest that year.’9 
Ibn Ghannām’s texts marked a departure from these previous Najdi annals. Written 
under the patronage of the first Saudi state, they formed an elaborate history of an 
expanding political and religious entity. The chronicler transcended his home region of al-
Aḥsāʾ and followed the growth of the first Saudi state and the Wahhabi mission. In contrast 
to pre-Wahhabi authors, Ibn Ghannām also established the ‘takfīrist’ paradigm (from takfīr ‘to 
declare someone an unbeliever’10) that featured so prominently in later Saudi historiography, 
such as Ibn Hadhlūl’s text. This paradigm assumed that only the followers of the Wahhabi 
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mission, led by the Al Saud, were true Muslims. Non-Wahhabi Muslims were described as 
infidels or idolaters. 
Putting the takfīrist paradigm into practice, Ibn Ghannām applied a whole set of ideas 
and idioms from the historiography of early Islam to the first Saudi state. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, 
the ‘imam’, propagated ‘monotheism’ (tawḥīd). He performed a ‘hijra’ from the land of 
polytheism in search for supporters. The Al Saud, who agreed to support his mission in 
1744, subsequently undertook ‘jihad’, ‘raids’ (ghazawāt) and ‘conquests’ (futūḥāt). Earlier 
generations of Muslim historians used ghazawāt (singular ghazwah) and fatḥ (pl. futūḥ and 
futūḥāt) particularly to describe the Prophet Muhammad’s expeditions against infidels.11 In 
line with this terminology, Ibn Ghannām usually referred to the Al Saud and their subjects as 
the ‘Muslims’ and to their Arabian enemies as the ‘idolaters’ (mushrikūn). The Ottomans, for 
their part, appeared as the ‘Romans’ or ‘Byzantines’ (rūm).12 Rebellions against the Al Saud 
were termed ‘apostasy’ (riddah),13 implicitly referring to the battles between Arabian tribes 
and the early Muslims under the Prophet Muhammad and the first caliph Abu Bakr (r. 632–
34).14 
Ibn Ghannām’s takfīrist paradigm was the expression of the violent exclusivism that 
characterized the Wahhabi mission, as the first Saudi state expanded from its base in al-   
Dirʿīyah and came into conflict with its neighbours. In this conflict, the Saudi leadership 
called all neighbouring rulers and their people to repentance for having lapsed from the pure 
monotheism of the early Muslims and for having espoused ‘corrupt and decadent beliefs and 
practices’, such as the veneration of tombs and saints.15 In 1802, the Saudis sacked Karbala 
                                                   
11 Johnstone, “G̲h̲azw” (1965), 1055. A term of the same root, maghāzī, came to prominence with Kitāb al-
maghāzī, a work on Muhammad’s campaigns by al-Wāqidī (747/48–822). Hinds, “al-Mag̲h̲āzī” (1986), 1161. 
Baṭāyinah, “Al-fatḥ” (1978), 230–31. See, for instance, the History of the Muslim Conquests (Futūḥ al-buldān) by the 
ninth century historian al-Balādhurī, which described the conquests of Syria, Armenia, Egypt, the Maghrib, Iraq and 
Persia. 
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and destroyed the Shiite shrine of Muhammad’s grandson Ḥusayn (626–80). By 1805, they 
had conquered Mecca and Medina and had the audacity to call the Ottomans infidels. The 
‘imam’ Saud ibn Abdulaziz, who had invited Ibn Ghannām to al-Dirʿīyah, proudly reminded 
an Ottoman leader in Iraq that he refused a truce even if the Ottomans were willing to pay 
tribute.16 In another letter to the Ottoman governor of Iraq, dated 1810, Saud seemed to 
deny that the governor and his followers were Muslims. He ‘gave a long list of their sins, 
concluding with a threat that if they did not mend their ways, the Wahhabis would fight them 
until they did so’.17 
An important part of the takfīrist paradigm in Ibn Ghannām’s work was a conception of 
the pre-Wahhabi situation as a jāhilīyah or ‘age of ignorance’, a term that refers to the time 
before the Prophet Muhammad and denotes the opposite of Islam.18 Ibn Ghannām argued 
that before the Wahhabi mission, most people in Najd, al-Aḥsāʾ and neighbouring regions 
had fallen back to ‘idolatry’ (shirk), ‘aberration’ (ḍalāl), and ‘abominations’.19 This argument 
also reflected the Wahhabi discourse of his time. While Ibn Ghannām in his original text fell 
short of actually using the term ‘jāhilīyah’, other contemporary ulema were explicit in this 
regard. They included, among others, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s grandson ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn 
Ḥasan (1779–1869). He wrote that ‘the people of Najd had been ignorant as in the jāhilīyah, 
aberrant and blind. Idolatry had prevailed among them.’20 
In contrast to the pre-Wahhabi Najdi chronicles, which had been written by scholars in 
small towns, Ibn Ghannām’s work represented historical production in the service of a 
nascent state. With an income from taxes and booty that far exceeded the budgets of the 
earlier Najdi petty princes, the Saudi religious and political leadership were able to finance 
his elaborate historiography. The state did not only employ Ibn Ghannām as teacher in al- 
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Dirʿīyah. The state’s leadership also sought to collect historical sources, thus putting the 
author in contact with the historiography of early Islam, whose idioms he adopted. John 
Lewis Burckhardt (1784–1817), a Swiss traveller who visited western Arabia between 1814 
and 1815, observed that historical works appeared to be ‘in particular request’ in al-Dirʿīyah. 
He noted the purchase and removal of numerous works from the Hejaz and Yemen and 
believed the library of Ibn Ghannām’s patron Saud ibn Abdulaziz to be the richest of its day 
in ‘Arabic manuscripts on historical subjects’.21 
The violent expansion of the first Saudi state, and especially its challenge of the 
Ottomans through the conquest of Mecca and Medina, as well as incursions into Iraq, 
eventually led to its demise. Because of this, the resource base and infrastructure for 
elaborate dynastic historical production was also destroyed. In 1818, Egyptian–Ottoman 
forces left al-Dirʿīyah in ruins and shipped many descendants of Muhammad ibn Saud and 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab to Egypt. Abdullah ibn Saud (r. 1814–18), the last ruler of 
the first Saudi state, was executed in Istanbul at the behest of the sultan. Thus, patronage 
for histories of the Al Saud was interrupted in central Arabia. Moreover, the libraries of al-  
Dirʿīyah were looted and their manuscripts burnt or moved to the Hejaz.22 
After the fall of al-Dirʿīyah, the power of the Al Saud re-emerged in the form of the 
second Saudi state. In 1824, forces led by Turki, a son of the executed Abdullah ibn Saud, 
re-conquered Riyadh from the Egyptians under Muhammad Ali, and made this town the 
capital of his new state. The second Saudi state did not gain the same reach as its 
predecessor. It neither conquered Mecca and Medina nor attacked Karbala. However, by 
controlling much of central and eastern Arabia, and especially the rich eastern oasis of al-
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Aḥsāʾ, this state still commanded considerable resources. These resources allowed it to 
sponsor some scholarly works in history as well as other fields.23 
Under the second Saudi state, the writing of dynastic history that Ibn Ghannām had 
started continued in the work of Ḥamad ibn Laʿbūn (c. 1767–1844). From Najd, Ibn Laʿbūn 
became a supporter of the Saudi state and the Wahhabi mission. He became a tax collector 
under Abdulaziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud (r. 1765–1803) and later imam of the grand 
mosque of the town of al-Tuwaym.24 Trained as a religious scholar, Ibn Laʿbūn also authored 
a chronicle. Drawing on the pre-Wahhabi Najdi chronicles by Ibn Bassām, al-Manqūr, and 
Ibn Rabīʿah as well as other works, he began his account with Adam.25 He focused, 
however, on the history of the Saudi state since 1744. For this period, he drew on Ibn 
Ghannām and, like him, expressed the takfīrist paradigm. He also stripped Ibn Ghannām’s 
account of its rhymed prose (sajʿ), making the history of the Al Saud more accessible to 
readers.26 
While Ibn Laʿbūn adopted Ibn Ghannām’s takfīrist paradigm, he also made his own 
contribution to dynastic historiography. Whereas Ibn Ghannām had introduced the idea of a 
pre-Wahhabi jāhilīyah, Ibn Laʿbūn was the first Arabian historian to conceive the emerging 
power in Najd as a ‘state’, calling it ‘the Ḥanafī Saudi state’ (al-dawlah al-suʿūdīyah al-
ḥanafīyah).27 ‘Ḥanafī’ probably related to the Banū Ḥanīfah, the Al Saud’s parent tribe, or 
ḥanīf, ‘following the true monotheistic religion’.28 In order to strengthen the contrast between 
the new Saudi state and the smaller Arabian petty emirates and sheikhdoms, the historian 
called Muhammad ibn Saud, the first ruler of the Saudi state, ‘imam’ or supreme leader of 
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the Muslims. Ibn Ghannām, in contrast, had still mentioned him until his death with the title 
of most Arabian chiefs, ‘emir’, and only called his successors ‘imams’.29 
Besides Ibn Laʿbūn, the second Saudi state supported another scholar who built on 
Ibn Ghannām’s account: ʿUthmān ibn Bishr (1795–1873). Thus, during the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, a school of takfīrist chroniclers of the Al Saud gradually came into 
being. This school can be called the Ibn Ghannām School, with Ibn Bishr as its third 
prominent member. From the town of Jalājil in Najd, Ibn Bishr moved to the capital of the 
first Saudi state, al-Dirʿīyah, in about 1809. There, he studied Arabic under Ibn Ghannām 
and attended lectures on Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s manifesto, the Book of Monotheism (Kitāb al-
tawḥīd).30 After the establishment of the second Saudi state, Faisal ibn Turki (r. 1834–38 and 
1843–65), the state’s longest-ruling monarch, hired Ibn Bishr to write a new chronicle on the 
history of his state. To that end, he not only supplied the scholar with paper imported via 
pilgrims from the Hejaz, but also personally corrected his work.31 Relying on Ibn Ghannām 
and Ibn Laʿbūn, Ibn Bishr authored a new chronicle of the Saudi dynasty and the Wahhabi 
mission up to 1850. It was entitled The Symbol of Glory in the History of Najd.32 Like Ibn      
Laʿbūn, Ibn Bishr also wrote his work in plain prose. 
Stressing the difference between the Ibn Ghannām School and its Najdi 
predecessors, Ibn Bishr put great distance between his own takfīrist dynastic writing and 
pre-Wahhabi scholars. He extended the notion of the pre-Wahhabi ‘age of ignorance’ to the 
field of historiography, arguing that previous Najdi ulema produced hardly any real history. At 
the beginning of his chronicle, he stated that ‘the people of Najd and their ancient and 
modern scholars were not concerned with recording what happened during their times or in 
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their hometowns, or who built them’. Regarding the ‘rare pieces’ of writing that existed, Ibn 
Bishr complained about their lack of argument. ‘When they mention a year, they only state 
that so-and-so the son of so-and-so was killed, and do not mention the name of the killer nor 
the reason. When they mention a fight or event, they state that in this year the battle so-and-
so happened.’ Ibn Bishr continued that ‘we all know that since the time of Adam, there has 
been fighting. What we want to know is the truth and the reason.’ Yet, ‘all of this is absent’ 
from previous Najdi histories.33 
While Ibn Bishr was dismissive of the method of pre-Wahhabi Najdi chroniclers, he 
nevertheless used their accounts. They served him in drawing a sharp contrast between the 
periods before and after the establishment of the first Saudi state. Precisely because the 
records of fights and killings appeared meaningless to him, they allowed him to draw a static 
image of conflicts and division in pre-Wahhabi Najd. In an innovation that marked a 
departure from most pre-modern Arabic historiography, Ibn Bishr paused after certain 
sections in the main body of his annals that dealt with the history of the Saudi state. In these 
pauses, he inserted accounts of the pre-Wahhabi past as kind of ‘flashbacks’.34 They include 
reports of killings and battles written by the pre-Wahhabi authors, al-Manqūr, Ibn Rabīʿah, 
Ibn Yūsuf and Ibn ʿAbbād. The flashbacks thus served to remind the listeners of the security 
and prosperity that Najd enjoyed under Saudi rule.35 
Despite the pro-Saudi agenda of the Ibn Ghannām School, the relative isolation of the 
second Saudi state did not allow for a wide distribution of the School’s works. Even at its 
height under Ibn Bishr’s patron Faisal ibn Turki, the state lacked access to printing presses, 
which the Ottomans only introduced to the Arabian peninsula in the 1870s and 1880s.36 
After the death of Faisal in 1865, the second Saudi state itself suffered from infighting within 
the Al Saud and collapsed in 1891. In total, probably not more than ten copies of each 
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chronicle were produced in the nineteenth century.37 Three manuscripts of Ibn Bishr’s 
Symbol of Glory, dated 1843, 1854, and 1858, are known to have survived until the 
present.38 Likewise, three manuscripts of Ibn Laʿbūn’s history and three handwritten copies 
of Ibn Ghannām’s work, one of them dated 1886, have been preserved.39 
The influence of the Wahhabi mission, however, reached beyond, and survived, the 
second Saudi state. This led some of its opponents to produce historical accounts that 
challenged the portrayals of the Al Saud as the only true Muslims. One of the most important 
opponents was Aḥmad Daḥlān (1816–86), the Shāfiʿī mufti of Mecca.40 Besides anti-
Wahhabi tracts, he wrote A Synopsis of the Princes of the Sacred City, a history of the 
Meccan sharifs. It was printed posthumously in Cairo in 1888.41 Contrary to the Ibn 
Ghannām School, Daḥlān sought to demonstrate that the Wahhabi mission contradicted the 
Sunna, and thus Islam. He emphasized that during the Saudi conquest of Ta’if of 1803, the 
followers of Wahhabism treated the local Muslims as infidels. They killed them 
indiscriminately, including women and children, and even those praying in the mosques. 
They looted everything except the manuscripts of the Koran and Hadith collections, which 
they destroyed in the streets.42 
Daḥlān’s condemnation of the Wahhabi mission formed part of a wider criticism of 
Wahhabi teachings and practices.43 Such criticism already arose among contemporaries of 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, as the Wahhabi mission and the first Saudi state expanded. In the 
second half of the nineteenth century, however, the criticism flared up again and reached 
larger audiences thanks to the proliferation of the printing press. For instance, Dāwūd ibn 
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Jirjīsh (1816–82), a Shāfiʿī scholar in Baghdad, published a number of tracts in which he 
argued that the Wahhabi postulates had no basis in Sunni Islam generally nor in the Ḥanbalī 
School of Islamic legal thought, to which Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had ascribed.44 
The criticism of the Wahhabi mission by Daḥlān as well as other scholars encouraged 
the mission’s followers to further support the proliferation of the Ibn Ghannām School.45 In 
the early twentieth century, these followers benefitted from the mission’s expansion into 
Middle Eastern countries that already possessed printing presses. In 1925, a book appeared 
in Cairo that relied heavily on Ibn Bishr. It was entitled The History of Najd and written by 
Maḥmūd al-Ālūsī (1856–1924), a scholar in Baghdad, whose family enjoyed a close 
relationship with the Al Saud. Against the notion that the Wahhabi mission contradicted the 
Sunna, al-Ālūsī argued that ‘the people of Najd are all Muslims and professors of God’s 
unity’. They follow the ‘beliefs of the pious ancestors [al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ]’, that is, the early 
Muslims.46 In 1910, two of al-Ālūsī’s Najdi disciples printed Ibn Bishr’s Symbol of Glory for 
the first time in Baghdad. This edition aimed at gaining recognition of the Wahhabi mission 
among Sunnis outside of Najd.47 
After a brief interregnum following the fall of the second Saudi state, a new Saudi 
state emerged under the leadership of Abdulaziz Al Saud, a grandson of Ibn Bishr’s patron 
Faisal ibn Turki. This state, commonly called the third or modern Saudi state, would take on 
the name ‘Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ in 1932. Abdulaziz also sponsored a continuation of the 
Ibn Ghannām School. He hired the Najdi chronicler Ibrāhīm ibn ʿĪsá to write an addendum to 
Ibn Bishr’s history under the title The String of Pearls.48 Ibn ʿĪsá’s work in turn received a 
supplement by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Nāṣir (1897–1970), another religious scholar. Ibn Nāṣir’s 
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text begins in 1884, ends with the events of 1936/37,49 and resembles Ibn Bishr’s history in 
its title: The Symbol of Fortune and Glory.50 This latest member of the Ibn Ghannām School 
probably also received, or at least, sought patronage from the state’s leadership, as he sent 
his manuscript to King Abdulaziz’s brother Musaid (1922–86).51 
Abdulaziz Al Saud used the translocal connections of the Wahhabi mission to print Ibn 
Ghannām’s work for the first time. Here, the ruler benefitted from the Gulf’s scholarly and 
trade links to India. Already in the late nineteenth century, followers of the Wahhabi mission 
published a number of books, including Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s Book of Monotheism, in British 
India and thus beyond the reach of Ottoman censorship.52 With the help of a merchant from 
Riyadh, Abdulaziz published Ibn Ghannām’s two books through a press in Mumbai in 
1919.53 They were combined under the title The Garden of Ideas and Concepts for 
Someone Exploring the State of the Imam and the List of Islamic Raids.54 
In the 1920s, the Saudi government became able to print the works of the Ibn 
Ghannām School inside the kingdom. In 1924, Saudi forces conquered Mecca for the 
second time after 1803 and took possession of the first printing press. In 1885/86, the 
Ottomans had originally brought this press to Mecca, where it subsequently served the 
Hashemites by printing al-Qiblah, their official gazette. Under the Saudis, the press was 
promptly renamed Umm al-Qurá Press.55 The press mainly published the official newspaper 
Umm al-Qurá, ‘The Mother of Towns’ (i.e. Mecca). Yet, in 1938, it also printed a part of Ibn 
Laʿbūn’s history, which had first spoken of a Saudi ‘state’, at the order and expense of King 
Abdulaziz.56 
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Despite its new capability to print books domestically, the Saudi government 
continued to use foreign presses, which were often more technically advanced, for the 
publication of works of the Ibn Ghannām School. From the 1920s onwards, it co-operated 
with the Salafīyah Press, which two Syrian Salafis had founded in Cairo in 1909. This private 
press was instrumental in spreading the term ‘Salafism’ and its association with 
‘Wahhabism’ in the twentieth century.57 It thus contributed to rehabilitating the Wahhabis in 
the eyes of many Sunni Muslims as followers of the way of the pious ‘ancestors’ (salaf).58 In 
1924, the Salafīyah Press published the History of Najd by Maḥmūd al-Ālūsī, who had relied 
on Ibn Bishr.59 In 1927, it established a branch in Mecca that specialized in Ḥanbalī and 
Wahhabi texts. Three years later, in 1930, this branch issued an extended version of Ibn 
Bishr’s Symbol of Glory.60 
After World War II, the Najdi scholar and entrepreneur ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Abābuṭayn 
(1918/19–81) joined the Salafīyah Press in publishing editions of the chronicles of the Ibn 
Ghannām School. He was a former student of several Wahhabi ulema, including 
Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Āl al-Shaykh (1893–1969), a descendant of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and 
later grand mufti of Saudi Arabia.61 In 1945, Abābuṭayn opened one of the first commercial 
bookshops, the Ahlīyah, ‘Private’, Bookstore in Riyadh. Through this bookshop in 1949, he 
republished Ibn Ghannām’s work under the new, ‘modern’ title History of Najd.62 In the 
absence of any printing presses in Riyadh, he commissioned the Cairo-based Muṣṭafá al-
Bābī al-Ḥalabī and Sons Bookstore and Press to print the work. This press possessed a 
record of accomplishment in publishing historical work.63 In 1954, Abābuṭayn’s Ahlīyah 
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Bookstore also paid for the publication of a new edition of Ibn Bishr’s history. This edition 
included the first print of Ibn ʿĪsá’s chronicle, The String of Pearls, as an appendix.64 
While the Salafīyah and Ahlīyah companies were private businesses, the Saudi state 
encouraged and supported their publication of the chronicles of the Ibn Ghannām School. 
When the Salafīyah Press established its Mecca branch, the government exempted it from 
all customs on their equipment and machines as well as from the financial deposit required 
by law. In 1932, it also removed import duties from paper used for the printing of religious 
books generally.65 In 1930, the official newspaper Umm al-Qurá recommended Ibn 
Ghannām, Ibn Bishr and Ibn ʿĪsá’s chronicles in a front-page article as ‘the books authored 
by the most formidable Najdis’.66 Finally, Abdulaziz ordered the purchase of numerous 
copies of Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr’s histories and their free distribution.67 
The Saudi state also promoted the Ibn Ghannām School by suppressing dissenting 
histories. This becomes clear in the story of Muqbil al-Dhukayr (1882/83–1944), a Najdi, 
whose international connections in the Persian Gulf allowed him to gain an education 
outside the Saudi realm. From a wealthy family of merchants and landowners, al-Dhukayr 
studied in his hometown ʿUnayzah in the region of al-Qaṣīm as well as in Kuwait and 
Bahrain. In addition, he read books and literary magazines imported from Egypt and 
Lebanon, including the pioneering Arabic scientific review al-Muqtaṭaf, ‘The Digest’. After he 
had worked as a secretary and accountant for Bahraini merchants, King Abdulaziz 
appointed him as the director of the treasury of al-Aḥsāʾ in 1924/25. In 1930/31, al-Dhukayr 
retired from this position in order to set up a business in Bahrain. By that time, he had also 
completed a manuscript chronicle of Najd.68 
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Al-Dhukayr did not intend his chronicle to be anti-Saudi. One of the titles the author 
contemplated even read The Dawn of Good Fortune: The History of Najd and the Al Saud.69 
However, the work was critical of Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr and did not share their 
takfīrism. Al-Dhukayr argued, for instance, that Ibn Ghannām was mistaken in his negative 
judgment of Dihām ibn Dawwās (r. 1737–74), an emir of Riyadh and long-term opponent of 
the Al Saud. During Dihām’s time, the Saudi family resided in neighbouring al-Dirʿīyah. Al-
Dhukayr stated that ‘Ibn Ghannām is probably not free from prejudice against Dihām’ 
because of Dihām’s ‘opposition’ to the Wahhabi mission. In contrast to Ibn Ghannām, al-
Dhukayr saw positive aspects in Dihām’s reign, like the growth of Riyadh. In addition, he 
portrayed the conflict between the Saudis and Dihām as political rather than religious, 
considering Dihām’s ‘strong resistance that lasted seventeen years not as directed against 
religion but as defence of his position’.70 Al-Dhukayr also denounced Ibn Ghannām and Ibn 
Bishr’s depiction of an anti-Saudi rebellion in his home region, al-Qaṣīm, in the 1780s as 
‘apostasy’. Al-Dhukayr called this depiction a ‘vilification of the people of al-Qaṣīm’ and 
‘irrational talk’.71 
Unsurprisingly, al-Dhukayr became a victim of censorship. While he worked for the 
Saudi government in al-Aḥsāʾ, his chronicle aroused the interest of King Abdulaziz, who 
asked the author to send him a copy. Upon receipt, the ruler, however, was reportedly not 
pleased by the chronicle’s praise for some individuals of the Āl Rashīd, the former rulers of 
the region of Jabal Shammar in northern Saudi Arabia. Consequently, Abdulaziz did not 
return the manuscript to its author. For unknown reasons, Iraqi authorities confiscated a 
second copy from a merchant at Baghdad airport during the reign of King Ghazi (1933–39). 
Al-Dhukayr’s history thus remained unpublished until ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-
Bassām (b. 1927/28–2003), a judge and descendant of the pre-Wahhabi chronicler Aḥmad 
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ibn Bassām, presumably found the second copy. Somehow, it had ended up in a library of 
the University of Baghdad.72 
Censorship of al-Dhukayr’s work and control over the Najdi historiographical tradition 
generally continued even in ʿAbd Allāh al-Bassām’s time. In 1999, the judge published al-
Dhukayr’s history within a ten-volume collection entitled Library of Najdi Histories. This 
collection, which was published in Beirut, also contained editions of numerous other Najdi 
manuscript chronicles in the possession of al-Bassām and his family. Besides works by Ibn   
ʿĪsá, Ibn Laʿbūn, and Ibn Nāṣir, these chronicles included works by previously little known 
writers who did not belong to the Ibn Ghannām School.73 The Saudi government bought up 
and banned this collection almost immediately.74 Fahd al-Semmari, the secretary general of 
the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, justified this measure through a 
‘problem’ in the ‘method’ of the edition. ‘Sheikh al-Bassām is an old man. He just gave the 
manuscripts to the printing press, where they were typed.’ The edition thus contained many 
errors. ‘There is a page by Ibn ʿĪsá in the history of Ibn Nāṣir, for instance.’ This was 
intolerable, because ‘people rely on these sources’. Al-Semmari added that the King 
Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives would re-edit and republish the work.75 
This, however, has not yet happened, and the work has been successfully put out of 
circulation. 
After individual entrepreneurs had published the first printed editions of the chronicles 
of the Ibn Ghannām School, the Saudi government and senior Wahhabi ulema became 
more involved in their promotion in the 1960s. However, they continued to rely on foreign 
expertise. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Āl al-Shaykh (1919–2005), the eldest 
son of the Saudi grand mufti, sought to make Ibn Ghannām’s chronicle more appealing to 
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the ‘contemporary youth’.76 He thus commissioned Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Asad (b. 1922), a 
Jordanian scholar, with a re-edition. Al-Asad was charged especially with rephrasing the text 
in order to rid it of the rhymed prose (sajʿ), which hindered understanding.77 The text, which 
was published through a Cairo-based press as History of Najd, was thus altered, but kept 
the takfīrist paradigm. Probably under the influence of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl al-Shaykh, al-Asad’s 
edition explicitly spoke of a pre-Wahhabi ‘age of ignorance’ or jāhilīyah, a notion that had 
remained implicit in Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr’s original texts.78 The rephrased text stated 
that ‘most Muslims—at the beginning of the eighteenth century—had regressed to idolatry 
[shirk] and fallen back to the age of ignorance [jāhilīyah]’.79 
Like Ibn Ghannām’s work, Ibn Bishr’s history also appeared in new editions 
sponsored by the government and endorsed by the Wahhabi establishment. After the edition 
of Abābuṭayn’s Ahlīyah Bookstore had sold out, the Ministry of Education reissued the work 
in 1967 and distributed it without charge. Thereby, the ministry claimed to fulfil the wish of 
the ‘Imam of the Muslims’, King Faisal, ‘as this noble scholarly work corresponds with his 
Islamic directives and religious zeal’.80 In 1971, the ministry, then under Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh 
(1933–87), published the work again in an edition by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Āl al-
Shaykh, yet another descendant of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAbd al-Laṭīf 
promoted Ibn Bishr’s Symbol of Glory as the foundational text for the writing of Najdi history. 
According to him, it was ‘the only source on the historical events that happened in Najd from 
the dawn of the reform movement and the appearance of the Salafi mission until fifteen 
years before the death of Imam Faisal ibn Turki’, that is, until about 1850.81 
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The result of this state support over many decades was the domination of the Ibn 
Ghannām School in the Najdi historiographical tradition and subsequently in dynastic 
historiography in the emerging modern kingdom. The imposition of this school also sidelined 
the Hejazi historiographical tradition.82 Being subsumed under the notion of a pre-Wahhabi 
‘age of ignorance’, the memory of the pre-Wahhabi historians themselves had become 
suppressed if not obliterated in the minds of many. These minds included Ḥasan Āl al-
Shaykh, who was the first chair of the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives 
besides being minister of education. In 1975, he gave an interview in the foundation’s 
flagship journal al-Dārah. He argued that in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s time, ‘people lived in a 
state of anxiety, trouble, and fear. Therefore, no one in Arabia would have been concerned 
with its history, had God not sent the two sheikhs Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr’.83 
Foreigners and dynastic exclusivism 
While the chronicles of the Ibn Ghannām School were published and republished, a number 
of authors wrote new works on the history of the Saudi dynasty between the 1920s and 
1960s. With the exception of Ibn Hadhlūl and a few others,84 most of these authors were not 
indigenous Saudis, but foreigners who became close to, or formed part of, the Saudi 
government. These authors developed a dynastic exclusivism that conceived the history of 
the country essentially as the history of the Al Saud. While the chroniclers of the Ibn 
Ghannām School had focused on the actions of Saudi rulers as residents in Najd who partly 
drew on pre-Wahhabi local chronicles, they had also noted non-dynastic events in their local 
environments, such as biographies and deaths of scholars, droughts and rainfalls. The 
foreigners in contrast, who had few ties to local communities, focused much more on the Al 
Saud. Their histories thus became more dynastic histories than ‘histories of Najd’ (as 
editions of Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr’s histories were entitled). 
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These foreign authors were attracted by the new international prominence the Saudi 
state had gained in the 1920s. The Saudi realm not only comprised the Muslim holy places 
of Mecca and Medina after 1925, but also remained formally independent unlike most other 
Arab countries. In addition, Saudi Arabia became more integrated into global political and 
economic systems. By 1938, thirteen countries, including the Soviet Union, France and the 
United Kingdom, had embassies or consulates in Saudi Arabia. The kingdom in turn had 
representatives in the United Kingdom, Egypt, Iraq and Syria.85 At the time, however, few 
indigenous Saudis were proficient in foreign languages, international law and international 
relations. The government thus needed the foreigners for its engagements in the 
international arena. 
One of the first foreign dynastic historians was Ameen Rihani (1876–1940), a 
Lebanese-American writer. After having developed an interest in the politics of the Arab 
world, he attended the ʿUqayr conference in 1922, in which Abdulaziz Al Saud negotiated 
the Najdi–Kuwaiti borders with the British.86 Subsequently, Rihani travelled to Riyadh, where 
he persuaded the Saudi ruler to accept him as his biographer. Over the course of six weeks, 
Abdulaziz dictated his life and the history of his family to him. In addition, the ruler provided 
the writer with copies of Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr’s histories. After his return to Lebanon, 
Rihani continued to receive letters with comments and corrections from the Saudi monarch 
as well as copies of Umm al-Qurá, the official gazette.87 On that basis in 1928, the writer 
published a book entitled The Modern History of Najd and its Dependencies and the Life of 
Abdulaziz ibn Abdulrahman al-Faisal Al Saud, King of Hejaz and Najd and their 
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Dependencies. In the same year, he also published a book for English-speaking audiences 
under the title Ibn Sa’oud of Arabia: His People and His Land.88 
The Modern History of Najd and Its Dependencies was one of the first histories 
displaying dynastic exclusivism. Rihani as a foreigner who spent relatively little time in Najd 
had few ties to local communities and did not use pre-Wahhabi works. In his history, specific 
towns and regions thus only appeared in connection to conquests and other actions by 
Saudi rulers. The oasis of al-Aḥsāʾ, for instance, appeared mainly in a chapter about 
Abdulaziz’s ‘conquest of al-Aḥsāʾ’ (in 1913) and the Hejazi town of Ta’if in ‘the fall of Ta'if’ (in 
1924).89 
Some foreigners not only visited Saudi Arabia, but due to their foreign education they 
also became senior members of the Saudi government. They included a group of officials, 
whom some indigenous officials and Hejazi notables still resentfully called ‘the Syrians’ 
years after they had gained Saudi citizenship.90 One of the most prominent was Youssef 
Yassin (1892–1962), a Syrian from Latakia who had come to Mecca in the early 1920s and 
served as the founding editor of Umm al-Qurá and as Abdulaziz’s director of publicity. Later, 
he worked as director of the political section of the royal court and minister of state.91 
Another major figure was Fuad Hamza (1899–1951). From Lebanon, he was educated at the 
Syrian Protestant College in Beirut and Jerusalem’s Law School.92 Subsequently, he 
enjoyed a similar career to his colleague and rival Yassin. In 1926, Abdulaziz appointed him 
as a personal interpreter and advisor. Thanks to his skills and the ‘flat hierarchies’ in 
Abdulaziz’s highly personalized government, Hamza quickly rose to the position of deputy 
minister of foreign affairs.93 
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The absence of many indigenous Saudis trained in foreign languages and 
international relations benefitted migrants from Greater Syria. Yet, the Saudi leadership also 
had strategic interests in employing them. According to a British diplomat, King Abdulaziz 
seemed to have retained Yassin and Hamza in his service partly in order to cement good 
relations with Syria and Lebanon. He hoped to keep both states as allies against the 
Hashemites, the former rulers of the Hejaz who headed the monarchies of Iraq and 
Transjordan.94 Domestically, Abdulaziz preferred to employ foreigners in the royal court, as 
they did not hold a local power base. Relying on them, he was able to keep the old Hejazi 
elite away from real power.95 
The Syrians also worked for Abdulaziz in public relations, which included the field of 
dynastic historiography. While Yassin oversaw the publication of articles on the king’s life 
and travels in the official gazette Umm al-Qurá, Hamza published two books on the Saudi 
state in 1933 and 1937: The Heart of Arabia and Saudi Arabia.96 Both works catered for the 
increasing international demand for information about the kingdom. Hamza justified the 
publication of The Heart of Arabia by claiming that the ‘public needs a modern reference 
work that is easily accessible and combines the general information scattered across old 
Arabic works and books by orientalists and European travellers that do not exist in Arabic’.97 
A few years later, he still noticed ‘a clear lack of factual information and necessary details’ 
about the Saudi state among politicians, writers and journalists from outside the country. He 
claimed to fill this lack with Saudi Arabia.98 
Like Rihani’s History of Najd, Hamza’s books also displayed an exclusive concern 
with the Saudi dynasty. Stricter than Ibn Bishr and Ibn ʿĪsá, the author mentioned Arabian 
towns and regions mainly in relation to the Al Saud. Thus, the establishment of the modern 
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Saudi kingdom appeared primarily as a series of conquests led by Abdulaziz. After the 
‘conquest’ (fatḥ) of Riyadh in 1902, Hamza narrated the ‘annexation’ of al-Kharj in southern 
Najd, and the ‘conquest’ of al-Aḥsāʾ in 1913.99 Hamza’s unfamiliarity with local history 
strengthened his exclusivism. Not only was he from outside the Arabian peninsula. He also 
spent most of his time among members of the royal court in Riyadh, Mecca, and Jeddah, 
and on diplomatic missions abroad. He first travelled to Asir in 1934, eight years after his 
arrival in the kingdom, and still called the region ‘this virgin land’ in a book published in 1951, 
the year of his death.100 
Hamza’s conception of the country’s history as the history of the Al Saud was also a 
reflection of his political work. In 1932, the foreign-born official co-designed the formal 
merger of the Kingdom of Hejaz and the Kingdom of Najd and its Dependencies. Putting a 
dynastic stamp on the country, he invented its new name ‘Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’.101 The 
reasons for this ‘unification’ (tawḥīd), as the merger was called, were partly ‘dynastic’, as a 
British diplomat explained at the time. The ‘unification’ aimed at assimilating Asir and 
consolidating ‘the Hejaz as a Saudi possession, to the final discouragement of Hashemite or 
Republican aspiration’. In addition, the merger sought to ‘cover the absorption of the 
resources of the Hejaz in those of Nejd and perhaps to facilitate the publication of a single 
Saudi budget of a kind that may create confidence in the money markets’. Finally, Hamza as 
a jurist probably also sought to solve the constitutional difficulties of the ‘dual Kingdom and 
set about building a tidier and more critic-proof edifice of State’.102 
Besides anti-regionalism, Hamza also developed another form of exclusivism: a 
strong anti-nomadism, expressed in takfīrist terms. In his book The Heart of Arabia, he 
presented the Bedouin not only as an obstacle to the state, but also as living in a jāhilīyah. 
According to him, ‘the incurable disease of Bedouinism is a form of existence in ignorance of 
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the prohibitions of religion. Through the nature of their life, including migration and travelling, 
the Bedouin have no homeland and no fixed property that they fear to lose. Therefore, they 
are people whose affections and interests change and who are unreliable for the 
establishment of stable rule.’103 Following from that, Hamza described the forced settlement 
of the nomads in villages under Abdulaziz in the 1910s and 1920s as a conversion to Islam. 
He stated that ‘the settlements are, in religious terms, mosques filled with people who gave 
up the superstitions, heresies, customs of the age of ignorance, and manners of the 
Bedouin. They turned to a humble religious life, a life of righteousness and virtue, morals 
and belief.’104 
Hamza’s takfīrist anti-nomadism largely resulted from the very settlement project he 
described. The conversion from jāhilīyah to Islam was a major part of the discourse that 
Wahhabi ulema and preachers spread among the nomads. The former Bedouin tribesmen 
thus referred to themselves as the Ikhwān or Muslim ‘Brothers’. They called each of their 
villages a ‘hijra’, a term that also referred to the Prophet Muhammad’s emigration from 
Mecca as a place of polytheism. Notably, the chronicler Ibn ʿĪsá, who was a contemporary of 
the settlement project, was already much harder in tone towards the nomads than Ibn Bishr 
had been, in whose time no such endeavour was undertaken. Ibn ʿĪsá called the Bedouin of 
the ʿUjmān tribe, for instance, ‘refractory and inveterate enemies of the Muslims’ and ‘a tribe 
of wicked men, full of cunning, treachery, and evil’.105 
Foreign authors who were close to the royal family or served the Saudi government 
were also important in establishing the conventional partition of Saudi history into three 
Saudi states or one Saudi state in three stages. The introduction of this periodization marked 
a further strengthening of dynastic exclusivism, as it marginalized times without Al Saud rule. 
The poet Khālid al-Faraj (1898–1954/55) took one of the first steps in this direction. Born in 
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Kuwait, he studied in one of the emirate’s first modern schools, the Mubārakīyah School, 
and later worked for the Saudi provincial government in al-Aḥsāʾ. In 1928 and 1930, he 
recited two lengthy poems in front of Abdulaziz Al Saud, which contained a historical outline 
of Najd since the time of the king’s ancestor Muhammad ibn Saud. Both texts were 
published under the title History of Najd (Tārīkh najd) in the official newspaper Umm al-Qurá. 
In addition, at the request of the monarch, al-Faraj wrote a lengthy treatise explaining the 
poem entitled Story and Witness in the History of Najd.106 
Inspired by Ibn Bishr, his principal source, al-Faraj divided the history of the Al Saud 
into two general periods. The first was the ‘emirate’ from 1454 until 1744, when Muhammad 
ibn Saud and his ancestors had merely been ‘emirs’. The second period, since 1744, was 
the ‘imamate’. The Kuwaiti-born poet further subdivided the imamate, creating elements of a 
periodization that later became standard. ‘After the end of the tragedy of al-Dirʿīyah’, the poet 
stated, ‘the curtain fell over this great kingdom for the first time’. This was followed by an age 
of ‘chaos’ that lasted until Turki ibn Abdullah’s reign (1819–20 and 1824–1834), that is, the 
beginning of the second Saudi state. Finally, the writer portrayed the fall of Riyadh to the 
rival dynasty of the Āl Rashīd in 1891 as the end of an era. This year would become the 
conventional end date of the second Saudi state.107 
Foreigners were also influential in producing the notion of Abdulaziz’s reign as the 
period of a new state. This notion was the concluding element in the later division of Saudi 
history into the history of ‘three states’. Hamza split the history of the Al Saud in his Heart of 
Arabia into four ‘stages’: 1724–1814, 1814–65, 1865–1900, and finally, the age of Abdulaziz 
since 1900.108 In Saudi Arabia, he elevated Abdulaziz’s reign, calling it, as one of the first 
authors, the stage of ‘the modern renaissance [nahḍah]’.109 Speaking of nahḍah, he 
employed a term that had become widespread in Egypt, Lebanon, and other Arab countries 
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since the nineteenth century. Hamza thus also tried to insert Saudi history into concepts of 
historical development that had become dominant in the wider Middle East. 
Another foreigner who saw Abdulaziz’s reign as a new era was St. John Philby. Born 
in British Ceylon, he studied oriental languages at Trinity College, Cambridge, before joining 
the Indian Civil Service and the British administration in Baghdad under Percy Cox (1864–
1937).110 He first met Abdulaziz while on a political mission to Riyadh in 1917 and sought to 
persuade him to take up arms against the Ottomans. In 1924, Philby resigned from the 
British services and settled in Jeddah as partner in a trading company. Although he was no 
official servant of the Saudi government, he counselled the king in his relations with Western 
powers and oil companies and developed cordial relations with him.111 Abdulaziz supported 
Philby’s expeditions across the peninsula and presented him with a house in Mecca and a 
slave girl, who became Philby’s second wife, after his conversion to Islam in 1930.112 In 
1930 and 1955 respectively, Philby published two major books on the modern history of 
Arabia: Arabia and Sa‘udi Arabia.113 
Although Philby’s books were published in London, they were also strongly influenced 
by the Ibn Ghannām School. Philby avoided European sources on Arabian history and took 
most of his information from the takfīrist chronicles instead.114 In his Arabia, he took Ibn 
Ghannām as his main source on the first Saudi state, calling him the ‘the father of Arabian 
history’.115 For his later book, Sa‘udi Arabia, he also consulted Ibn Bishr, Ibn ʿĪsá and Ibn 
Nāṣir as well as a manuscript of Ibn Hadhlūl’s History of the Kings of the Al Saud.116 This 
resulted in his adoption of major elements of their takfīrism, including the notion of the pre-
Wahhabi jāhilīyah. Philby stated in Arabia that before the appearance of the Wahhabi 
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mission, Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ were ‘sunk deep in the abyss of paganism’.117 This had 
happened to the people of central Arabia ‘within a thousand years of their rescue from a 
similar state by the call of Islam’.118 
Captivated by Abdulaziz’s personality, ‘whom he considered a man as close to 
perfection as any he would have ever encountered’,119 Philby conceived the king’s rule as a 
departure from the previous Saudi states. He thus contributed to the notion of the modern 
kingdom as a separate ‘third Saudi state’. In his book, Arabia, Philby conceived Abdulaziz’s 
reign as ‘the Second Wahhabi Empire’, after ‘the First Wahhabi Empire’ in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.120 In Sa‘udi Arabia, the British author went further, implying that 
Abdulaziz’s age was more important than Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s. According to Philby, the 
monarch’s death in 1953 ‘closed a brilliant chapter in the history of the Arabs’. This chapter 
was ‘second in importance, perhaps, only to the Meccan episode of the early seventh 
century, from which Islam emerged as a vital and permanent factor in human evolution. Like 
the prophet Muhammad, ʿAbdul-ʿAziz ibn Saʿud was also a man of destiny.’121 
As in Hamza’s case, the growth of the Saudi state in a globalizing context also 
encouraged the production of Philby’s books by creating international demand for 
information on Abdulaziz and his dynasty. By the late 1920s, this demand had already 
transcended the Arab world, as the British author addressed his Arabia to a wider English-
speaking audience. He described his work as ‘a sketch designed for the use of those 
members of the general public—Members of Parliament, journalists, business men and the 
like—who may be desirous of understanding something of the principal forces and 
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tendencies which have been at work in the desert spaces of the Arabian peninsula during 
comparatively modern times.’122 
His panegyrics notwithstanding, Philby’s use of London-based publishers also allowed 
him to express criticism, as he grew disaffected with what he considered wasteful handling 
of the new oil wealth after World War II. Access to foreign publishers thus facilitated 
narrative plurality even within dynastic historiography based on the Ibn Ghannām School. In 
his book Sa‘udi Arabia, Philby complained about ‘the weakness of a system, so entirely 
dependent on the will of an absolute monarch, and devoid of any technical devices of 
accountancy’. Moreover, he lamented ‘the brine of corruption, which permeated every 
branch of the public life of the land’.123 Despite his criticism, however, Philby retained some 
loyalty to the Al Saud. Saud ibn Jalawi (1901/2–67), the governor of the Eastern Province, 
commented that ‘Philby did not say anything. He could have said much more.’124 
Senior members of the Saudi government were nevertheless appalled by Philby’s 
comments and gave the writer a choice to either leave the kingdom or to write a letter to 
King Saud expressing contrition and to submit all future writings for censorship. Philby 
preferred to move with his family to Beirut, noting in a memorandum, ‘I obviously could not 
leave my dependents and my possessions (mainly books) to the tender mercies of the Saudi 
Government’.125 Even Samir Shamma (c. 1921–2001), a Palestinian-born legal advisor to 
the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, suffered from governmental repression. He published a 
critical but positive review of Sa‘udi Arabia in the newspaper al-Yamāmah just days before 
or after the announcement of Philby’s banishment on the Mecca radio. Shamma noted that 
‘Mr Philby is brutal in his attacks on any man of the kingdom whom he does not like’. Yet, 
the official also praised the work as ‘the most complete, well-balanced and serious book on 
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Saudi Arabia until now’.126 He was reportedly immediately degraded to ‘some minor post in 
the Ministry of Finance’.127 
After World War II, with increasing levels of education, native Saudi citizens gradually 
replaced foreigners as ministers and ambassadors. However, the rapid expansion of the 
state apparatus, including the public education sector, still required the employment of 
educated foreigners, some of whom engaged in dynastic historiography. In the 1950s and 
1960s, the Saudi government benefitted not only from increased oil revenues but also from 
various coups and purges in Syria, Egypt and Iraq. Many members of the political elite lost 
their positions or suffered from persecution in the course of these events. Some of them thus 
found it attractive to seek asylum and employment in the kingdom. 
One of the most prominent Arab political refugees was Mounir Ajlani (1911–2004), 
son of a wealthy Syrian landowner. He was highly educated, having first studied in 
Damascus and later in Paris, where he had gained a doctorate in law. Returning to 
Damascus in 1933, Ajlani also gained considerable political experience. He worked as a 
journalist and served as an independent member of the Syrian parliament between 1936 
and 1956. In addition, he worked as minister of propaganda and youth, minister of 
education, and finally minister of justice and deputy prime minister. In 1956, however, 
Ajlani’s opponents in the Syrian government accused him of being part of a ‘great 
conspiracy’ that worked against Syrian unification with Egypt and imprisoned him. After the 
declaration of the two countries’ unity, Gamal Abdel Nasser transferred him along with other 
political prisoners to Alexandria in 1959. Following his release, the Saudi government 
welcomed the arrival of the political refugee in Jeddah in 1962.128 
Ajlani did not reach such senior political positions as some members of the previous 
generation of Arab immigrants, like Yassin or Hamza, did. Yet he became very influential in 
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historiography and education generally. This was still a field in which few indigenous 
professionals were active. The Syrian was appointed senior advisor to the Ministry of 
Education in 1963, and published a four-volume, albeit uncompleted, History of Saudi Arabia 
between 1965 and 1972. This history was based on numerous manuscripts and documents, 
which he had accessed in Beirut, Istanbul, Paris, and London.129 Ajlani co-authored a history 
textbook for primary schools in the 1960s, which was entitled Images of the Modern 
World.130 In the 1970s, he also worked as an advisor to the principal government historical 
research institute, the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives.131 
With his History of Saudi Arabia, Ajlani not only published a very detailed account of 
the Saudi dynasty. Most significantly, he also completed the notion of the three Saudi states, 
to which Hamza, al-Faraj and Philby had contributed earlier. The Syrian virtually excluded 
periods without Saudi rule from the country’s history, as he divided ‘Saudi history’ into three 
stages: ‘the first Saudi state’ 1744–1817, ‘the second Saudi state’ 1824–91, and ‘the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ since 1902.132 Dark ages interrupted these bright periods. The 
textbook Images of the Modern World narrated, for instance, that the destruction of al-
Dirʿīyah by Egyptian-Ottoman forces in 1818 was followed by ‘chaos’, ‘oppression’, and 
‘darkness’.133 Ajlani was also very explicit in his exclusivism. He conceived only the 
territories historically ruled by the Al Saud as forming part of ‘Saudi Arabia’. He justified 
calling his book a History of Saudi Arabia rather than of ‘Najd’ not only with the remark that 
‘the name Saudi Arabia is known and familiar’, but also that ‘the country, which the Saudis 
ruled was sometimes smaller than Najd and sometimes larger than Najd’.134 He thus 
synchronized ‘Saudi Arabia’ with the Saudi dynasty itself rather than a physical territory. 
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Besides further restricting Saudi history to three periods of Al Saud rule, foreigners 
were influential in focusing dynastic historiography on Abdulaziz Al Saud. Dynastic 
exclusivism even marginalized Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who had been at the centre of Ibn 
Ghannām and Ibn Bishr’s chronicles. This shift in dynastic historiography largely resulted 
from the foreigners’ distance from the Wahhabi mission. Unlike Ibn Ghannām or Ibn Bishr, 
Rihani, Hamza, al-Faraj and Philby had not received training by Wahhabi scholars. Rihani 
was a Maronite, and Hamza belonged to the Druze, whom even many non-Wahhabi 
Muslims regarded as heretics.135 The foreigners thus became much closer to the Al Saud 
than to the scholarly elite around the Āl al-Shaykh, the ‘family of the sheikh’ (Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab). The only exception was Youssef Yassin, whom a British diplomat described as 
‘probably a more convinced Wahhâbi than most of the King’s alien entourage’.136 
While already Rihani’s History of Najd and Philby’s Sa‘udi Arabia focused on 
Abdulaziz’s life, this focus reached its peak in the work of yet another foreigner: Khayr al-Dīn 
al-Ziriklī (1893–1976), author of the well-known biographical lexicon The Great Figures.137 In 
hiring him, the Saudi government benefitted from colonial repression in neighbouring 
countries during the interwar years. From a Syrian family, al-Ziriklī studied at a private and 
an Ottoman state school. Later, however, the Ottoman authorities suspected him of 
propagating Arab nationalism, and he had to flee to Beirut. There, he studied French 
literature and subsequently taught history and Arabic literature. In 1920, the French 
authorities sentenced him to death in absentia for activities against their occupation of Syria. 
Following a pardon, he first travelled to the Arabian peninsula at the invitation of Hussein, 
the Hashemite King of the Hejaz. Subsequently, he worked for the Transjordanian 
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government in Amman between 1921 and 1923.138 In 1934, al-Ziriklī was appointed advisor 
to the Saudi foreign ministry at the suggestion of Youssef Yassin.139 In the following 
decades, al-Ziriklī worked as Saudi minister to Egypt and the Arab League in Cairo, and 
finally as ambassador to Morocco.140 As he was mostly deployed abroad, he developed 
even fewer links to local communities outside the government than Hamza or Philby did. 
This presumably strengthened the dynastic exclusivism in his writings. 
Al-Ziriklī, together with other foreigners, was a major contributor to a planned state 
celebration that sought to present Abdulaziz as the single founder of the modern Saudi 
state. This was the golden jubilee in 1950, which marked fifty years in the Islamic lunar 
calendar since the capture of Riyadh and beginning of Abdulaziz’s rule in 1902. On that 
occasion, al-Ziriklī, in coordination with Youssef Yassin, prepared a book entitled Abdulaziz 
Al Saud: Founder of a State and Renewer of a Nation.141 Sparing no costs, the government 
even brought the poet Khālid al-Faraj by plane from the eastern oasis of al-Qaṭīf to Riyadh in 
1949 so that that he could contribute to the work.142 The official gazette Umm al-Qurá also 
produced a special issue with a biography of Abdulaziz, which it planned to distribute among 
foreign newspapers through Saudi representations abroad.143 
Yet, as foreigners sought to celebrate Abdulaziz in 1950 without consideration of 
Wahhabi teachings, they also met resistance from religious scholars. According to an 
American diplomat, Youssef Yassin and Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī apparently prepared the 
golden jubilee ‘without seeking the opinion of the ulema on the permissibility of such 
celebration’.144 King Abdulaziz himself, however, eventually consulted Muḥammad ibn 
Ibrāhīm Āl al-Shaykh, the kingdom’s mufti, and other ulema. In a fatwa, they considered 
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such a jubilee to be an invention of the Christians and the Jews and thus contrary to 
Islam.145 The king cancelled the celebration, and al-Ziriklī’s manuscript was kept in the royal 
court.146 
Yet, in the 1960s, generous state support allowed al-Ziriklī to complete his historical 
project. The royal court returned the manuscript to its author, and the monarch 
commissioned him to expand on it. The Saudi government also granted al-Ziriklī indefinite 
leave from his position in the foreign ministry, provided him with an apartment near the sea 
in Beirut, a car, a driver, a typist and a servant to facilitate his writing.147 In his choice of 
sources, al-Ziriklī mainly relied on official documents and accounts by dynastic historians 
and officials close to King Abdulaziz. They included writings as well as oral accounts by 
Rihani, Yassin, Philby and Hamza.148 All of them contributed to his focus on the king. The 
result of several years of work was a four-volume work on Arabia under King Abdulaziz, 
which al-Ziriklī published in 1970.149 
Al-Ziriklī’s Arabia under King Abdulaziz, tellingly authored in Beirut, represented the 
pinnacle of dynastic exclusivism. His account of modern Arabian history over 1400 pages 
was essentially a huge life story of the first Saudi king. An abridged version in 1972 was 
entitled A Brief Biography of King Abdulaziz.150 Connecting most developments in modern 
Arabian history to the first Saudi ruler, the Syrian inserted ‘King Abdulaziz’ in almost all 
headings. They included, for instance, ‘King Abdulaziz seized al-Qaṣīm’, ‘King Abdulaziz and 
security during his reign’, and ‘King Abdulaziz and poetry’.151 Even the history of the first and 
second Saudi states is restricted to a background chapter entitled ‘King Abdulaziz: An 
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overview of the life of his ancestors’.152 Strengthening the contrast between Abdulaziz’s 
reign and previous eras, al-Ziriklī even applied the idea of the jāhilīyah to the pre-Abdulaziz 
period. ‘The end of our last age of ignorance’, he wrote, ‘was the beginning of the 
peninsula’s modern age, the age of renaissance and oil in the days of Abdulaziz’.153 
Arab nationalism 
Dynastic exclusivism was not the only feature that foreign-born authors introduced to 
dynastic historiography based on the Ibn Ghannām School. They also added narratives 
influenced by Arab nationalism. Whereas the focus of Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr’s 
chronicles was restricted to Najd, references to the wider Arab world increased in the new 
texts published between the 1920s and 1960s. The takfīrist paradigm, which conceived the 
Saudis as the true Muslims restoring Islam, remained, but the Al Saud also started to appear 
as heroes of the Arab nation and its ‘renaissance’ (nahḍah). 
Arab nationalism spread widely in Arabic lands between the 1920s and 1940s, 
especially in Iraq, Greater Syria, and Egypt.154 Already in the nineteenth century, ‘a sense of 
cultural and ethnic Arabism’ had emerged and consolidated itself in parts of the Ottoman 
Empire.155 As Michael Provence argues, additional foundations of Arab nationalism lay in 
‘the Ottoman mass education and conscription project and in the regionwide struggle against 
colonial rule in the 1920s and 1930s’.156 Between around 1880 and 1913, Ottoman military 
and civil schools and the army nurtured identities of ‘religion, nation, and homeland’. At the 
outbreak of World War I, Ottoman citizens, like their European counterparts, had thus ‘been 
generally conditioned to patriotic sacrifice and the idea of membership in vast imagined 
communities’.157 After the war, the fight against the European occupation of Syria and other 
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Arab countries fuelled this popular nationalism. Frequently, former members of the Ottoman 
armed forces led this fight. In the 1920s and 1930s, writers and political parties in the new 
Arab states elaborated notions of Arab (rather than Ottoman) nationalism in terms of self-
determination and independence.158 
As one of few formally independent Arab states after World War I, the Saudi realm 
was an attractive refuge for Arab nationalists, especially for those who sought to combine 
Arab nationalism with Islam. The life of Chekib Arslan (1869–1946), a prominent writer from 
Lebanon, is a pertinent example. The French authorities refused to issue a Lebanese 
passport for him, but the Saudi government granted him citizenship in the mid-1920s. He 
wrote, ‘from the moment I set foot on the quay at Jiddah, I felt like a free Arab in a free Arab 
country. I felt I had escaped the oppressive foreign rule which weighs so heavily on all Arab 
countries.’ It was also important to Arslan that Abdulaziz’s state had remained ‘subject to the 
Islamic shariʿah in all its principles’.159 In subsequent writings, Arslan portrayed Abdulaziz as 
an exemplary Arab Muslim leader.160 
Like Arslan, several of the foreign-born officials and writers of dynastic histories were 
also Arab nationalists with strong anti-colonial sentiments. While still serving the 
Transjordanian government between 1921 and 1923, Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī attempted in vain 
to persuade it to openly oppose the French presence in his home country Syria.161 Between 
1943 and 1945, as Saudi representative in Cairo he worked towards the formation of the 
Arab League and co-drafted its charter together with Youssef Yassin.162 With regards to 
Yassin, a British representative in Jeddah stated about him that ‘throughout his career, he 
has been an Arab nationalist and as such is to a considerable extent anti-British though he is 
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equally opposed to any other foreign influence’.163 Fuad Hamza was knighted during a Saudi 
diplomatic mission to London early in his career. Yet, British diplomats later described him 
as an Anglophobe and a devoted Arab nationalist who stayed in contact with like-minded 
people in Palestine and Syria even while in Saudi service.164 
Already in the 1920s, the Lebanese-American writer Ameen Rihani introduced Arab 
nationalist narratives to dynastic historiography. He developed his Arabism in the United 
States, while studying the history of Arab Spain and reading English travel literature on 
Arabia.165 In contrast to other Arab nationalists, such as the Syrian Constantin Zureiq (1909–
2000), Rihani’s Arabism was, of course, monarchical. As Nijmeh Hajjar notes, Rihani 
‘argued that the Western “republican” system did not suit the Arab “monarchist mentality” 
and political culture especially in Arabia’.166 He thus praised the first Saudi king as an Arab 
nationalist hero. In 1926, Youssef Yassin, then King Abdulaziz’s director of publicity, allowed 
the Lebanese writer to publish an article entitled ‘Ibn Saud: Liberator of the Arabs’ on the 
front page of Umm al-Qurá.167 In his book, History of Najd, published two years later, Rihani 
described Abdulaziz as the unifier of the Arabs and a ‘second Umar’.168 Addressing the 
monarch in his introduction, the writer stated that ‘from the reign of Caliph Umar until the 
beginning of your Saudi reign, the Arabs did not enjoy anybody who gathered them, united 
their word, and supported their causes’.169 
Even Philby as a former official of the British Empire developed sympathies for Arab 
nationalism. During his studies at Cambridge, he became an anti-imperialist.170 While he 
was still a servant of the Empire, he seemed to have genuinely hoped for Arab 
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independence after World War I. In one of his first books in 1922, he described the Arabs as 
‘a proud race long ground down under the heel of the Ottoman Turk’.171 In his book Arabia in 
1930, he portrayed even the settlements of the Ikhwān as places of national awakening 
rather than—as Hamza did—as places of conversion. Philby stated that the settlements 
‘embodied the new nationalist spirit of Arabia and formed the backbone on which Ibn Sa‘ud 
could count for the realisation of his ideal of an Arab state united in support of its 
independence against the foreigner, the Turk’. The Turk’s objective, in contrast, ‘was to 
obstruct and prevent, if he could, the formation of an Arabian nation, and to maintain his 
imperial dominance over the land of the Arabs’.172 
While the Arabism of Rihani and other dynastic historians was monarchical, a new 
revolutionary form of Arab nationalism rose to prominence after World War II. Following the 
Egyptian Revolution of 1952 and Egypt’s defiance of Britain, France and Israel in 1956, the 
spirit of the movement in many countries became ‘republican and socialist’.173 While the 
Saudi government initially supported Egypt in its rivalry with the Hashemite kingdoms of 
Jordan and Iraq, it soon considered this revolutionary Arab nationalism ‘destabilizing’. 
Following a visit by King Saud to the United States and prompting by the American 
government, Saud turned against the Egyptian president Abdel Nasser in 1957. That year, 
the United States also launched the ‘Eisenhower Doctrine’, pledging ‘assistance, including 
the dispatch of armed forces, to nations requesting American help “against overt aggression 
from any nation controlled by international communism”’.174 The Egyptian government 
responded with a propaganda campaign against the kingdom. Broadcasts from its radio 
station Voice of the Arabs denounced Saudi Arabia as a ‘feudal monarchy’ and a ‘focal point 
of Arab reaction and Western intrigue’.175 
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Although the Saudi government opposed the revolutionary and socialist form of Arab 
nationalism, the Voice of the Arabs, Arab migrants as well as Saudis who had studied in 
Egypt also brought this ideology to the kingdom. Palestinian and Yemeni workers spread 
revolutionary ideas in the camps of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) in Dhahran 
in the 1950s. Egyptian and Saudi journalists working in the kingdom also expressed their 
enthusiasm about Nasser until a crackdown on the media in the early 1960s.176 The 
influence of Egyptian media even reached government officials. John Chalcraft reports a 
telling episode about a conversation in 1962 between a British diplomat and Ziad Shawwaf 
(1926–1990), a legal adviser in the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘The Saudi official and 
the Briton had apparently argued “from midnight till dawn,” with the former defending a 
series of anti-imperialist positions on Palestine, Muscat, and other issues. An Englishman 
present wrote: “I had decided to put Ziad in the anti-British category . . . when he concluded: 
‘I enjoyed our talk. You must remember that we know nothing about these places, apart from 
the Cairo brainwashing of the past ten years.’”177 
In the Saudi struggle with Nasser, senior Wahhabi ulema started to denounce Arab 
nationalism categorically. Around 1960, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Bāz (1912–99), the later grand 
mufti, wrote his A Critique of Arab Nationalism Based on Islam and Reality. He conceded 
that ‘any Muslim with the slightest knowledge of Islamic history does not doubt the merits of 
the Muslim Arabs. They carried the message of Islam in the best centuries and brought it to 
all people’.178 Yet, Ibn Bāz argued that ‘the call for Arab nationalism or any other kind of 
nationalism is false, a grave error, pure vice, and abominable ignorance [jāhilīyah]’. One of 
the reasons he gave was that ‘the call for Arab nationalism divides Muslims and separates 
the non-Arab Muslim from his Arab brother’.179 Moreover, he found that according to ‘many 
historians of Arab nationalism’, the first proponents of Arab nationalism in the nineteenth 
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century were ‘Westerners through missions in Syria’. Their aim was ‘to separate the Turks 
from the Arabs and divide the Muslims’.180 
In contrast to the ulema, however, a number of historians and officials did not 
denounce Arab nationalism. They rather sought to demonstrate that the Al Saud were ‘more 
authentic Arab nationalists than Nasser’.181 The Saudi kings were thus Arab as well as 
Muslim leaders. This was a vision promoted even by King Faisal (r. 1964–75) himself. In an 
interview published in 1972, Faisal argued that ‘Arab unity has been our demand and our 
goal for a long time, before people appeared in the Arab world claiming Arabism and the 
demand and strife for unity’. He added that ‘Arabism is no doctrine, principle or belief. It is 
feeling, blood, and language. We do not need to prove our Arabism’.182 
In order to assert its Arab authenticity, the Saudi government again relied on 
foreigners. One of the most prominent voices was Hafiz Wahba (1889–1967), an Egyptian 
who had joined the royal court in 1923. In the following decades, he rivalled Hamza in his 
career in the Saudi diplomatic service. Starting as a foreign-affairs advisor to Abdulaziz, he 
became civil governor of Mecca and, in 1928, director of education. In the latter function, he 
sent the first mission of Hejazi students to Egypt in order for them to pursue higher 
education. Subsequently, he became minister plenipotentiary and first Saudi ambassador to 
the Court of St James. In 1960, Wahba published Fifty Years in Arabia, a combination of 
autobiography and history of the Saudi dynasty.183 
In his Fifty Years in Arabia, Wahba portrayed Abdulaziz as a pan-Arab hero, as Rihani 
did. Moreover, he even traced the Saudi service to the Arab nation back to the eighteenth 
century. In a section on ‘the birth of the Arab League’, he stated that ‘the Arab union, or Arab 
unity, was the hope of every Arab, after the Arabs had tasted the bitterness of the Turkish 
occupation of their country’. This union had appeared in different forms since the eighteenth 
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century. ‘In the form of the first Saudi movement this union appeared in the Arabian 
peninsula. However, the Saudi forces clashed with the Turkish forces in Iraq and Syria and 
stopped at the borders of these two regions. In 1818, the movement was crushed by Ibrahim 
Pasha’s invasion of Najd.’184 In the twentieth century then, Abdulaziz appeared. He was, 
according to Wahba, an ‘Arab, who loved his Arab people, was devoted to Islam and its 
teachings, desired to found a young Arab kingdom that took over the cause of the Arabs and 
sought to restore their ancient glory’.185 
The struggle with Nasser made it attractive for the Saudi government to employ men 
persecuted by the Egyptian state, who were adept at countering Nasser’s rhetoric.186 In the 
field of historiography, these authors included, besides Mounir Ajlani, a fellow Syrian named 
Amin Said (1891–1967). Born in Latakia, Said became a journalist and publisher in 
Damascus and later in Cairo, following prosecution by the French authorities over political 
activities.187 An early proponent of Arab nationalism, he published a three-volume work on 
the Arab anti-colonial struggle entitled The Great Arab Revolution in 1934.188 Through his 
work for newspapers, he met Faisal, Yassin and Hamza in the Hejaz, Egypt and Syria.189 In 
1960, when relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic were tense, Said 
travelled to many Saudi cities at the invitation of the Saudi government. Upon his return to 
Egypt, Said published a book entitled Glories of the Al Saud in 1961, in which he praised 
Saudi Arabia’s modern development.190 This offended Nasser and led to Said’s 
imprisonment in Egypt for eleven months, during which the Saudi embassy in Cairo 
supported the author’s wife and children.191 
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Indebted to the kingdom’s leadership, Said continued to engage in dynastic historical 
production. Following his release, he moved to Lebanon and Syria, where he published 
three books on Saudi history between 1964 and 1965: The History of the Saudi State, The 
Life of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and Faisal the Great.192 Subsequently, Faisal 
invited Said to Riyadh and presented him with an office close to the royal court. The author 
continued to reside in the kingdom until 1967, when he died while spending the summer in 
Beirut.193 After his funeral in Damascus, his family remained in Riyadh and continued to 
receive support from the Saudi government.194 
In contrast to socialist and secular forms of Arab nationalism, Amin Said sought to 
combine Arabism with Islam in his historical narrative. He thus related the idea of the pre-
Wahhabi jāhilīyah to the notion of Arab decline. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, according to him, was 
not only ‘the first to perceive the state of stagnation and backwardness of the inhabitants of 
Najd, and the Arabs and Muslims like them’. He was also ‘the first to realise that the direct 
cause for all the stagnation and decline was the people’s departure from the essence and 
spirit of religion’.195 Against this background, Said presented the Wahhabi mission as an 
Arab nationalist as much as an Islamic movement. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was ‘the first 
harbinger of Arab nationalism’. From Najd ‘the germs of the new renaissance, the germs of 
awakening and reform, spread to the neighbouring Arab countries.’ Subsequently, the Arabs 
‘started to fight the corrupt Turkish rule and strove to replace it with an Islamic Arab national 
rule’.196 
Said’s combination of Arab nationalism and Islam was in line with Saudi policies to 
reach out to the Muslim world in the kingdom’s struggle against Arab socialism and 
communism. In 1961, at the height of the Cold War, Saudi Arabia established the Islamic 
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University of Medina as a proselytizing institution in order to train international students to 
fight against ‘Soviet atheism’.197 A year later, in response to the Egyptian military 
involvement in Yemen, the government organized a conference in Mecca to discuss ways of 
combating secularism and socialism. This conference resulted in the creation of the Muslim 
World League. Subsequently, further pan-Islamic organizations were created with Saudi 
sponsorship. They included the International Islamic Relief Organisation and the World 
Assembly of Muslim Youth, which sought to warn the new generation against ‘false’ 
ideologies.198 These initiatives were widely seen as countering Arab nationalism, but King 
Faisal rejected such views. In his interview published in 1972, the monarch was asked 
whether there was not a ‘conflict’ between the Arab League and his ‘call for Islamic unity’. 
He responded that he considered ‘Arab unity and the Arab union as the nucleus of a greater 
Islamic unity’. Thus, Islamic solidarity was ‘a force for Arab solidarity and the Arab 
League’.199 
Although the immediate threat of revolutionary and socialist forms of Arab nationalism 
ended with the Israeli victory over Egypt in 1967, non-state actors continued to challenge the 
Saudi regime’s legitimacy. Especially prominent was a leftist group around Nāṣir al-Saʿīd (c. 
1923–79). A former strike leader at Aramco, al-Saʿīd escaped to Syria after having attempted 
to form an Arabian Trade Union Association in 1956. In 1958, he founded the oppositionist 
organization Union of the People of Arabia (Ittiḥād Shaʿb al-Jazīrah al-ʿArabīyah). While the 
organization was mainly active abroad, it enjoyed limited support in the region of Jabal 
Shammar, among the Aramco workforce and among foreign Arabs in the kingdom.200 In 
December 1979, the Saudi secret service abducted al-Saʿīd in Beirut.201 
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The opposition by the Union of the People of Arabia had an important historiographic 
dimension. In 1983/84, the organization published a monograph by Nāṣir al-Saʿīd entitled 
The History of Al Saud. 202 It was an overt anti-royalist dynastic history, which narrated the 
path of the Al Saud from the eighteenth century until the twentieth with the aim of 
discrediting it. This was clear in the cover page, which displayed a shocking rendering of the 
Saudi coat of arms, with a decapitated head instead of the palm tree on top of the two 
sabres (see figures 1 and 2). 
 
Figure 1: Cover of Nāṣir al-Saʿīd, Tārīkh [1983/84]. 
                                                   
202 Nāṣir al-Saʿīd, Tārīkh [1983/84]. 
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Figure 2: The Saudi coat of arms, adopted in 1950. 
Nāṣir al-Saʿīd’s History of the Al Saud aimed at delegitimizing the Saudi regime in the 
Arab world. On the first pages of the book, the oppositionist rejected the depictions of the Al 
Saud as the most authentic Arabs, declaring that ‘the following facts will disprove the claims 
of the Al Saud. They will also refute the lies of the writers and historians who sold their souls 
to them, fabricated history, and inserted the genealogy of the Al Saud into the lineage of the 
Arab prophet.’203 Similar to sporadic allegations of Yasser Arafat’s Jewish origins, al-Saʿīd 
also claimed to provide ‘evidence for the Jewish character of the Al Saud’.204 
Al-Saʿīd’s anti-Saudi stance also mirrored the anti-imperialism in contemporary 
dynastic histories, as he alleged close collaboration between Saudi Arabia, Western powers 
and Israel. He dedicated a chapter to the ‘trinity of treason’ of Abdulaziz, the Kuwaiti emir 
Mubārak al-Ṣabāḥ (r. 1896–1915) and Khazʿal (d. 1936). Khazʿal was the ruler of the semi-
autonomous Gulf sheikhdom of Moḥammerah who concluded a treaty with the British for the 
benefits of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Al-Saʿīd also emphasized ‘the unlimited English 
support for Abdulaziz’ in his crushing of a rebellion by the ʿUjmān tribe in eastern Arabia. 
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Moreover, he told the ‘history of the Saudi betrayal of Palestine’, the ‘truth about the success 
of the conspiracies by the Zionists, the Americans, the Saudis and al-Sadat’.205 
Such anti-Saudi narratives make it not surprising that the Saudi government, with 
increasing oil revenues, continued to employ foreigners persecuted by neighbouring regimes 
for its Pan-Arab legitimation effort even after the Egyptian defeat of 1967. A notable author 
was Muhammad Keshk, a communist-turned-Islamist who had been prohibited from working 
in Egypt between 1964 and 1967.206 In 1981, Keshk published a tome entitled The Saudis 
and the Islamic Solution: The Source of the Legitimacy of the Saudi Regime.207 The Saudi 
government sponsored this publication by purchasing and distributing numerous copies, 
thus enabling him to sell three editions at a price of a hundred riyals (around twenty-nine 
dollars) per copy in less than twelve months.208 Here, Keshk benefitted from a policy of the 
Ministry of Information to ‘encourage’ Saudi as well as foreign writers through ‘the purchase 
in quantity of books which can be useful for cultural and information purposes, after careful 
study of their contents. These books are then distributed on a wide scale’.209 
Keshk was among the most explicit voices in promoting the superiority of the Saudis 
as a Muslim Arab dynasty over secular Arab nationalists. In his monograph, he argued that 
from the start of the Wahhabi mission in the eighteenth century, the Saudis put forward the 
‘Islamic solution’ in fighting European ‘imperialism’ and Westernization. While secular Arab 
movements led to ‘subordination and division’, the ‘Muslim Arabism of the Saudis’ 
succeeded in achieving ‘liberty and unity’.210 This made King Abdulaziz ‘a Muslim Arab 
national giant’ and was the basis of the supreme legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy.211 
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In another instance in which the employment of a foreigner led to plurality even within 
dynastic historiography, Keshk also denounced Rihani and Philby’s texts for alleged pro-
Western stances. He argued that ‘Rihani’s Arab nationalism was naïve and simple: expelling 
the Turks from Arabia and opening this land to Western civilization through European 
presence’.212 Thus, Rihani ‘did not conceal his support for a British occupation of Arabia for 
the sake of developing it’.213 According to the Egyptian author, Philby ‘did not believe in 
Islam or Wahhabism, nor did he possess any tendencies of liberation, and he did not believe 
in an Arab nation’.214 
Conclusions 
Keshk’s work represents the endpoint and pinnacle of a series of histories describing the Al 
Saud as a true Muslim Arab dynasty. The expansion of the Saudi state in a globalizing 
context contributed to, and shaped, the emergence of this dynastic historiography. Over the 
nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, the developing Saudi polity supported the production 
and publication of a series of Najdi chronicles. Under the influence of the Wahhabi mission 
and the violent confrontation between the Saudis and their neighbours, these works argued 
that the Al Saud were the only true Muslims. This argument was part of a takfīrist paradigm 
that described non-Wahhabi Muslims as unbelievers and included the notion of a pre-
Wahhabi ‘age of ignorance’ (jāhilīyah). 
Between the 1920s and 1960s, the expanding state attracted foreigners who, besides 
serving the government in its international relations, authored major dynastic histories. 
These were produced by foreign or foreign-run publishers and were intended partly for 
international audiences. The authors adopted major parts of earlier takfīrism, but also 
undertook two major innovations. First, as men whose principal loyalties lay with the Saudi 
monarchs and who had limited contacts with local communities, they strengthened dynastic 
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exclusivism; a tendency to conceive the country’s history essentially as the history of the Al 
Saud. Second, in the context of rising Arab nationalism in the region and the Saudi struggle 
with the ideology’s revolutionary and socialist forms, foreign writers introduced Arab 
nationalist narratives to dynastic historiography, alongside the takfīrist narratives already 
prevalent in this genre. They presented the Saudi dynasty as having led the Arab world’s 
struggle for unity and independence, and thus as being the most authentic Arab nationalists. 
While foreigners dominated dynastic historiography between the 1920s and 1960s, 
they did not control the Saudi historiographical field entirely and enforce narrative uniformity. 
The works by pre-Wahhabi local historians as well as authors critical of the Ibn Ghannām 
School, in Najd were, indeed, suppressed. Yet, as the next chapter will demonstrate, new 
local historians emerged in the kingdom from the 1920s onwards. They used parts of the 
pre-modern annalist tradition as sources, but at the same time published non-annalist works 
in modern style. Focusing on local and regional history, they challenged dynastic 
historiography, and thus contributed to narrative plurality, especially regarding the critical 
pre-Wahhabi situation.
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3. Particularistic Local Histories, 1920s to 1970s 
Between the 1920s and 1970s, it was not only historical works on the Saudi dynasty which 
proliferated. About a dozen major monographs and numerous articles on local history 
appeared too. These texts dealt with a variety of places in Najd, the Hejaz, Asir, the 
southern region of Jāzān as well as the eastern oases of al-Aḥsāʾ and al-Qaṭīf. Virtually all of 
their authors were indigenous Saudis. They were thus more homogeneous in their 
backgrounds than the authors of dynastic histories, who included many foreigners. Yet, as 
this chapter will show, local historians did not draw on a single tradition, like the Ibn 
Ghannām School of Najdi chroniclers. Nor did most of these historians gather in a single 
institution, like the royal court or the foreign ministry, as many of their dynastic counterparts 
did. Instead, they lived across the country and only started to form a loosely connected 
group in the decades after World War II, when a few of them established journals that 
served as platforms for local historiography. 
While local historians were primarily concerned with their own specific regions, their 
endeavours bore a common feature in relation to dynastic historiography: a particularistic 
expression of a local community’s historical independence from the Al Saud. Three related 
characteristics constituted this particularism. The first was the narration of local political, 
religious and social traditions that were often distant from the traditions of Najd or 
suppressed by the Al Saud and the Wahhabi mission. The second characteristic was the 
narration of a long, multi-dynastic local history as opposed to dynastic exclusivism, that is, 
the tendency to exclude periods without Saudi rule from the country’s history. The third 
characteristic of many Saudi local histories was an assertion of the presence of Islam even 
during periods before and without Saudi rule. This was in contrast to the takfīrist paradigm of 
dynastic histories, which assumed that Muslims not reached by the Wahhabi mission were 
infidels. 
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The production of particularistic histories was helped by the fact that nation building 
was in its infancy between the 1920s and 1970s. The different regions of the Hejaz, Asir, 
Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ were not only culturally distinct. They had also enjoyed political autonomy 
and, in the case of the Hejaz, even recognised statehood before the Saudi conquests in the 
early twentieth century.1 Regionalism remained especially strong in the Hejaz. Among the 
sources of this regionalism were the claims of the Hashemite family who continued to rule 
Transjordan and Iraq. Other sources include the more cosmopolitan environments of Mecca 
and Medina and the Red Sea trading port of Jeddah in comparison with Riyadh and other 
towns in southern Najd. Even decades after the Saudi conquest of the region in 1924–25, 
Hejazis often saw their own urban culture as ‘sophisticated’, in contrast to the ‘rough’ and 
austere Najdi culture, which they associated with the Bedouin.2 
Given the strong regionalism, the Saudi conquests in the early twentieth century led to 
resentment especially among the local elites, which culminated in several anti-Saudi 
rebellions. Pressure on their religious identity led the Shiites of al-Qaṭīf to take up arms in 
1927–28.3 In 1932, the Hejaz and Asir also witnessed rebellions. The organizers of these 
rebellions were wealthy Hejazi families, who opposed the Saudi exploitation of the Hejazi 
economy in the middle of the global economic crisis.4 In Asir, they found support in the 
region’s nominal ruler al-Ḥasan al-Idrīsī, who protested against the ‘outright annexation’ of 
his realm by the Saudis.5 Even after the Saudi government had crushed these rebellions 
resentment continued, especially in the Hejaz, and national integration was slow. Mixed 
marriages across regional and sectarian lines remained rare and were, in some cases, 
considered ‘shameful and sinful’.6 
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While the lack of sufficient national integration contributed to particularism, this 
chapter will investigate the ways in which globalization and state expansion shaped the 
emergence of these local histories. Globalization brought opportunities to study and publish 
abroad and increased access to foreign literature. In addition, it led to the establishment of 
the first modern schools influenced by foreign models. Growth of the Saudi state meant not 
only the institutionalization of censorship. It also brought the employment of an increasing 
number of people in the bureaucracy and the further development of the public education 
sector. In addition, state building involved a spatial re-organization of the country’s 
provinces, the subjects of many local histories. 
Narrating local political, religious and social traditions 
A major feature of the particularism of the Saudi local histories produced between the 1920s 
and 1970s was a narrative organized around local political, religious and social traditions 
suppressed under Saudi rule. The focus on these traditions was especially frequent in the 
Hejaz and Jāzān. Most local historians did not explicitly demand independence from the 
central government. Yet, their emphasis on local and regional traditions presented local 
communities as having been historically autonomous from the Al Saud and the Wahhabi 
mission. In some instances, local historians even explicitly lamented the destruction of local 
traditions by the Saudi conquests. This was in contrast to the takfīrist narratives in most 
dynastic histories, which presented the Saudis as bringing the light of Islam and political 
order against the background of ignorance, chaos and division. 
One of the first representatives of this particularistic local history approach was 
Ḥusayn Naṣīf (1905/6–547). He was a member of a prominent merchant family who 
benefitted from new opportunities in education brought about by globalization in the port city 
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of Jeddah. He was the grandson of an agent of the sharifs in Jeddah8 and a son of the 
scholar Muḥammad ibn Ḥusayn Naṣīf (1885–1971). This privileged background allowed him 
to study at the Falāḥ, ‘Success’, School in Jeddah, one of the first modern schools in the 
Arabian peninsula. 9 The school itself was part of a trans-regional network. Its founder and 
owner was the trader in pearls Muḥammad ʿAlī Zaynal Riḍā (1882/83–1969), who also 
created schools with the same name in Mecca, Bahrain, Dubai and Mumbai.10 
Naṣīf’s education and the increasing contacts between Jeddah and Egypt enabled 
him to publish a book with the title The Past and Present of the Hejaz. The author focused 
explicitly on the political traditions of the Hejaz, as he wanted to ‘leave the study of its 
environment and nature’ to a planned book by another graduate of the Falāḥ School.11 Two 
scholars with strong connections to Egypt helped and encouraged Naṣīf in writing his work. 
One of them was Maḥmūd Shākir (1909–97), an Egyptian writer and sharif. He had migrated 
to the Hejaz in 1928 and established a new primary school in Jeddah at the request of King 
Abdulaziz. The other supporter of Naṣīf was Aḥmad al-ʿArabī (1915–99), another sharif and 
a graduate of the Falāḥ School in Mecca. Al-ʿArabī incidentally formed part of the first Saudi 
student mission to Egypt, which the Egyptian-born official and dynastic historian Hafiz 
Wahba had initiated. He was one of the first Saudis with a modern university education in 
the early 1930s. Thanks to these men, Naṣīf was able to find a printing press in Cairo for his 
book on the Hejaz and thus to circumvent Saudi censorship.12 
In Naṣīf’s Past and Present of the Hejaz, there was no notion of a common political 
community shared with Najd or the Al Saud. Instead, the author sought to narrate the brief 
political tradition of an independent Hejazi nation in the early twentieth century. This was a 
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tradition that exclusivist Saudi dynastic histories largely ignored. Naṣīf began his book with a 
biography of Hussein (r. 1916–24), the first Hashemite king of the Hejaz, and concluded it 
with the surrender of Jeddah to Abdulaziz Al Saud in 1925. Drawing on the former Hejazi 
official gazette, al-Qiblah, Naṣīf gave detailed accounts of the Hashemite state in the Hejaz, 
including its finances, communications, schools and the judiciary. Celebrating local political 
traditions, the Hejazi author even printed images of Hussein and his sons, the Hashemite 
flag, coat of arms, and stamps.13 
Despite the prominence of the Hashemites in Naṣīf’s work, the book was more a 
Hejazi national history than a Hashemite dynastic chronicle. Naṣīf was primarily interested in 
the fate of the Hejaz rather than that of the Hashemites per se. Thus, he even praised the 
former Ottoman governor Vehib Pasha (1877–1940), whom Hussein had fought. The author 
narrated that with Vehib the Ottoman Empire had chosen a man ‘who combined the 
attributes and capabilities of a governor from administrative skills to intelligence, 
shrewdness, love of good, sympathy for the people, bravery, determination, and strictness’. 
According to Naṣīf, Vehib ‘rightly won the admiration of the wise men of the Hejaz’.14 In the 
later parts of his book, Naṣīf also told the history of the Hejazi National Party, which had 
ousted Hussein at a time when the Hashemites were losing the war against the Saudis in 
1924. Through his father, who had been co-founder of the party in 1924,15 Naṣīf was also 
able to access numerous letters between the party and the Hashemites. He published these 
letters and even included the party’s principles in his book. The first of them was explicitly 
anti-Saudi, namely ‘to seek by every means to save the country from the imminent 
catastrophe’, that is, the Saudi conquest.16 
Naṣīf not only narrated local political traditions. Drawing on foreign literature, he also 
discussed an important religious practice suppressed under the Saudi regime. This practice 
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was the usage of the maḥmal, a camel palanquin that carried the Kaaba’s cloth or kiswah 
from Cairo and other cities to Mecca. Saudi authorities had refused to admit it to Mecca in 
the early nineteenth century and again in the twentieth century on the ground that it was a 
heresy (bidʿah) and used as an object of prayers instead of God.17 In contrast to the dynastic 
author Hafiz Wahba, for instance,18 Naṣīf made no reference to the maḥmal being heretical. 
Instead, he presented the maḥmal as a legitimate historical tradition by narrating its long 
history. He explained that the practice began with the sultana of Egypt Shajar al-Durr (r. 
1250), who rode a camel with a palanquin as a pilgrim to Mecca in 1248. In addition, Naṣīf 
quoted an Egyptian traveller from the early twentieth century who stated that ‘the Prophet 
rode a maḥmal to Mecca with gifts for the Kaaba’.19 
At the time of the publication of his work in 1930, Ḥusayn Naṣīf was not alone in his 
concern for Hejazi political and religious traditions. He was part of a circle of similar-minded 
Hejazi nationalists, who were principally members of the elites of Jeddah and Mecca. In 
1932, a relative of Naṣīf and another co-founder of the Hejazi National Party, Muḥammad 
Ṣāliḥ Naṣīf (1895–1973), founded the newspaper Ṣawt al-Ḥijāz, ‘Voice of the Hejaz’, in 
Mecca. Just as Ḥusayn Naṣīf focused on Hejazi political traditions with hardly any praise for 
the Saudis, the editorial of the first issue of Ṣawt al-Ḥijāz in 1932 was, as one Hejazi writer 
commented later, ‘completely free from praise and glorification’ of the Saudi government and 
‘did not mention it at all’. Instead, the editorial claimed, it was ‘our sacred national duty to 
raise our voice in this newspaper in order to tell the world about the life of us, the Hejazi 
nation’.20 
The expression of Hejazi nationalism was helped by the fact that the Saudi 
government formally unified the dual Kingdom of the Hejaz and Najd only in 1932. Hence, 
the Hejaz as a legal entity continued to exist for eight years after the Saudi conquest of 
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Mecca in 1924. The regime, however, gradually suppressed this form of regionalism in order 
to consolidate its possessions. It banished the editor-in-chief of Ṣawt al-Ḥijāz from the Hejaz 
after the newspaper’s thirteenth issue. He was accused of ‘factionalism’ (ḥizbīyah) and 
‘spreading lies in inflating the incident of Ibn Rafādah’. This incident was the unsuccessful 
anti-Saudi rebellion in the Hejaz in 1932.21 
Over the following decades, an official emphasis on the social and political 
homogeneity of the kingdom led to suppression of the term ‘the Hejaz’, although no decree 
explicitly prohibited its usage.22 Ṣawt al-Ḥijāz only continued until 1941, when the 
government suspended all newspapers and magazines except Umm al-Qurá, the official 
gazette. This was justified with the shortage of newsprint during World War II. In 1953, Ṣawt 
al-Ḥijāz re-appeared under the new, national name al-Bilād al-Suʿūdīyah, ‘Saudi Land’. This 
name was later shortened to al-Bilād, ‘The Country’.23 It is not clear whether Naṣīf’s book on 
Hejaz was formally banned. Yet, the author did not realize his intention to publish a second 
volume of the work.24 Nor has a second edition appeared since. 
Despite the repression of Hejazi nationalism, the expansion of the Saudi state in its 
global context also indirectly facilitated the publication of some other Hejazi histories with 
underlying narratives of local traditionalism. One of the main figures was ‘Abd al-Quddoos 
al-Ansari (1905–83), another member of the group of new Hejazi writers that emerged with 
the expansion of modern education and increasing global connections. Al-Ansari studied at 
one of Medina’s first modern schools, the School of Legal Studies (Madrasat al-ʿUlūm al-
Sharʿīyah).25 At the same time, he read magazines imported from Egypt, including al-Balāgh 
al-Usbūʿī, al-Hilāl and al-Muqtaṭaf. They influenced him in adopting a plain prose instead of 
the prevalent rhymed prose (sajʿ), which he was learning at school. In the late 1920s, few 
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Saudi periodicals existed, through which al-Ansari could have gained experience as a writer. 
He was, however, able to place articles in a number of foreign print media. Besides al-
Muqtaṭaf, the media included al-Murshid al-ʿArabī, a Yemeni newspaper, and al-ʿĀlam al-
Islāmī, a periodical from Sumatra.26 
Thanks to his modern education, al-Ansari quickly found employment in the 
expanding Saudi bureaucracy. This provided him with a salary that financed his writing 
about local history. After his graduation from the School of Legal Studies in 1928, he 
became one of the youngest employees in the diwan of the new Saudi governor of Medina. 
This position allowed al-Ansari to publish a book on The Ancient Monuments of Medina, in 
which he explored the Ottoman and pre-Ottoman heritage of his hometown. In the absence 
of many local presses before World War II, he used a Damascene publisher to print the book 
in 1935. Al-Ansari thus benefitted, as dynastic authors did, from foreign expertise in 
typesetting and printing that was still unavailable in Saudi Arabia.27 In addition, globalization 
facilitated the publication of his book by creating international demand, especially among the 
increasing number of pilgrims to the holy sites of Medina. An abridged version of The 
Ancient Monuments of Medina was reportedly translated into French and Indonesian.28 
Apart from paying al-Ansari a salary, the Saudi state supported him in publishing the 
magazine al-Manhal, ‘The Spring’, which became a new medium for local historiography. 
This periodical covered literary texts as well as articles on a broad range of topics, including 
social sciences, ethics, linguistics, geography and the natural sciences. Between 1937 and 
1981 alone, al-Manhal also published forty-four articles on the history of regions, towns and 
villages in Saudi Arabia. In addition, it featured dozens of biographical articles about local 
scholars and other historical figures.29 The government hesitated to allow the establishment 
of such a privately owned literary magazine. Despite al-Ansari’s work for the state, it only 
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granted him a licence about seven years after his initial application and following a review of 
his personal history and a sample of his writings.30 Thereafter, however, the state assisted 
al-Ansari considerably. The governmental Umm al-Qurá Press, which also issued the official 
newspaper, printed some of the first issues of al-Manhal in 1937. In an interview in 1964, al-
Ansari acknowledged that the government ‘extended much help to the magazine, foremost 
of which is free airmailing privileges inside the country and abroad, placing of ads for some 
of its ministries and major branches, and tax exemption for the paper’.31 
In overcoming the government’s initial resistance to the founding of his magazine, al-
Ansari benefitted from the Arab nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments that some foreign-
born members of the Saudi government held at the time. The writer described his magazine 
in 1928/29 as a means to ‘defend Arabism and Islam’ against ‘the Westernization of 
everything’.32 Specifically, he sought to fight the ‘change from the Arabic to the Latin 
alphabet’, which had happened in Turkey. He also claimed to resist ‘the abolition of the 
Arabic grammar and the replacement of the standard language by the vernacular in its 
various forms in the Arab and Muslim countries’.33 With this agenda, al-Ansari gained the 
support of the Syrian-born Arab nationalist and dynastic historian Fuad Hamza, who was 
then the Saudi deputy foreign minister. Thanks to Hamza’s intervention, al-Ansari finally 
gained the licence for al-Manhal alongside exemption from the legal deposit fee in 1937.34 
Perhaps helped by the fact that al-Ansari’s son Nabīh (b. 1937/38) worked as 
supervisor of printing in the Saudi Ministry of Information for many years,35 the Hejazi editor 
enjoyed considerable freedom in publishing texts on local history. These texts included Our 
Recent History, a series of articles on modern Hejazi history mixed with autobiographical 
accounts by ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq Naqshabandī (1904–88). Naqshabandī was a poet and writer who 
                                                   
30 Jones, Desert Kingdom (2010), 277. 
31 Aramco, “Portrait” (1964), 6. 
32 Taqī al-Dīn, Majallat al-manhal, vol. 2 (1986), 315.   
33 ʿAbd Allāh al-Qaḥṭānī, Al-kashshāf (1994), 30. 
34 Ibid., 26–27. 
35 Ibid., 3. ʿAbd al-Ghanī, “Mudīr” (2009). 
  
100 
had benefitted from the increasing connections between the Hejaz and the rest of the world. 
These connections allowed him to receive an education in India, Greater Syria as well as 
Medina.36 In Our Recent History, published in 1963, Naqshabandī narrated the Saudi–
Hashemite war in 1924–25 from a Hejazi perspective and without any concessions to Saudi 
versions of this event. He even reproduced pro-Hashemite lyrics as he recalled his 
excitement about the Saudi–Hashemite war while studying in Medina. He wrote, ‘what 
increased our vigour and enthusiasm were those songs that reached us from Syria, 
Lebanon, and Mecca. We used to sing them in the schoolyard in the morning and evening. 
Most of them praised Hussein and the Hashemite house. There is no objection to giving 
some examples: (1) Oh great lord, pride of all Arabs, magnificent King; your ancestor was 
the Prophet. [Oh soldiers,] March towards the King to rescue the homeland! Attack the 
enemies to save the homeland!’37 
The Hejaz remained the only region, in which historians presented the past in the 
framework of an independent ‘nation’. Yet, local authors elsewhere also emphasized non-
Saudi political traditions, which dynastic histories excluded. Muḥammad al-ʿAqīlī (1918–
2002) in Jāzān is a pertinent example. He illustrates how the expanding Saudi state 
indirectly facilitated such historiography by employing locals in the bureaucracy and thus 
providing them with an income that paid for their research expenses. Born in the town of 
Ṣabyā, al-ʿAqīlī received a religious education from his father, a scholar, as well as other 
ulema in the region. Subsequently, he worked for the Saudi government in various positions. 
In 1937, he began working for the Ministry of Finance in Jāzān and eventually became the 
director of the local department of revenues. In 1957, al-ʿAqīlī administered Jāzān’s 
orphanage and subsequently was appointed a member of Jāzān’s Municipal Council (al-
Majlis al-Baladī) and Administrative Council (al-Majlis al-Idārī).38 These appointments offered 
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him sufficient material security to facilitate years of research in his spare time. It also allowed 
him to build up a private library. By 1963, this library contained more than thirty-five 
manuscripts, on which he had spent ‘large amounts’.39 The research culminated in the 
publication of his first book in 1958: The History of al-Mikhlāf al-Sulaymānī or the Arab South 
in History.40 Al-Mikhlāf al-Sulaymānī, ‘the Sulaymānid District’, was the traditional name for 
the region around Jāzān.41 
Employment in the administration of his home region, which lasted for more than three 
decades until his retirement in 1972,42 indirectly fostered al-ʿAqīlī’s engaging in local 
historiography. For his fiscal and political work, he presumably needed to gather information 
about, and keep records of, local social and genealogical relations as well as the property of 
individuals, families, and tribes. This probably encouraged encyclopaedic interests,43 but 
only on the local level. Besides his History of al-Mikhlāf al-Sulaymānī, al-ʿAqīlī published 
articles on geography, a book on ancient ruins, a vernacular dictionary and a literary history. 
Yet, he kept his focus in all of these works on Jāzān.44 Even in 1992 he still seemed to have 
been more devoted to Jāzān than to any other place. He stated, ‘our lives do not belong to 
any of us. They belong to the history of Jāzān. Thus, I write it with sincerity and honesty for 
generations’.45 
Al-ʿAqīlī’s employment in local administration facilitated a particularistic portrayal of the 
past by providing him with access to many local sources. Well connected through his fiscal 
and municipal work, the author was able to interview various heads of villages and local 
tribes and even a former servant of the Idrīsids who had ruled the region between 1908 and 
1930. He thus gathered information, which historians of the Al Saud had missed or chosen 
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to ignore.46 Moreover, while twentieth-century dynastic historians relied on the Ibn Ghannām 
School of Najdi chronicles, al-ʿAqīlī accessed the letters by Muḥammad ibn Idrīs (1876–
1923), the ruler of his hometown Ṣabyā, as well as manuscript annals of local dynasties.47 
He even edited an anti-Wahhabi chronicle of a local ruler entitled The Fragrance of Aloes: 
The History of the Dynasty of Sharif Ḥumūd.48 
The influx of literature from abroad benefitted al-ʿAqīlī’s exploration of the non-
Wahhabi past too. It allowed him to avoid relying on the chronicles of the Ibn Ghannām 
School, on which dynastic historiography was based. In his History of al-Mikhlāf al-
Sulaymānī, he drew, for instance, on the History of the Islamic Peoples by the German 
orientalist Carl Brockelmann (1868–1956).49 A Lebanese private press had published this 
work in Arabic only a few years before al-ʿAqīlī wrote his history.50 Al-ʿAqīlī could also rely on 
the library of his father in Ṣabyā, which contained about 300 works. These works included 
not only classical texts, such as the historical manual Erudition (al-Maʿārif) by the Kufa-born 
judge ʿAbd Allāh ibn Qutaybah (828–89). They also comprised modern books from outside 
the Arabian peninsula, like the Arabic Encyclopaedia by Buṭrus al-Bustānī (1819–83) from 
Mount Lebanon.51 
Al-ʿAqīlī’s devotion to Jāzān and its past did not mean that he saw his home region in 
complete isolation or that he did not imagine any larger communities. In fact, he was very 
affected by the rise of Arab nationalism in the 1950s. In his History of al-Mikhlāf al-
Sulaymānī, he asserted that the history of his region ‘is in fact a part of the history of the 
Arab nation and its families and the history of its vast lands’.52 It is thus not so much part of 
Saudi Arabia. Moreover, al-ʿAqīlī even proclaimed to serve Arab unity. He wrote, ‘I hope to 
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have contributed to this blessed renaissance and passionate consciousness in this important 
phase of the noble Arab nation, which has begun to complete the building of its unity’.53 In 
this statement, he seemed to refer to the merger of Egypt and Syria that took place in 1958, 
the same year as his book’s publication. Consequently, the author from Jāzān also 
addressed this work to a pan-Arab rather than a local audience. He stated in the 
introduction, ‘I hope to receive encouragement from my brothers, the sons of the Arab nation 
in the Arab homeland. This will drive me to finish the remaining two volumes.’54 
Despite his pan-Arab professions, the focus of the History of al-Mikhlāf al-Sulaymānī, 
however, remained on Jāzān and neighbouring regions, especially Yemen and Asir. Al-ʿAqīlī 
focused mainly on the political traditions of these regions. In the first part of his work, he 
discussed ‘the most famous ancient governments’ in Yemen, and gave accounts of the 
Sabaeans and of Yemen during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods. Entering early modern 
and modern times, he focused on Jāzān, narrating the fate of various local dynasties and 
rulers until the Idrīsids, who finally surrendered to King Abdulaziz. Only a few chapters 
referred to the Saudi dynasty and the Wahhabi mission. These dealt with the Wahhabi 
expansion in the area during the early nineteenth century and Saudi–Idrīsid relations.55 
Local sources provided al-ʿAqīlī with material on local political and religious traditions. 
On their basis, the author from Jāzān dedicated chapters to the history of the Ismaili dynasty 
of the Ṣulayḥids (c. 1047–1138) and the Sufi Idrīsids.56 He also conceived the ‘Wahhabi-
Salafi mission’ as only one of several ‘religious and political currents and factors’ fighting 
over Jāzān for much of the nineteenth century. One of them was Zaydism, which Sharif 
Ḥumūd’s Āl Khayrāt dynasty supported. Another one was the Aḥmadīyah Sufi order, which 
‘found the way paved for extending its spiritual authority over the people’.57 
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Al-ʿAqīlī’s discussion of local traditions was in line with his aim to serve Arab 
nationalism and bring about a social revolution that would remove religious and class 
differences. In his introduction to the History of al-Mikhlāf al-Sulaymānī, he stated that ‘the 
modern approach to writing history requires rational deduction in the broadest areas of 
thought’. The author claimed to use this approach in order to ‘abolish the differences 
between the classes of the one nation’. These differences ‘divide and waste energy through 
sectarian conflicts and tribal hatred, thus corrupting the healthy body of the nation’.58 
Based on local primary sources and foreign secondary literature, al-ʿAqīlī even 
authored a monograph on Sufism in Tihāmah. ‘Abd al-Quddoos al-Ansari helped to publish it 
in Jeddah in 1964. This book gave detailed biographies of twenty-five Sufi leaders who lived 
in Jāzān and northern Yemen between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. As his 
monograph was published inside the kingdom, it is not surprising that al-ʿAqīlī at least paid 
lip service to Wahhabi condemnations of the Sufis’ belief system. He stated about Sufism 
that, ‘without any doubt, it is a heresy [min al-bidaʿ]’.59 However, with his view that all 
religious traditions formed part of the Arab nation’s history, he defended the study of such a 
‘very delicate’ topic.60 ‘I believe’, he wrote, ‘that as a nation we must benefit from the 
experiences and lessons of our past by studying them in depth, with sincerity and in the light 
of the spirit of religion, with which God has fostered the Arabs.’61 
Besides local political and religious traditions, some local historians, particularly in the 
Hejaz, also narrated local social and cultural heritage. They thus presented their region as 
having been culturally autonomous from the Najdi centre in the past.62 An important author 
in this field was Muḥammad ʿAlī Maghribī (b. 1913/14). Born in Jeddah, he studied at the 
city’s Falāḥ School, which had already educated Ḥusayn Naṣīf, the author of The Past and 
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Present of the Hejaz. Subsequently, Maghribī entered the emerging Hejazi literary scene 
and publishing industry. In 1941, he worked briefly as editor of Ṣawt al-Ḥijāz, and, after 
World War II, for the newspaper’s successor, al-Bilād.63 This work for Hejazi newspapers led 
Maghribī to study Hejaz’s political and social traditions. In 1981, he published a lexicon on 
Great Figures of the Hejaz, 1883–1980.64 Besides this, he also wrote three books on the 
Medina-based early Islamic caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman.65 This biographical 
research led him to investigate the social context of prominent Hejazis, which culminated in 
the publication of a book on Features of the Social Life in the Hejaz in 1982.66 
Maghribī celebrated past Hejazi culture without reference to Wahhabi teachings. In his 
Features of the Social Life in the Hejaz, he described Sufi practices and included colourful 
drawings of Hejazi women singing and dancing without wearing veils.67 In addition, with a 
clear sense of nostalgia, he described Hejazi musical traditions that had declined and 
stopped under Saudi rule. He wrote, ‘singing was the most prominent original Hejazi art in 
the 1920s and 1930s. Mecca was distinguished by two stars during that time, who were 
leaders of this art: Sheikh Ismāʿīl Kardūs and Sheikh Ḥasan Jāwah.’ Both ‘gave concerts that 
were always held at the big weddings in Mecca and Jeddah’.68 
The narration of local traditions occasionally entailed negative views of the Saudi 
conquests that had put an end to them. Such views characterized the book Mecca in the 
Fourteenth Islamic Century (i.e. 1882–1979). It was written by the Meccan writer Muḥammad 
ʿUmar Rafīʿ and published posthumously in 1981 by the Mecca Cultural Club. Incidentally, 
Rafīʿ also benefitted from state employment as he worked for the Saudi Directorate of 
Education. He gained familiarity with foreign literature early in his life, as he travelled to 
India, the Malay Peninsula and Turkey as well as a number of Arab countries in the 1920s 
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and 1930s.69 Like Maghribī’s work on Features of the Social Life in the Hejaz, Rafīʿ’s book 
focused on Hejazi social traditions. It included chapters on Meccan houses, furniture, dress, 
food and beverages, wedding customs, transportation, economy, the local vernacular, 
proverbs, education and the press.70 
With regard to the Saudi conquest of Mecca in 1924, Rafīʿ depicted the desperation of 
the city’s inhabitants, after the Ikhwān had ‘occupied’ it in the name of King Abdulaziz. ‘The 
prices of everyday commodities and especially of food were soaring’, he wrote, ‘and the city 
and its inhabitants worried in silence not knowing how this situation would end’. ‘Intense 
arguments between the Bedouin soldiers and some inhabitants frequently arose. When one 
of the Ikhwān caught sight of a cigarette in the hand of an inhabitant or its light from afar, the 
devil rode him. He started a brawl that led to fighting and beating, in which the Bedouin 
soldier was the one with the loudest voice and the gun in his hands.’ Rafīʿ also negatively 
portrayed the enforcement of the Wahhabi public order by the Ikhwān in Mecca. He stated 
that ‘they started to destroy the graves of the Hashemites in the graveyard of al-Maʿlá. They 
also announced a ban on smoking and the punishment of flogging for anyone, who engaged 
it, as well as a ban on everything they considered a heresy [bidʿah].’71 
Perennialism 
The narration of local political, religious and social traditions was not the only means by 
which historians expressed the historical autonomy of their towns and regions from the 
Saudi dynasty and dynastic historiography. The particularism of local histories received 
further strengthening from ‘perennialist’ narratives.72 These narratives stressed the 
continued existence or recurrent rise of a town or region over many centuries or even 
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millennia. By emphasizing a continuous history under various leaders and governors over 
such long periods, local historians gave a city or region an identity that in the long term 
allows it to survive the coming and going of individual rulers.73 
To be sure, not all particularistic histories shared perennialism. The scope of Ḥusayn 
Naṣīf’s The Past and Present of the Hejaz, for instance, was limited to the early twentieth 
century, when the Hejaz was an independent state.74 However, perennialism was a 
recurrent feature, as, for instance, in Muḥammad al-ʿAqīlī’s work. By starting his History of al-
Mikhlāf al-Sulaymānī with accounts of the ancient Yemeni civilizations, south-west Arabia as 
a historical entity appeared to have existed for thousands of years before the appearance of 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century.75 
Another prominent local historian besides al-ʿAqīlī, who combined the narration of local 
traditions with perennialism, was Ahmad Subaʻi (1905–84). Born into a middle-class family in 
Mecca, he was, like Naṣīf, one of the first Hejazis to receive a modern education. Suba‘i 
attended the city’s Hashemite School, which taught mathematics, literature, and history 
alongside Koranic recitation and other subjects.76 This education prepared him for two years 
of studies at the Coptic High School in Alexandria.77 After his return to Mecca, he retained an 
interest in foreign social and literary trends, reading books and journals that Meccan 
intellectuals brought back from travels to Egypt.78 
With his relatively high level of education in the Saudi context, Suba‘i, like Maghribī, 
joined the Hejazi newspaper industry, which grew in the 1920s and 1930s and again after 
World War II. This provided him with experience in writing and publishing that was beneficial 
for his historiography. After publishing a few articles in the official gazette Umm al-Qurá,79 he 
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worked for Ṣawt al-Ḥijāz, one of the main forums for young Hejazi writers,80 and became its 
editor-in-chief. When Ṣawt al-Ḥijāz stopped publication during the war, Subaʻi relied, as 
many of his colleagues did, on the state for an income, working as an inspector for the 
Ministry of Finance. In the 1950s, however, he returned to the publishing industry, founding 
the magazine al-Quraysh (Muhammad’s tribe) in Mecca in 1959.81 
Influenced by his education, his readings of Egyptian literature and involvement in the 
community of Hejazi journalists, Subaʻi became a liberal social critic and an innovative writer 
who sought to push the boundaries set by Wahhabi ulema and religious conservatives 
generally. Already in the 1930s, decades before the establishment of the first state schools 
for girls in 1960, he published articles in support of female education. Frequently, he used 
pseudonyms like ‘girl of the Hejaz’ or ‘Khadījah’, which was the name of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s first wife.82 In the literary field, Suba‘i founded one of the country’s first 
theatres in Mecca. Signifying his attachment to Mecca, he also called it ‘al-Quraysh’ and 
intended to stage a play on The Conquest of Mecca (by Muhammad in 630). Yet, he 
reportedly closed the theatre due to pressure by ‘conservatives’.83 
While Subaʻi looked outside of the Hejaz for education and literary inspiration, his 
historical interests were centred on his hometown Mecca. As a young man, he worked as a 
hajj operator or muṭawwif for several years, bringing pilgrims from neighbouring countries to 
Mecca and guiding them to the city’s sacred sites.84 He thus benefitted from an increase in 
the number of pilgrims after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.85 This work fostered 
Suba‘i’s wish to write a comprehensive history of Mecca, which he initially planned together 
with another Hejazi journalist and friend of his. In 1937 and 1950, ‘Abd al-Quddoos al-Ansari 
also allowed him to publish two articles on Meccan and Hejazi history in al-Manhal. In 1953 
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and after years of work, Subaʻi finally published a monograph with the title The History of 
Mecca: Studies in Politics, Scholarship, Society and Civilization.86 
Subaʻi’s History of Mecca expressed a strong perennialism that portrayed Mecca as 
having existed since the beginnings of humanity. In one of the first chapters, the author 
stated that ‘Mecca has been known for long, immemorial times before the time of Abraham’. 
‘The Kaaba was a meeting place of people before its construction by Abraham, as many 
Muslim sources tell us.’87 Over several hundreds of pages, Subaʻi then followed the course 
of Mecca through the ages of Ishmael, the Quraysh, the Prophet Muhammad, the 
Umayyads, Abbasids, Fatimids, Ayyubids and Mamluks. After that, Subaʻi focused on how 
Mecca passed through the ‘age of the Ottoman Turks’, ‘the first Saudi age’ in the early 
nineteenth century, ‘Muhammad Ali’s age’ and ‘the second Ottoman age’. The book ended 
with Mecca under the Hashemites.88 
Subaʻi’s perennialism was facilitated by the influx of literature from abroad. This 
literature provided rich information about the pre-Wahhabi past of Mecca in contrast to the 
Najdi chronicles of the Ibn Ghannām School. Already by the middle of the nineteenth 
century, the Ottomans had refilled the stocks of the local libraries, which had suffered from 
looting and destruction after the Saudi conquest of the city a few decades earlier. This 
formed part of wider Ottoman subsidies and support for the Hejaz as a province whose 
possession lent great prestige to the Sultans.89 Sultan Abdülmecid (r. 1839–61) sent a library 
of more than 3,000 books to Mecca, which formed the basis of the library of the grand 
mosque. In 1927/28, another library of more than 1,000 volumes belonging to Muḥammad 
al-Shirwānī (d. 1875/76), a former Ottoman governor of the Hejaz, was added to its growing 
collection.90 In these and other libraries, Subaʻi was able to access works by a number of 
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medieval Muslim chroniclers, which he repeatedly cited in his History of Mecca. The 
chroniclers included Ibn Hishām (d. 833 or 828), al-Masʿūdī (d. 956), Ibn Khaldūn (1332–
1406) and al-Maqrīzī (d. 1442).91 
In one important respect, the Saudi state inadvertently facilitated Subaʻi’s 
perennialism. In the 1930s, it supported the publication of a chronicle of Mecca by the ninth-
century scholar al-Azraqī. Its editor was the Palestinian-born Rushdī Malḥas (d. 1959), one 
of the many foreigners in the service of the expanding state. Malḥas worked as editor-in-
chief of Umm al-Qurá and subsequently as assistant to the Syrian-born official Youssef 
Yassin in the royal court. The edition of al-Azraqī was itself  based on an earlier edition by 
the German orientalist Ferdinand Wüstenfeld (1808–99) as well as Hejazi manuscripts.92 As 
one of few historical works not belonging to the Ibn Ghannām School, King Abdulaziz 
ordered the purchase of copies of it and their free distribution.93 Ahmad Subaʻi thus found it 
easy to rely on al-Azraqī’s work in his accounts of Mecca’s pre-Islamic and early Muslim 
past.94 
Support for al-Azraqī’s history of Mecca as a work on the early Muslim community in 
Mecca—and thus on the ‘pious ancestors’ (salaf)—was in line with Abdulaziz’s sponsorship 
of Salafi and Wahhabi literature in general.95 However, increasing demand for historical 
accounts of Mecca through the expansion of the hajj industry perhaps also played a role in 
the publication of al-Azraqī’s book and Suba‘i’s history itself. After a low of only 20,000 
foreign pilgrims during the Great Depression in 1933, the number of hajj arrivals reached 
about 50,000 in 1937 and 150,000 in 1953, when Subaʻi’s book was first published. One 
factor behind this increase in the number of pilgrims was the development of international 
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transport, including air transport after World War II. Another factor was the ‘security’ that the 
expanding Saudi state was able to enforce in the Hejaz after the 1920s.96 
A direct link between the increase in the number of pilgrims and the publication of al-
Azraqī’s and Suba‘i’s histories is difficult to establish. However, the publication of yet another 
book by a Mecca bookseller in 1951 indicates such a link. This book was the chronicle of 
Mecca by the sixteenth-century scholar Quṭb al-Dīn al-Ḥanafī.97 The declared aim behind its 
publication was to ‘satisfy the needs of the pilgrims who ask the hajj guides, teachers, and 
servants of the grand mosques about certain topics’.98 
While pre-modern chronicles provided material for Subaʻi’s perennialism, twentieth-
century works also influenced his writing. Combined with the writer’s interest in social issues, 
foreign works inspired a new methodology. Suba’i mentioned that historical works by the 
Egyptian writer Ṭaha Ḥusayn (1889–1973) influenced his style of referencing.99 Moreover, 
the Meccan writer investigated not only political events, but also social and cultural history. 
This is indicated in the sub-title of his work, Studies in Politics, Scholarship, Society and 
Civilization. Suba‘i also claimed to give a more analytical account of Meccan politics than his 
predecessors had done. He complained that a previous group of Meccan chroniclers ‘was 
not as concerned with the details of politics as the philosophy of history is. Mostly, it was 
satisfied with mentioning an instance of strife in Mecca or Arafat, the name of the person 
responsible, and its result. It neither investigated the conditions that led to its outbreak nor its 
diplomatic consequences.’100  
Subaʻi’s interest in social and cultural history added a further dimension to his 
perennialism that put his History of Mecca in contrast not only to contemporary Saudi 
dynastic histories but also to earlier Muslim historiography. The writer reframed Mecca as a 
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city as viewed by its inhabitants, that is, a mundane city with a role beyond Islamic salvation 
history. As such, Mecca appeared to possess a history worth narrating even after the seat of 
the caliphate was lost to Damascus in the seventh century. In this vein, Subaʻi criticized pre-
modern Arab chroniclers for ignoring centuries of the Meccan past. He wrote that ‘most 
chroniclers among our ancestors treated the history of Mecca unjustly, a fact for which they 
are not to blame’. Suba‘i explained that ‘their perspective on the history of the region was 
purely Islamic. The historians were interested in this region during the time, when it was the 
cradle of the Arabs and produced the lord of the Arabs.’ After the period of the early caliphs, 
‘their pens followed the Muslim caliphate to Syria and subsequently to Baghdad. They left 
the Hejaz and mentioned it only occasionally, when the context demanded.’101 
Perennialism was not restricted to Mecca, but reached even historians of places with 
a much poorer tradition of pre-modern historiography. A pertinent example is the work The 
Gift of the Beneficiary of al-Aḥsāʾ’s Ancient and Modern History. Muḥammad Āl ʿAbd al-
Qādir (1894–1971), another author who benefitted from employment by the state, published 
it in two volumes in 1960 and 1963.102 From the town of al-Mubarraz in al-Aḥsāʾ, Āl ʿAbd al-
Qādir served as that town’s judge at the appointment of King Abdulaziz from 1925 until his 
retirement in 1961/62. In addition, he taught in local schools and headed the education 
board of al-Aḥsāʾ from 1941 to 1945.103 
Āl ʿAbd al-Qādir’s work for the state contributed to his engagement in local 
historiography in various indirect ways. Like al-ʿAqīlī in his fiscal work, Āl ʿAbd al-Qādir as a 
judge also needed to know local social, genealogical and property relations. This fostered an 
interest in the local past. In addition, thanks to his relatively high income and connections to 
other ulema, he was able to accumulate one of the largest private libraries in al-Aḥsāʾ, which 
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included rare historical manuscripts dating back to the eleventh century.104 While his salary 
would have allowed him to publish the work at his own expense, transnational connections 
rendered this unnecessary. The Qatari sheikh ʿAlī Āl Thānī (r. 1949–60), who was also a 
sponsor of other Muslim historical works, agreed to subsidize the publication of The Gift of 
the Beneficiary.105 
Based on a number of pre-modern Arabic works, Āl ʿAbd al-Qādir conceived a much 
longer history of al-Aḥsāʾ than most dynastic authors did. He first gave geographical 
descriptions of the region taken largely from the Lexicon of Regions (Muʿjam al-buldān) by 
Yāqūt (1179–1229). Subsequently, and similar to Suba‘i in relation to Mecca, he emphasized 
al-Aḥsāʾ’s passage from pre-Islamic times to the Prophet Muhammad, the Umayyad, 
Abbasid and Qarmaṭian dynasties, and ultimately to the Saudi and Ottoman periods. In his 
narration, Āl ʿAbd al-Qādir drew on further pre-modern works, including Ibn al-Athīr’s 
Complete History and The Fulfilment of Faithfulness (Wafāʾ al-wafāʾ), a chronicle of Medina 
by al-Samhūdī (1440–1506).106 
British penetration of Eastern Arabia and Saudi state building facilitated Āl ʿAbd al-
Qādir’s perennialism by contributing to territorial understandings of al-Aḥsāʾ. These 
understandings allowed al-Aḥsāʾ as a spatially rather than tribally defined entity to move 
through time and survive the shifts of political influences intact. Al-Aḥsāʾ and Najd emerged 
as fix and ‘bounded’ areas in the reports, guides, handbooks, and maps used by the British 
personnel stationed in the region. Discussions on imaginary boundary lines preceded the 
publication of John Gordon Lorimer’s (1870-1914) Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 'Oman, 
and Central Arabia in 1908. This gazetteer was the largest compendium on the Gulf 
produced by the government of India.107 At the ʿUqayr conference in 1922, the British and 
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Abdulaziz Al Saud defined Najd and al-Aḥsāʾ’s borders with Kuwait and Iraq. At the time, it 
seems that Abdulaziz did not share the concept of physically defined borders. Percy Cox, 
the British High Commissioner in Baghdad, reprimanded him for his ‘childish attitude’ in 
imagining boundaries based on tribal loyalties.108 In the following year, the London-based 
finance group Eastern and General Syndicate obtained a concession for oil exploration in al-
Aḥsāʾ. Although this concession ended a few years later, both sides had thus delineated the 
borders of al-Aḥsāʾ.109 
In the case of Asir, the production of territorial understandings by foreign powers and 
Saudi state building was even more radical than in al-Aḥsāʾ. It turned a confederation of 
tribes into a province, thus allowing for an Asiri local instead of tribal history to be written. 
Asir, as the name of a region, was probably an Egyptian or Ottoman invention. Before the 
nineteenth century, ‘Asir’ meant a tribal confederation centred on the town of Abhā in a 
mountain range called al-Sarāt or Sarāt ʿAsīr. Only during Muhammad Ali’s campaigns 
beginning in 1834 did the notion of Asir as a separate region intervening between the Hejaz 
and Yemen develop. In 1872, the Ottomans created a district (mutaṣarrifīyah) around Abhā 
belonging to the province of Yemen.110 After the Saudis had defeated the regional dynasty of 
the Āl ʿĀʾiḍ in the 1920s, they established Asir as a province led by an ‘emir’, or governor. 
This province subsequently gained clearly defined administrative borders, including with 
Yemen to the south after the treaty of Ta’if in 1934.111 
One of the first authors who took up the task of writing a history of the new province of 
Asir was Hāshim al-Niʿmī (b. 1921/22). He received a traditional education under ulema but 
also benefitted from state-provided education. The son of a judge, he went to a Koranic 
school or kuttāb in his birthplace, a village near Abhā, and attended the first governmental 
primary school in Abhā after it opened in 1936/37. Subsequently, al-Niʿmī studied Hadith, 
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Koranic exegesis (tafsīr) and Arabic under scholars in Mecca’s grand mosque from 1939 to 
1942. In addition, he developed his historical interest by reading a variety of medieval 
annals. They included Ibn al-Athīr’s Complete History, al-Ṭabarī’s (838–923) History of 
Prophets and Kings (Tārīkh al-rusul wa-al-mulūk) and Ibn Kathīr’s The Beginning and the 
End.112 
Upon his return from his studies in Mecca, state employment also facilitated al-Niʿmī’s 
particularistic historiography. The scholar taught jurisprudence and Arabic grammar at 
Abhā’s primary school, and served as judge of several Asiri towns, including Abhā, between 
1946 and 1991.113 His legal work further deepened his interest in local history and 
genealogy, as it presumably required him to learn the tribal and family relations of claimants 
and defendants. His contacts with other scholars in the region and relative affluence also 
allowed him to accumulate a private library of several thousand volumes, including many 
manuscripts, where he is said to have spent up to six or seven hours a day reading.114 In 
addition, similar to al-ʿAqīlī’s case, al-Niʿmī’s position as a judge probably facilitated his 
access to senior informants, such as sheikhs of Asiri towns and villages.115 
As al-Niʿmī spent most of his professional life in his home region dealing with local 
affairs, such as property disputes between local tribes and families, he developed 
encyclopaedic interests in his home region—as al-ʿAqīlī did in Jāzān. Al-Niʿmī’s writings were 
mainly restricted to Asir but focused on many different aspects. The writings included a 
biographical lexicon of Asiri scholars, a geographical dictionary of the region, a history of 
Abhā, a book on the lineages of Asiri tribes, as well as a manuscript entitled Asir between 
Geography and History.116 Perhaps his most important historical work, however, was his first 
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book: The History of Asir in the Past and Present, published in 1962. With his salary as a 
judge, al-Niʿmī was able to print it at his own expense.117 
Saudi state building incidentally fostered al-Niʿmī’s writing in another way. It brought 
people from outside Asir to the region, people whose observations provoked a local reaction. 
The deputy foreign minister and dynastic historian Fuad Hamza led an expedition to the 
region in 1934 in the context of border conflicts with Yemen and recorded geographical, 
social and historical information in a book in 1951.118 In 1940, the Directorate of Education 
also sent the Meccan local historian Muḥammad Rafīʿ to Asir. Rafīʿ worked as director of the 
school of Rijāl Almaʿ and established several other schools in southern Saudi Arabia.119 In 
1954, he published his observations of the region in a book entitled In the Quarters of Asir.120 
Al-Niʿmī was dissatisfied with these outsiders writing about his region. He wrote, ‘I am not the 
first writer who attempted or thought about writing about the history of this part of our 
beloved homeland known as the region of Asir’. Yet, al-Niʿmī found previous works 
‘extremely brief’. According to him, they ‘look at the history of this region from a narrow angle 
that does not give it the position that it deserves.’121 
Al-Niʿmī conceived Asir as a territory corresponding to the new administrative 
definition. Reflecting remnants of older identities, however, he also spoke of Asiri tribesmen 
and their customs. His perennialism thus had both a tribal and territorial dimension. The 
judge began his historical account with a chapter on ‘the Arabs before Islam’ and their 
ancestors in traditional Arab genealogy, ʿAdnān and Qaḥṭān.122 He thus provided the Asiris 
with a primordial ancestry that formed the basis of his perennialism. In the latter parts of The 
History of Asir, he switched from a genealogical to a territorial definition of Asir, conceiving it 
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as a ‘region’ (bilād) rather than a tribal confederation.123 This allowed him to present a 
continuous, uninterrupted sequence of Asiri emirs. In his presentation of ‘emirs’, he exploited 
the double sense of the word as ‘princes’ and ‘provincial governors’. Thus, in his account, 
the ‘emirs’ of Asir Turkī al-Sudayrī and ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-ʿAskar, who were in fact Saudi 
governors and from Najd, followed the ‘emirs’ of Asir from the local dynasty of the Āl ʿĀʾiḍ.124 
Thereby, the Asiri entity appeared to endure regime changes intact and to some extent 
autonomously from developments in the rest of Arabia. 
While perennialism strengthened a local identity independent from the Al Saud, this 
feature of particularism was rather subtle and was not seen as challenging Saudi rule 
directly. As a result, the government did not categorically repress this kind of historiography. 
State agencies allowed the publications of six editions of Subaʻi’s History of Mecca alone in 
Saudi Arabia up to 1984.125 Similarly, al-ʿAqīlī’s History of al-Mikhlāf al-Sulaymānī 
reappeared twice in print up to 1989.126 Moreover, at various points in time the state even 
subsidized re-editions of some perennialist local histories. The government re-issued Subaʻi 
and al-Niʿmī’s works within the frame of the kingdom’s centennial celebrations in 1999.127 
In one major instance, a governmental agency even commissioned the production of a 
perennialist local history. This was the History of Jeddah by ‘Abd al-Quddoos al-Ansari,  the 
editor of the magazine al-Manhal, which was one of the main periodicals of local 
historiography.128 The Jeddah Municipality under the mayor ʿAbd Allāh al-Qaṣabī paid for the 
work, perhaps in order to raise the profile of the city nationally.129 Although al-Ansari did not 
originate from the Red Sea town, al-Qaṣabī chose him for his credentials as one of the most 
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prominent Hejazi local historians.130 The History of Jeddah extensively covered the positive 
development of Jeddah under Saudi rule. In over 900 pages, the author described the city’s 
architectural development, society, education, economy, and the biographies of its rulers as 
well as the city’s mosques, banks, arts, press and writers. 
The book’s positive coverage of Saudi rule made it not only attractive to the Jeddah 
Municipality but also to the central government. In October 1963, Crown Prince Faisal sent a 
letter to al-Ansari, congratulating him on his work: ‘We gratefully received a copy of the book, 
History of Jeddah, which you authored in order to inform about the progress and 
development of this town and its ancient and modern history in detail and with clarity’. Faisal 
added, ‘we appreciate your scholarly effort, as this is the first history of its kind published on 
Jeddah. Thereby, you rendered an important service to the country, knowledge and 
history.’131 Two decades later, in 1983, the Ministry of Education re-printed the History of 
Jeddah for distribution among the libraries of state schools.132 
Although al-Ansari’s History of Jeddah praised Saudi rule and focused more on the 
twentieth century than Suba’i’s History of Mecca did, it also had perennialist traits. Al-Ansari 
considered the derivation of the city’s name from the nearby tomb of Eve, the ‘grandmother’ 
(jaddah), a ‘pure legend’.133 This was in contrast to Subaʻi’s upholding of Mecca’s Abrahamic 
stories. Yet, al-Ansari narrated a history of Jeddah that far exceeded the periods of Saudi 
rule. He followed the line of local rulers from the tenth century onwards.134 Moreover, the 
author narrated with equal pride three instances, when Jeddah was the capital of a realm. 
He thus celebrated the city’s recurrent importance under different regimes. Al-Ansari wrote 
that ‘we can conclude that Jeddah became the seat of a principality or kingdom three times’. 
‘The first time was when Sharif ʿAbd al-Muḥsin ibn Aḥmad ibn Zayd resided in it as a guest 
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of its governor Sulaymān Pasha in the eighteenth century.’ The ‘second time was during the 
reign of King Ali ibn Hussein’ in 1924–25. ‘The third time was in 1954/55, when the Saudi 
government made it its seat before it moved to Riyadh.’135 
Muslim pasts 
The particularism of local histories in relation to the Saudi dynasty also bore another major 
feature besides the narration of local traditions and perennialism. This feature was the 
assertion of the persistence of Islam among local communities even in periods without Saudi 
rule. It contrasted with the takfīrist paradigm of dynastic histories, which assumed that 
people were heretics unless they adhered to the principles of the Wahhabi mission. The 
rejection of takfīrism further strengthened the notion that a number of towns and regions 
were historically independent rather than being part of a common nation led by the Al Saud 
and Wahhabi ulema. 
An important part of the rejection of takfīrism was the absence of the notion of a pre-
Wahhabi ‘age of ignorance’ or jāhilīyah in many local histories. Instead, and in combination 
with perennialism, many local authors described a continuous presence of Islam at least in 
their own regions since the seventh century. One of these authors was ‘Abd al-Quddoos al-
Ansari. In 1964, he published an article entitled Medina: Second City of Islam in Aramco 
World, the magazine of the Arabian American Oil Company. Al-Ansari recognized the loss of 
political power in Medina after the death Muhammad and the early caliphs. However, he 
argued that the grand mosque of his hometown remained a major centre of religious 
scholarship. Al-Ansari narrated that ‘the influence of Medina has been steadily throughout 
the history of Islam, drawing Muslims to the scene which witnessed the final epochal events 
of the Prophet’s life. But by the Middle Ages both Medina and Mecca had lapsed into 
comparative obscurity as political power gravitated steadily toward the Mediterranean. The 
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Mosque of the Prophet, however, continued to be a place not only of respect but of 
learning.’136 
A more elaborate assertion of the enduring presence of Islam in Medina than that 
found in al-Ansari’s writings characterized the work of another writer from Medina named 
ʿAbd al-Salām Ḥāfiẓ (1929–95). Although his father was a Sufi, Ḥāfiẓ also benefitted from 
employment in the expanding state sector and from increasing access to foreign 
publishers.137 After having studied at a Koranic school or kuttāb and a modern primary 
school, Ḥāfiẓ worked as a secretary for a governmental project to expand the grand mosque 
from 1952/53 until 1954/55. Subsequently, he served as a police inspector for five years, 
until a cardiac disease forced him to retire.138 His salary allowed him to travel extensively, 
and he visited Egypt seven times between 1950 and 1961 as well as Syria, Lebanon and 
Turkey. These visits also led him to marry an Egyptian woman. Using his connections to 
Egypt, he published a book entitled Medina in History: A Comprehensive Study through a 
Cairo publishing house in 1961.139 
In his book, Medina in History, Ḥāfiẓ presented a continuance of religious learning and 
observance in his hometown. After providing a lengthy account of the life of the Prophet 
Muhammad and his successors in Medina, he discussed the town’s political history up to the 
twentieth century without mentioning any ‘age of ignorance’. Later in the text, ‘as a sample of 
the scholarly, literary, and religious movements over time’,140 the author from Medina gave 
biographies of major religious scholars in every century from the seventh until the 
twentieth.141 Between the seventeenth century and the mid-eighteenth, in which most 
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dynastic historians situated the pinnacle of the jāhilīyah or ‘age of ignorance’, at least twenty 
distinguished ulema lived in the city, according to Ḥāfiẓ.142 
In line with his assertion of Medina’s Muslim past, Ḥāfiẓ paid relatively little attention to 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The writer did not include the biography of the religious reformer, 
although he had studied in Medina. Nor did he discuss Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s theological 
stances. The author mentioned the rise of the Wahhabi mission in the context of Medina’s 
twentieth-century history, but did not give it special significance in Islamic history. He stated, 
‘here in the Hejaz, there was a religious movement that had arisen for the second time and 
consisted of the followers of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. They came from Najd 
in order to extend their rule in the name of fighting corrupt beliefs and heresies [bidaʿ]—
things that exist in every age’.143 
Besides the notion of the pre-Wahhabi jāhilīyah, few local histories adopted the 
related takfīrist idioms that implied that the enemies of the Al Saud were non-Muslims. 
Influenced by the persistence of regionalism in the early kingdom, many historians of towns 
and regions instead conceived conflicts between the Saudis and their Arabian neighbours in 
terms of regional opposition. They avoided, for instance, the usage of the takfīrist terms fatḥ, 
‘conquest’, and ghazwah, ‘raid’, which were central to the narratives of many dynastic 
histories. In The Past and Present of the Hejaz, for instance, Ḥusayn Naṣīf spoke of ‘the fall 
of the Hejazi coasts into the hands of Najd’ in 1924/25. ‘Najdi armies’ (rather than ‘Muslim’ 
armies) ‘entered’ (dakhalat) Mecca. ‘Najdi forces’ ‘occupied’ (iḥtallat) Yanbuʿ in the course of 
the same war.144 Similarly, Ḥāfiẓ in his Medina in History conceived the Saudi conquests in 
the early twentieth century as an expansion of dynastic rule rather than a spread of Islam. 
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He described the Al Saud as a ‘movement that came from eastern Arabia in order to expand 
its authority and to annex the two holy cities’.145 
As with perennialism, access to source texts not belonging to the Ibn Ghannām 
School fuelled narratives of an enduring Islam since the time of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Among the most important sources for Hejazi local historians was the history of the Meccan 
sharifs A Synopsis of the Princes of the Sacred City by Aḥmad Daḥlān. Daḥlān had been the 
Shāfiʿī mufti of Mecca and an opponent of the Wahhabi mission.146 Hardly surprising, his 
book does not mention a general pre-Wahhabi ‘age of ignorance’, let alone one that was 
specific to Mecca. Although Saudi authorities banned the book due to its anti-Wahhabi 
stances, it continued to be accessible in Hejazi libraries, at least private ones.147 Suba‘i, 
Ḥāfiẓ and al-Ansari all referred to Daḥlān’s Synopsis as one of their major sources.148 
The use of local anti-Wahhabi sources, like Daḥlān’s chronicle, also contributed to a 
more secular rather than takfīrist idiom in describing wars between the Saudis and their 
neighbours. Relying on Daḥlān, al-Ansari in his History of Jeddah, for instance, gave an 
account of the Ottomans and the sharifs ousting the Saudis from Mecca in the early 
nineteenth century. Consistent with Daḥlān’s account, the Jeddah-based author narrated the 
events from the Sharifian instead of the Saudi perspective and mentioned the Saudi ruler 
Saud ibn Abdulaziz ibn Muhammad with the secular title ‘emir’ instead of ‘imam’. Al-Ansari 
wrote that ‘after the wali and his deputy had agreed to fight Emir Saud, the governor Sharif 
Pasha and his deputy supported Sharif Ghālib in his war against Emir Saud’. ‘Sharif Ghālib 
and the wali entered Mecca, who presented a larger gun to him that had been transported 
from Jeddah by fifty camels. When this huge gun arrived at Mecca, it bombarded the walls of 
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the garden, in which [the Saudi commander] ʿUthmān Abū Nuqṭah lived. The latter sought a 
truce that was granted. Subsequently, he left with his men for Najd.’149 
One of the most emphatic voices in the assertion of Islam in the local community, 
however, did not come from the Hejaz. Although the Wahhabis opposed Sufism, the camel 
palanquin (maḥmal) and other practices in the Hejaz, the sanctity of the Muslim cities 
themselves was widely accepted. Among the Shiites, who mainly populated the eastern 
Arabian oases of al-Qaṭīf and al-Aḥsāʾ, defence against Wahhabi takfīrism was a much more 
critical issue. In 1927, the ulema of Riyadh issued a fatwa calling on Abdulaziz to refuse the 
Shiites the right to worship publicly, to destroy their places of worship in al-Aḥsāʾ, and 
prevent them from visiting the Shiite shrines in Karbala and Najaf. Moreover, the Wahhabi 
scholars argued that the ruler should force the Shiites to submit to the ‘religion of God and 
His Prophet’, to attend the five prayers in mosques, and to undergo instruction in the writings 
of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.150 Although Abdulaziz did not order forcible conversion, the Shiites 
suffered from religious discrimination. Shiite literature and mourning processions, which 
Wahhabi doctrine considered ‘idolatry’ (shirk),151 were banned. Likewise, courts did not 
recognize Shiites as witnesses.152 
Not considered Muslims and frequently called ‘rejectionists’ (rāfiḍah) or ‘idolaters’ 
(mushrikūn) by Wahhabis, Shiites were excluded from many benefits that Saudi state 
building brought to Sunnis. Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Āl al-Shaykh, the Saudi grand mufti, 
once issued a fatwa according to which the ruler should forever exclude the Shiites from 
receiving ‘state booty’ (fayʾ) and ‘should not allocate any portion to them whatsoever unless 
they overtly abandon their beliefs’.153 Shiites were not accepted in the armed forces and the 
National Guard or in leading positions in the provincial administration. In addition, they were 
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markedly underrepresented in the education and health sectors. To make matters worse, the 
government invested considerably less in infrastructure and public services in Shiite quarters 
than it did in Sunni areas. These services included schools, clinics, roads, sewage, 
electrification, and water supplies.154 
One of the first Shiite local historians, who reacted against Wahhabi takfīrism, was 
Muḥammad al-Muslim (1922–94).155 In 1960, he published a book on his native oasis of al-
Qaṭīf, entitled The Black Gold Coast: A Historical and Cultural Study of the Arab Gulf 
Region. A second edition was published in Beirut, beyond Saudi censorship, in 1962.156 Al-
Muslim received his main inspiration not in the kingdom, but in Baghdad in the 1950s, where 
he studied accounting and English and participated in the city’s literary life. He first 
developed the idea for his book, when a friend encouraged him to publish a historical 
overview of al-Qaṭīf in an Iraqi newspaper in 1952. Subsequently, al-Muslim read foreign 
literature and copied rare sources on the region’s history in Baghdad’s public and 
archaeology libraries.157 
This contact with literature from outside Saudi Arabia created in al-Muslim the feeling 
that al-Qaṭīf had been ignored or misrepresented, similar to al-Niʿmī’s feeling about Asir. This 
feeling encouraged al-Muslim to write his history and served as a justification for his 
endeavour. The author lamented, ‘It made me sad to find many people who fail to know al-
Qaṭīf’. ‘This reaches the point that even some intellectuals do not know its geographical 
location and its historical role.’ It ‘hurt’ him that some authors, like the French journalist Jean-
Jacques Berreby (b. 1927), ‘did not mention it or only in passing, although it was the most 
prosperous town in the Gulf’. If he finds a writer ‘who is completely unfamiliar with it, he 
pronounces it al-Quṭayf’ or confines himself to the ‘statement that it is one of the oilfields of 
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Saudi Arabia, as if it were an unknown spot of the Empty Quarter or a Bedouin site in the 
wilderness of the desert’.158 
Despite sectarian discrimination, the growth of the Saudi economy, which was fuelled 
by increasing oil revenues, also benefitted many Shiites, including al-Muslim. In 1959, he 
returned to the kingdom and, with his training as an accountant in Baghdad, was able to take 
up a position with Riyad Bank in Dammam. By then, Dammam had become the capital of 
the Eastern Province, in which the oil industry was concentrated.159 The leisure that al-
Muslim gained upon commencement of this work made possible the completion of his book 
after he had gathered sufficient material in Baghdad. Following his return to Saudi Arabia, he 
remembered, ‘I was given free time that I had not dreamt about’. In order to escape his 
‘boring routine life’, he was ‘killing spare time through writing over two years’.160 
Al-Muslim’s book on The Black Gold Coast was highly particularistic. The Shiite 
author also emphasized local traditions, as Naṣīf in the Hejaz and al-ʿAqīlī in Jāzān did. His 
book included positive evaluations of times without Saudi rule. According to al-Muslim, even 
the Egyptian occupation of Eastern Arabia in the 1830s brought benefits for the local 
population. In contrast, dynastic historians argued that this occupation, which followed the 
destruction of the first Saudi state, had caused ‘chaos’. Al-Muslim contended that al-Qaṭīf 
and al-Aḥsāʾ perhaps benefitted most from the Egyptian occupation of the area through the 
‘creation of a committee of experts’. This committee ‘organized the governmental agencies, 
introduced taxes and arranged their collection. This had been unknown in this area.’161 In 
contrast to local development under the Egyptians, al-Muslim occasionally described 
victimization of the Shiites by the Saudis. He stated that at the end of the eighteenth century, 
Saud ibn Abdulaziz (r. 1803–13) ‘marched towards al-Qaṭīf in order to occupy it. He 
besieged the town of Sayhāt and entered it forcefully, looted it, and killed a group of its 
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inhabitants. He also occupied the village of ʿAnak, killed four-hundred men of its inhabitants, 
and confiscated their possessions and property.’162 
In response to the perceived neglect of his home region by previous writers, al-Muslim 
also developed an elaborate perennialism. He portrayed al-Qaṭīf as having existed for 
millennia and as the cradle of human civilization. He stated, ‘perhaps few people know that 
the ancient people of this region were the first who invented the alphabet. They were the first 
teachers of the whole world, and this region was the abode of ancient civilizations. They are 
some of the most ancient civilizations in known history, and the civilization of the Semites 
emerged from it, which became prevalent from Mesopotamia to Lebanon’.163 
However, while al-Muslim accused foreign scholars of ignoring al-Qaṭīf, he also used 
foreign literature, which he had accessed in Baghdad, as a source for his construction of a 
perennial history. Foreign researchers led al-Muslim to argue that al-Qaṭīf even dominated 
eastern Arabia before Saudi rule. The Shiite author pointed out that the Egyptian intellectual 
and first director of King Saud University ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ʿAzzām had stated that the whole 
Saudi Gulf coast had once been ‘called al-Qaṭīf’. According to al-Muslim, the prominent 
Egyptian scholar Rifāʿah al-Ṭahṭāwī (1801–73) had written that ‘the Arab Gulf was termed 
the sea of al-Qaṭīf’. The Austrian orientalist Aloys Sprenger (1813–93) for his part mentioned 
that it had been called ‘the Gulf of al-Qaṭīf before it was given any other name’. Based on 
these quotations, al-Muslim concluded that ‘these areas on the western shores of the Gulf 
were all provinces belonging to this city’.164 
In his assertion that the Shiites were Muslims, al-Muslim drew on foreign literature too. 
Relying on an earlier History of the Shiites by the Iraqi scholar Muḥammad al-Muẓaffarī, he 
argued that Shiism had already been present during the Prophet Muhammad’s time.165 
‘Shiism’, he stated, ‘goes back to the time of the Prophet, when the Umayyad Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ 
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was the governor of Bahrain. He was a client of Ali and the one who planted the seed of 
Shiism there.’166 To substantiate his argument, al-Muslim also quoted the well-known Syrian 
Sunni historian Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī (1876–1953). Kurd ʿAlī wrote that ‘a group of 
Muhammad’s companions were known for their support of Ali during the time of the Prophet, 
like Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī’. Al-Muslim commented that this quotation was ‘sufficient as a reply 
to those who defame Shiism’.167 
While al-Muslim was clear in his assertion that the Shiites were not idolaters, he still 
sought a kind of accommodation with the Saudi state. He thus played down the differences 
between Shiites and Sunnis, although not explicitly those between Shiites and followers of 
the Wahhabi mission. He argued that between the Sunnis and the Twelver Shiites ‘no 
fundamental difference exists’, apart from the Shiites’ belief in the spiritual leadership of Ali 
and the imams succeeding him. ‘Although there is conflict over some legal questions, this 
disagreement is not greater than those between the Sunni schools. As for those 
distinguishing features, like funeral ceremonies, et cetera, they are incidental creations over 
time and merely customs and traditions inherited from the time of the Būyids in Baghdad in 
963/64.’168 
Despite this accommodationist stance towards the Sunnis more generally, The Black 
Gold Coast contradicted the conception of the leaders of the first and second Saudi states 
as ‘imams’. Al-Muslim emphasized that ‘the Shiites believe that the imamate is restricted to 
the family of the Prophet’.169 He referred to Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law as ‘Imam 
Ali’, but refused to confer the same title to any Saudi prince. He stated, for instance, that 
Muhammad ibn Saud’s son Abdulaziz inherited only the ‘political leadership’ (ziʿāmah), 
making no mention of an imamate. In a list of Saudi rulers, none of them appeared with the 
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title ‘imam’. Abdulaziz was, according to al-Muslim, ‘succeeded by Saud, Abdullah, Turki, 
Faisal, Abdulrahman, and finally His Majesty the late King Abdulaziz’.170 
Al-Muslim also avoided many of the takfīrist terms that were prevalent in dynastic 
historiography. He spoke of the Saudi ‘occupation’ (iḥtilāl) of al-Aḥsāʾ and al-Qaṭīf in the late 
eighteenth century. He avoided the verbs fataḥa, ‘to conquer’, and ghazā, ‘to raid’, which 
corresponded to the nouns fatḥ and ghazwah and implied a struggle against non-Muslims. 
Al-Muslim stated, for instance, that Abdulaziz in 1913 ‘seized [istawlá] al-Aḥsāʾ and al-Qaṭīf. 
In 1921, the ruler defeated the Āl Rashīd, the princes of Ḥāʾil. In 1922, he extended his 
influence to the region of Asir. In 1924/25, he seized the Hejaz.’171 
As the question of being Muslims or idolaters was as important as it was sensitive for 
the Shiites, al-Muslim had clearly crossed a boundary with his particularistic history of a 
Shiite-dominated area. Saudi authorities imprisoned him briefly and forced him to edit out 
certain critical statements in the second edition of The Black Gold Coast in 1962. This was 
mainly a reaction to his discussion of Shiism and its oppression under Saudi rule. In 1964, 
the authorities jailed al-Muslim again for ten years. Moreover, he was forbidden to travel 
outside Saudi Arabia.172 Following his release, however, Riyad Bank re-employed him in the 
Eastern Province until his retirement as a branch manager.173 
Not all local historiography between the 1920s and 1970s rejected the terminology of 
dynastic historiography as categorically as al-Muslim’s history did. Increasing state control 
over education, mass media and support for dynastic historiography also brought more 
authors in the Saudi periphery in contact with the narratives of dynastic histories. Āl ʿAbd al-
Qādir, for instance, used the terms ‘fatḥ’ and ‘ghazwah’ as well as the title ‘imam’ for Saudi 
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rulers in his history of al-Aḥsāʾ.174 This can be explained by the fact that he was a Sunni, 
studied Wahhabi beliefs, corresponded with the Najdi chronicler Ibrāhīm ibn ʿĪsá, and relied 
on Ibn Bishr’s chronicle.175 Similarly, Hāshim al-Niʿmī called Abdulaziz ibn Muhammad ibn 
Saud and other Saudi rulers ‘imam’ in his The History of Asir.176 In his case, his education in 
monotheism (tawḥīd) in the Abhā primary school and his work as a member of the religious 
police or Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice may have 
contributed to his adoption of this terminology.177 
However, even Āl ʿAbd al-Qādir and al-Niʿmī as trained religious scholars working for 
the Saudi state did not adopt all elements of the takfīrist paradigm. In particular, they 
seemed to have been unwilling to apply the notion of the pre-Wahhabi jāhilīyah to their home 
regions. Al-Niʿmī did not mention this idea,178 while Āl ʿAbd al-Qādir considered heresies and 
chaos as having been restricted to Najd. Āl ʿAbd al-Qādir wrote that when Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab appeared, ‘the Muslims in the Najdi lands were hostile to one another and divided’. 
Following Ibn Bishr, he added that ‘they had neither king nor imam, and no law and order 
ruled. They killed each other, the strong consumed the weak, and they did not refrain from 
the heretical acts they were committing.’179 As with perennialism, Saudi authorities seem to 
have tolerated this absence of the notion of the pre-Wahhabi jāhilīyah or its restriction. They 
allowed a re-publication of Āl ʿAbd al-Qādir’s work inside the kingdom in 1982.180 
Even one of the first major histories of the Saudi capital did not adopt the notion of a 
pre-Wahhabi ‘age of ignorance’. This was Hamad Al-Jasser’s (1910–2000) book Riyadh 
over the Course of History, published in 1966. Al-Jasser claimed that readers of some of his 
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newspaper articles had encouraged him to publish the book.181 Similar to other local works, 
the history gave the city a perennial identity that was not tied exclusively to the Al Saud, but 
to a multi-dynastic political heritage. The author began his account with the history of ancient 
Ḥajr, Riyadh’s predecessor, up until the rule of the Banū Ḥanīfah. He continued with Ḥajr in 
the early Islamic and the Abbasid periods, repeatedly emphasizing its enduring importance. 
He wrote, for instance, that ‘most historians of the ninth century agree that Ḥajr was still the 
capital of al-Yamāmah in this century’.182 Subsequently, Al-Jasser discussed the history of 
the oasis from the rule of the Shiite Ukhayḍirids between the ninth and eleventh centuries 
until the reign of Dihām ibn Dawwās in the eighteenth. The book ended with the Saudi 
periods and their interruption by the Āl Rashīd emirate between 1891, when the second 
Saudi state fell, and 1902, when Abdulaziz Al Saud captured Riyadh. Less than a sixth of 
the book was concerned with Riyadh under Saudi rule.183 
Although Al-Jasser wrote about the Saudi capital, he was, unlike many dynastic 
authors, from a humble background and did not form part of the royal entourage. He was, 
however, able to exploit new opportunities in the expanding public education sector. Born in 
a village to the north-west of Riyadh, Al-Jasser studied under ulema in Riyadh and, between 
1930 and 1935, at the kingdom’s first modern secondary school, the Saudi Scientific Institute 
(al-Maʿhad al-ʿIlmī al-Suʿūdī) in Mecca.184 This school was itself part of Saudi state building. 
It was intended to train primary school teachers for the country’s towns and villages. The 
Saudis hoped it would provide them, as Henri Lauzière put it, ‘with an indigenous means for 
consolidating the new state through education’.185 From 1928, the institute thus paid its 
students generous stipends.186 
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Upon graduation from the Scientific Institute, Al-Jasser also worked in a variety of 
positions in the public education sector. Initially, he became a primary school teacher in the 
Hejazi town of Yanbuʿ. In 1939, he briefly studied history at the College of Arts of Fuad I 
University in Cairo as part of a student mission, until the Saudi government recalled him and 
his colleagues following the outbreak of World War II. Subsequently, Al-Jasser worked in a 
variety of governmental positions. They included censor of publications and newspapers in 
al-Aḥsāʾ, education commissioner in Najd, assistant director of Riyadh’s Scientific Institute 
(al-Maʿhad al-ʿIlmī) and director of two colleges in Riyadh.187 
As in the case of other local historians, however, state employment did not mean co-
optation. Like Suba‘i, Al-Jasser became—after his work as a censor—a critical voice in the 
Saudi newspaper and publishing industry. He established al-ʿArab Bookstore (Maktabat al-   
ʿArab) in Riyadh in 1949/50, one of the first bookshops in the city selling modern Arabic 
works.188 Between 1953 and 1961, he issued al-Yamāmah, one of the first newspapers in 
Najd, and in 1955 founded Riyadh Presses (Maṭābiʿ al-Riyāḍ), one of the first publishers in 
the Saudi capital. Subsequently, al-Yamāmah proved to be one of the country’s most critical 
media outlets. 
 Because al-Yamāmah was critical, Al-Jasser also suffered from a tightening of 
governmental control over the media. In its struggle against Nasser and revolutionary forms 
of Arab nationalism, the government decreed a law of the press and publications in 1959. It 
banned newspapers from publishing material propagating ‘aberration, atheism, or 
destructive principles, or contradicting the customs and traditions of this country’.189 Violating 
the law carried a fine of between 100 and 1000 riyals (c. 22–222 dollars) or a prison 
sentence of between three weeks and three years.190 In 1964, the government promulgated 
the National Press Regulation that sought to ensure that the newspaper industry was run on 
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officially acceptable lines. The regulation enabled the Ministry of Information to withdraw the 
concession of a Saudi newspaper, if it considers ‘that the country’s interest deems it 
necessary’. The ministry also became able to remove the editor-in-chief of any Saudi 
newspaper if it finds ‘he is incapable of carrying out his duties in a manner ensuring the 
public interest’.191 
The crackdown even led to Al-Jasser’s temporary exile. In 1959, King Saud took an 
article published in al-Yamāmah ‘as an attack on Islam, punishable by death’. Although 
Crown Prince Faisal intervened on behalf of the writer,192 in a report Youssef Yassin, the 
head of the Political Section in the Royal Court, later singled out al-Yamāmah as a 
newspaper not in line with the government. On this basis, King Saud ordered the seizure of 
al-Yamāmah and the imprisoning of Hamad Al-Jasser in 1962. Fortunately for Al-Jasser, he 
received notice of this order while in Beirut and continued to live there with his family until 
the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975. After Faisal had become king in 1964, he 
allowed Al-Jasser to establish al-Yamāmah House (Dār al-Yamāmah). This publishing 
house was based in Riyadh but retained an office in Beirut.193 
Al-Jasser also assisted his peers in having their local histories printed, which was 
done partly abroad and thus beyond Saudi censorship. Like ‘Abd al-Quddoos al-Ansari, he 
thereby helped Saudi local historians form a loosely connected group. His Riyadh Presses 
published the first editions of al-ʿAqīlī’s History of al-Mikhlāf al-Sulaymānī and Āl ʿAbd al-
Qādir’s book on al-Aḥsāʾ.194 In addition, Al-Jasser wrote the introduction to al-Muslim’s Black 
Gold Coast.195 Through al-Yamāmah House, he started publishing the journal al-ʿArab in 
1966. Printed in Beirut and later in Cairo, al-ʿArab became an important platform for local 
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historians besides al-Manhal. In subsequent decades, al-ʿAqīlī, al-Niʿmī, and al-Muslim all 
contributed articles on the history and geography of their regions to the journal.196 
Although Al-Jasser later suffered from repression under the regime, he also benefitted 
from the rise in Saudi oil revenues after World War II through his work for the Saudi 
government and publishing activities. When he taught at Yanbuʿ’s primary school between 
1935 and 1939, that is, before the growth of the oil industry, he, like his colleagues, initially 
endured long delays in the payment of his salary. At one point, seven months without 
income forced him to sell some of his books.197 However, a few decades later, he was able 
to travel extensively and access historical documents in the Vatican in 1960 and the Hagia 
Sophia in Istanbul in 1965.198 By 1970, his private library had a reputation for containing 
precious manuscripts.199 
Some of the terminology of dynastic historiography also entered Al-Jasser’s work. 
This was not surprising given his dependency on the Saudi government and his familiarity 
with official discourses through his education and publishing work. Moreover, Prince 
Salman, the governor of Riyadh, had sponsored the publication of Riyadh over the Course of 
History.200 Similar to Āl ʿAbd al-Qādir and al-Niʿmī, Al-Jasser called the first Saudi king, 
Abdulaziz, ‘imam’, for instance.201 However, he did not denounce Dihām ibn Dawwās, the 
former ruler of Riyadh and enemy of the Saudis, as an infidel. This was in contrast to the 
dynastic chronicler Ibn Ghannām. Al-Jasser merely stated that Dihām was ‘one of the 
toughest opponents’ of the Wahhabi mission.202 Moreover, the historian did not speak of a 
pre-Wahhabi ‘age of ignorance’. He did not describe the Ukhayḍirid rulers of al-Yamāmah as 
heretics, but merely stated that ‘their sect is Zaydism’. Al-Jasser also did not describe the 
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religious situation in the area before the Prophet Muhammad as negative. On the contrary, 
he quoted the early medieval Muslim geographer al-Hamdānī (c. 893–945), stating that 
‘nobody had been a polytheist’ in ancient Ḥajr.203 
Finally, Al-Jasser, who was from the Ḥarb tribe and a descendent of the Bedouin,204 
even considered the migrant pastoralists as Muslims. Here, he contradicted Fuad Hamza 
and other dynastic historians. Al-Jasser argued in an article in al-Yamāmah in 1954, that the 
nomads were the most powerful weapon of Islam, in early Islamic as well as King 
Abdulaziz’s times. The first Saudi king, according to Al-Jasser, ‘saw in the Bedouin what al-
Fārūq [Caliph Umar] had already seen in them, namely that they were the original Arabs and 
the substance of Islam. He considered them the most powerful weapon and the strongest 
army, with which he could unify Arabia under one banner.’205 
Conclusions 
Through his own writings and his publishing work, Al-Jasser formed a central figure 
connecting local historians in the kingdom. The texts produced by these historians were 
distinguished by their particularism in relation to dynastic historiography, that is, the 
expression of the historical independence of local communities from the Al Saud. They thus 
established narrative plurality during the period between the 1920s and 1970s, in which the 
first major dynastic histories were also printed. The particularism had three elements: the 
emphasis on local political, religious and social traditions, the perennialist narration of a long, 
multi-dynastic past as opposed to dynastic exclusivism, and the persistence of Islam in 
contrast to dynastic takfīrism. While censorship curbed criticism of the government, state 
building inadvertently supported local historiography. The expansion of state education and 
the bureaucracy provided authors in the provinces with the skills and financial means 
necessary for their research. In some cases, state agencies even directly subsidized local 
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histories. Moreover, globalization stimulated local writings by giving authors increased 
opportunities to study and publish abroad and thus beyond Saudi censorship. This global 
process also facilitated an influx of foreign literature, which inspired local historians and 
provided authoritative material for perennialism and depictions of a continued presence of 
Islam even without Saudi rule. 
 Despite their differences, particularistic local histories and exclusivist dynastic 
histories had an important element in common: the relative absence of references to a Saudi 
nation. Neither historians of towns and regions nor those of the Al Saud thus contested a 
Saudi national history. Instead, they rather diverged in their interests, often without criticizing 
the works of the other group directly. The situation would change, however, from the 1960s 
onwards, as dynastic historiography and later local historiography too would become 
‘nationalized’.
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4. The Saudization of Dynastic Historiography, 1960s to 
Present 
Two days after the Saudi National Day on 23 September 2009, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Wābilī, a 
historian and lecturer at King Khalid Military Academy in Riyadh, published an article in the 
Saudi newspaper al-Waṭan, ‘The Nation’. It was entitled Our National Need for New 
Historians. Al-Wābilī stressed the importance of history for the nation, postulating that 
‘history in relation to the nation is like what memory is for man’. If the nation ‘loses its history, 
this is a huge disaster and calamity, a collective damage to the memory of the citizens and 
the nation in general’. He went on to say that history produces ‘man’ as well as ‘the present 
official discourse’ within nations. Hence, ‘we can imagine the extent of the confusion in 
relation to man and the nation, if both are the product of loss, deficiency or a misreading of 
their history’.1 
In his article, al-Wābilī gave a few examples of the shortcomings of previous 
historiography. The first example was part of ‘our Islamic Arab history’ and dealt with the 
murder of the second caliph Umar by a Persian in 644. Distinct from ‘our Islamic Arab 
history’, al-Wābilī drew his second example for historical misunderstandings from ‘our Saudi 
national history’. This example concerned the story of the capture of Riyadh by Abdulaziz Al 
Saud and about sixty men in 1902. This event was typically called ‘the battle of Riyadh’ or 
‘the conquest of Riyadh’. Al-Wābilī, however, considered the usage of the term ‘battle’ for 
this historical event ‘completely inaccurate’. According to him, it ‘confuses the reader or 
listener, creates doubts or makes him believe that there was external support or intervention 
in support of King Abdulaziz in his seizure of Riyadh’. A ‘military battle as understood by the 
reader takes place between two armies that are equal in size’. Instead, al-Wābilī suggested 
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that the capture of Riyadh should be called a ‘special military (commandos) operation’.2 
Within two weeks of the publication of his article, al-Wābilī received many e-mails that made 
him feel, as if he had ‘raised a discussion on a contemporary and sensitive subject that 
touches and moves people’s lives directly’.3 
In his article, al-Wābilī may seem to be merely a military expert dissatisfied with 
nomenclature. Yet, the whole episode also signified that by the time of al-Wābilī’s writing in 
2009, Saudis had become concerned with a ‘Saudi national history’ and its details. This 
‘Saudi national history’ was distinct from an ‘Islamic Arab history’. Whereas the Saudi kings 
stood in the centre of the former, the early caliphs were the focus of the latter. This placing 
of the Al Saud in a Saudi national history was different from earlier dynastic histories that 
had seen the Al Saud as part of an Islamic and Arab salvation history. In the earlier histories, 
the Al Saud had appeared as restorers of Islam and leaders of Arab independence and 
renaissance after an ‘age of ignorance’. Yet, in al-Wābilī’s article, an event involving the 
Saudi national capital of Riyadh stood at the centre of the discussion of King Abdulaziz’s 
history. This narrative is indicative of a dynasty-centred Saudi national history distinct from 
Arab national history that had emerged by 2009. In other words, the history of the Al Saud 
had become nationalized or, more precisely, ‘Saudized’. 
As a general background to the emergence of a Saudi national history, one may see 
the slow emergence of a Saudi national identity and Saudi nationalism. Suliman Toufik 
argues that during the 1960s, ‘almost every segment of the nation’ in Saudi Arabia started to 
feel the presence of the state. At that time, the kingdom had become the ‘ultimate political 
organization’ with which many citizens of Saudi Arabia identified themselves. Moreover, a 
unified educational system and a national economy formed the basis of a Saudi 
nationalism.4 In the 1980s, as John Chalcraft points out, an economic slowdown with lower 
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oil prices also ‘stoked the fires of local nationalism’ in the Arabian peninsula and led to 
nationalization policies.5 From that time onwards, the term ‘Saudization’ for the 
nationalization of the workforce gained currency. 
This rise of Saudi nationalism did not mean that a Saudi national identity replaced 
regional or tribal identities, but rather that a Saudi identity was added to the identities Saudis 
could draw on. Hamza Al-Hassan wrote in 2006 that ‘sub-identities are still far stronger than 
the national one, and loyalty to region is stronger than loyalty to the state’.6 However, by 
1997, it had become possible for the prominent Saudi businessman Hani Yamani to publish 
a book under the title To Be A Saudi, in which he made his attachment to the kingdom clear: 
‘When I am travelling, I am on a constant search for news on Saudi Arabia. It is my country, 
where I was born and bred, and all my family live there. It is not enough just to telephone 
home, I find a need to read about any news related to the land where I belong.’7 
Saudi nationalism and national identity did not preclude concerns for a wider Arab 
national identity. Developing what Orit Bashkin calls a ‘hybrid’ form of nationalism,8 some 
Saudis did not, and perhaps could not ignore, wider pan-Arab and Islamic issues despite 
their concerns for a Saudi nation. In fact, as James McDougall argues, Arab nationalism 
probably provided Arab nation-states such as Saudi Arabia with ‘Arabist languages of 
legitimacy’.9 To be sure, Saudi religious scholars, like the grand mufti ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Bāz, 
continued to see contradictions between nationalism and Islam. Other Saudis, however, 
were more inclined to admit multiple identities. The prominent Saudi historian ʿAbd Allāh al-  
ʿUthaymīn (b. 1936) explained his allegiances in terms of ‘circles’. ‘In the first circle, I am a 
son of the Arabian peninsula. The regions of the peninsula were united under the kingdom. 
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Hence, I am a Saudi. Then there is the wider region: I am an Arab. Then I am a Muslim.’10 
Al-ʿUthaymīn also mentioned that the saying ‘love of the homeland is an article of faith’ (ḥubb 
al-waṭan min al-īmān) was no Hadith, but ‘good in itself’.11 
This chapter will analyse how the expanding state in a globalizing context contributed 
to the production of a dynasty-centred national history. This national history was a product of 
the emerging Saudi national identity and at the same time aimed at strengthening this 
identity. I will pay special attention to the related processes of the creation of a national 
archive, the establishment of an indigenous historical profession, and the celebration of 
national dynastic jubilees. These processes all involved the import of foreign expertise, 
despite having ‘national’ aims. 
King Abdulaziz and the foundation of Saudi Arabia 
An important element of the Saudization of dynastic historiography was the development of 
a ‘founder paradigm’. This paradigm conceived Abdulaziz Al Saud as the ‘founder’ of the 
modern Saudi nation. Historians influenced by the founder paradigm still focused on Saudi 
monarchs, as earlier dynastic authors had done. Yet they introduced the Saudi nation as the 
main frame of dynastic histories. Whereas many earlier dynastic histories had measured the 
actions of the Al Saud with reference to the Muslim community and the Arab world, the new 
histories focused more on how the Saudi dynasty served the Saudi nation. Moreover, the 
dynastically defined national space of Saudi Arabia appeared as the setting. Thereby, as 
Yoav Di-Capua argues with reference to Egyptian royalist historiography, the dynasty and 
the territory ‘were synchronized in a movement toward the future’.12 
The notion of Abdulaziz as the founder of a new nation was not an invention of the 
1960s, but had already appeared in some of the propaganda of the Saudi government 
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during the monarch’s lifetime. The Saudi diplomat and dynastic historian Khayr al-Dīn al-
Ziriklī gave a speech on Cairo radio in 1946 in honour of a state visit by King Abdulaziz to 
Egypt. Al-Ziriklī described the foundation of the kingdom in the following words: ‘Emirates 
were united, a nation formed, a state built’. ‘Within less than fifty years, one man was able to 
establish between the Red Sea and the Gulf of the Arabs what had been impossible to 
establish or to bring about in twelve centuries.’13 
Despite al-Ziriklī’s early statement, however, the founder paradigm formally emerged 
only after the 1960s. Of principal importance to this process was the King Abdulaziz 
Foundation for Research and Archives. According to the foundation’s own accounts, King 
Faisal established it in 1972 as an ‘independent agency’ in order to ‘commemorate the great 
leader, His Majesty King Abdulaziz, who laid the foundations of this country and spread 
security and justice in its corners’. The foundation was the first state institution outside of the 
universities that specialized in history. It saw itself as ‘a symbol of the nation which King 
Abdulaziz had united’ and the ‘abounding spring that is frequented by everybody who wants 
to learn about the kingdom particularly and about Arabia and the Arab world generally’.14 
Signifying the importance Faisal attached to the foundation, he appointed the minister of 
education Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh as its first chair. Far from being only a symbolic head, Āl al-
Shaykh was very interested in dynastic historiography. Already during the 1960s, he had 
commissioned the publication of histories of the Al Saud by Mounir Ajlani and Ibn Bishr—
one of the members of the Ibn Ghannām School—through the Ministry of Education.15 
Dissatisfaction among members of the government with previous histories of the 
country, most of which had been the products of foreign-born amateurs, drove the 
establishment of the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives as a national, 
professional institution of history. In 1975, Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh stated in an interview that 
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Saudi history ‘had not been written as it should be, despite the manifold writings on the 
history of Saudi Arabia’. He recalled that when King Faisal contemplated the foundation’s 
creation, he requested that it published ‘a book on the history of Abdulaziz that 
encompassed Saudi history’. Paying reference to an idea of historical professionalism, 
Faisal had demanded that it should be ‘an academic book without flattery for King 
Abdulaziz’.16 
Marking a step in the Saudization and professionalization of dynastic historiography, 
the government chose Muhammad Al-Sha’afi (b. 1938/39) as secretary general of the 
foundation. Al-Sha’afi was one of the first indigenous Saudis professionally trained in the 
history of the Saudi state. Born in Asir, he attended the School for the Preparation of Student 
Missions (Madrasat Taḥḍīr al-Biʿthāt) in Mecca. Subsequently, he studied history at Cairo 
University and, in the absence of appropriate programmes in the kingdom at the time, went 
to England for postgraduate studies.17 In the course of his career, he acquired a national 
outlook. A colleague later stated about Al-Sha’afi that ‘he does not differentiate between 
Najd and Asir’. To him, ‘those at the foot of the mountains are equal to those in the desert, 
and the Bedouin is like the townsman’.18 
While Al-Sha’afi received a professional historical education abroad, his research did 
not challenge the takfīrist paradigm that put the ‘Islamic’ Saudi state in opposition to its 
‘heretic’ neighbours. This made him a suitable candidate for leading the new centre of a 
nationally oriented dynastic historiography. In 1967, he completed a doctoral dissertation at 
the University of Leeds on The First Sa'udi State in Arabia. In his thesis, he sought to depart 
from previous writings on this state, which, according to him, had concentrated on ‘recording 
historical events’.19 In contrast, he set out to investigate the state’s administrative, military, 
and economic organization. He did not deviate from the notion of the Saudi state as a 
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religious project, however. He wrote in his conclusion that the Saudi ‘military activities which 
were carried out against the neighbouring countries were wholly based on religious motives’. 
This was because the state sought ‘to restore the Islamic religion to its purity’. Also 
administratively, the aim of the Saudis was to ‘establish an Islamic state on the model of the 
first Islamic state’.20 
Despite Al-Sha’afi’s credentials as an indigenous professional historian who upheld 
the takfīrist paradigm, he remained the foundation’s secretary general for only three years. In 
1975, after a personal ‘conflict’ over unknown matters with other members of the foundation, 
he left the research institute.21 Subsequently, three further secretaries general of the 
foundation were appointed up to the early 1990s. While none of them held a PhD in history, 
all of them were known as men who enjoyed the personal trust of Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh.22 
Although Al-Sha’afi’s tenure at the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and 
Archives was brief, it laid an important basis for the founder paradigm. Here, the foundation 
fulfilled a similar function as the ʿĀbdīn palace archive in Cairo. This archive had contributed 
to the emergence of a view of Muhammad Ali as the founder of the modern Egyptian nation. 
Systematically, it privileged the history of Muhammad Ali’s dynasty and excluded Ottoman 
and subaltern pasts.23 It is likely that the foundation sought to imitate the ʿĀbdīn archive, as it 
built up a collection that focused on the Al Saud generally and on King Abdulaziz in 
particular. 
In creating a royalist archive that was similar to the ʿĀbdīn palace archive, the 
foundation relied on Muhammad Tamimi (d. 1976/77), a Saudi who, in fact, had worked at 
the ʿĀbdīn archive in Cairo between 1931/32 and 1946/47. During a time of good relations 
between the Saudi and the Egyptian monarchies, Tamimi had ‘corrected wrong information’ 
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about the Wahhabi mission in Egyptian textbooks in co-operation with the Egyptian 
Directorate of Education.24 In addition, he drew one of the first comprehensive family trees of 
the Al Saud, which the Egyptian government printed on King Abdulaziz’s state visit to Cairo 
in 1946.25 Based on Tamimi’s experience in Egypt, the Saudi Ministry of Education hired him 
in 1961/62 to work as director of library administration and to author history textbooks. 
Between 1968 and 1970, the ministry, then under Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh, commissioned 
Tamimi with photocopying documents from Ottoman and British archives. These copies 
would subsequently form the core of the foundation.26 This process was similar to the 
establishment of the ʿĀbdīn archive based on Egypt-related documents in European 
archives.27 
The foundation’s archival policies excluded periods before the rise of the first Saudi 
state and thus privileged the dynastic past. Generally, the documents in the possession of 
the foundation were restricted to those ‘shedding light on Arabian affairs from the second 
half of the eighteenth century until the 1930s’. Copies of British documents in the foundation 
were confined to Abdulaziz’s reign itself, while copies of Ottoman documents were limited to 
the period from 1746 until the early twentieth century. In 1974, the government also created 
a national archive, which was attached to the foundation in 1976. The ‘national documents’ 
preserved were, however, initially restricted to the period from 1815 until the end of King 
Saud’s reign in 1964.28 
The King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives not only contributed to the 
development of the founder paradigm through the creation of a dynasty-centred national 
archive. It also placed Abdulaziz at the centre of national history through its publications. 
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These publications included the journal al-Dārah founded in 1975.29 Muḥammad Zaydān, 
another man trusted by Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh, edited it until his death in 1992. Previously, 
Zaydān had taught Wahhabi theology with the consent of ʿAbd Allāh Āl al-Shaykh (1870–
1959), the father of Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh and former chief cadi in the Hejaz.30 Zaydān also 
professed a Saudi national identity, which he did not see as in conflict with a broader Islamic 
identity. In the first issue of al-Dārah, he described his commitment to the journal. He stated 
that his ‘respect for the principles of the foundation and the history of the Al Saud only 
means love for this nation as part of love for this religion, Islam’.31 
Through al-Dārah, Zaydān promoted a Saudi national identity centred on the Al Saud. 
He saw this identity as part of, rather than separate from, a wider Arab and Islamic identity. 
According to him, King Abdulaziz was thus the founder of a modern nation that was central 
to the Arab and Muslim world. Building on football as a means of nation building, Zaydān 
gave a lecture at Ittihad Football Club in Jeddah on the Saudi National Day on 23 
September 1975. Shortly thereafter, he published the lecture in al-Dārah under the title ‘The 
National Day’. He began his lecture by asking, ‘The National Day, why do we celebrate it?’ 
He answered that ‘we in Saudi Arabia’ are ‘the motherland’. ‘We are the ones who have 
given Islam to the Muslim umma and we are the ones have given Arabic to its millions of 
speakers.’ Zaydān narrated that ‘our lord, God’s messenger, left this peninsula united for us, 
and how similar are its borders today to its borders yesterday’. ‘God united it through King 
Abdulaziz, after it had been fragmented. The day of this unification is our National Day.’32 
In the early 1980s, the idea of a conference on King Abdulaziz emerged that would 
consolidate the founder paradigm. In another instance of foreign influence on the 
development of dynastic historiography, Ḥusayn Amīn (b. 1925), the Iraqi secretary general 
of the Union of Arab Historians, proposed the organization of an international conference on 
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‘King Abdulaziz’s personality and life’.33 Presumably, Ḥusayn Amīn, a devout Arab 
nationalist,34 saw Abdulaziz as a pan-Arab as well as Saudi hero. Independent from Amīn, 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Shathrī put forward a similar idea. Al-Shathrī was then the editor-in-chief 
of al-Ḥaras al-Waṭanī, the magazine of the Saudi National Guard. In an editorial in al-Ḥaras 
al-Waṭanī in 1981, he argued that the hundredth birthday of Abdulaziz in 1980 and the fiftieth 
anniversary of the establishment of the modern Saudi state in 1982 ‘merit the 
comprehensive academic study of King Abdulaziz’s biography and achievements in various 
fields’. A conference would, in al-Shathrī’s view, study these ‘achievements in the service of 
his people, country, and Islamic umma’ and produce a ‘useful book for researchers and 
students now and in the future’.35 
 Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University (Imam University) in Riyadh took up 
Ḥusayn Amīn’s proposal and turned the idea of the conference into major public event. In 
1982, a preparatory committee began working on what was called the International 
Conference on the History of King Abdulaziz. This committee consisted of ʿAbd Allāh al-Turkī 
(b. 1940), the director of Imam University, as well as delegates from other universities, the 
King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, and the Union of Arab Historians. A 
media sub-committee was responsible for television interviews and radio programmes. 
Moreover, it sought to co-operate with the Ministry of Information in inviting foreign 
journalists to attend the conference.36 Besides academic historians, King Fahd (r. 1982–
2005) and Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh, who had become minister of higher education by then, both 
agreed to give speeches at the conference. In December 1985, when the weeklong 
conference was finally held, it received extensive coverage in the Saudi press. 
 Conceived as a media as well as an academic event, the conference on King 
Abdulaziz sought to strengthen allegiances to the Saudi dynasty and nation internally, while 
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also presenting the kingdom to the outside world. Domestically, the conference aimed at 
‘reminding’ the audience ‘of the blessings, which God bestowed upon this country and its 
people. They were represented in the blessing of unification, the blessing of security and 
stability thanks to the application of Islamic law and the blessing of prosperity.’ 
Internationally, another declared aim of the conference was ‘to present the political and 
social system which King Abdulaziz established and which his sons promoted in the Muslim 
world and the whole world after him, so that people learn from it and follow its example’. The 
final official aim was ‘to express appreciation, gratitude and recognition of the service of this 
great man, who established this big entity, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on the basis of 
piety. He also established the basis for its rise, consolidated its Islamic and international 
position, and served his religion, nation and humanity’.37 
 Through its lectures, the conference sought to put Abdulaziz at the centre of 
narratives about the founding of the nation. In one of the opening speeches, ʿAbd Allāh al-
Turkī, the director of Imam University, stated that ‘King Abdulaziz appeared in a period of 
darkness full of hardship and depression and marked by a decline in intellectual strength 
and material production’. According to al-Turkī, the monarch was ‘the strong man, the unifier, 
the applier of the sharia who held on to a total programme of reform, the builder’.38 The final 
declaration of the conference read that ‘in spite of a period of time full of difficulties, King 
Abdulaziz was able to build a strong nation; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’. This was ‘a 
nation that is guided by Islam, achieved unity, granted security to both citizens and 
residents, made great efforts in rebuilding the Two Holy Mosques, facilitated the 
accomplishment of Islamic rites for all Muslims’.39 
In order to consolidate the narrative of Abdulaziz as the single founder of the modern 
Saudi nation, the organizers of the conference relied not only on Saudi academics and 
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officials, but also on foreign professional historians. ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAbd al-
Raḥīm (1936–2006), a professor of history at Cairo’s Azhar University, delivered one of the 
leading papers at the conference. It was entitled ‘The Effect of King Abdulaziz’s 
Resoluteness in the Formation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’. ʿAbd al-Raḥīm argued that 
the monarch’s personality was the defining factor in the kingdom’s creation. Abdulaziz 
overcame various difficulties with his resolution, confidence and wisdom until he had built a 
‘strong Arab structure, the ‘Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’’. Later, the monarch reformed this 
structure internally and thus ‘proved to the world that a successful leader was a leader who 
had resolution, self-confidence, and ability to overcome the difficulties he faced’.40 
After the conference on King Abdulaziz, an important element of the founder paradigm 
came to prominence. This was the founding story or myth about the capture of Riyadh by 
Abdulaziz and about sixty men in 1902, which would become so controversial in al-Wābilī’s 
article in 2009.41 The capture of Riyadh was probably more suitable as a foundation story 
than the arguably far more important conquests of al-Aḥsāʾ in 1913 and the Hejaz in 
1924/25. A possible reason for the absence of both regions in the narrative, as Madawi Al-
Rasheed writes, was the reluctance to reactivate dormant sentiments among some people in 
the outlying provinces who still regarded Saudi rule ‘as an imposition of an alien Najdi 
leadership’.42 In addition, members of some Najdi families and tribes close to the Al Saud 
probably favoured the capture of Riyadh as a foundation story because they were relatives 
of Abdulaziz or his sixty men and they could claim a share in the foundation of the kingdom. 
The story of the capture of Riyadh had been part of the oral tradition and the 
historiography of the Al Saud since the early twentieth century, although it had not entered 
wider public celebrations. Abdulaziz himself regularly told the story in his council or majlis. 
His audience consisted not only of tribal sheikhs, Arab functionaries and foreign guests, but 
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also writers. Thereby, the event entered the monographs of the dynastic historians Ameen 
Rihani, Fuad Hamza, Hafiz Wahba, and St John Philby.43 In the 1960s, the dynastic authors 
Mounir Ajlani and Muhammad Tamimi also included the story in a history textbook for 
primary schools. Under the title, ‘the great adventure’, they wrote that Abdulaziz set out from 
Kuwait in a second attempt to ‘recover’ Riyadh in 1902 from ʿAjlān, a governor of the Āl 
Rashīd. During the first night after their arrival at the town, ‘Abdulaziz and a handful of his 
relatives and brave men were able to kill the emir of Riyadh and make his large, heavily-
armed and entrenched army surrender. At dawn, they entered the town square, and one of 
them shouted, “God is great! The rule belongs, thanks to God, to Abdulaziz.”’44 With some 
variation, this story has remained in different textbooks until the present.45 
In 1950, as discussed above, Abdulaziz cancelled the celebrations of the golden 
jubilee of the beginning of his rule. The capture of Riyadh was thus not commemorated 
outside of oral narratives and historical books. In the late 1980s and 1990s, however, a 
number of influential actors in the capital felt that the government should invest more in the 
public commemoration of the capture of Riyadh. This was during a time, in which the King 
Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives appeared to have fallen ‘asleep’, as the 
local historian Mohammed al-Zulfa described it. Until his death in 1988, Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh, 
the chair of the foundation, had given the institution ‘much time and effort’. Under its new 
chair, Abdul-Aziz Khowaiter, who succeeded Āl al-Shaykh as minister of education and 
higher education, the foundation received a ‘lower degree priority, to the extent that it almost 
became forgotten’.46 This happened although Khowaiter was himself a historian. 
The foundation’s inactivity coincided with a general budgetary austerity in the 
education and research sectors in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During that time, 
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increased Saudi military expenditure exacerbated the effects of lower oil prices. Saudi 
Arabia first supported Iraq during its long war against Iran between 1980 and 1988. 
Subsequently, it shouldered much of the financial burden of the war against Iraq in 1990–
1991. Muhammad Al-Sha’afi, the former secretary general of the foundation, remembered 
that ‘during the time of the Gulf War, there was a lack of everything’. ‘First, money was spent 
on Iraq and then on the multinational forces.’47 
Despite the kingdom’s fiscal difficulties, another writer named ʿAbd Allāh al-Ruwayshid 
demanded new initiatives in dynastic commemorations from the government. Al-Ruwayshid 
was a man close to the Al Saud and a frequent contributor to the journal al-Dārah. In 1989, 
he published an article in al-Dārah entitled ‘The Legendary Epic of the Conquest of Riyadh 
and the Sixty Heroes Led by King Abdulaziz’. He urged Abdul-Aziz Khowaiter in his function 
as minister of education to ‘give the name of every one of those sixty conquering and 
founding heroes to sixty schools in every province, town and village’. Likewise, he called 
upon Ibrāhīm al-ʿAnqarī, the minister of municipal and rural affairs, to ‘give the name of every 
one of those sixty Fedayeen to sixty streets’.48 With the term ‘Fedayeen’ instead of ‘martyrs’, 
al-Ruwayshid’s statement was also part of a nationalist discourse. 
Parallel to ʿAbd Allāh al-Ruwayshid, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ruwayshid (b. 1928), who 
was also close the royal family, developed the idea of celebrating the hundredth anniversary 
of the capture of Riyadh. His father had worked in the house of one of Abdulaziz’s wives. 
Thus, al-Ruwayshid had known several princes since his childhood. He enjoyed a special 
friendship with Prince Salman ibn Abdulaziz (b. 1939),49 a senior member of the royal family 
very interested in history.50 After having studied law and education in Riyadh and Beirut, al-
Ruwayshid rose to the position of director of the administration of textbooks and curricula in 
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the Ministry of Education. In 1970, he transferred to the Ministry of Interior, where he ended 
his administrative career as assistant to the secretary general of the National Security 
Council.51 His work in both the state’s education and security apparatuses probably 
convinced him that a new attempt to celebrate a royal jubilee would contribute to the 
regime’s legitimacy. In addition, as a man who had grown up in the royal household he 
found that many previous books ‘did not cover all the aspects of King Abdulaziz’s life’.52 
The idea of the centenary, however, was bound to face the opposition of ulema who 
rejected projects to strengthen nationalism, whether Arab or Saudi. In 1950, Muḥammad ibn 
Ibrāhīm Āl al-Shaykh, the grand mufti, had considered the Golden Jubilee as contrary to 
Islamic law. Official textbooks quoted his successor, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Bāz (1912–99), as 
characterizing Arab nationalism as a jāhilīyah, ‘a movement of ignorance whose main 
purpose is to fight Islam and shake its teachings and rules’.53 Ṣafar al-Ḥawālī (b. 1950), a 
prominent former teacher at Umm al-Qurá University in Mecca, also rejected both Arab and 
local nationalism (waṭanīyah). According to him, both ‘were produced and exported from the 
West to prevent the unity of Islam’.54 
Given the opposition of the ulema, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ruwayshid initially planned the 
centennial celebrations in secrecy together with a few high-ranking government officials. In 
the late 1980s, he proposed the event to his friend Prince Salman, who ‘liked the idea’ and 
subsequently attained King Fahd’s consent. As al-Ruwayshid remembered it, he worked 
with two other men close to Fahd on the project, without being able to ‘tell anybody about it’. 
One of the men was Ibrāhīm al-ʿAnqarī, the minister and subsequent personal advisor to 
Fahd. The other one was ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Sālim (b. 1932), then secretary general of the 
council of ministers. In 1990/91, the Gulf War, however, interrupted the planning. King Fahd 
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was desperate to gain the support of the ulema for the invitation of non-Muslim forces to the 
kingdom during the war. In order not to offend this constituency, he asked al-Ruwayshid and 
his collaborators ‘not to talk about the centenary again’.55 
Yet, the centennial celebrations were also meant to be an instrument in nation 
building. This became urgent in the 1990s, when the government ‘felt the necessity of an 
identity that could help in overcoming the unprecedented internal and external problems, 
including the threat to the unity of the state’.56 During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein 
challenged the cohesion of the country by addressing Saudi Arabia as the ‘lands of Najd and 
the Hejaz’. The crisis also made it clear to members of the royal family that they could not 
rely on the loyalty of the whole religious establishment. They were able to extract a fatwa 
from ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Bāz justifying the invitation of foreign, non-Muslim forces to the 
kingdom. This fatwa, however, led to a schism within the religious establishment, with some 
scholars, including Ṣafar al-Ḥawālī, opposing the invitation.57 
Against external and internal threats to the Saudi state’s security and legitimacy, the 
government made new efforts to foster a national identity centred on the Al Saud. Already 
during the war, Ghazi Algosaibi (1940–2010), then Saudi ambassador to Bahrain, countered 
the Iraqi propaganda with a poem that was later turned into a popular song. The poem 
emphasized national unity, with the first line being ‘yes, we are the Hejaz and we are Najd, 
we have glory here and glory there’.58 In 1996, the Ministry of Education also created the 
new school subject ‘national education’.59 One of its aims was to ‘introduce pupils to the 
history of their nation and its achievements and the struggle of their ancestors’. Another aim 
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was to ‘strengthen the belonging to the nation and the concern for its security, stability, and 
protection’.60 
As part of the nation-building project, the government also resumed the planning of 
the centennial celebrations. Al-Ruwayshid’s idea thus turned into a state project. On the 
Saudi National Day on 23 September 1996, Prince Salman publicly announced that the 
celebration would take place three years later.61 Salman also headed the newly established 
Supreme Committee for the Preparation of the Centenary of the Kingdom’s Foundation. 
Giving witness to the importance the government attached to the centenary, this committee 
contained no professional historians, but only men of ministerial rank apart from ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān al-Ruwayshid. It included the finance minister and the minister of information as 
well as Ibrāhīm al-ʿAnqarī and ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Sālim. In addition, ʿAbd Allāh al-Turkī, the 
former director of Imam University, served on the committee in his new function as minister 
of Islamic affairs.62 
The centenary gained unprecedented dimensions, as not only ministries, but also the 
King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives contributed with new vigour to 
dynastic historical production. After the foundation’s publication activities had stagnated 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new leadership expanded its activities. The 
government offered ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ruwayshid the position of the foundation’s secretary 
general, but he declined in order to dedicate himself to publishing al-Shibl, a children’s 
magazine.63 Instead, Fahd al-Semmari (b. 1957/58) became the first professional historian 
after Muhammad Al-Sha’afi to administer the historical research institute. Like Al-Sha’afi, he 
had also studied abroad. He completed a doctoral dissertation on Saudi diplomatic relations 
under King Abdulaziz at the University of California, Riverside.64 
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Soon after al-Semmari’s appointment as secretary general in 1995, Prince Salman 
became the new chair of the foundation. Al-Semmari’s leadership and Salman’s backing 
allowed the research institute to expand and assume a pivotal role in the centennial 
celebrations. In 1999, together with the newly founded General Secretariat for the 
Celebration of the Centenary of the Kingdom’s Foundation, which Salman also headed, the 
foundation organized a five-day international conference with 197 papers. In addition, the 
foundation and the general secretariat produced five documentaries, organized six 
exhibitions, and issued sixty-four books. Aiming at broad audiences, these books not only 
comprised academic studies but also children’s books on Abdulaziz’s life and battles.65 
Having the full backing of the government, the organizers of the centenary were able 
to overcome the resistance of the ulema. This was in contrast to the jubilee of 1950, when 
Saudi nation building was still in its infancy. As expected, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Bāz, the grand 
mufti, issued a fatwa declaring the centenary a heresy (bidʿah) shortly before the festivities 
began. This caused elaborate decorations to vanish from shop windows in Riyadh.66 ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān al-Ruwayshid was familiar with the ulema’s arguments, however, as he had studied 
under Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Āl al-Shaykh, the former grand mufti, and he managed to 
persuade Ibn Baz not to oppose the celebration. He argued that the centenary was merely a 
‘political commemoration’. As it was not to be repeated every year, it could not turn into an 
‘Eid’. In return for all their efforts for the centenary, Fahd awarded al-Ruwayshid and other 
contributors to the centenary the highest order of the kingdom, the King Abdulaziz Order.67 
As an attempt to promote Saudi national allegiances without alienating the ulema 
further, the aims of the centenary had both Islamic and national dimensions. The first two 
official objectives sought to legitimize the state religiously. According to them, the festivity 
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was supposed to ‘highlight the importance of the Islamic pillars on which the kingdom is 
based’ and to ‘explain the effect of the application of the sharia on the security and stability 
in the kingdom’. The remaining aims sought to foster national unity by ‘revealing the 
specialty of the kingdom’s unity’ and ‘explaining national achievements in order to 
strengthen national identity’.68 
In order to foster a Saudi national identity, the centennial celebrations gave central 
attention to the national foundation story of 1902. The centennial logo itself displayed a 
silhouette of Riyadh’s Muṣmak fort, which Abdulaziz and his men had captured in that year. 
In addition, the logo featured the date ‘1319’ in the Islamic lunar calendar, which is the 
equivalent of 1902 in the Gregorian calendar (see figure 3). The centenary organizer ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān al-Ruwayshid also published a compilation of the biographies of the men involved 
in the capture of Riyadh: The Sixty Men of Eternal Memory: The Forefront of the Recovery of 
Riyadh and the Unification of the Kingdom.69 In this work, al-Ruwayshid reiterated the 
importance of these men for the foundation of the kingdom. He wrote that ‘it was Abdulaziz, 
on whom the hopes of the Al Saud and the hopes of the citizens for the unification of their 
country relied’. These hopes ‘began to appear, when he led this group, who achieved the 
first step, the recovery of Riyadh’.70 King Fahd honoured sons and grandsons of these 
‘pioneers’ in a large ceremony in central Riyadh during the centenary, and a large plate 
bearing the pioneers’ names was placed in front of the Muṣmak fort.71 
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Figure 3: Official logo of the centenary in 1999 
 Unification, not jihad 
As the government popularized the paradigm of Abdulaziz as the founder of the nation, this 
paradigm was combined with the notion of unification. A similar founder paradigm in 
Egyptian historiography viewed Muhammad Ali (r. 1805–48) as the father of the modern 
nation ‘on top of a corrupt Ottoman order’.72 Saudi dynastic histories, in contrast, portrayed 
Abdulaziz as the unifier of the nation against the background of previous division. The notion 
of national unification further contributed to the Saudization of dynastic historiography, after 
earlier dynastic histories had portrayed the Al Saud mainly as restorers of Islam and 
champions of the Arab world. Consequently, the takfīrist paradigm lost ground. ‘Unification’ 
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replaced ‘jihad’ and ‘conquest’ (fatḥ), and the idea of pre-Wahhabi political disunity became 
more important than a religious ‘age of ignorance’. 
Although dynastic histories between the 1920s and the 1970s emphasized jihad and 
the spread of Islam, the notion of unification, like the foundation story of 1902, also appeared 
during the early consolidation of the Saudi state. The notion first arose during the official 
renaming of the Hejazi and Najdi kingdoms as the ‘Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ in 1932. The 
23 September marking this event was initially called ‘Union Day’ (ʿīd al-tawḥīd).73 Later, it 
was termed the ‘National Day’ (al-yawm al-waṭanī) following resistance by Wahhabi ulema to 
the usage of the term ‘Eid’ (ʿīd).74 Fuad Hamza, one of the officials involved in the 
consolidation, however, continued to use the term tawḥīd. In his book Saud Arabia published 
in 1937, he called the renaming of 1932 the ‘unification of the kingdom’s parts’.75 
With the rise of Arab nationalism after World War II, the notion of ‘unification’ 
remained part of governmental discourse. Although it principally referred to a Saudi national 
rather than an Arab national process, Saudi leaders also used it to emphasize their 
commitment to Arab unity. In an interview published in 1972, a journalist put to King Faisal 
the observation that ‘it seems that the kingdom has not been happy with some projects of 
unity’ in the region. This observation presumably referred to the United Arab Republic 
headed by Nasser, with which Saudi Arabia had wrestled in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Faisal responded that Saudi Arabia, in fact, was ‘the first establisher of unity. The late King 
Abdulaziz struggled to unify the parts of this kingdom, after it had been ravaged by conflicts, 
fighting, and looting.’76 
Since the 1970s onwards, historians have used the notion of ‘unification’ frequently 
and have applied it not only to the ‘merger’ of 1932 but also to the preceding conquests. This 
happened during a time, in which the idea of the Saudi nation as an object to be unified 
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became consolidated. In addition, the rise of the concept of ‘unification’ coincided with the 
appearance of more and more indigenous dynastic historians who shared a national outlook. 
One of these authors was Ibrahim Al Khamis (b. 1906), an author from al-Dirʿīyah and close 
to Al Saud. After having fought in the Saudi armies under King Abdulaziz’s brother 
Muhammad (1878/79–1944), Al Khamis became a trader travelling to Kuwait, Iraq, and other 
neighbouring countries. With the help and encouragement of Muhammad ibn Abdulrahman’s 
sons and Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh, the minister of education, he completed a semi-
autobiographical book entitled The Lions of the Al Saud and My Experience in Life in 1972.77 
The ‘lions’ were King Abdulaziz, his son Faisal and his brother Muhammad. 
In Al Khamis’s text, unification and jihad initially occurred together. He still used the 
earlier terminology, but combined it with unification of the nation. He spoke of Abdulaziz’s 
‘conquest’ (fatḥ) of Ḥāʾil in 1922, and stated that the Al Saud ‘raided’ (ghazaw) the Shammar 
and ʿUtaybah tribes.78 However, he also argued that ‘the Al Saud and their helpers led by 
Abdulaziz fought battles in order to unify the country in one strong kingdom’.79 In Al Khamis’s 
characterization of Faisal, the notion of jihad, or service to Islam, and unification, or service 
to the nation, merged. The author wrote that Faisal, under his father Abdulaziz, ‘fought the 
battles of jihad and struggle in order to liberate and unify the country. Then he fought and 
fights until this day the battles of the greater jihad in building, reforming, constructing and 
laying the bases of growth, prosperity, stability and justice in the country’. According to Al 
Khamis, ‘nothing has kept him away from carrying out what he saw as in the interest of his 
country and what he saw as in the interest of all Arabs and Muslims’.80 
Although the national term ‘unification’ arose at the expense of jihad, it was not 
entirely secular. What contributed to the success of the term was, in fact, its association in 
Arabic with Islam and the Wahhabi mission as well as with the nation. While the word did not 
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have the strong takfīrist meaning of fatḥ, ‘conquest’, tawḥīd retained a religious connotation 
in contrast to the ‘unification of Germany’ (deutsche Einigung) of 1871 and the Italian 
unification, or ‘resurgence’ (il Risorgimento).81 It also meant ‘monotheism’, the belief that 
‘there is no other god but God’ (lā ilāha illā allāh), as stated in the Muslim profession of 
faith.82 As such, it was a central concept in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrines, as expressed in 
his manifesto, The Book of God’s Unity (Kitāb al-tawḥīd).83 
Forming an obstacle to the rise of the unification narrative, the notion of the pre-
Wahhabi jāhilīyah and related takfīrist narratives retained an important platform at Imam 
Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University (Imam University). After having published an edition 
of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s works in seven volumes in 1977/78,84 the university organized the 
Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab Week in 1980, a conference aimed at ‘informing 
Muslim public opinion about the truth of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s mission’.85 
In his opening speech, Prince Salman ibn Abdulaziz still argued that the pre-Wahhabi period 
was ‘a stage of chaos and ignorance, in which heresies prevailed, until God blessed this 
country with a true mission and faithful rulers. Imam Muhammad ibn Saud and Shaykh 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab thus began to call for a return to the Koran and the Sunna, 
adherence to monotheism, and jihad.’86 Here, Salman expressed a governmental view that 
still saw the Wahhabi mission at the centre of the regime’s legitimacy. In 1975, the minister 
of higher education, Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh, was asked in an interview how he would imagine 
the Arabian peninsula and the Arab and Muslim world without the Wahhabi mission. He 
answered, ‘void, lost, and full of strife, wars and darkness’.87 
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An influential author at Imam University, who followed the takfīrist paradigm, was ʿAbd 
Allāh al-Shibl (b. 1936/37). He was a professor of history who served as the institution’s 
secretary general twice between 1977 and 1995.88 In 1978, al-Shibl published an article in 
al-Dārah on ‘Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s Mission’. He argued that before the 
sheikh, ‘aberrance from the true Islamic religion in the form of idolatry, heresies, and 
superstition prevailed in all countries of the Muslim world’.89 Still in 1999, al-Shibl claimed 
that pre-Wahhabi Najd had deteriorated to a ‘level comparable to, or greater than, that of the 
age of ignorance’.90 ‘Within two years after the Sheikh had moved to al-Dirʿīyah’, the 
historian maintained, the mission had ‘gathered its military forces, announced jihad in order 
to bring the people to the truth, and created the right atmosphere to spread the mission and 
to return the Muslims to the way of God’.91 
However, while the establishment of an indigenous historical profession gave takfīrism 
an academic platform, it also facilitated its erosion. This contributed to the gradual rise of 
‘unification’ at the expense of ‘jihad’. Importantly, professional historical training encouraged 
criticism of sources and the use of new sources beyond the takfīrist chronicles by Ibn 
Ghannām and Ibn Bishr. Abdul-Aziz Khowaiter, the future minister, established the new 
approach to sources in higher education in the kingdom. After having studied at Cairo 
University, he gained a PhD from SOAS in 1960.92 For his thesis, he edited a source on 
Mamluk history under the supervision of the historian Peter Holt.93 As one of the first Saudis 
with a doctorate,94 the government appointed him as secretary general and subsequently 
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deputy director of King Saud University. As a fellow Najdi, King Faisal also entrusted him 
with teaching Saudi history at the university between 1961 and 1971.95 
As part of his teaching at King Saud University, Khowaiter passed on his skills in 
historical research, which he had gained in Cairo and London, to the first generation of 
professional historians trained inside the kingdom. He thus encouraged them to criticize and 
contrast different sources. In a manual on Research Methods, published in 1975, he 
introduced his students to a variety of source materials, including oral narrations, 
manuscripts, inscriptions, writings on leather and papyri, coins, stamps, jewellery and even 
furniture.96 
Moreover, Khowaiter encouraged his students to study and edit chronicles other than 
those by Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr in order to discover more about the country’s history. 
These chronicles included previously unpublished pre-Wahhabi Najdi texts, which lacked 
takfīrism. Khowaiter himself published al-Manqūr’s chronicle in 1970, considering this edition 
as a service to national history. He argued that the work contained ‘jewels of information 
that, if polished, emit a guiding light that connects an important past episode in the history of 
this country to its present’. ‘The little that has been written on the history of Najd over the last 
five centuries made me feel that any effort towards some of it, either by studying or 
commenting upon it, is a clear service, however small the effort may be.’97 
ʿAbd Allāh al-Shibl, who graduated from King Saud University under Khowaiter in 
1962, succeeded his teacher as a prolific editor of Najdi histories. As part of his master’s 
dissertation, he edited a chronicle by Muḥammad al-Fākhirī’s (1772/73–1860).98 In 1980, al-
Shibl completed a PhD thesis on The Most Important Najdi Sources on the History of the 
First Saudi State. While he dedicated large passages to the works of the Ibn Ghannām 
School, he also discussed the pre-Wahhabi authors Aḥmad al-Bassām, Ibn Yūsuf and al-
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Manqūr.99 In 1999, Khowaiter’s former student also published the chronicles by Ibn ʿAbbād 
and Ibn Rabīʿah.100 
Keeping the notion of the pre-Wahhabi jāhilīyah, ʿAbd Allāh al-Shibl employed Ibn        
ʿAbbād’s chronicle with its accounts of battles and killings mainly to substantiate the idea of 
‘chaos’ before Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.101 ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿUthaymīn, one of al-Shibl’s classmates 
at King Saud University, however, analysed the religious and political background of the 
Wahhabi mission more critically. He became a specialist in Saudi history rather incidentally 
and as result of Western interest in the Wahhabi mission as an underresearched topic. 
When his supervisors at King Saud University decided to send him for postgraduate studies 
to Britain, they demanded that his research topic should not be Saudi history. This was 
because Muhammad Al-Sha’afi had already written his PhD on the first Saudi state, and, as 
al-ʿUthaymīn put it, ‘the officials at the university thought at that time that this was enough in 
this field’.102 Instead, al-ʿUthaymīn was supposed to study the Arab presence in East Africa 
for his PhD. However, Montgomery Watt (1909–2006), his supervisor at the University of 
Edinburgh, convinced him to study Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. As al-ʿUthaymīn 
remembered it, Watt justified this change of topics by stating that ‘researchers in the West 
were looking for more information about him’.103 In 1972, al-ʿUthaymīn thus completed a 
dissertation on Muḥammad ibn ’Abd al-Wahhāb: The Man and His Works.104 
Upon his return to the Kingdom, al-ʿUthaymīn was able to continue his research on 
Saudi history and publish the results of his graduate work in 1979.105 More important for the 
rise of the unification narrative at the expense of the takfīrist paradigm, however, was that he 
re-investigated the pre-Wahhabi situation in Najd in the light of new sources. These sources 
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included vernacular poetry and the chronicles by al-Manqūr and al-Fākhirī. They provided 
him with a picture of Najd in which Islam had been present. Between 1975 and 1978, al-       
ʿUthaymīn published the results of his research in an article in four parts in al-Dārah. It was 
entitled ‘Najd from the Tenth/Sixteenth Century until the Rise of Sheikh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd 
al-Wahhāb’.106 The historian contended that his sources ‘stress that Najd was the homeland 
of important scholars, most of whom were graced by piety and righteousness. They also 
depict most of its urban inhabitants (at least) as faithfully adhering to the rules of Islam and 
carrying out its duties and practices.’ In contrast to Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr’s 
descriptions, ‘the poetry of this period contains nothing that conflicts with sound Islamic 
belief or is incompatible with the general rules of Islam. In fact, the poems emphasize the 
adherence of their poets to their faith and their commitment to Islam’.107 
These findings led al-ʿUthaymīn to break with the takfīrist notion of the pre-Wahhabi 
‘age of ignorance’. He criticized Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr, who had been pertinent in 
establishing this notion in Saudi dynastic histories. The historian argued that ‘the religious 
situation in Najd was not conformant with the picture given in those sources that supported 
Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s reformist daʿwa’. He conceded that ‘there were, indeed, ignorant 
people who performed polytheist or paganist rites, but their number was apparently small’. 
However, ‘there was also strict observance of the Sharīʿa, and those who adhered to the 
religious principles of Islam and the duties and practices it enjoins.’108 
Having rejected the notion of the pre-Wahhabi jāhilīyah, al-ʿUthaymīn described the 
Wahhabi mission mainly as a unifying force in the context of previous political division. He 
concluded that Najd was ‘ripe for a political movement that would unite its various emirates 
and tribes under one banner, in order to achieve security and stability’. The region ‘provided 
fertile ground for the success of such a movement for it was remote from the control of a 
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strong central authority. Thus it was possible for a movement to achieve at least initial 
success without drawing the attention of outside powers.’109 
Al-ʿUthaymīn’s replacement of jāhilīyah and jihad by division and unification did not fail 
to meet resistance from scholars of Imam University who continued to follow the takfīrist 
paradigm. One of them, Ṣāliḥ al-Ḥasan, published a comment on al-ʿUthaymīn’s article in al-
Dārah in 1979. He stated that the article ‘questioned the role played by the Imam, the Sheikh 
of Islam, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, in fighting idolatry and returning the community to 
the Koran and the sunnah’. Al-Ḥasan added, ‘I do not consider it justified that Muslims 
practicing history resort to philosophy and analyze some events and history in order to 
question important facts in the building of the Muslim community. This is what Dr al-              
ʿUthaymīn did, when he investigated the religious aspect of that time.’110 
ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿUthaymīn did not appear to have suffered in his career from al-Ḥasan’s 
criticism. The historian continued to teach at King Saud University and, in 1981, was 
promoted to full professor. Later, he also worked as an advisor to the ministries of education 
and higher education. Moreover, he has served as secretary general of the King Faisal 
International Prize since 1987 and as member of the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shūrá) 
for the legal maximum of three terms from 1999 to 2009.111 Presumably, the Wahhabi 
credentials of his brother Muḥammad ibn ʿUthaymīn, who was a senior official religious 
scholar, offered him some protection.112 What was also not a disadvantage for him was that 
al-ʿUthaymīn’s former teacher Abdul-Aziz Khowaiter served as a government minister since 
1974, including as minister of education between 1975 and 1994.113 
Supportive of al-ʿUthaymīn’s revisions of the pre-Wahhabi past was the fact that Abd 
al-Rahman al-Ansary, a colleague of his at King Saud University, challenged previously held 
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notions of earlier Arabian history. They included what al-Ansary called ‘legends’ about the 
pre-Muhammad jāhilīyah in traditional Islamic historiography, such as female infanticide and 
the burning of Christians at al-Ukhdūd, today’s Najrān in southern Saudi Arabia. Al-Ansary 
studied Arabic and textual criticism at Cairo University. Subsequently, he developed critical 
approaches to the ancient Arabian past, while studying for a PhD at the University of 
Leeds.114 Back in the kingdom, al-Ansary led excavations at Qaryat al-Fau in central Arabia 
between 1971 and 1995, discovering the capital of the ancient Arab kingdom of Kindah.115 
Keen to study the Arabian past beyond the limits of traditional chronicles, he co-organized 
two international conferences on the history of Arabia at King Saud University in 1977 and 
1979, including on ‘Pre-Islamic Arabia’.116 In 1982, al-Ansary also published a book on 
Qaryat al-Fau that spoke of Saudi Arabia’s ‘pre-Islamic civilization’ rather than ‘age of 
ignorance’.117 
Although al-Ansary challenged previous historiography, his archaeological work also 
received support from a government devoted to nation building. The kingdom’s first five-year 
plan between 1970 and 1975 already recognized the ‘cultural importance of antiquities and 
the scientific value of museums’. The plan specified that the Ministry of Education carry out 
‘an annual programme under which missions could be sent out to survey archaeological 
sites, to look for antiquities and define their exact location’. The second development plan 
between 1975 and 1980 included among its objectives the ‘institution of a comprehensive 
antiquities survey programme’ and ‘detailed exploration in selected sites of archaeological 
importance’. Important for the fostering of a national identity, the plan also comprised the 
‘creation of a national museum to give Saudis the chance to increase their knowledge of the 
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religious, cultural and social heritage and to increase their appreciation and understanding of 
this heritage’.118 
With the notions of jāhilīyah in both antiquity and early modern times being shaken, 
the national narrative of ‘unification’ came to dominate dynastic characterizations of the 
kingdom’s foundation. One of the first authors who made this narrative the overarching 
theme of a biography of Abdulaziz was Mohammed Almana, a former Najdi translator in the 
royal court between 1926 and 1935 who had previously studied in India. In 1980, Almana 
published a book in English, in which he summarized Abdulaziz’s achievements under the 
title Arabia Unified. Almana’s work responded to the previous domination of Saudi dynastic 
historiography by foreigners and sought to provide Western markets with a ‘native’ view. He 
decided to write the book after several of his English friends had told him that ‘they were 
tired of reading books and articles about Arabia and the Arabs by Europeans who had 
appointed themselves experts on the subject after visiting our country for only a few weeks. 
It was about time, they thought, that a native Arab wrote a book in English, giving an Arabian 
view of his country’s recent history.’119 ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿUthaymīn later gave Almana’s book a 
more explicit Saudi national frame. The historian at King Saud University reviewed the book 
and found that ‘“Saudi Arabia Unified” would be a more suitable title for the book’.120 
Subsequently, he translated the work into Arabic and changed the title to The Unification of 
Saudi Arabia.121 
In 1985, the notion of foundation-as-unification also entered the speeches at the 
International Conference on the History of King Abdulaziz. King Fahd himself urged 
historians to follow this idea in his opening speech, while appealing to their professionalism. 
‘When we research King Abdulaziz’s history’, he urged his audience, ‘we should as 
academics and honest historians remember his determination when he was young to unify 
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this precious country which was yearning for unity and dreaming of it in his thoughts and 
feelings. At one time this country experienced disunity and lack of security and its life was 
filled with fear and instability. People became certain that unification was extremely 
necessary for the existence of the country.’122 
Importantly, the notion of unification also replaced parts of the takfīrist narratives of 
earlier dynastic historiography. Following Al Khamis, al-ʿUthaymīn described Saudi 
expansion in textbooks with the terms tawḥīd, ‘unification’ or ‘restoration’, and ḍamm, 
‘annexation’ or ‘joining’. They largely replaced ‘jihad’, fatḥ, ‘conquest’, and ghazwah, ‘raid’. In 
his textbooks on The History of Saudi Arabia, al-ʿUthaymīn spoke of ‘the unification [tawḥīd] 
of Najd’, ‘the annexation [ḍamm] of al-Aḥsāʾ’, ‘the unification of Asir’, ‘the unification of the 
Hejaz’ or ‘the annexation of the Hejaz’, et cetera.123 This idiom also appeared in other 
publications by the Ministry of Education and as well as those by the King Abdulaziz 
Foundation for Research and Archives.124 
The establishment of an indigenous historical profession also fostered a preference 
for ‘unification’ over Islamic ‘conquest’ and jihad in a more indirect way. Universities and 
conferences gathered researchers from all parts of the kingdom and fostered a sense of 
mutual tolerance and respect—as between al-ʿUthaymīn from Najd and Muhammad Al-
Sha’afi from Asir. Al-ʿUthaymīn remembered that he started using tawḥīd instead of fatḥ 
soon after his return from the University of Edinburgh to the King Saud University in the early 
1970s. Distancing himself from takfīrism, he explained that he did not want to imply that the 
Hejazis, for instance, had not been Muslims.125 
On the centenary, the organizers of the event applied the notion of unification to the 
foundation story of 1902. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ruwayshid in his book Sixty Men of Eternal 
Memory introduced the event by stating that ‘it was Abdulaziz, on whom the hopes of the Al 
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Saud and the hopes of the citizens for the unification of their country relied. These hopes 
began to appear, when he led this group, who achieved the first step, the recovery of 
Riyadh’.126 In contrast, Mohammed Almana in Arabia Unified had still implied that 
Abdulaziz’s right to capture Riyadh from the Āl Rashīd was based on inheritance rather than 
unification. He wrote that there had been ‘many influential chiefs and tribesmen’ who ‘would 
have been only too happy to see the family of Saud resume their rightful place in Najd’.127 
Al-ʿUthaymīn and al-Ansary’s work also contributed to the narratives underlying the 
presentation of a national history in the Saudi National Museum, which was opened in 1999 
as part of the centenary. In contrast to the earlier dynastic exclusivism, which conceived the 
history of Saudi Arabia essentially as a history of the Saudi family, this institution presented 
the dynasty within the frame of a perennial nation. In five galleries, visitors followed the 
nation’s path from pre-history to the period of the pre-Islamic Arabian kingdoms through to 
the ages of Muhammad, the Umayyads, Abbasids, Mamluks and Ottomans. Subsequently, 
they moved on to two galleries on the three Saudi states.128 In long preceding discussions, 
al-Ansary and his colleagues had been able to persuade officials to base the depiction of 
pre-Islamic Arabia on the results of twentieth-century archaeology rather than traditional 
Muslim historiography.129 
The narrative of modern Saudi history in the National Museum was decisively less 
takfīrist than those in texts by ʿAbd Allāh al-Shibl and earlier dynastic historians. The text at 
the entrance to the ‘gallery of the first and second Saudi states’ described pre-Wahhabi 
religious deterioration, but not an ‘age of ignorance’. One text stated that when Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab was born, Arabia was ‘in a state of chaos and constant wars between towns and 
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tribes. Despite the presence of ulema and scholarship, heretical practices, idolatry, and 
superstition, such as the veneration of graves of saints, trees and rocks, were common in 
some towns and village in Najd as well as in the rest of the Muslim world. Sheikh 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought to return the Muslim faith to purity of the Prophet 
Mohammed’s teachings.’130 In the gallery on King Abdulaziz, entitled ‘unification of the 
kingdom’, the ‘unification’ narrative had won over ‘jihad’ and ‘fatḥ’. One text stated that 
‘during thirty years from the recovery of Riyadh until the proclamation of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia in 1932, King Abdulaziz could restore [tawḥīd] southern Najd and al-Qaṣīm in 
1903–4, the Eastern Province in 1913, Asir in 1920, Ḥāʾil in 1921, and the Hejaz in 1924–25. 
He completed the restoration [tawḥīd] of Jāzān and Tihāmah in 1930.’131 
Development 
Besides foundation or foundation-as-unification, dynastic historiography also produced 
another, complementary national paradigm: development. This paradigm sought to provide 
additional legitimacy for the Saudi dynasty. After Abdulaziz had ‘founded’ and ‘unified’ the 
nation, he and his sons and successors went on to ‘develop’ it. The rise of the notion of 
development also formed part of the Saudization of dynastic histories. Dynastic historians 
did not stop portraying Saudi kings as champions of Islam and the Arabs. Yet they focused 
more on describing them as leaders in the development of the Saudi nation. They thus 
sought to give the Saudi dynasty an elaborate Saudi national as well as wider Arab and 
Islamic legitimacy. 
While the paradigm of development in dynastic historiography referred to the Saudi 
nation, the idea or ‘ideology’132 of development itself was a global one. During the 1930s, the 
idea of development as a state-mediated national process was consolidated in the United 
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States, parts of Latin America, and Europe.133 In the 1940s, the British Colonial Office used 
it as a framework for a series of policy initiatives in order to assume greater control over the 
economy during the war effort, to improve living standards in the colonies and to re-
legitimize empire. After World War II, however, nationalists and trade-unionists in the Middle 
East, Africa, and Asia appropriated the language and concepts of state-mediated 
development. As Mark Berger put it, they thus escalated ‘demands for better wages, social 
services and improved living standards as well as political power and national sovereignty or 
independence’.134 Subsequently, India played a key role in universalizing the idea of national 
development, raising expectations that Indian ‘efforts to deliver material improvement and 
prosperity to its citizens could serve as a model’.135 By the 1970s, development had become 
a ‘global ideology’ of the world economy.136 As Immanuel Wallerstein put it, ‘when the United 
Nations declared that the 1970s would be the “decade of development,” the term and the 
objective seemed virtually a piety’.137 
Ideas of the Al Saud as leaders of a modernization of the country had already 
emerged in some writings during King Abdulaziz’s reign. A prominent proponent of this idea 
was Chekib Arslan, the Muslim and Arab nationalist from Lebanon who found refuge in the 
kingdom in the 1920s. He reacted against widespread assumptions among social and 
political reformers in the Middle East that Islam and modernization were incompatible. In the 
late 1920s, he initiated a campaign that sought to show that King Abdulaziz not only 
enforced the sharia, but ‘that he was also a modernizer’. Arslan thus portrayed the first 
Saudi king as ‘eagerly introducing automobiles, electricity, a new postal system, and other 
attributes of modern civilization into the Hijaz’.138 
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A few decades later, in the early 1960s, the Saudi government produced a full-fledged 
programme of ‘development’. This step was a symbolic response to self-described 
‘progressive’ foreign governments, such as Nasser’s, which classified Saudi Arabia as 
‘reactionary’ and ‘backward’.139 King Faisal himself was aware of the negative reputation that 
his kingdom had among foreign observers and sought to counter it publicly. In his interview 
published in 1972, the interviewer remarked that ‘you are accused of backwardness, of 
course without a clear definition of the meaning of his accusation. This was first, because 
you are leading a monarchic regime, and second, because you are calling for Islam and are 
doing so in the last third of the twentieth century’. Faisal dismissed the criticism of the 
alleged backwardness of Islam outright. Regarding the issue of the kingdom’s monarchic 
system, he responded by arguing that ‘the important thing is not the name, but the 
application. Any regime, whether it is monarchical or republican, should reflect benevolence 
and progress.’140 
Apart from being a message addressed to foreign audiences, the Saudi government’s 
development programme also served as a modernist legitimation directed against internal 
dissent. By 1962, as Toby Jones put it, ‘Islam was no longer viewed as sufficient to pacify 
restless citizens’, and development was formulated ‘as a means to engender social and 
political harmony’.141 That year, the government issued a ten-point-plan that ‘shaped a 
message in which Islam and development, science, and modernity were to come together in 
forging a new era of Saudi prosperity’.142 In 1970, the government started the first five-year 
development plan for the kingdom. Yet, in contrast to socialist or semi-socialist development 
plans of many other developing countries at the time, this plan, drafted with the assistance of 
American consultants, was based on capitalist concepts, such as the free market.143 
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Soon after the paradigm of development had entered Saudi policies, it also appeared 
in history textbooks. These textbooks described King Faisal as the leader of national 
development. A primary school textbook from 1969 co-authored by Mounir Ajlani and 
Muhammad Tamimi stated that Faisal had so far carried out ‘the development of the Ministry 
of Information, radio, the press, and television, and spread those media across the kingdom. 
He has also actively sought to reform the administration and to drive forward the scientific 
and cultural renaissance based on the country’s possibilities and capacity.’144 Another 
textbook issued two years later contained sections on ‘agricultural renaissance’, ‘educational 
renaissance’, ‘health care’, and ‘communications and their development’ under Faisal.145 
Whereas the founder paradigm focused on King Abdulaziz, the development 
paradigm initially concentrated on Faisal. This partly served to justify Faisal’s deposition of 
his brother Saud in 1964 after an extended power struggle. In their 1969 textbook, Ajlani and 
Tamimi thus mainly credited Faisal with the development of the country. While the authors 
did not ignore Saud’s reign between 1953 and 1964, they attributed the establishment of 
new ministries, hospitals, schools, and new military units principally to Faisal’s tenure as 
prime minister during that time.146 The textbook from 1969 blamed members of Saud’s 
entourage for exploiting their master’s authority in order to ‘gain positions and spoils’. When 
Saud temporarily removed Faisal from his office as prime minister in response to their 
intrigue, he caused a ‘major setback and a serious catastrophe involving the country’s 
foreign relations, financial, economic, and domestic situation’. Subsequently, the textbook 
stated that ‘the entourage’s plots and the king’s expenditures made it necessary to depose 
him and proclaim Crown Prince Faisal as king’.147 
In producing development policies, the government relied on, and tried to appeal to, a 
new kind of elite besides the princes and the ulema, namely the ‘intellectuals’ 
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(muthaqqafūn).148 Most of these people had not pursued a traditional religious education, but 
had studied secular subjects abroad with governmental scholarships. Many of them 
supported the ‘modernization’ of the kingdom, and gained themselves important positions in 
the state. In a strategy endorsed by the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) and US 
advisors, King Faisal and his successor Khalid (r. 1975–82) preferred to appoint graduates 
of foreign universities to key positions in the government and its new agencies.149 By 1977, 
out of the twenty-six members of the Council of Ministers, ten held a master’s degree or 
doctorate from Western universities.150 King Fahd continued this strategy, so that by 1997, 
out of the ninety members of the Saudi parliament or Consultative Council, 64 per cent held 
doctorates and an additional 14.4 per cent held master’s degrees. Western universities had 
awarded 80 per cent of these postgraduate degrees. Only 14 per cent of the members had 
backgrounds in Islamic studies, with the rest being educated in secular subjects. 
Backgrounds in engineering, political science, economics, and public administration topped 
the list.151 
A major technocratic institution in the production of development narratives was the 
Ministry of Information. It was founded in 1962, the same year as King Faisal’s ten-point 
development plan was issued. Besides being responsible for media censorship, the ministry 
was supposed to advertise the kingdom’s developmental policies among foreign as well as 
domestic audiences. Among the aims of the ministry, as stated in a publication from 1981, 
was to publicize ‘the Comprehensive Development Plan, its objectives and projects’ and to 
spread ‘knowledge of the work of the state in various fields in the light of the Development 
Plan’. To that aim, the ministry was supposed to receive foreign press delegations in order 
‘to acquaint them with the progress and development of the country and provide them with 
all relevant information’. In addition, the agency sought to classify ‘data relating to 
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development in the kingdom so that they may be available to visitors in a scientific and 
objective form’.152 
The Ministry of Information’s engagement in the promotion of development narratives 
partly resulted from the leadership of Fouad Al-Farsy (b. 1946). His interest in development 
grew out of previous academic work. In 1976, he completed a PhD dissertation at Duke 
University in North Carolina entitled Saudi Arabia: a case study in development.153 In 
addition, he helped his former dissertation supervisor, Ralph Braibanti (1920–2005), to gain 
Saudi governmental funding for the establishment of an Arabian Development Studies 
Center at Duke University in 1977.154 The same year, Al-Farsy was appointed assistant 
deputy minister of information. In 1984, he was promoted to deputy minister and, in 1993, to 
minister of information.155 
While directing the Ministry of Information, Al-Farsy also published a revised version 
of his PhD thesis as a book in 1978. In line with King Faisal’s ten-point plan, this book 
stressed that the kingdom ‘developed’ while still preserving its traditions, especially Islam. 
Al-Farsy mainly argued against foreign literature on political development in Saudi Arabia, 
complaining that it ‘manifested the bias and ignorance of scholars who neither can read 
Arabic nor have ever been to the country’.156 Against this literature, he presented Saudi 
Arabia as a ‘unique model of nation building’. ‘Modernization and development have 
occurred and are still occurring at a slower but forceful pace and in a manner which will 
enable the Kingdom to maintain and preserve its culture, heritage, and distinctive identity.’ 
This he saw in contrast to ‘most developing countries’, which ‘risk the loss of their cultural 
identity while modern transformation takes place. Alien societal norms and values, not in 
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harmony with these nations’ heritages and cultures, seem to overwhelm indigenous 
values.’157 
Al-Farsy also used the Ministry of Information to sponsor at least three re-editions of 
his book in English between 1982 and 1990, making it one of the most widely distributed 
works on the development of Saudi Arabia.158 He did not convince his international 
academic readership, however. One reviewer of the first edition in The Journal of 
Developing Areas concluded that Al-Farsy’s book ‘sounds more like an apology than an 
attempt to raise fundamental questions’.159 Another reviewer of a later edition in the 
International Journal of Middle East Studies stated that the work ‘resembles the sort of 
government-sponsored propaganda where official announcements, reports and documents, 
statements by government officials, and the like, are taken at face value, and whose 
arguments are usually simply restatements of the government line on various issue.’ ‘On the 
positive side’, the reviewer noted that ‘the book contains a good deal of information on Saudi 
Arabia’. Yet, he still ‘wonders how a work like this could be accepted as a doctoral 
dissertation at Duke University’.160 
Despite Al-Farsy’s doubtful impact on international academic audiences, with the 
backing of technocrats like him, ‘development’ increasingly became a complementary 
narrative to foundation and unification in the 1980s and 1990s. Development also spread 
from descriptions of Faisal’s reign to portraits of Abdulaziz. At the International Conference 
on the History of King Abdulaziz held at Imam University in 1985, King Fahd himself applied 
the notion of both unification and development to his father’s history. He stated in his 
opening speech that ‘the history of King Abdulaziz was not only the history of the unification 
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and foundation of a great entity. It was also the history of service and developmental 
construction on scientific bases and on methods based on science and faith.’161 
After the 1985 conference, development also entered the centennial celebrations of 
the beginning of King Abdulaziz’s rule. Their slogan was ‘unification and building’. Influential 
in making the centenary a celebration of development alongside the unification of the 
kingdom was the participation of numerous ministries in the event. As they competed with 
each other for resources and responsibilities, they found it convenient to use the framework 
of development in displaying their respective ‘achievements’ over the decades. The 
centennial conference organized by the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and 
Archives contained, besides studies by academics, papers that were essentially, as the local 
historian Mohammed al-Zulfa put it, ‘performance reports’ by governmental organizations.162 
Ministries also issued their own works on the occasion. They included a volume on The 
Development of Electricity over the Last Hundred Years by the Ministry of Industry and 
Electricity and a ‘documentary study’ on Transportation and Telecommunications in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during 100 Years by the Ministry of Communications.163 
The ministerial publications in turn contributed to the spread of development 
narratives among academic works, as they provided authors with officially endorsed 
statistical material for dynastic success stories. One of these works was the book Saudi 
Arabia: A Hundred Years of Achievements. It was written by ʿAbd Allāh al-Shahrānī, a faculty 
member of King Fahd Security College (Kullīyat al-Malik Fahd al-Amnīyah) in Riyadh. Al-
Shahrānī could easily fill dozens of pages with quotations taken from reports on the success 
of development plans by the Ministry of Planning and the texts by Fouad Al-Farsy himself.164 
After the centenary, development narratives became more important than stories of 
unification, as the focus of dynastic historiography shifted from Abdulaziz and Faisal to their 
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successors. Members of a new generation of princes, grandchildren of Abdulaziz, drove this 
shift, as they sought to give their fathers a prominent position in national history. This came 
during a time, when an increasing number of princes sought to strengthen their position in 
expectation of future competition over succession to the throne. In 1996, King Fahd suffered 
a debilitating stroke, and Crown Prince Abdullah took over many of his duties. After Fahd’s 
death in 2005, Abdullah created the Allegiance Commission (Hayʾat al-Bayʿah) in 2006. This 
commission comprised all living sons as well as a number of grandsons of King Abdulaziz. 
They would choose the next crown prince from among themselves. The commission thus 
provided dozens of princes with theoretically equal rights in competing for the post of the 
crown prince.165 
The first significant move away from King Abdulaziz and King Faisal was the twenty-
year jubilee of Fahd’s accession to the throne in 2001/2. Like the centenary, it was a state 
project with the Ministry of Information, the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and 
Archives, and the national universities issuing dozens of books.166 An influential figure 
behind the organization of this jubilee was Fahd’s youngest and favourite son Abdulaziz (b. 
1973). A minister of state without portfolio, he was concerned with both the legitimacy of the 
government and his own ailing father’s historical legacy. The prince personally sponsored 
the sixth annual meeting of the Saudi Historical Society in cooperation with the foundation in 
2002. Its theme was the kingdom’s history under King Fahd.167 
King Fahd’s twentieth anniversary brought little innovation to the narratives of dynastic 
historiography in general. Shortly after the conference, Abdullah al-Askar (b. 1952), a social 
and economic historian, published an article in the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahrām, which 
caused ‘waves of opposition’, as he saw it. In his article, al-Askar accused his fellow Saudi 
historians of ‘recycling history’, by which he meant ‘writing history through the use of the 
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same sources and reference works without referring to a new source or reference’.168 In a 
subsequent article in the newspaper al-Riyāḍ, he repeated his claims, complaining that ‘in 
this country we repeat history and recycle it similarly to industrial recycling’. ‘After every 
historical lecture or conference’, according to him, most members of the audience 
complained about ‘the weakness of the treatment, repetition, the emphasis on chronology 
and descriptiveness’.169 
Irrespective of the repetition of narratives, the celebration of the twentieth anniversary 
of King Fahd’s reign also contributed to the Saudization of dynastic historiography. It still 
praised the service to Islam by a king who had replaced his title ‘Majesty’ with ‘Custodian of 
the Two Holy Mosques’ in 1986. Yet, the jubilee also emphasized his achievements within 
the frame of the Saudi nation. This was expressed in the logo of the anniversary. While the 
display of the pious Fahd next to the two grand mosques of Mecca and Medina was central, 
Saudi Arabia with its contemporary borders, flag, and coat of arms surrounded them. 
Neighbouring countries did not even appear, as the kingdom’s landmass arose like an island 
from the empty background (figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Official logo of Fahd’s twentieth anniversary as king in 2001/2 
As the Saudi government did not seek to give up its religious and pan-Arab legitimacy 
for a secular Saudi national one, the older frameworks of the Arab and Muslim world did not 
disappear. In a jubilee book on Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd bin Abdul 
Aziz, the minister of information Fouad Al-Farsy, for instance, described the pan-Arab and 
pan-Islamic nature of Fahd’s foreign policy. He narrated that Fahd ‘has shown throughout 
his years as Crown Prince and King an unfaltering commitment to the unity of the Arab world 
and to the unity of the still more broadly defined community of the Islamic faith’.170 
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Despite the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic references, the twentieth anniversary, however, 
primarily celebrated Saudi national development. This was implied in its slogan, ‘twenty 
years of growth and prosperity’. The Ministry of Higher Education through its universities 
issued a book series on the occasion that sought to portray Fahd’s reign in these terms. The 
aim of the series was to ‘be evidence for the achievements of an important episode in the 
history of development and construction during the reign of the Custodian of the Two Holy 
Mosques’.171 One volume produced by King Saud University concentrated mainly on the 
economy. It asserted that ‘King Fahd has demonstrated great interest in economic 
development and especially in building the Saudi citizen over the past twenty years’. His 
policies aimed at ‘lessening the reliance on oil, expanding the economic basis by developing 
and diversifying non-petroleum exports, and strengthening the role of the private sector in 
order to achieve a balanced development’.172 
In placing development at the centre of the history and legitimacy of the Saudi 
monarchy, some authors also implicitly prioritized it over other royal achievements. These 
authors included Mayy al-ʿĪsá, a granddaughter of the Najdi chronicler Ibrāhīm ibn ʿĪsá. She 
was one of the first female professional Saudi historians, gaining a PhD from King Saud 
University in 1996. In 2001, she wrote the editorial to a special jubilee edition of the journal 
al-Dirʿīyah entitled ‘The Nation Commemorates Service and Growth’. She argued that ‘the 
power of states manifests itself in their development achievements’. ‘History immortalizes 
the names of the great leaders to the extent that they achieved resurgence, development, 
and progress for their country, and to the extent that they participated in the international 
arena. These facts touch our feelings as the children of this blessed nation, Saudi Arabia, as 
we celebrate twenty years since the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques took over the 
rule.’173 
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After the centenary and King Fahd’s jubilee, children of the late King Saud also felt 
encouraged to re-establish their father in dynastic historiography after decades of perceived 
marginalization following his deposition. They used the paradigm of development as a 
means to emphasize Saud’s contribution to national history, thereby strengthening the 
national development paradigm in dynastic historiography overall. With the help of Prince 
Salman ibn Abdulaziz they were already able to introduce Saud’s history into the programme 
of the centennial conference organized by the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and 
Archives.174 
In 2005, Prince Salman ibn Saud (b. 1944) issued a three-volume work entitled The 
History of King Saud ibn Abdulaziz, 1902–69: An Academic and Historical View of His Role 
in the Unification and Government of Saudi Arabia. As the sub-title suggests, the work 
sought to re-insert Saud into the main dynastic narrative. Perhaps because of the sensitivity 
of this matter, Salman issued the book not in the kingdom but through the British publisher 
Saqi. The author argued that under King Saud ‘a great expansion in the state’s activities in 
development in various fields’ occurred. In contrast to previous allegations that King Saud’s 
‘expenditures’ and his entourage’s ‘intrigue’ had threatened the state, he asserted Saud’s 
effort to ‘organize the bodies regulating the state’s accounts’.175 
In 2006, the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives even organized a 
three-day conference on King Saud in Riyadh. Perhaps seeking to establish a balance 
between the different sons of Abdulaziz, the foundation used it as the starting point for a 
series of biennial conferences, each dedicated to a specific Saudi king. One of the main 
figures behind this rehabilitation of Saud in the family history through the foundation was 
Fahda, another child of Saud. She had gained a higher education abroad, studying at the 
American University of Beirut and SOAS.176 In 2006, she gave one of the leading papers at 
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the conference entitled the ‘Documentation of King Saud ibn Abdulaziz’. Fahda lamented the 
difficulty in, and asserted the necessity of, recovering details about her father. She noted 
that after Saud’s deposition, many copies of royal speeches, treaties, and correspondences, 
and even published books on his reign were removed from Saudi libraries and other 
institutions.177 Moreover, she found that many contemporaries of his reign ‘were afraid of 
bringing forward their information’. She also complained that ‘there was no major road in the 
kingdom’ bearing her father’s name.178 Yet, she saw the conference of the foundation as the 
beginning of a ‘revision of King Saud’s history’, which ‘was lost at times’.179 
In his opening speech at the conference, Prince Salman ibn Abdulaziz, the chair of 
the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, did not mention the struggle that 
had led to King Saud’s deposition. Instead, he used the development paradigm to re-insert 
Saud in the history of the dynasty and the nation, thus stressing an uninterrupted line of 
Saudi monarchs and their developmental achievements. He narrated that ‘King Saud 
continued, after his father, the construction and development, the service to the two holy 
mosques, the support for Arab and Muslim issues, and the nation’s advancement in many 
fields of civilization. The results of his efforts became visible in education, politics, economy, 
culture, administration, et cetera.’ The conference, like the centenary and King Fahd’s 
jubilee, thus became an occasion to strengthen the development paradigm. ‘Undoubtedly’, 
Salman stated, ‘this conference will document these great efforts and many achievements, 
which were realized in the country during King Saud’s reign and present them to future 
generations.’180 
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Conclusions 
After the 1960s, dynastic histories underwent a profound development of narratives. After 
earlier being characterized mainly by takfīrism and Arab nationalism, they gradually 
developed features of a Saudi national historiography. Importantly, dynastic histories 
produced a paradigm that conceived King Abdulaziz as the founder of the modern Saudi 
nation. This view had existed in earlier writings, but received strengthening through the 
establishment of the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives as well as 
through the centennial celebrations in 1999. Moreover, the founder paradigm was combined 
with the notion of unification, resulting in the presentation of Abdulaziz as the unifier of the 
country. While the term unification (tawḥīd) retained a religious connotation, this theme partly 
replaced earlier takfīrist narratives of Saudi rulers waging jihad against the background of a 
jāhilīyah. This process was fostered by the development of professional historical research 
and the usage of new sources that led to a questioning of a pre-Wahhabi ‘age of ignorance’. 
Finally, the Saudization of dynastic historiography also involved the rise of the 
paradigm of national development led by the Al Saud. This view complemented the 
paradigm of foundation and unification, as it gave King Abdulaziz and his successors an 
ongoing legitimacy to rule even after the nation had been unified. It was derived from the 
global ideology of development, which the Saudi government adopted in the 1960s as a 
supplement to its Islamic legitimacy. Subsequently, members of the royal family and 
technocratic governmental agencies all used narratives of development to celebrate Faisal 
and other Saudi kings. 
The emergence of the paradigms of national foundation, unification, and development, 
however, did not produce uniformity in the Saudi historiographical landscape. Even inside 
dynastic historiography, takfīrist notions of the Al Saud as the true Muslim Arab dynasty 
continued alongside, and sometimes competed with, narratives of the monarchs as Saudi 
national developmental leaders. As the next chapter will explore, local, tribal, and Shiite 
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histories contributed to further narrative plurality. Under the influence of the expanding Saudi 
state in its global context, they adopted elements of the new Saudi national narratives from 
the 1960s onwards, but used them for their own purposes.
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5. Asserting Towns, Tribes and the Shiites in National 
History, 1970s to Present 
The period since the 1960s has not only witnessed a surge in historical production centred 
on the Al Saud, but also a boom in local, Shiite, and tribal histories. Whereas the kingdom 
had seen the publication of only about a dozen major books on local history until about 
1970, this number has since reached at least several hundred. Moreover, the literature came 
to cover not only the major cities and regions, like Riyadh, Mecca, al-Aḥsāʾ and Asir, but also 
small towns and districts. In addition to these urban and rural communities, tribes have also 
made an emphatic appearance on the historiographic stage. Between 1996 and 2005 alone, 
117 books on tribal history were published in Saudi Arabia, more than in any other Arab 
country.1 
Fouad Ibrahim interprets this rise in writings about regions and tribes as the result of 
flourishing ‘tribal, regional and sectarian tendencies’ amidst a ‘crisis of national identity’ with 
the challenge to the state during the Gulf War in 1990/91.2 However, while regional and 
tribal identities indeed contributed to these histories, the trend did not start in the 1990s, but 
has a longer pedigree. Moreover, rather than being the result of the crisis of national identity, 
the tribal histories were clearly affected by nation building and the Saudization of dynastic 
histories. In contrast to earlier particularism, many historians of towns, tribes, and the Shiites 
adopted national narratives, including those of unification and development. They thus  
acknowledged the existence of, and to an extent legitimized, the nation state. Rather than 
describing a given town or region on its own, they focused on its relation to the nation and 
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the centre. These histories were now, in Thongchai Winichakul’s words, partial histories of 
the ‘national whole’.3 
The new nationally oriented histories of towns, tribes and the Shiites did not become 
subservient to dynastic historiography, however. In order to assert their communities in 
national history, many writers wrote ‘contribution histories’, that is, histories which argued for 
the contribution of their communities to national achievements.4 While contribution 
arguments involved, to some extent, the adoption of the national narratives of unification and 
development, they challenged the nature of the state as an exclusively royal project. The 
authors of contribution histories thus competed with dynastic historians, and with each other, 
in claiming a share in national history for different regions, towns, sects, tribes and families. 
I will investigate the reasons for this rise in regional local, tribal and Shiite contribution 
histories with a focus on a number of processes related to state expansion and globalization 
since the 1970s. These processes included not only the development of higher education, 
which simultaneously shaped the ‘Saudization’ of dynastic historiography. They also 
comprised the emergence of new state institutions beyond the King Abdulaziz Foundation 
for Research and Archives and the universities in the Saudi historiographical field. Moreover, 
the governmental distribution of oil revenues brought changes in social mobility to large 
sections of the population, which affected historical production among different communities. 
Local contribution histories 
The increase in the number of Saudi local histories and their employment of contribution 
arguments are connected to the expansion of professional historical education. This process 
saw a number of students write master and doctoral dissertations about their hometowns or 
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regions. Out of ninety-eight MA dissertations in history submitted to the College of Social 
Sciences at Imam University in Riyadh between 1978 and 2007, eighteen were explicitly 
dedicated to local history. Out of thirty PhD theses in history examined at the same college 
between 1980 and 2006, three focussed on a specific town or region.5 The phenomenon 
also comprised Saudi students studying abroad. At least seven Saudi students completed 
doctoral dissertations on the history of towns and regions at American and British 
universities between 1974 and 1999 alone.6 
While textbooks focused on the history of the Saudi dynasty, higher education 
curricula permitted the study of local history as part of dissertations and essays. Many 
professors even encouraged the treatment of local topics, partly because they considered 
them less sensitive than the contemporary history of the state.7 Ghithan Jrais (b. 1959), for 
instance, encouraged his students in the course ‘historical research’ at King Saud 
University’s College of Education in Abhā to write essays on local topics. By 2002, his 
students had produced 234 papers about the southern provinces of Asir, al-Bāḥah, Jāzān, 
and Najrān.8 As Daniel Woolf notes regarding local historiography elsewhere, micro-studies 
promised to provide ‘an exhaustively documented monograph on a particular area that is 
nevertheless manageable within a short period’.9 When the authors studied their home 
regions, their familiarity with the area and access to local sources also provided them with 
advantages and their supervisors with confidence in the dissertations’ completion. 
One of the first and most prominent authors of local contribution histories was 
Mohammed al-Zulfa (b. 1950),10 a professional historian who had benefitted greatly from the 
new educational opportunities provided by the expanding state. From a village in Asir, he 
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has been interested in the history of his region since his childhood. He thus perceived the 
history of the region to be ‘neglected’ in many books. When he studied history at King Saud 
University (KSU) in Riyadh in the early 1970s, he found Asir’s history to be ‘neglected’ even 
there. This fuelled his interest in Asir’s history.11 That some of his non-Saudi teachers at 
KSU reportedly doubted whether the province possessed a written history only encouraged 
him further.12 Al-Zulfa also benefitted from a relatively meritocratic hiring scheme. He 
recalled that he had studied hard in order to ‘achieve the necessary grades’ which would 
qualify him ‘to gain the position of graduate assistant’. After his graduation in 1973, King 
Saud University indeed hired him as a graduate assistant and sent him abroad to gain a 
master’s degree and doctorate.13 
In his search for Asiri history, al-Zulfa came to use new sources other than the Najdi 
dynastic chronicles of the Ibn Ghannām School, especially unpublished documents. 
Incidentally, the creation of the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives 
facilitated his first encounter with such documents. A few months after King Saud University 
had hired him as a graduate assistant, the Ministry of Education charged him with assisting 
Muhammad Tamimi, one of the researchers who built up the foundation. The two visited 
archives in Istanbul and copied a large number of documents over three months. Thereafter, 
Tamimi sent al-Zulfa back to Riyadh with letters and copies of rare documents on Saudi–
Ottoman relations. Al-Zulfa handed one of these letters to Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh, the minister 
of higher education and chair of the foundation. The minister was impressed by al-Zulfa and 
proposed to send him to Turkey for his postgraduate studies. Al-Zulfa insisted on going to 
the United States but promised to work on Arab-Ottoman relations and use Ottoman 
sources.14 A few years later, in 1979, al-Zulfa completed a master’s degree at the University 
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of Kansas. Subsequently, he was admitted to Cambridge University, where he gained a 
doctorate in 1987.15 
During his doctoral studies, al-Zulfa visited Asir and discovered a variety of 
documents in the possession of individuals, including letters between sheikhs from Asir and 
King Abdulaziz. These documents led him to emphasize Asir’s role in national history.16 In 
1985, al-Zulfa participated in the International Conference on the History of King Abdulaziz 
organized by Imam University. While most other lectures focused on King Abdulaziz’s role in 
founding the kingdom, al-Zulfa’s paper was entitled ‘The Importance of Asir in the Formation 
of Saudi Arabia’. ‘Asir’, the historian contended, ‘was the first brick outside Najd in 
constructing the big entity of comprehensive political unity that later became Saudi Arabia’. 
Emphasizing Asir’s economic importance, al-Zulfa added that his home region was the 
‘corner stone’ in the formation of Saudi Arabia ‘due to its strategic location and human and 
economic resources’. He explained that Asir was ‘in the pre-oil period far richer than Najd 
and the Hejaz’.17 
After al-Zulfa had gained his doctorate from Cambridge, he returned as an assistant 
professor to King Saud University. This appointment allowed him to continue his research on 
Asir. In 1995, he published a monograph that was based on many unpublished documents 
and contained his argument in its most elaborate and comprehensive form. The monograph 
was entitled Asir during King Abdulaziz’s Reign: Its Political, Economic, and Military Role in 
Building the Modern Saudi State.18 In contrast to earlier particularistic writings, the work 
asserted the region’s age-old belonging to a common Saudi state and nation. Al-Zulfa 
argued that Asir had ‘strongly supported the first Saudi state’.19 Even after the fall of al-     
Dirʿīyah in 1818, its relationship with Najd was only interrupted by short periods that ‘did not 
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supersede the sweet memories, in which both sides were under one regime and one central 
government’.20 
Venturing into economic history and relying on letters between King Abdulaziz and 
sheikhs in Asir, al-Zulfa situated Asir’s most important contribution to national history in the 
twentieth century. In contrast to the founder paradigm that conceived King Abdulaziz as the 
single founder of the modern kingdom, al-Zulfa propounded that Asir participated in the 
formation of the contemporary Saudi state. As the rich agricultural produce of its fertile 
highlands fed the Saudi armies, Asir made possible the subjugation of the Hejaz and the 
suppression of the rebellions of the Ikhwān and the Idrīsids. In addition, the region allowed 
for the creation of ‘secure borders and enduring peace’ with Yemen.21 
Al-Zulfa’s contribution history challenged the exclusivism of dynastic historiography, 
the tendency to conceive the history of the country exclusively as the history of the Al Saud. 
This makes it not surprising that he did not publish his texts through government presses. 
Out of about nine historical books up to 2003, all were published through private presses 
and mainly at the author’s expense.22 Al-Zulfa’s lecture on ‘The Importance of Asir in the 
Formation of Saudi Arabia’ in 1985 did not appear in a publication of Selected Papers from 
the International Conference on the History of King Abdulaziz.23 Nor has a manuscript of 
‘Lectures on the Contemporary History of Saudi Arabia’, which he submitted to the King 
Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives in the early 2000s, so far been published.24 
Although governmental agencies did not publish his writings, al-Zulfa was able to 
benefit from Saudi nation building by acting as what John Eidson calls a ‘cultural broker’, 
linking ‘nation-oriented and community-oriented groups’ and institutions. Within the ‘politics 
of meaning’, he sought to establish an identity for Asir to secure its status as autonomous 
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part of a larger whole.25 This was at a time when the central government had formalized its 
relations with its periphery through the Law of the Provinces (niẓām al-manāṭiq) decreed in 
1992.26 On the one hand, al-Zulfa established himself in national circles in the capital. 
Besides his academic work as a professor of history at King Saud University, he served, as 
one of the few people from Asir, as a member of the kingdom’s Consultative Council 
between 1997 and 2009.27 Nonetheless, he kept his connections to Asir, founding the al-
Zulfa Cultural Centre in al-Marāghah, his village of birth. In this centre, he placed his private 
library and presented Asir’s history within the framework of national unification.28 
Inspired by al-Zulfa’s success, other academic local historians, especially from Asir, 
followed him in producing local contribution histories. Asiris were perhaps initially more 
interested in developing contribution histories than people from other regions, because they 
felt a greater need to assert the importance of their region. Although Asir was more fertile 
than other regions, it did not enjoy the prestige and wealth that Najd as the political centre, 
the Hejaz as the region of Mecca and Medina, and the Eastern Province as the centre of the 
oil industry possessed. Contribution histories also promised to counter negative stereotypes 
of Asiris associated with the low political and economic status of the region. One study of 
such stereotypes found that students from other regions described Asiris as ‘poor, simple, 
ignorant, patient, generous, and backward’.29 
One of the Asiri scholars who followed al-Zulfa’s example was Ahmad Faea (b. 
1969/70), who also benefitted from the expanding public education. After gaining a degree in 
history from King Saud University in 1991/92, he worked as an assistant in Abhā’s Teachers’ 
College. Later, he returned to his alma mater and gained a master’s degree in 1999. In 
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2006, he published his MA dissertation as a book entitled The Role of the Āl al-Matḥamī in 
Extending the First Saudi State in Asir and Neighbouring Regions, 1800–18.30 
Thus, a state-sponsored professional historical education incidentally allowed Faea to 
diverge from dynastic historiography. Faea’s work refuted the notion of a pre-Wahhabi ‘age 
of ignorance’ or jāhilīyah in Asir. The relatively open research environment of King Saud 
University, in which the dynastic historian al-ʿUthaymīn had already challenged takfīrism in 
the 1970s, perhaps facilitated this refutation. Partly based on inscriptions on eighteenth-
century Asiri mosques, Faea argued that the religious situation of the region before the 
arrival of the Wahhabi mission did not correspond to the ‘bad and dark picture drawn by 
some contemporary sources and later reference works’. Instead, it was ‘good’. In an original 
logical twist, he combined this argument with one of participation in the Wahhabi mission. 
Because of the presence of Islam, the Asiris ‘hastened to join the Salafi movement, as it did 
not bring anything new, which they had not known before or had not  been familiar with’.31 
While al-Zulfa explored economic history, Ahmad Faea saw the Asiri contribution to 
national history primarily in military and religious terms. He wrote that the ‘sons and leaders’ 
of Asir had ‘shed their blood on the soil of this precious nation’ in order to defend the 
Wahhabi mission and the first Saudi state. By privileging military leaders and scholars, his 
work also had a local elitist flavour in contrast to al-Zulfa’s socially broader regionalism. As 
the title of the work, The Role of the Āl al-Matḥamī, suggests, the author sought to 
demonstrate the ‘distinct role of the emirs of Asir from the Āl al-Matḥamī in accepting the 
principles of the Salafi mission’. After the emirs had travelled to al-Dirʿīyah, they became the 
Saudi representatives in Asir. In this position, they not only ‘defended the mission and the 
state as leaders of the region’s tribes’. They also ‘sought to spread the mission and extend 
the influence of the Saudi state in the surrounding regions’.32 
                                                   
30 Āl Fāʾiʿ, “Āl al-matḥamī” [1999]; Dawr (2006). 
31 Āl Fāʾiʿ, Dawr (2006), 402. 
32 Ibid., 403–4. 
  
192 
Following al-Zulfa’s model, Faea acted as a cultural broker between the provincial and 
the national levels in the context of increasing governmental investment in heritage and 
historiography after the 1970s. Al-Zulfa and Faea sought to attract the central government’s 
attention to their region. They were especially interested in gaining more funding for their 
own field of research. Already in 1991, al-Zulfa demanded the foundation of a regional 
archive and a museum of popular culture in Asir. He did not voice this demand in a regional 
medium, but in the national newspaper al-Riyāḍ.33 Fifteen years later, in the conclusion to 
The Role of the Āl al-Matḥamī, Faea called upon the King Abdulaziz Foundation for 
Research and Archives, the King Fahd National Library, the Ministry of Education and other 
institutions to ‘send representatives, provide necessary facilities and give material support to 
researchers in order to gather the heritage of Asir’.34 In 2009, the Saudi Commission for 
Tourism and Antiquities indeed laid the corner stone of an Asir Regional Museum.35 
The expanding state not only supported local contribution histories indirectly through 
its development of a university system, from which al-Zulfa and Faea benefitted. While the 
foundation and the Ministry of Education continued to produce accounts centred on the Al 
Saud, another agency also published some histories that asserted regions in national 
history. This was the General Presidency of Youth Welfare, established in 1974. The parallel 
government support for different and contradictory approaches in historiography resulted 
from a fragmentation of the state beginning in the 1960s. This fragmentation was itself the 
product of the rapid, oil-propelled expansion of the state and the oligarchy within the royal 
family. In order to lessen family conflicts over responsibilities and reward his allies in the 
struggle with his brother King Saud, Faisal used the kingdom’s abundant resources to 
establish parallel structures with similar tasks but under different senior princes and officials. 
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Subsequently the Ministry of Defence and Aviation, the Ministry of Interior, and the National 
Guard all became states within the state.36 
The parallel structures established under King Faisal were not only found in the 
security sector, but also in the cultural fields, including in historiography. By 1981, seven 
agencies besides the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives were all active 
in these fields. They included the Ministry of Education and the General Presidency of Girls’ 
Education, which were responsible for textbooks, the Ministry of Higher Education, which 
supervised the universities, and the Ministry of Information, which publicized the country’s 
‘development’ under Saudi monarchs. In addition, the Ministry of Defence and Aviation and 
the National Guard comprised cultural departments.37 In the 1970s, the General Presidency 
of Youth Welfare also emerged as a major actor in the field. Most importantly in this context, 
it concerned itself more with local historiography than the other agencies did. 
From its establishment in 1974, the General Presidency of Youth Welfare engaged in 
nation building on the local level through its promotion of sports, especially football, as well 
as cultural and literary activities.38 The presidency’s local concerns partly resulted from a 
broad presence in the provinces, whereas the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and 
Archives, as the principal sponsor of dynastic historiography, focused its activities initially on 
Riyadh. The presidency supervised not only numerous sports clubs, but also a network of 
cultural and literary clubs across the kingdom. In 1975, Prince Faisal ibn Fahd, the vice-
president of youth welfare and the eldest son of the later King Fahd, agreed to establish six 
such clubs in Mecca, Medina, Jeddah, Ta’if, Jāzān and Riyadh. This followed a request by a 
number of writers, including the local historians Ahmad Suba‘i, Muḥammad al-ʿAqīlī, Hamad 
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Al-Jasser, and 'Abd al-Quddoos al-Ansari.39 Suba‘i and al-ʿAqīlī also became the first 
presidents of their respective clubs in Mecca and Jāzān.40 
The presidency’s support for cultural production was facilitated by the state’s adoption 
of an ideology of development and the preparation of five-year development plans from the 
1960s onwards. The government justified the establishment of the literary clubs with its 
desire that ‘development’ should ‘be comprehensive and embrace all aspects of intellectual 
and social life’.41 The third development plan published in 1980 specified not only economic 
goals, but also objectives for youth welfare, the principal field of the presidency. One of 
these objectives was to ‘organize and channel the energies and creative capabilities of youth 
so that they may contribute positively to the country’s social and economic development’.42 
Through its cultural and literary clubs, which it subsequently established in all 
provinces of the kingdom, the presidency provided amateur local historians with necessary 
infrastructure and material support. As in the case of chambers of commerce, local members 
elected the board of each club.43 Yet, the  presidency supervised them and, with soaring 
governmental revenues during the 1970s, paid each club a foundational grant of 250,000 
riyals (about 67,000 dollars) and an annual subsidy of up to one million riyals (about 270,000 
dollars) in its first years. These clubs hosted libraries, organized lectures, and paid for the 
publication of books by local authors.44 
Between the 1980s and the 2000s, the General Presidency of Youth Welfare 
supported local historiography in a more targeted manner. In 1982, it launched the series 
This Is Our Country (Hādhihī bilādunā), which comprised books on the history and 
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geography of most towns and regions of the kingdom. This series was the idea of 
Muḥammad al-Qashʿamī (b. 1943/44), who directed the presidency’s offices in Ḥāʾil and al-
Aḥsāʾ. With a sense of a national mission, al-Qashʿamī volunteered to distribute publications 
and posters by authors from northern Saudi Arabia in the south and vice-versa. Together 
with intellectuals affiliated with al-Qaṣīm’s Literary Club, he won the support of Prince Faisal 
ibn Fahd, who had become the president of youth welfare by then.45 Under al-Qashʿamī’s 
supervision, the presidency paid the authors of This Is Our Country, who were generally 
drawn from the local population, 10,000 riyals (about 2700 dollars) each and printed all 
volumes at its own expense.46 
As part of its efforts in nation building, the presidency conceived and advertised this 
collection of local histories as a national project that served to create a more inclusive 
national history. According to Faisal ibn Fahd, This Is Our Country aimed at ‘providing the 
Saudi library with national publications that present the history of the nation in a series of 
simplified academic books and record the intellectual and artistic heritage and the kingdom’s 
customs and traditions’.47 The prince justified this project by situating it within policies to 
nationalize the Saudi historical profession. He stated that ‘it is best for any nation to write its 
history by itself through its loyal sons who have been given the opportunity to learn and 
reach the highest academic degrees’.48 
In a departure from most dynastic histories, This Is Our Country tried to include local 
communities that were peripheral to the Saudi heartland of southern Najd. Outlines of Ḥāʾil, 
the first volume of the series, included an account of the dynasty of the Āl Rashīd, the former 
rivals of the Al Saud.49 The volume was written by Fahd al-ʿUrayfī (1929–2002), a journalist 
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and member of the Shammar tribe, to which the Āl Rashīd belonged.50 Curiously, the 
presidency even hired the Shiite Muḥammad al-Muslim to write a volume on al-Qaṭīf in 
1989.51 Previously, al-Muslim had been imprisoned following the publication of the 
particularistic history The Black Gold Coast. Generally, the series also sought to cover less 
populated areas that had not received scholarly attention previously. By 2004, the 
presidency had issued 67 volumes on places as diverse as the ancient northern oasis of 
Taymāʾ, the isolated Farasān islands in the Red Sea, and Raʾs Tannūrah, the principal Gulf 
oil terminal.52 
With the presidency’s inclusive vision of national history, it encouraged the authors of 
This Is Our Country to place their own localities prominently on the national map. These 
localities even included towns and regions commonly considered peripheral. Volume 5 of the 
series on The Zahrān Region, for instance, covered a small area of the southern province of 
al-Bāḥah. Its author was Muḥammad al-Zahrānī (b. 1943/44), a native from the area who 
had studied at Cairo University. He emphasized that the Zahrān region was ‘an important 
region of Saudi Arabia by virtue of its geographical location as a link between the western 
and southern regions’ as well as its ‘agricultural and animal wealth’.53 In a departure from 
earlier particularistic histories, the author also asserted that ‘the society of the Zahrān region 
is an inseparable part of the larger Saudi society’.54 ʿAbd Allāh al-Qushayrī, a graduate of 
Imam University and an administrator of public education in Asir, was commissioned to 
provide a monograph on the small Asiri town of al-Namāṣ that would form volume 67 of the 
series. This allowed him to express a similar contribution argument to Faea and al-Zulfa’s. In 
his book, which was published in 2004, al-Qushayrī contended that ‘the sons of al-Namāṣ 
and its surroundings made honourable contributions to the unification of the peninsula, 
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especially in its southern part’. These contributions included the participation in the Saudi 
capture of Jeddah from the Hashemites in 1925.55 
The provinces of Asir and al-Bāḥah were fertile topics for contribution histories, 
because of their politically and economically peripheral status compared with Najd, the 
Hejaz, and the Eastern Province. Yet, contribution arguments were not restricted to writers 
from the kingdom’s southern regions. Members of the Najdi elite too felt the need to assert 
their communities’ importance in national history. A typical example is Khaled Al-Jeraisy (b. 
1964), a manager working for the family conglomerate Jeraisy Group.56 In 2002/3, Al-Jeraisy 
published Raghbah, a monograph on the hometown of his father Abdul-Rahman, the 
founder and proprietor of the Jeraisy Group.57 The monograph was printed in several glossy, 
colourful editions in English and Arabic and contained a professional curriculum vitae of 
Abdul-Rahman Al-Jeraisy in a section on ‘Renowned Personalities from Raghbah’. As such, 
the work probably sought to promote the Jeraisy family business as much as the town 
itself.58 
Given that Raghbah only had a population of 1369 in 2004, according to Al-Jeraisy 
himself,59 the subject of his contribution history was much smaller than Asir. Asir, in contrast, 
recorded 1.7 million inhabitants (about seven per cent of the kingdom) during the same 
year.60 Khaled Al-Jeraisy did his best, however, to emphasize the importance of his town 
and family. ‘Raghbah’, he argued, ‘was one of the first towns of al-Miḥmal that responded 
and supported the Salafi mission. This was in 1750, only six years after the mission’s start’. 
Paying special attention to one of his own ancestors, he claimed that ‘the people and the 
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prince of Raghbah played an outstanding and honourable role, when Emir Ali Al-Jeraisy built 
his famous castle, al-ʿUqdah, before 1757. It was one of the fortresses of the mission.’61 
Probably in order to preserve their privileged positions under the Saudi state, 
members of the traditional Najdi aristocracy added to the burgeoning group of contribution 
histories. In the wake of the new contribution histories produced in the periphery and by the 
nouveaux riches, they perhaps felt that dynastic historiography despite its focus on Najdi 
events did not properly represent them. One of these authors was ʿAbd al-Muḥsin ibn        
Muʿammar (b. 1955), a graduate of KSU’s College of Education and supervisor of cultural 
affairs in the National Guard. In 2004, he published a monograph that combined local with 
family history more explicitly than Al-Jeraisi’s book did. It was entitled Pages of Najdi History: 
The al-ʿUyaynah Emirate and the History of the Āl Muʿammar.62 
Reminding the readers of the status of his family, Ibn Muʿammar stated that the 
emirate of al-ʿUyaynah had ‘reached the peak of its power in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries’. At that time, it ‘became the most powerful emirate in Najd under the leadership of 
the Āl Muʿammar’.63 In the later part of the books, Ibn Muʿammar gave biographies of great 
family figures, including that of his father, who served as Saudi governor of various towns 
and districts.64 The author, however, complained that even his family was neglected in 
national historiography. He stated that ‘despite the important role of the Muʿammar family in 
Najdi events, it did not gain the share of studies that it deserved apart from some references 
in sources on the history of Najd and Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s reform 
movement’.65 
Although Ibn Muʿammar partly covered a town, al-ʿUyaynah, his motive of preserving 
the position of his own family—rather than that of all people of al-ʿUyaynah—becomes 
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sufficiently clear. He expressed contribution arguments similar to those of the Asiri historian 
al-Zulfa. He stated that ‘the Āl Muʿammar employed all their human and material resources 
in participating together with the unifier, King Abdulaziz, in the unification of our precious 
country’.66 Backed up by a list of biographies, Ibn Muʿammar promoted a view that the Al 
Saud and the Āl Muʿammar had led, and perhaps ought to lead, the country together. He 
stated that most of his relatives had ‘assumed positions as administrators and leaders by 
virtue of the trust between the two noble families, the Al Saud and the Āl Muʿammar. This 
trust had deep historical roots.’ In juxtaposing the two families that way, he perhaps sought 
to imply a sense of equality between the two houses. Ibn Muʿammar stressed that in the 
contemporary kingdom, his relatives have continued to hold, alongside the Al Saud, ‘offices 
of ministers, governors of towns and regions and other leading and administrative positions, 
in which they have served loyally and whole-heartedly’.67 
Tribes entering the arena 
After the 1970s, tribes emphatically appeared on the historiographical stage. The term, ‘tribe’ 
(qabīlah) is obviously more vague than the names of the towns and provinces described by 
other historians. It denoted ‘a joining together of several or more clans as the descendants 
of a common ancestor’.68 Frequently, the tribes are also identified with the Bedouin, and 
contrasted with the settled folk (ḥaḍar), as almost all of the nomadic population has been 
based on tribal formations.69 Such nomads still formed over 25 per cent, or about 1.9 million, 
of the kingdom’s inhabitants in the 1974 census.70 However, it is doubtful whether there has 
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ever been a clear-cut social and cultural dichotomy between the Bedouin/tribes and the 
sedentary population. Not only has there been a ‘broad spectrum of intermediate forms and 
interactions between nomadic and sedentary lifestyles’.71 Most of the major Arabian tribes 
also had large proportions of their population, sometimes over 50 per cent, in permanent 
settlements even in the pre-oil era. Through the production of dates, these settled 
tribespeople ‘played an important economic role in the life of the nomadic elements of the 
tribe’.72 Nevertheless, many Saudi tribal historians, especially in Najd, divided Saudi society 
into people of Bedouin/tribal and urban/non-tribal backgrounds.73 
From its inception, the Wahhabi mission had, as Marcel Kurpershoek put it, the 
‘objective of breaking the tribal spirit and merging the tribesmen into one Islamic community 
subject to Islamic law under the political overlordship of the Saudi rulers’.74 In the second 
half of the twentieth century, the state’s adoption of an ideology of development under the 
influence of foreign expertise further consolidated this anti-tribalism at the heart of Saudi 
state and nation building. In the early 1960s, the government started the King Faisal 
Settlement Project, one of the most ‘sophisticated’ projects of its kind, which planned to 
settle a thousand Bedouin families in eight newly established villages in the Rub' al-Khali. 
The objectives of the project, according to a 1966 report by the Ford Foundation, which 
advised the government, combined sedentarization with the promotion of national identity. 
The objectives included changes from ‘nomadic pastoralism to modern farming’, ‘kinship to 
citizenship’, and from ‘tribal participation as a kinsman to national participation as a citizen’.75 
The anti-tribalism of the Wahhabi mission and Saudi nation building also shaped the 
official representations of tribal belonging. A textbook on Islamic history for secondary 
schools from 1993 argued that ‘tribal group feeling’ (ʿaṣabīyah) causes the disintegration of 
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the Muslim community. Its consequences include ‘fanaticism’ based on kinship loyalty, which 
should be ‘replaced by loyalty to faith and the umma’.76 Even university curricula almost 
completely excluded tribal history.77 One of the few courses treating the subject was a 
course entitled ‘Pedigree of the Arab Tribes’, which formed part of the undergraduate history 
curriculum at King Saud University in 1987.78 
Despite its anti-tribal and anti-nomadic tendencies, however, Saudi state building left 
the ‘social, ideological, and territorial structures’ of the tribes ‘largely intact’.79 In 1925, the 
Saudi government abolished collective territorial rights.80 Yet, in practice, it accepted the 
existence of tribes and the areas predominantly owned and settled by their members. 
Moreover, Saudi princes made use of the ‘the ill-defined, but effective authority exercised by 
tribal chiefs of various ranks over tribal groups’ by rewarding the sheikhs who actively 
cooperated with the government and withholding favour from those who refused to do so.81 
Beginning in the 1960s, the Ministry of Interior formally administered stipends for the tribal 
leaders,82 many of whom frequently attended the royal councils (majālis).83 ‘Their function as 
a conduit for information, counsel and the exercise of influence from and to the court’ 
reinforced their position of eminence among their own tribespeople. In turn, it enabled the 
ruling house ‘to keep a finger on the pulse of popular feeling in a discreet and invisible 
manner’.84 This fine balance between central government and tribal autonomy greatly 
facilitated the task of government, especially in the rural areas.85 
Saudi state building also benefitted tribespeople through the provision of modern 
education and employment. It thus empowered them to write their own histories. Although 
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the government did not make education compulsory, it encouraged the Bedouin to send their 
children to schools for the sake of ‘development’ and nation building. The Ministry of 
Education paid for the accommodation, food and clothing of many students and 
compensated fathers for the losses caused by their sons’ attendance of schools instead of 
herding sheep or camels.86 The National Guard not only recruited its members primarily from 
among the Bedouin, but also organized Arabic literacy classes and training in the English 
language and modern military sciences for them. In this context, it also sent some former 
Bedouin to the United States and other countries for training as officers. The Ministries of 
Defence and Interior established similar programmes, although they opened them to Saudis 
from sedentary as well as nomadic backgrounds.87 As a result of all these initiatives, by 
2003, illiteracy among young tribespeople had been almost wiped out even among the Āl 
Murrah tribe.88 As late as 1975, Donald Cole had still described this tribe as the ‘nomads of 
the nomads’.89 
Although many tribespeople in rural areas did not become as wealthy as the urban 
business elites did after the start of the oil boom in the 1970s, they also benefitted from 
governmental handouts, especially through the so-called ‘land and loan’ (arḍ wa-qarḍ) 
policy. In this programme, every Saudi was in principle entitled to a piece of land and half a 
million riyals (about 200,000 dollars at the beginning of the oil boom) in order to start up a 
farm. In addition, he would receive subsidies for machinery, fertilizers and seeds. Moreover, 
the government granted interest-free loans of 300,000 riyals for the building of a villa and 
required only half the amount to be repaid over thirty-five years. Hence, the standard of 
living soared even in political and economic backwaters, such as Wādī al-Dawāsir, the home 
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of the Dawāsir tribe in southern Najd.90 The distribution of land, which was formally started in 
1968, also reinforced the tribal system, as it was in practice based on tribal membership.91 
Access to the state’s increasing resources was not equal between different tribes and 
their branches however. This differential access made the arguments of contribution 
histories attractive. Proving the historical loyalty of one’s tribe and national importance to the 
Al Saud may have served to help claim a greater share of the oil wealth. One of the tribes 
discriminated against was the Shammar, who, in contrast to the ʿUtaybah for instance, were 
considered historically disloyal. Until about the 1970s, Shammarīs were not allowed to work 
in the oil industry.92 Moreover, the National Guard neither paid them regular salaries nor set 
up units in their area.93 
The material improvements and the monopoly of violence claimed by the state also 
increased the symbolic capital stored in narratives about the tribal past. Traditionally, 
courage in war, protection of the weak, hospitality, and ‘pure-blooded’, or aṣīl, descent 
determined one’s position in society. One’s ‘rank and pedigree’, or ḥasab wa-nasab, in turn 
signified, as Marcel Kurpershoek put it, a person’s ‘worth on the market where affinity 
relations are created through marriage’.94 The state, however, banned intertribal violence 
and, through its distribution of the enormous income from oil, devalued the virtues of 
hospitality and protection of the weak, thereby closing the traditional ‘avenues for the 
acquisition of honour’.95 Moreover, the attainment of a specific economic level created a 
sense of ‘lack' or ‘loss’ among some in the community in terms of symbolic capital, which is 
specifically locked to family and its antiquity’.96 Hence, many Saudis of tribal backgrounds 
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turned to stories about past glories and asserted their ‘forefathers’ nobility as a measure of 
their own standing’.97 
In addition to the economic boom, Saudi nation building paradoxically further 
increased the symbolic value of tribal belonging and, by extension, popular interest in 
writings about the tribal past and genealogy. After the abolition of slavery in Saudi Arabia in 
1962, all Saudis theoretically ‘became equal before the law, as they were already before 
God’.98 As the government insisted on this equality, the use of derogatory terms, such as 
‘craftsman’ (ṣāniʿ) and ‘slave’ (ʿabd), for Saudis without recognized pedigrees became less 
and less acceptable. However, many tribespeople still refused to marry fellow Saudis without 
equivalent ‘rank and pedigree’, regardless of their wealth.99 In order to avoid being lumped 
together with former slaves and other sedentary people without recognized pedigrees, 
settled tribesmen started calling themselves ‘Bedouin’ (badw) instead of ‘settlers’ (ḥaḍar).100 
Without losing its sense of Arab nomad, the word ‘Bedouin’ thus came to denote ‘social 
groups that pride themselves on a tribal affiliation which is generally known and recognized 
as being deeply rooted in history and belonging to a lineage unadulterated with blood from 
outside the Arabian society of tribes’.101 As no central register of the Bedouin nobility 
existed,102 research into tribal history and genealogy became a means to assert one’s 
belonging to this class. 
Despite the rejection of tribalism in textbooks, the King Abdulaziz Foundation for 
Research and Archives upheld the value of tribal descent in the symbolic economy of 
pedigrees and status by publicizing the lineage of the Al Saud. The foundation republished 
The Stimulant of Ecstasy: The Lineage of the Kings of Najd twice in 1979 and 1999. This 
was a genealogical work on the Al Saud by Rāshid ibn ʿAlī ibn Jurays (c. 1834–85), a Najdi 
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scholar and contemporary of Ibn Bishr.103 The foundation also included the pedigree of the 
Al Saud in some of its other publications, like an Abridged Historical Atlas of Saudi Arabia for 
Students, published in 2004.104 
Prince Salman ibn Abdulaziz, the foundation’s chair and one of the most senior 
members of the royal family, also took a personal interest in his family’s genealogy. He 
advised the dynastic historian ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ruwayshid in the production of a tome on 
The Family Trees of the Saudi Royal Family.105 In 2004, Prince Salman published an open 
letter in the newspaper al-Riyāḍ, seeking to ‘correct’ information on this family tree. This 
came in response to a programme on al-Mustaqillah, a London-based satellite-channel. 
While Salman maintained that ‘the Saudi state was based on the Koran and the Sunna and 
not on a regional or tribal basis’, he felt the need to clarify that the Al Saud descended from 
the Banū Ḥanīfah of Wāʾil and neither from the Tamīm nor the ʿAnazah tribe.106 
Finally, although official textbooks formally rejected tribalism, the state also supported 
an important periodical covering tribal history and genealogy. This was the journal al-ʿArab, 
which the local historian Hamad Al-Jasser had established in 1966. Besides dealing with the 
history and geography of towns and regions, the journal also covered tribal history. Initially, 
al-ʿArab mainly responded to queries by individuals. In 1969, for instance, one reader asked 
al-ʿArab to publish an article on the Hizzān tribe. In response, Al-Jasser published a text, in 
which he argued that the tribe ‘took a magnificent and heroic stance in maintaining their 
dignity and defending their country, when the Egyptian army invaded Najd after the 
elimination of the first Saudi state’.107 Later, al-ʿArab also published longer articles, including 
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excerpts of a two-volume Lexicon of the Tribes in Saudi Arabia, authored by Al-Jasser 
himself.108 
Conceived as a general historical and geographical journal that treated tribes as only 
one of its topics, al-ʿArab was initially able to thrive on governmental support. Until 1975, Al-
Jasser published the journal outside Saudi Arabia, namely in Beirut.109 During that time, 
various agencies, including the National Guard, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water, placed advertisements in the journal.110 In an editorial in 1978, after 
al-ʿArab had moved to Riyadh, Al-Jasser thanked the Saudi government for its support and 
for permitting the continuation of his journal.111 Eventually, various state universities and 
other governmental institutions subscribed to the journal. In 1985, King Saud University 
alone subscribed to twenty-five copies per issue.112 This was, however, not because of tribal 
topics, but because of King Saud University’s interest in al-ʿArab’s geographical articles.113 
In the mid-1980s, one state agency even saved al-ʿArab from closure. At the time, al-  
ʿArab suffered from the general economic downturn with the fall in oil prices. In 1986/87 
alone, the subscriptions to the journal fell by 41 per cent compared to the previous year.114 
These subscriptions not only included those by individuals, but also by governmental 
institutions. In 1985, al-Ḥaras al-Waṭanī, the cultural magazine of the National Guard, 
reported that Hamad Al-Jasser would stop al-ʿArab. When asked about his reasons, Al-
Jasser responded that he had recently received an order from a ministry for one copy only. 
He wrote back to the ministry, ‘consider it as a gift’.115 
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At that point, the General Presidency of Youth Welfare stepped in because of its 
interest in geography and local historiography generally.116 Shortly after the report in al-
Ḥaras al-Waṭanī, Prince Faisal ibn Fahd met with Hamad Al-Jasser and published a 
statement in Saudi newspapers. He announced that the General Presidency of Youth 
Welfare would ‘take all measures to guarantee the continuing publication and development 
of the journal al-ʿArab. It believes in its importance and the great cultural role it plays inside 
and outside of the kingdom’.117 Al-ʿArab thus continued. 
Most authors of tribal histories published in al-ʿArab and elsewhere were self-taught 
amateurs who had benefitted from Saudi state expansion in various ways. One of the first 
authors who sought to unlock the symbolic capital stored in his tribal ancestry was ʿĀtiq al-
Bilādī, the son of a storyteller from the Ḥarb tribe. Born among Bedouin near Mecca, al-
Bilādī entered the Saudi army. This allowed him to gain a formal education in the Infantry 
School (Madrasat al-Mushāt) in Ta’if. In 1956, he was dispatched to Jordan as part of Saudi 
reinforcements to the front against Israel. In Amman, he was able to gain diplomas in 
journalism and English. Later, he reached the rank of a lieutenant colonel at the Border 
Guard in Jeddah.118 In 1977, just after his retirement, al-Bilādī published a book entitled The 
Pedigree of Ḥarb: Its Lineages, Branches, History, and Territories. The book reflected the 
great value the author attached to genealogy. It was dedicated ‘to those who search for their 
pure-blooded roots and their eternal heritage, for the history of their bright nation, and for the 
glories of knowledge about their honourable, blessed ancestors’.119 
As one of the first prominent tribal authors, al-Bilādī reclaimed the history of Arab 
Bedouin tribes from the perspective of town-based chroniclers. He stated that ‘the historians 
in Mecca and Medina were not interested in these tribes’. ‘When they mentioned them, they 
wrote, “Emir So-and-so punished the insurgents of tribe So-and-so.” Alternatively, they said 
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that the Emir “stopped at this village after his return from fighting tribe So-and-so.”’ In battles 
between a ruler of Mecca and the surrounding Bedouin tribes, the chroniclers presented ‘the 
prince as the always victorious hero’120 and spoke about the tribes ‘with the tongue of the 
judge’.121 Al-Bilādī set out to offer a different interpretation of the history of his tribe, basing 
his account on the Ḥarb’s oral tradition. 
Al-Bilādī also sought to shield his tribe from the takfīrist anti-nomadism of dynastic 
authors. According to him, the Ḥarb of the Hejaz did not live in an ‘age of ignorance’ or 
jāhilīyah before the establishment of the Saudi state. On the contrary, they formed an 
‘encyclopaedia’. Al-Bilādī emphasized particularly the Ḥarb’s religious learning. Because 
‘their territories lie on the hajj route’ and their dialect was close to standard Arabic, ‘many 
Bedouin memorized stories about Ali, many companions of the Prophet and old virtuous 
men’.122 Al-Bilādī also contended that tribal judges delivered verdicts that were ‘sometimes 
close to a Sharia sentence’ and ‘always striking in their logic’.123 Moreover, according to him, 
the Ḥarb even possessed profound natural knowledge. Al-Bilādī argued that even illiterate 
members of this tribe had been experienced in ‘medicine, veterinary medicine and 
meteorology’. This, according to him, ‘was during a time, in which no innovations and 
discoveries, medical instruments and drugs of the West had reached us’.124 
Al-Bilādī also developed contribution arguments, as many historians of towns and 
regions did. He thus joined the competition to assert the importance of one’s community in 
national history. He emphasized the Ḥarb’s participation in the conquests led by Abdulaziz 
Al Saud (also known as Ibn Saud) over the participation of the ʿUtaybah tribe in particular. 
Al-Bilādī lamented that ‘everybody who reads the modern history of Saudi Arabia knows that 
Ibn Saud entered the Hejaz’. He also knows that ‘Ibn Bijād, the emir of the Barqā of 
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ʿUtaybah, and Khālid ibn Luʾayy al-ʿAbdalī were the two, who entered Mecca victoriously’. 
However, ‘history has not told us that the Ḥarb were the frontrunners with Ibn Saud’.125 The 
tribal historian continued that during the 1920s and 1930s, his tribe participated in the 
conquest of Jeddah, the defeat of the rebels of the Ikhwān in the decisive battle of al-
Sabalah, and the war with Yemen.126 
While al-Bilādī worked on Hejazi history more broadly after the publication of his 
Pedigree of Ḥarb, his research on the tribe specifically was continued by Fayez al-Harbi (b. 
1956). Al-Harbi was a man whose public education and employment also empowered him to 
engage in amateur scholarship. He gained a diploma in hospital administration from the 
Institute of Public Administration in Riyadh in 1978. Subsequently, he worked for different 
hospitals in central Saudi Arabia while gaining a bachelor’s degree in business 
administration from Imam University and a master’s degree in health and hospital 
administration from King Saud University. Later, he worked for eight years as chief executive 
officer of the Prince Sultan Cardiac Center, a specialist hospital with about 150 beds. His 
relatively high salary even allowed him to set up his own publisher, Dār al-Badrānī, through 
which he published most of his historical books.127 
Having chosen an administrative career in urban Najd, Fayez al-Harbi initially had little 
interest in tribal historiography. However, the encounters with Saudis from different 
backgrounds in higher education encouraged him to reflect upon, and investigate, his roots. 
In 1981, he was sent to the United States as part of a student mission to gain a diploma in 
health sciences. There, he first became interested in tribal histories, when his fellow Saudi 
students inquired about his tribal background, regarding which he had little knowledge. After 
his return to the kingdom in 1983, he started to undertake research in this field. Besides 
relying on oral accounts, he read accounts by foreign travellers and was one of the first tribal 
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historians to access documents. Al-Harbi’s interest in the tribal past even led him to retire 
early from his position as a hospital chief executive officer in order to devote himself to 
historical studies.128 
Like his fellow tribesman al-Bilādī, al-Harbi struggled to reclaim the history of the 
Bedouin from earlier urban authors. Working on Najd as well as the Hejaz, he not only 
criticized chroniclers from Mecca and Medina for their neglect or misrepresentation of tribal 
history. He also turned against members of the Ibn Ghannām School and other Najdi 
chroniclers. This was already evident one of his first monographs, which he published in 
1994. The monograph was entitled The History of the Tribes in Najd, 1446–1800. Al-Harbi 
contended that ‘the history of the Bedouins of Najd has not enjoyed the interest of our 
historians, who were all from the people of Najdi settlements and villages’. Al-Harbi 
complained that Ibn Ghannām, Ibn Bishr and Ibn ʿĪsá, as well as the pre-Wahhabi author al-
Manqūr recorded only events relating to these settlements.129 
In 1996, Fayez al-Harbi published another book entitled Chapters on the History of the 
Ḥarb Tribe in the Hejaz and Najd. In this book, he was more critical of urban historians. He 
lamented that in the past, mostly ‘followers and protégés of the state’ had written history, 
‘whether the Sharifs of the Hejaz, the military commanders, the pashas, or their clients’. 
They had proceeded with a ‘clear bias in favour of the state and its followers, at the expense 
of the Arab Bedouin sheikhs and their followers, who were their opponents and enemies.’ 
Thus, ‘an unjust historical picture was formed’, which ‘glorifies the state’ and ‘denies the 
rights, and belittles the heroism’, of the Bedouin.130 
In response to perceived neglect and distortions by both dynastic and Hejazi local 
historians, Fayez al-Harbi sought to place the Ḥarb tribe prominently on the historical map. 
In contrast to ʿĀtiq al-Bilādī’s book, The Pedigree of Ḥarb, however, this map was more 
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explicitly national. Saudi nation building had already affected al-Harbi as a man of a younger 
generation. He drew on the paradigm of national development when he asserted that ‘the 
sons of the Arabs’, that is, the Bedouin, had become ‘doctors, judges, engineers, pilots, 
technicians and soldiers’ under Saudi rule. Thus, they had ‘transformed into important 
national pillars in the building of the nation, preserving its security and interests’.131 
In 1997, al-Harbi directly attacked official dynastic historiography. In an article in al-     
ʿArab, the author criticized a textbook for secondary schools on The History of Saudi Arabia, 
written by ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿUthaymīn. The article was entitled The Āl Muḍayyān, the Sheikhs of 
the Ḥarb Tribe: Are They Not Worth Mentioning? As the title suggests, al-Harbi complained 
that the textbook did not include the leaders of the Ḥarb in its discussion of the history of the 
first Saudi state. He argued that the Āl Muḍayyān ‘played a fundamental role in the 
annexation of Medina and its surroundings to the Saudi state’ and ‘spread the Salafi 
movement among the tribes of the region’. Against an accusation in the textbook that the 
Ḥarb tribe had collaborated with the invading Egyptian forces, the tribal historian 
emphasized the sacrifice of the Āl Muḍayyān. Their sheikh, Masʿūd ibn Muḍayyān, was even 
‘captured and sent to Istanbul, where he was strangled’.132 
The Saudi government did not repress al-Harbi’s attack on one of its textbooks. ʿAbd 
Allāh al-ʿUthaymīn merely published a response in al-ʿArab in order to ‘eliminate confusion 
among some readers’. Concerned not to offend tribal sensibilities, he stated he had ‘the 
same appreciation towards the Āl Muḍayyān as towards any leaders of the tribes of this 
nation’.133 However, he had mentioned only a few examples of ‘emirs and leaders of the first 
Saudi state’, because he did not want to burden the pupil with the need to ‘remember them 
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all’. He also stated that the ‘efforts’ of some of the Saudi emirs, which he had mentioned, 
were at least equal to the ‘efforts of the Āl Muḍayyān, if not greater’.134 
Although al-Bilādī and al-Harbi frequently spoke of ‘the sons of the Arabs’ or ‘the 
Bedouin’ collectively, tribal authors were not united in their criticism of dynastic 
historiography. As they discussed intertribal warfare and conflicts, their narratives frequently 
offended other tribespeople. Turkī al-Qaddāḥ, an author from a younger generation and 
member of the ʿUtaybah tribe, for instance, dedicated a whole book to a criticism of al-   
Harbi’s History of the Tribes in Najd. He accused his counterpart from the Ḥarb of 
‘concentrating on the author’s tribe and glorifying its history while raising doubts about the 
battles of other tribes’. Al-Qaddāḥ also made use of the state’s hostility to tribalism. Because 
al-Harbi had partly relied on Ḥarb oral traditions, al-Qaddāḥ contended that his work ‘lacks 
accuracy and objectivity, while the abominable smell of tribal group feeling [ʿaṣabīyah] 
reveals itself, which blinds the view and silences the call for any truth’.135 
The government took such quarrels between tribespeople like al-Harbi and al-Qaddāḥ 
seriously. While allowing a considerable amount of tribal literature to appear, it was ready to 
ban titles that threatened to obstruct Saudi nation building. As Kurpershoek observes, the 
Ministry of Information permitted some ‘tribal boasting and bragging about the feats and 
virtues of the forefathers’ as long as this could be disguised as a contribution to the ‘common 
pride of the Saudi nation’136 and ‘national character-building’.137 Fahd al-Semmari, the 
secretary general of the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, however, 
made clear in 2007 that he sought an ‘interest in the history of the tribes’ that was ‘as distant 
as possible from agitation, controversy, and passion’. Refusing tribalism on national rather 
than religious grounds, he warned that the increasing interest in tribal history might lead to 
the spread of tribal ‘group feeling’. This group feeling was ‘insulting the national view that 
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binds the sons of this one nation together’. Hence, the secretary general of the main 
governmental historical research institute considered it ‘necessary to get rid of the heroic 
literature’.138 
Not only battle narratives but also pedigrees as a source of symbolic capital made 
tribal writings contentious in the eyes of other tribespeople as well as governmental 
agencies concerned with building national unity. Fayez al-Harbi considered genealogy ‘one 
of the most difficult fields of writing, because of the surrounding sensitivity and the fear of 
reactions by others’.139 In 2008, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Sanāḥ, a fellow researcher from the Muṭayr 
tribe, warned his colleagues not to ‘rely on oral narratives in composing pedigrees as this 
causes discontent among the members of the tribes’. The promotion of such disputed 
lineages ‘troubles the ministries of information and interior as well as the governorates of the 
provinces and serves neither the umma nor the nation’.140 
One of the books banned for causing a genealogical controversy was a work by the 
young ʿUtaybah author Turkī al-Qaddāḥ, who had accused Fayez al-Harbi of displaying 
‘tribal group feeling’. In early 2010, al-Qaddāḥ published a book titled An Inquiry into the 
Genealogy of the ʿUtaybah tribe. In March 2010, in an article in the newspaper al-Riyāḍ, 
members of his own tribe accused him of ‘distorting names and contradicting the truth that 
existed among the tribal elders’.141 In April 2010, the Ministry of Culture and Information thus 
banned the book and fined al-Qaddāḥ 8000 riyals (about 2100 dollars).142 Subsequently, al-
Qaddāḥ was prohibited from writing on genealogy, ‘because he was not a specialist’ and 
because of the ‘problems’ his book had caused. These problems had led to ‘discord among 
the sons of the one tribe’, that is, the nation.143 
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Authors seeking to assert tribes in national history faced additional difficulties, as one 
of the most suitable topics for contribution histories, namely the Ikhwān, remained highly 
sensitive. While poetry attacking the Ikhwān was taboo due to their association with the royal 
family, poetry extolling the Bedouin warriors remained rare. This rarity resulted from painful 
memories of the suppression of the rebellion in 1930 and from the fact that the movement 
had, as Marcel Kurpershoek put it, ‘cut across the entire tribal society, pitting one section of 
a tribe against another and leaving deep rifts’.144 Even in academia, resistance towards the 
topic of the Ikhwān remained. Talal Al-Azma’, a member of a prominent family of the Subayʿ 
tribe, for instance, proposed to write an undergraduate dissertation on the Ikhwān at King 
Saud University. His supervisor at first rejected the idea and later forced him not to mention 
the name Ikhwān in the title.145 
Despite this sensitivity, tribal authors developed contribution arguments with reference 
to the Ikhwān. Here, they benefitted from globalization by studying abroad and co-operating 
with foreign scholars. After his BA from King Saud University, Talal Al-Azma’ went on to 
doctoral studies at the University of Durham. He did not receive a governmental scholarship, 
but was fortunate to have the support of Talal ibn Abdulaziz Al Saud, a liberal prince who 
had taken care of his orphaned namesake since his childhood. At Durham, Al-Azma’ 
completed a doctoral thesis on The Role of the Ikhwan under 'Abdul-'Aziz Al Sa'ud 1916-
1934. Al-Azma’ based his thesis largely on interviews with fellow tribesmen, who were, 
according to him, not affected by ‘the forgery concerning the great achievement of their 
fathers, grandfathers, and great grandfathers in unifying the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’. 
Relying on these accounts, he gave the main credit for the kingdom’s existence to the 
Ikhwān.146 Playing down the eventual Ikhwān rebellion against King Abdulaziz in the late 
1920s, Al-Azma’ argued that the overwhelming majority of the Ikhwān, including members of 
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his own tribe, remained loyal and supported the Saudi monarch ‘in his conflict with the 
minority rebels’.147 
More explicitly than many other tribal authors, Al-Azma’ also expressed open hostility 
towards many dynastic historians. These historians included ‘the national Arab writers’, like 
Rihani, Hamza and Wahba, and ‘the writers of the hadhar of Najd’, like Mohamed Almana 
and ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿUthaymīn. According to Al-Azma’, all of them ascribed ‘the role of the 
creation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the hadhar of Najd’ and ‘neglected the main role 
of the bedouin of the Ikhwan’.148 He even drew a picture of a historiographic conspiracy by 
the ‘village writers’, or ḥaḍar, against the ‘Bedouin’. He argued that there ‘has been a 
historical conflict between the tribes of Najd and the hadhar of Najd because the Bedouin of 
Najd held the power and prestige in Najd’ and the Bedouin ‘looked down upon’ the ḥaḍar. In 
response, scholars from the ḥaḍar, including al-ʿUthaymīn, ‘sought to steal the achievements 
of the tribes of Najd and claim that they were behind the unification of the new Saudi state’. 
As most ‘researchers and postgraduate students are from the hadhar of Najd’ due to their 
early advantage in education, they had, according to Al-Azma’, ‘great opportunity to fashion’ 
Saudi Arabia’s history.149 
In Al-Azma’’s case, the Saudi Ministry of Higher Education suppressed the attack on 
dynastic historiography. It did not recognize his PhD and barred him from becoming a 
professor at a Saudi university.150 However, Al-Azma’ did not remain the only historian 
asserting the role of  tribes in national history against dynastic authors. In parallel, Sulṭān ibn 
Ḥithlayn (b. 1952), a member of one of the leading families of the ʿUjmān, worked on a book 
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entitled The History of the ʿUjmān Tribe. It was published abroad, in Kuwait in 1998, like 
many other histories of towns and tribes, to avoid Saudi censorship.151 
Sulṭān ibn Ḥithlayn did not only benefit from globalization in the form of access to 
foreign scholarship, as Al-Azma’ had through his studies in Durham. In a rare case among 
tribal historians, he also benefitted from employment at a state university. After studying at 
Imam University in Riyadh, he gained a PhD in Islamic studies from the University of 
Birmingham in 1997. That same year, the King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals in 
Dhahran appointed him as an assistant professor in its Department of Islamic and Arabic 
Studies. For a revision of the history of his tribe, Ibn Ḥithlayn teamed up with Zekeriya 
Kurşun, a historian at Marmara University, Istanbul, who read Ottoman documents on the 
history of the ʿUjmān tribe.152 
Ibn Ḥithlayn was conscious of the general sensitivity surrounding tribal historiography. 
He acknowledged that ‘some people have reservations over bringing up the history of tribes 
in Saudi Arabia with the argument that its presents former conflicts that will revive the 
different tribal feuds’. In a commitment to national unity, he thus sought to reassure his 
readers that, ‘in our present age, the concept of loyalty and citizenship has taken root among 
the sons of the tribes, and this history has become memory and stories’.153 In this spirit, the 
author argued against the view of his tribe as a historical obstacle to the Saudi state. Ibn 
Ḥithlayn instead suggested proximity between his tribe and the Al Saud. He contended that 
‘the ʿUjmān had adopted the banner of the Saudi state’ in the late eighteenth century. His 
tribe had also promoted the Wahhabi mission ‘in the north, south, east and West during the 
reign of Abdulaziz ibn Muhammad and his successors’.154 
The dynastic historian ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿUthaymīn reviewed Ibn Ḥithlayn’s work in the 
newspaper al-Jazīrah. He acknowledged plurality in the writing of the kingdom’s history, but 
                                                   
151 Ibn Ḥithlayn and Kūrshūn, Tārīkh (1998). 
152 Ibid.; al-Shāmirī, “Al-sīrah” (2005). 
153 Ibn Ḥithlayn and Kūrshūn, Tārīkh (1998), 9. 
154 Ibid., 33. 
  
217 
also criticized Ibn Ḥithlayn. He wrote that texts on the history of Saudi Arabia included 
‘writings on the general history of the Saudi state concentrating on the works of its leaders’. 
Other writings treated ‘the history of one of the regions which this state has united or the 
history of one of the tribes that have come under its rule’. Ibn Ḥithlayn’s book was, according 
to al-ʿUthaymīn, a history of ‘a tribe of our dear homeland that has its own role and status 
and that has been famous for its courage and strength’.155 Al-ʿUthaymīn, however, 
‘corrected’ numerous details in the tribal history, referring mainly to Ibn Ghannām and Ibn 
Bishr.156 In his conclusion, he expressed the hope that future writings would be ‘deeper in 
their scrutiny’.157 
Al-ʿUthaymīn’s review provoked Ibn Ḥithlayn to challenge dynastic histories and their 
reliance on the Ibn Ghannām School. Given that members of nomadic tribes had produced 
few writings before the mid-twentieth century due to very high illiteracy rates, the tribal 
historian argued for the recognition of oral history and poetry as valid sources. In a rejoinder 
to al-ʿUthaymīn, Ibn Ḥithlayn contended that ‘restricting Arabian history to only some sources 
and making them the main reference is a constraint that does not conform to the academic 
method, even if those sources are the size of Ibn Bishr and Ibn Ghannām’. He asserted that 
‘the most knowledgeable people in the history of these tribes were the trusted narrators who 
transmitted their events and history from generation to generation. Even if these stories 
contain some omissions and errors, they can never be ignored.’158 
Beginning in 1999, another aspect of globalization, namely public internet access, 
also facilitated the production of controversial tribal histories. Although the kingdom’s public 
internet hub, the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology, blocked access to many 
websites,159 hardly any tribal websites were affected.160 Many Saudis, even those, who did 
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not regularly buy and read books, still authored and read tribal literature online and 
downloaded electronic copies of volumes that were unavailable in Saudi bookstores.161 One 
of the most active tribal historians on the web was the historian of the Muṭayr tribe ʿAbd al-
ʿAzīz al-Sanāḥ. He was one of the supervisors and main contributors to the Muṭayr Tribe 
Website, established in 1999. In 2010, it contained pedigrees, biographies, poetry, accounts 
of ‘braveries’, pictures, a historical dictionary, and forums.162 
Presumably expecting the ban of a printed version, al-Sanāḥ published a collection of 
reviews exclusively as a Portable Document Format (PDF) file. This collection was entitled 
The Muṭayr Tribe in the Writings of Saudi Historians: Remarks on the Errors by Some 
Historians.163 In a broad attack on dynastic historians, including ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-
Ruwayshid and ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿUthaymīn, al-Sanāḥ claimed that he ‘found many errors and 
contradictions in the writings by our historians especially when treating the history of our 
dear nation’. Similar to Al-Azma’, he contended that these historians ‘tried to marginalize the 
role of the members of the Muṭayr tribe even if their influence had been strong’.164 
Specifically, he accused al-ʿUthaymīn of not paying attention to the role of the Najdi tribes 
along ‘with King Abdulaziz Al Saud in his steps to unify the country’. In al-Sanāḥ’s opinion, 
al-ʿUthaymīn ‘decreased the standing and prestige of the Najdi tribes’.165 Asserting his tribe 
in national history, al-Sanāḥ also criticized the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and 
Archives for failing to recognize a member of the Muṭayr tribe as a participant in the capture 
of Riyadh in 1902, the nation’s foundation story. Al-Sanāḥ contended that ‘through the lack 
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of tribute to Muḥammad ibn Hazzāʿ al-Muṭayrī the foundation loses its credibility among 
researchers in explaining and documenting our oral history’.166 
Shiite histories from revolution to contribution 
Besides local and tribal writings, histories of the Shiite community in Saudi Arabia have 
flourished since the 1980s.167 Very important in producing Shiite histories was the 
oppositional movement the Islamic Revolution Organization (Munaẓẓamat al-Thawrah al-
Islāmīyah, IRO). Its members operated in Syria, Iraq, and Iran as well as Saudi Arabia.168 
Besides numerous pamphlets and books, this organization published, beginning in 1980, al-
Thawrah al-Islāmīyah, ‘The Islamic Revolution’, a monthly newsletter that called for a 
revolution and an overthrow of the Saudi government. Its publication was inspired by the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979 and followed the repression of demonstrations against Shiite 
marginalization in the modernization of Saudi Arabia.169 
In the late 1980s, the discourse of the Islamic Revolution Organization shifted from 
revolution to a more ‘moderate’ position. According to Fouad Ibrahim, many Saudi Shiites by 
that time had become ‘convinced that the revolutionary option had been unsuccessful in 
their region’.170 The Saudi government also made a few concessions to the Shiites. In 1987, 
a massacre of hundreds of Iranian pilgrims in Mecca produced tensions in the country. In 
order to reduce these tensions, King Fahd issued a general amnesty in favour of the Shiite 
prisoners in the Eastern Province. Following this amnesty, the IRO decided in 1987 to 
gradually soften the tensions with the Saudi regime.171 In early 1991, the organization 
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renamed itself the ‘Reform Movement’ (al-Ḥarakah al-Iṣlāḥīyah).172 By relinquishing 
revolution in favour of reform, the Shiite movement ‘implicitly recognized the status quo in 
Saudi Arabia and the Saudi regime’.173 
As part of its new focus on reform, the rhetoric of the Shiite opposition movement 
shifted from a call to overthrow the regime to a criticism of the regime's human rights abuses 
and the restrictions of civil liberties.174 This shift was influenced by Mikail Gorbachev’s policy 
of perestroika and the fall of the Soviet Union. It also coincided with the move of senior 
members of the Shiite opposition from Syria to London and Washington, where they found 
audiences for reports on human rights abuses. In late 1990, for instance, the IRO 
established a non-profit organization in Washington named International Committee for 
Human Rights in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula.175 Between 1991 and 1993, the Reform 
Movement’s London office also issued a new magazine entitled al-Jazīrah al-ʿArabīyah, ‘The 
Arabian Peninsula’. According to Mamoun Fandy, the magazine’s purpose was ‘not to incite 
a revolution against the royal family’. Instead, it focused ‘on human rights, tolerance, 
problems of public administration in Saudi Arabia, government corruption, and abuses of 
civil rights’.176 
In the early 1990s, the historical publications by the Reform Movement included 
demands for an end of authoritarianism and discrimination against their community. In 1992, 
Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Majīd, a young Shiite writer affiliated with the movement, published a 
book on Sectarian Discrimination in Saudi Arabia. In the preface, Ḥasan al-Ṣaffār (b. 1958), 
the leader of the Reform Movement, lamented that ‘at a time when the winds of democracy 
are blowing over most peoples of the world and the defence of human rights rises 
everywhere, our people in the Arabian peninsula is still languishing under the weight of 
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political despotism and the policy of sectarian discrimination’.177 In line with this statement,    
ʿAbd al-Majīd’s book demanded a ‘constitution’, ‘respect for human rights’, and ‘freedom of 
opinion, religion and expression’. It also demanded ‘freedom to form parties, organizations, 
and unions’. ʿAbd al-Majīd also put forward specific demands related to the Shiites. They 
included the freedom to practice their religious rituals, the permission to build their own 
mosques and the right to Shiite religious education in areas with a Shiite majority. Moreover, 
the author demanded ‘permission to print and import Shiite books and the granting of 
licences to Shiites to publish magazines and newspapers’. Finally, he also pleaded for a 
general ‘abolition of sectarian discrimination in universities, educational institutions and 
governmental jobs’.178 
Unlike many local and tribal historians, ʿAbd al-Majīd rejected the unification narrative 
of dynastic histories outright. Instead, he portrayed Saudi rule as having damaged and 
divided the nation. He argued that before the establishment of this rule, ‘the sons of the 
Arabian peninsula were all living in harmony, unity and co-existence’. ‘Doctrinal difference 
was no factor of differentiation between the sons of the one nation’.179 With Saudi rule, 
however, ‘division began to prevail and the doctrinal, ethnic, and regional differences 
appeared’, as the ‘authorities began to subjugate and suppress anyone who did not believe 
in their doctrines’. Moreover, the author accused the Saudi princes of having treated the 
‘national resources as if they were a private family possession’.180 
Despite his rejection of the unification narrative, ʿAbd al-Majīd also employed 
contribution arguments in order to emphasize the Shiites’ rights as an integral part of the 
nation. In contrast to his harsh criticism of the Saudi dynasty, ʿAbd al-Majīd praised the 
Shiites’ contribution to the nation and its unity. He argued that ‘the Shiite community in the 
Arabian peninsula over time adopted heroic and bright national and Islamic positions’, 
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standing up ‘against foreign colonialism and domestic repression and dictatorship’.181 The 
Reform Movement ‘insisted on the one nation, the co-existence of all doctrines and schools 
of thought and the preservation of the achievements of the homeland’.182 In 1990, when Iraqi 
forces invaded Kuwait, the Shiites ‘rushed to defend the borders of the nation’. Many of them 
‘poured into the volunteering offices to add their names to the lists of volunteers’. Even 
travellers ‘cut short their holidays and returned home to face all the threats to the country’.183 
During the Gulf crisis, the Saudi Shiites did indeed largely remain loyal to the 
kingdom. This was in contrast to some Sunni activists who condemned the invitation of 
American forces to the kingdom. In January 1991, a representative of the Reform Movement 
stated in the Shiite magazine al-Jazīrah al-ʿArabīyah that ‘we are ready to defend the nation 
and the independence of the nation’.184 In recognition of their loyalty, the Saudi government 
concluded an accord with members of the Shiite opposition led by Ḥasan al-Ṣaffār in 1993. 
Representatives of the Shiites agreed to ‘suspend their activities abroad, including putting 
out publications that attack Saudi Arabia's policies and record on human rights’. In return, 
Prince Naif (b. 1933), the minister of interior, agreed to allow the dissidents to return home, 
release a number of political prisoners and reissue passports to others. As part of the 
accord, King Fahd declared a general amnesty of Shiite oppositionists, many of whom thus 
returned from exile.185 
Hamzah Al-Hassan, one of the chief negotiators of the 1993 accord, was also a 
prominent historian of the Saudi Shiites. After having studied politics at King Saud 
University, he left the country in 1980 amidst the wave of governmental repression of his 
community. In exile, he was involved in the IRO and published texts critical of contemporary 
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Saudi history and politics.186 In addition, he contributed to a report by Article 19, a London-
based non-governmental organization, on restrictions to freedom of expression in Saudi 
Arabia.187 In the year of the accord, Al-Hassan published The Shiites in Saudi Arabia, a two-
volume work on the history of the community since 1871.188 
In his history of the Shiites, Al-Hassan also expressed a counter-narrative to the 
unification narrative of dynastic histories. He called the Saudi conquest of al-Aḥsāʾ and al-
Qaṭīf in 1913 an ‘occupation’ (iḥtilāl).189 Rather than naming Abdulaziz ‘the unifier’ of the 
country, he described him as a ‘man who had expansionist ambitions at the expense of his 
neighbours’.190 The Shiite author also dismissed King Abdulaziz’s alleged ‘historical rights’ 
over the region by arguing that in the nineteenth century Saudi control of al-Aḥsāʾ only lasted 
for thirty-one years and was disrupted by local revolts.191 In 1913, al-Aḥsāʾ and al-Qaṭīf ‘did 
not want’ Abdulaziz to invade the region, but ‘were unable to resist’. This was due to the 
people’s ‘fatigue’ from the insecurity that Abdulaziz himself had created through his 
campaigns.192 
Despite the counter-narrative of ‘occupation’, Al-Hassan also seemed to have 
accepted the belonging of al-Aḥsāʾ to a common Saudi nation. Nevertheless, and similarly to 
his fellow Shiite ʿAbd al-Majīd, he warned the Saudi government that its policies threatened 
the nation’s unity. He stated that his book ‘does not aim to raise age-old sectarian issues, 
which deepen division and place more barriers between the followers of the one religion and 
the one nation’.193 Yet, he warned that continued repression would indeed strengthen 
separatist tendencies. He admitted that ‘we all know the fact that unity is better than 
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separation. However, a unity that puts the rights of a large segment of the population at risk 
cannot be in our interest, as it spreads among the oppressed the spirit of separatism.’194 
Asserting the place of the Shiites within the nation, Al-Hassan aimed at gaining equal 
rights for the members of his community as ‘citizens’ (muwāṭinūn), a term that he used over 
and over again. He made clear that his monograph ‘calls for equal treatment of all citizens in 
their rights and duties irrespective of the sects, regions, and tribes they belong to’.195 He 
turned explicitly against Wahhabis who did not acknowledge the Shiites as their compatriots. 
The historian and political activist complained that ‘a number of those sectarianists—among 
them officials in the Saudi state—do not refrain from accusing their Shiite subjects of being 
Iranians who should be expelled from the country. They ignore the fact that Shiism and the 
Shiites are not alien to this region.’196 
In support of his demand for equality between Saudi citizens of all sects, Al-Hassan 
developed a genealogical argument that rejected claims that the Saudi Shiites were of 
foreign ethnicity. He contended that ‘the Shiites are original Arabs. One part belongs to the 
original ancient Arab tribes who lived in the region before Islam, ʿAbd al-Qays and Bakr ibn 
Wāʾil, and another part originates from Bedouin who settled down and adopted Shiism.’197 
Al-Hassan did not see the lack of genealogical evidence as a problem, but, on the contrary, 
argued that the Shiites, who had given up tribal forms of social organization and forgotten 
parts of their pedigrees, were more pious than Sunni tribespeople who knew their lineages in 
detail. He postulated that ‘no religion’ unites these tribespeople ‘more strongly than their 
pedigree. No spirit of brotherhood and Islam supports them like the group feeling [ʿaṣabīyah] 
of the tribe.’198 
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Al-Hassan argued against discrimination of his sect based not only on ‘their 
‘authenticity’ (aṣālah) as an indigenous Arab and Muslim community in Saudi Arabia’.199 He 
also emphasized their contribution to the national economy and complained about 
differential access to the oil wealth. He lamented that the Shiites of the Eastern Province 
were ‘the only ones who saw nothing of the revenues, although they produce the main 
wealth of the country, and their land is the source of the riches’.200 Even before the discovery 
of oil, he argued, ‘the Shiite areas were the richest of the Arabian peninsula’. Hence, their 
occupation by the Ottomans in 1871 was one of the main reasons for the end of the second 
Saudi state.201 With the appearance of oil, these regions became ‘the heart of the kingdom 
that fills the other parts with life’. Al-Hassan also contended that without the Saudi oil 
workers, 65–70% of whom were Shiites, ‘not a drop of oil would be exported’. He even went 
so far as to say that, ‘without oil and the Shiite workers, the kingdom would not exist’.202 
Although contribution histories proliferated among Shiite authors, particularistic 
tendencies did not disappear. The rise of such nationally oriented writings thus represented 
a pluralization rather than a complete transformation of Shiite historiography. Al-                      
ʿAwwāmīyah, a town within the al-Qaṭīf oasis and the centre of an anti-Saudi rebellion in 
1929/30,203 formed the topic of a particularistic book published in 1995. Its author was Zakī 
al-Ṣāliḥ, an amateur historian and another former activist of the Islamic Revolution 
Organization. His book, al-ʿAwwāmīyah, celebrated the town’s Shiite traditions without 
references to Wahhabi doctrines. It gave the biographies of many of the town’s ulema, 
including the leader of the 1929/30 rebellion, Ayatollah Muḥammad ibn Nimr. Al-Ṣāliḥ 
praised al-Nimr as ‘a famous scholar, mujtahid, and mujahid’.204 
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Al-Ṣāliḥ added to the particularism of his history through the development of a 
perennialist argument. He stated that ‘al-ʿAwwāmīyah is an ancient city with deep historical 
roots. At one time, it was connected to the history of al-Zārah, the famous historical city that 
was the capital of al-Khaṭṭ and Bahrain from pre-Islamic until early Islamic times.’205 
Subsequently, the author narrated a story of endurance, stating that, ‘for parts of its history’, 
al-ʿAwwāmīyah ‘faced violent shakeups resulting from sectarian oppression, persecution, 
and injustice’.206 The town, however, survived the coming and going of different rulers and 
conquerors. They included ‘Emir Saud’—and not ‘Imam’ as in dynastic historiography—, 
who ‘looted enormous wealth from al-ʿAwwāmīyah’ in the early nineteenth century.207 
Despite the accord of 1993, most Shiite historians continued to publish their books 
abroad and suffered from censorship in the kingdom. The accord itself did not provide any 
legal protection, but was mainly an exchange of a right to return for political quiescence. A 
member of the royal family stated in 1993 that ‘there are no deals as such, but those who 
issued these publications will stop them, and they can come back home where they are 
welcome’.208 Hamzah Al-Hassan thus returned to the kingdom, but his book on The Shiites 
in Saudi Arabia was banned.209 In the following years, he applied for a licence to publish a 
historical journal with the title al-Wāḥah, ‘The Oasis’. However, the Ministry of Information 
rejected this application, ostensibly because it seemed to focus on a specific region, namely 
the ‘oasis’ of al-Qaṭīf rather than the whole nation. Al-Hassan viewed this argument as 
hollow, because other periodicals, such as the newspapers al-Riyāḍ and al-Madīnah al-
Munawwarah, also referred to specific places.210 
Despite the continued repression of Shiite historiography, increasing connections 
between Saudi Arabia and the rest of the world also allowed Shiite scholars to continue their 
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historical production from abroad. In 1995, Al-Hassan and colleagues of his launched al-
Wāḥah as a private non-profit journal. In 1998, the historian and activist left Saudi Arabia 
again for London, where he continued editing the journal.211 The periodical focused on the 
history, heritage, culture, and literature of al-Qaṭīf especially and of the Persian Gulf coast 
generally. Although it took London as its base, it also engaged in inner-Saudi debates about 
nationalism and national unity. Its articles covered topics such as citizenship and rights, 
national unity and terrorism, and national responsibility. From 2007 onwards, the al-Wāḥah’s 
website provided open access to most of its contents. By 2011, more than 400 writers based 
in Saudi Arabia and abroad had contributed articles, and the journal’s website had registered 
more than 50,000 visitors.212 
While the articles in al-Wāḥah covered a diverse range of topics, arguments about the 
historical contributions of the Shiites to the nation also appeared in some of them. In 2004, 
for instance, Muḥammad al-Ḥirz, a member of the journal’s editorial board, published an 
article on The Role of the Ulema of al-Aḥsāʾ in Building National Unity. Al-Ḥirz wrote that 
already in the early eighteenth century, the oasis had been a ‘cradle’ of both Shiite and 
Sunni scholars who had sought to ‘build a peaceful society’. Mutual visits between Shiites 
and Sunnis contributed to ‘calming sectarian strife’, and Shiite ulema even copied works by 
Sunni scholars. This created an extraordinary ‘harmony’ between the sects that was noted 
by Arab travellers. A manifestation of this harmony was that by the end of the nineteenth 
century, the ‘national spirit was strong’ among all scholars of al-Aḥsāʾ, and ‘the development 
of the country was the only obsession that drove them’. In his conclusion, al-Ḥirz lamented 
that this ‘intimacy and tearing down of the sectarian wall’ no longer existed after the Ottoman 
period. However, the writer proposed to revive it in the form of ‘joint committees’ of Shiite 
and Sunni scholars in order to ‘preserve our national cohesion and unity’.213  
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Conclusions 
As the example of al-Wāḥah makes clear, significant parts of Shiite historiography have 
joined the histories of towns, regions and tribes that have been affected by Saudi nation 
building and the nationalization of dynastic historiography since the 1970s. While 
particularistic notions of a community’s historical independence continued in some works, 
many of these histories employed national frames and references. This did not mean, 
however, that the historiography of towns, tribes, and sects became subservient to dynastic 
histories. Many authors questioned the history of Saudi Arabia as an exclusive royal project 
and asserted their communities in national history. To that aim, they developed contribution 
arguments, asserting the contribution of different communities to national achievements. 
The emergence of these contribution histories was largely driven by the state-financed 
expansion of education, from which even the former Bedouin benefitted. In addition, the 
General Presidency of Youth Welfare, as a state institution rooted in the provinces, came to 
support nationally oriented local historiography. Moreover, formal equality between Saudi 
citizens combined with differential access to the state’s resources encouraged some authors 
to develop contribution arguments for the fulfilment of various aims. The authors aimed at 
ending sectarian discrimination, increasing a specific community’s share of the oil wealth, 
gaining symbolic capital located in the tribal past, or establishing themselves as cultural 
brokers between local and national institutions. In many cases, assertions of the role of 
Shiite and tribal communities in national history was met with repression by the state. 
Nevertheless, increasing opportunities to study abroad, to co-operate with foreign scholars, 
and to publish abroad and online facilitated a plurality of narratives. 
While the different assertions of various regions, towns, tribes and the Shiites in 
national history have so far had little success in changing official textbooks, in March 2011 
Prince Salman ibn Abdulaziz indicated that future textbooks on the kingdom’s history might 
become more inclusive. Amidst the ‘Arab Spring’, the chair of the King Abdulaziz Foundation 
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for Research and Archives gave a lecture at Medina’s Islamic University. Perhaps seeking to 
stabilize the country during the regional turmoil, he made a concession to contribution 
arguments. He acknowledged that ‘there is no family or tribe in this country whose fathers or 
grandfathers did not contribute effectively to the unification, building, and strengthening of 
the country’. Departing from dynastic exclusivism, he added that ‘everybody in this nation is 
an inseparable part of the historical success of this blessed state and participated in 
building, unifying, and consolidating it’.214 
Whether the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives and the Ministry of 
Education will act according to Salman’s statements and change textbook approaches 
towards the national past, is difficult to foresee. Even if they do, this would probably not be 
the end of the history of Saudi historiographical plurality. As the next chapter demonstrates, 
this plurality was not restricted to the contest between the histories of the Saudi dynasty and 
of the various towns, regions, sects, and tribes in the kingdom. The state-sponsored 
expansion of Saudi higher education in a globalizing context also shaped the emergence of 
another approach in the historiography of the kingdom in the 1970s and 1980s. This new 
school transcended the confines of both dynastic and subnational histories in order to 
develop new interpretations of broader changes in Saudi society, including the key 
processes of the rise of the Wahhabi mission and the Saudi state itself.
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6. Social and Economic Histories, 1970s to Present 
In 2001, two years after the Saudi centennial celebrations had brought a flood of new 
historical publications, Dalal al-Harbi, a historian at Girls’ College in Riyadh, published an 
editorial in the journal al-Dirʿīyah. The editorial’s title asked, ‘Does the History of the Kingdom 
Need More Studies?’ Hardly surprising for a professional scholar, al-Harbi’s answer was a 
definite yes. However, rather than calling for more texts on the contribution of this tribe or 
that region to the political and military ‘unification’ of the country, she supported the writing of 
distinct social and economic histories. According to her, previous studies concentrated 
mostly on what she called ‘the political’. New studies, in contrast, should focus on ‘the 
economic, intellectual, and social aspects’, making use of ‘the hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions, of documents preserved in official agencies’. In order to establish social and 
economic history in Saudi Arabia, al-Harbi hoped that ‘departments of history at the 
kingdom’s universities and colleges consolidate the concepts of the new studies’.1 
As al-Harbi’s call for more research suggests, social and economic histories formed a 
much smaller group of writings than dynastic, local and tribal histories did. To be sure, texts 
about Saudi kings or the history of Asir or Mecca often included descriptions of social and 
economic life. However, this chapter is mainly concerned with studies, which put social and 
economic factors at the very centre of their inquiry. Such distinct studies in social and 
economic history were few compared with the hundreds of studies on dynastic, local and 
tribal topics. Professors with significant contributions to social and economic history did not 
exceed a few dozen out of several hundred between the 1970s and the 2000s. One study 
classified 168 master and doctoral theses in modern and contemporary history that were 
examined at Saudi colleges and universities until 2000. It found that only twelve (7.1%) dealt 
with ‘economic history’, five (3%) with ‘social history’, and nine (5.4%) with ‘cultural history’. 
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Still, sixty-two (36.9%) of the topics were situated within international relations and forty-six 
(27.4%) within ‘political history’. The study also found that at least until 2000, departments of 
history in the kingdom offered no course entitled ‘social history’.2 
This chapter will discuss a number of distinct social and economic histories as well as 
studies in historical sociology produced by Saudis since the 1970s. Through their focus on 
wider social and economic change, these histories often differed from takfīrist dynastic texts 
and to a lesser extent from local and tribal writings. Dynastic as well as local writings 
frequently used ‘formist’ explanations, which consider ‘the uniqueness of the different 
agents, agencies, and acts which make up the events’ as central to one’s inquiries.3 Formist 
dynastic historians presented Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud as ‘great men’, 
who suddenly appeared against the background of an ahistorical ‘age of ignorance’ or 
jāhilīyah. Other formist arguments focus on the unique contribution of a given tribe or family 
to national history. In contrast, social and economic historians as well as historical 
sociologists contested, and diverged from, takfīrist and contribution narratives by developing 
‘contextualist’ arguments. These arguments sought to explain events, like the rise of the 
Wahhabi mission, by setting them ‘within the “context” of their occurrence’ and by revealing 
‘the specific relationships they bore to other events occurring in their circumambient 
historical space’.4 
The chapter will explore the rise of social and economic histories as a group of 
writings that further broadened narrative plurality in Saudi historiography. I will pay special 
attention to an important way in which Saudis, supported by the state, participated in 
globalization: the Saudi student missions to the United States and other countries. In the first 
section of the chapter, I will explain these student missions and their influence on the 
production of social and economic historians and historical sociologists. In the second 
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section, I will focus on the ways in which social and economic historians, many of whom had 
been part of student missions, sought to ‘contextualize’ the emergence of the Wahhabi 
mission and thus challenged takfīrism. 
In the third section, I will focus on the work of historical sociologists and political 
scientists. Although not part of the ‘historical profession’ in a narrow sense, these social 
scientists often studied together with social and economic historians abroad and were 
supervised by social historians. In their research, they also built on the work by social and 
economic historians and engaged in discussions with them as well as with representatives of 
dynastic historiography. Moreover, they produced new interpretations of the history of the 
Saudi state that contradicted takfīrism and thus contributed to a wider plurality in narratives 
about the past. 
From student missions to social history 
Compared with other countries, social and economic history advanced rather slowly in Saudi 
historiography. Abdullah al-Askar (b. 1952), who would later publish a major book on the 
economic history of southern Najd, remembered that when he studied history at King Saud 
University (KSU) in Riyadh in the early 1970s, he ‘only learned chronological history, names 
and dates, especially political history and a bit of military history’. History, according to him, 
‘was presented as separate from other humanities and social sciences’ and ‘as if it was the 
ideal truth’. Al-Askar’s classmate Mohamed Al-Freih (b. 1950), who would write a PhD 
dissertation on social and economic history, was of a similar opinion. He recalled that his 
education at KSU had been ‘monolithic’ and had interpreted history ‘in political and religious 
terms’.5 
A political climate opposed to communism, socialism, and materialism curbed the 
development of social and economic history in Saudi Arabia. Al-Freih remembered that 
during his studies at King Saud University, ‘socio-economics had the touch of Marxism’ and 
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was therefore ‘avoided’.6 Anti-communism was present even before World War II, and 
alleged communist writings suffered from censorship.7 This tendency received further 
strengthening during the Arab Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s, in which the Saudi 
government championed ‘Islam’ against what it perceived as ‘atheist’ socialism. In 1975, 
Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh, the minister of higher education and chair of the King Abdulaziz 
Foundation for Research and Archives expressed this point clearly. In an interview with the 
foundation’s journal al-Dārah in 1975, he stated that ‘Muslim solidarity is construction, [while] 
communism [is] destruction’.8 In 1982, the Saudi government also decreed a charter that 
required the Saudi media to resist ‘atheist tendencies’ and ‘materialist philosophies’.9 
Between the 1950s and 1970s, the Saudi government brought many members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and other Sunni religious groups into the country. Many of these men 
had suffered from persecution in the socialist Arab republics, especially Nasser’s Egypt. In 
its confrontation with socialism, the government also gave these men positions in education, 
administration as well as other sectors. This affected Saudi curricula, including history. 
Mohammad Atar, in a study of several Saudi history textbooks from 1985 to 1988, found that 
these books ‘reflect the ideological assumptions of the Muslim Brotherhood, to the degree 
one might suspect the texts were written by them’.10 In particular, the books advocated belief 
in the Muslim umma rather than an Arab nation.11 
The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood combined with that of the Wahhabi 
establishment also led to a proliferation of Islamic subjects in history courses at Saudi 
universities. This happened at the expense of social and economic history and in opposition 
to materialist interpretations. The proliferation was particularly strong at Imam Muhammad 
ibn Saud Islamic University (Imam University). The university’s director from 1976 to 
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1993/94, ʿAbd Allāh al-Turkī, was himself a former Muslim brother.12 Out of eighty-four credit 
hours of the history undergraduate curriculum in 1981, eighteen (about 21 per cent) were 
reserved for religious subjects. They included the history of the prophets and the life (sīrah) 
of Muhammad as well as several courses that were compulsory for students across all 
disciplines: Hadith, Koranic exegesis (tafsīr), and Islamic culture. In the 1987 curriculum, two 
further courses were introduced: monotheism (tawḥīd) and principles of Islamic education. 
The share of essentially theological subjects had slightly increased to forty-three (about 22.6 
per cent) out of 194. Social and economic history, in contrast, was virtually absent from 
these curricula.13 
Despite opposition to materialism, however, the large social and economic 
transformations that accompanied the expansion of the oil industry after World War II 
provided a fertile ground for historical studies going beyond political and religious events. 
Not only did many Saudis experience the development of transport, urbanization, the 
building of state institutions and the emergence of the nuclear family in their own lives over 
the twentieth century. Through increasing mobility as well as access to national and 
international media, they recognized that these transformations were not peculiar to their 
local communities but were wider social phenomena. New ideologies, like Arab nationalism, 
also affected Saudi history students in the 1960s and 1970s. They created in Mohamed Al-
Freih ‘the feeling that there was something missing’ in the histories taught at Saudi schools 
and universities at the time.14 
However, the main unintended driver of the emergence of social and economic 
histories was the state-financed growth of a historical profession in the kingdom in 
combination with the rise of development policies. Beginning in the 1970s, the government 
                                                   
12 Lacroix, Les islamistes (2010), 55. Also King Abdulaziz University introduced compulsory courses in 
Islamic culture and sought to create an ‘Islamically-oriented conception of knowledge’ in the late 1970s. Faheem, 
“Higher Education” (1982), 199. 
13 Jāmiʿat al-Imām Muḥammad ibn Suʿūd al-Islāmīyah, Dalīl jāmiʿat al-imām (1981); Dalīl al-dirāsāt (1981); 
Dalīl jāmiʿat al-imām (1987). 
14 Mohamed Al-Freih, interview, 4 November 2009. 
  
235 
supported some writings on social and economic change, especially when they conceived 
social development as a royal ‘achievement’. This was underpinned by the regime’s 
adoption in the 1960s of an ideology of development as a second pillar of its legitimacy 
alongside Islam.15 In 1974, the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives 
organized the King Faisal Prize for historical studies in three areas, one being ‘social reform 
during King Abdulaziz’s reign’.16 Three years later, the foundation organized a competition 
for the King Abdulaziz Prize for University Students. It awarded six thousand riyals (about 
1600 US dollars) to the best student papers about Abdulaziz’s reign in five categories, 
including agriculture and industry and trade.17 
One of the first recipients of state support for a study in social history was ʿAbd al-
Fattāḥ Abū ʿAlīyah, a Jordanian who contributed to building up Imam University’s history 
department. He won the foundation’s King Faisal Prize in 1974 in the area of social reform. 
Encouraged by Albert Hourani (1915–93) and Muhsin Mahdi (1926–2007), two historians of 
the Middle East with whom he stayed as a visiting researcher at Harvard University, Abū       
ʿAlīyah authored one of the first monographs on social change in modern Saudi Arabia. It 
was entitled Social Reform during the Reign of King Abdulaziz. Relying on archival 
documents in London, Washington and Istanbul, Abū ʿAlīyah analysed the settlement of the 
Bedouin under Abdulaziz and the changes in economic and social life following the 
discovery of oil. The historian distanced himself somewhat from exclusivist dynastic 
historiography. Although he frequently referred to King Abdulaziz, he stated that he sought 
to produce a study in which ‘the entire society is the hero of the story’. Yet, the King 
Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives still published the book in 1976 at the 
expense of the Ministry of Higher Education.18 
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More important than prizes to the emergence of social and economic history, 
however, was another part of the state-sponsored growth of the indigenous historical 
profession: the student missions to foreign countries. These missions aimed at educating 
Saudi citizens so that they could contribute to national development and replace foreigners 
as officials and professors in history as well as other disciplines. The first generation of 
Saudi professional historians and archaeologists, including Abdul-Aziz Khowaiter, ʿAbd Allāh 
al-ʿUthaymīn and Abd al-Rahman al-Ansary, gained their doctorates mainly from British 
universities in the 1960s and 1970s. Thereafter, the United States became the favourite 
destination for many of their Saudi students. This shift not only reflected the increasing 
importance of Saudi–American relations but also a growing consciousness of American 
leadership in many disciplines after World War II. Financed by the increased revenues in the 
1970s, the number of Saudi students in the United States across all disciplines soared from 
851 in the summer of 1970 to some 11,000 by late 1979.19 In history alone, thirty-six Saudis 
completed doctoral dissertations at American universities between 1970 and 1990.20 
At King Saud University in particular, members of the second generation of graduates 
were encouraged to use the new opportunities for state-financed studies in the United 
States. The professor of archaeology Abd al-Rahman Al-Ansary recalled that he and his 
colleagues at the university’s history department supported their students in their 
applications to American research universities. They put ‘great hopes’ especially in the 
return of Mohamed Al-Freih and a few other students admitted to the University of California, 
Los Angeles (UCLA).21 Besides professorial recommendations, the diffusion of positive 
ideas about Western academia also made it attractive for Saudis to apply to universities in 
the United States. One of the Saudi students affected by this diffusion of ideas was Abdullah 
Al-Subaiy, who went on to do postgraduate studies at Michigan State University after 
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completing a BA in history at King Saud University in 1970. Al-Subaiy remembered that 
reading magazines about life in the US and the UK and the tales by fellow Saudis, who had 
returned from abroad, created aspirations. ‘We had a dream. We wanted to see the foreign 
universities, Oxford, Cambridge, Stanford, Michigan.’22 
Members of the religious establishment voiced concern over the influence of Western 
ways of life on Saudis studying in America. Yet, the government exerted relatively little 
control over these students, which it sent abroad in order to contribute to the nation’s 
‘development’. In his interview in 1975, Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh, the minister responsible for the 
student missions, was asked about what he did in order to ‘prevent that our young people, 
whom we have sent abroad, get lost in the abyss of Western currents’. He replied that Saudi 
students were encouraged to ‘join Islamic societies in the countries in which they pursue 
their studies’ and that ‘some preachers and enlightened ulema’ held workshops for them 
abroad. In addition, the government sought to provide foreign scholarships only to students 
who had completed their undergraduate studies in the kingdom.23 In 1982, Imam University 
also initiated a four-week preparatory programme that every scholarship holder had to pass. 
The programme comprised ‘all that one is supposedly either to watch out or to look for while 
he is out of the country’. It also included the advice to ‘associate only with designated Islamic 
organizations, either in Europe or in the United States’.24 
Despite governmental attempts at religious ‘guidance’, however, a number of Saudi 
students exposed themselves to social and political debates on US campuses and in the 
media. This fostered an interest in social history.25 The students included graduates 
predominantly from King Saud University, like Abdullah al-Askar, who was the first of a 
group of Saudi history students at UCLA in the 1970s and 1980s.26 During his time at UCLA, 
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he followed political analyses, subscribed to the Washington Post and the Los Angeles 
Times, read Time and Newsweek, and watched televised discussions in the programmes 60 
Minutes, Meet the Press, and Face the Nation. In addition, he immersed himself in American 
cultural life, visiting theatres, cinemas, forums, and conferences.27 Abdulrahman Al-
Shamlan, another KSU graduate who had gained a PhD from the University of Michigan, 
recalled that ‘political activity, demonstrations, and radicals’ had influenced him and other 
Saudi students while they had lived on US campuses.28 
Besides the impact of social and political movements and discussions, students 
perceived that they could think more critically and access new approaches at American 
universities. After al-Askar had arrived at UCLA, he ‘learned about different kinds of 
histories, like religious history, social history, and economic history’. The ‘best thing’ he 
learned, however, was that he ‘should have an open mind and should not engage in 
questions of history without thinking, analysis, and scepticism’.29 Mohamed Al-Freih was 
more sober in his memories about California. He recalled that the teaching at King Saud 
University and at UCLA had been ‘the same basically’. ‘The professor lectured, the students 
took notes and left after the lesson.’ However, Al-Freih also observed that at Saudi 
universities, there was ‘only one school, only one interpretation of history’. In the US, in 
contrast, ‘there are several schools of thought, and you are intellectually free’.30 Similarly, Al-
Subaiy stated that many Saudi students gained an ‘open mind’ by studying abroad, although 
this partly depended on their ‘personality’.31 
That a few dozen Saudi students learned about social and economic history during 
their studies in UCLA and other American universities resulted not only from the Saudi 
student missions. In a global historical juncture, it was also due to the rise of social and 
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economic approaches in Western studies of the Middle East. In the first half of the twentieth 
century, scholars of Europe had given increased attention to social and economic history. 
They founded specialized journals like Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte in Germany in 1903 and Annales d’histoire économique et sociale 
(Annales) in France in 1929.32 After World War II, this interest also grew among Middle East 
historians. This growth partly resulted from unprecedented access to the oriental records of 
European and Ottoman governments and post-war social debates and movements.33 In 
1958, the first specialized periodical emerged under the title Journal of the Economic and 
Social History of the Orient (JESHO). 
In the United States, several new centres in Middle Eastern studies promoted an 
affinity between historical, social and economic approaches after World War II. In contrast to 
earlier philologically based studies of the region, the new area studies centres were 
grounded in the social sciences. Reflecting increased American interests in non-Western 
regions during the Cold War, they were conceived to give rise to interdisciplinary expertise 
that would be useful to policy makers and companies. In the 1940s and 1950s, Princeton, 
Harvard and UCLA established new centres of Middle Eastern Studies.34 
The founding director of the Near Eastern Center at the University of California, Los 
Angeles, was Gustave von Grunebaum (1909–72). He was one of the founders of JESHO 
and made his center at UCLA a hub for research in Middle Eastern social and economic 
history. An Austrian orientalist who had migrated to the United States in 1938, von 
Grunebaum had previously taught Arabic at the University of Chicago.35 There he became 
influenced by cultural anthropology and historical scholarship that had in turn been shaped 
by the French Annales School.36 In 1957, UCLA appointed von Grunebaum as Professor of 
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Near Eastern History and director of the Near Eastern Center. Considering himself as a 
‘social scientist’ despite his philological training, von Grunebaum attracted people with ‘new 
perspectives’ on the Middle East.37 
At UCLA, a number of Saudi students subsequently developed an interest in social 
and economic history. One of the first was the aforementioned Abdullah al-Askar, who was 
from southern Najd. Following a bachelor’s degree from KSU in 1974, he went on to pursue 
postgraduate studies at UCLA. The chair of his doctoral committee was Michael Morony (b. 
1939), one of von Grunebaum’s former students and a young social and economic historian 
of the Middle East.38 Besides him, a number of social scientists fostered al-Askar’s interest 
in social history in the United States. They included Georges Sabagh (1920–2003), a 
sociologist at UCLA, and Anouar Abdel-Malek (b. 1924), an Egyptian Marxist whom al-Askar 
‘met many times’.39 Abdel-Malek probably influenced al-Askar through his arguments for the 
replacement of the ‘paradigms and methods of orientalism’ by those of disciplines such as 
‘history, sociology, anthropology, and political science’.40 The Saudi historian developed his 
interest in the social sciences further through a friendship with Dale Eickelman, who worked 
on eastern Arabia in the 1970s and 1980s.41 
At UCLA, al-Askar produced one of the first major works by a Saudi in social and 
economic history. This was a doctoral dissertation on al-Yamāmah or southern Najd entitled 
‘Regional Politics, a Case Study: Al-Yamama in the 6th and 7th Centuries’. He described the 
topic as a ‘natural’ choice, as he came from the region and found that little research had 
been undertaken on its history during the period.42 His dissertation argued that by virtue of 
its geography, al-Yamāmah formed an economic unit, which produced a ‘constant regional 
feeling’. This regional feeling formed the basis of a number of early Islamic conflicts between 
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the central Arabian region and neighbouring powers. These conflicts were associated with 
Musaylimah—the ‘false prophet’—, the Riddah (apostasy) wars following Muhammad’s 
death, and the Khārijī rebellion. In contrast to other scholars who interpreted these wars as 
originating in sectarian or tribal disputes, al-Askar viewed them as struggles by the Yamāmīs 
for autonomy and independence. He wrote that this regional feeling appeared to be 
‘religious’, ‘sectarian’, or ‘tribal’. Yet, in every case, it was ‘a matter of the local population in 
al-Yamama struggling to advance the economic interests of their region’.43 
While the main part of al-Askar’s analysis was concerned with Arabia in the sixth and 
seventh centuries, his findings also led him to offer one of the first explanations of the 
emergence of the Wahhabi mission based on economic factors. In the conclusion to 
‘Regional Politics’, he speculated about the persistence of an economically driven central 
Arabian regionalism up to the modern era. Al-Askar claimed that it ‘is no exaggeration to say 
that even the modern Wahhabi movement drew on regional feeling. That is Yamami regional 
feeling persisted well into the nineteenth century.’44 
While al-Askar’s studies at UCLA fostered his interest in social and economic history, 
they also familiarized him with previous American studies that were decisive for the 
development of his arguments about struggles for autonomy and the continuation of regional 
feeling over centuries. In 1967, al-Askar’s friend Dale Eickelman had already published an 
article in the Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. Eickelman suggested 
that the resistance of the Banū Ḥanīfah under Musaylimah to Islam had served to ‘maintain 
or strengthen their independence by supporting a rival prophet of their own’.45 In another 
article referred to by al-Askar,46 the American social historian Roy Mottahedeh (b. 1940) had 
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attested to an ‘Iranian group feeling in the tenth and eleventh centuries’. This group feeling 
had been ‘strong enough to survive a long succession of non-Iranian masters’.47 
After his return to the kingdom in the mid-1980s, al-Askar did not publish his thesis for 
about seventeen years, mainly because it was marked by ‘sensitivity unbearable to the 
censor’.48 This sensitivity resulted from his challenge to the Islamic historiographic tradition. 
Al-Askar provided an economic explanation for central Arabian opposition to the early 
Islamic community, as in the form of Musaylimah, ‘without considering the interpretations of 
the clerics’. Moreover, al-Askar conceived a long-lasting conflict between al-Yamāmah (later 
Najd) and the Hejaz based on regionalist struggles for autonomy.49 This conception 
contradicted not only the traditional view of early Islamic history, but also the national unity 
that the Saudi government sought to promote. In addition, King Saud University did not 
generally encourage al-Askar and his colleagues to publish their dissertations after their 
return from the US. The university administrators considered graduate research mainly as 
training in methodology and expected al-Askar and his colleagues to produce new research 
to gain promotion.50 
While the sensitivity surrounding his arguments remained, however, al-Askar was able 
to make use of the commitment of the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives 
to supporting historical research generally and achieved a partial victory over censorship in 
the 2000s. He persuaded the foundation to include his thesis in a scheme to publish the 
works of Saudi historians in English. This scheme sought to ‘expose’ these works to 
international audiences.51 In 2002, the foundation issued al-Askar’s dissertation in 
association with the British Ithaca Press. However, because of its ‘sensitivity’—as al-Askar 
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saw it—, it was published only in English.52 The words ‘Regional Politics’, which contradicted 
the notion of national unity, were also removed from the new, uncontroversial, title: al-
Yamama in the Early Islamic Era.53 
After governmental scholarships had incidentally facilitated controversial new studies 
on Arabian history, such as al-Askar’s, state funding for academic research generally, and 
thus also for social and economic history, declined in the 1980s and 1990s. The decline in 
funding occurred in the context of the plummeting of Saudi oil revenues from 108 billion 
dollars in 1981 to 18 billion in 1988 because of falling prices.54 In the 1990s, oil prices 
remained volatile, and Saudi Arabia accumulated foreign debts in the course of the Gulf war. 
Declining governmental revenues translated into stagnating university budgets. In 1984, for 
instance, KSU had an annual budget of about 4.9 billion riyals (about 1.4 billion in 2009 
dollars55). In the financial year 1991, the effective spending of the university was 1.9 billion 
riyals (about 709 million dollars). This amount only slowly increased to about two billion 
riyals (about 796 million dollars) in the financial year 1995.56 Still in 2005, it was only slightly 
higher at about three billion riyals (about 942 million dollars).57 As a result, Saudi universities 
did not increase the salaries of faculty members between 1981 and 2007 and thus exposed 
them to high inflation. 9650 riyals (about 2500 dollars) per month remained the starting 
salary for a Saudi assistant professor and 18,875 riyals (about 5000 dollars) the salary of a 
full professor.58 
The decline in funding affected historical writing generally, but especially studies in 
social and economic history. These academic studies benefitted to a smaller extent than 
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dynastic histories from state extravagance on jubilees, like the centenary in 1999.59 They 
also attracted fewer self-funded amateurs than local and tribal histories and were thus more 
exposed to budget cuts at universities. More importantly, budget cuts in the 1980s and 
1990s hit social history in the kingdom through a decline in foreign scholarships. Hence, the 
first generation of Saudi social historians, including al-Askar, found it difficult to reproduce by 
sending their own students to foreign institutions. Between 1981 and 2007, history 
departments hired hardly any new graduate assistants, who would have held the entry 
position for an academic career, and awarded hardly any new scholarships for studies 
abroad.60 Between 1990 and 2005, only one Saudi student completed a PhD in history at an 
American university.61 
Despite financial pressure, however, a number of Saudis continued to undertake 
research in social history after their return from studies abroad in the 1980s. They included 
Abdullah Al-Subaiy, the graduate of King Saud University who went on to study at Michigan 
State University. Having grown up and worked in al-Aḥsāʾ between the 1940s and the 
1960s, he presumably was conscious of the large social changes affecting the region with 
the establishment of the oil industry.62 However, he only started studying them 
systematically after he had gained his PhD in 1980 and a colleague at a conference on the 
Middle East had pointed out the importance of the topic to him.63 While working as assistant 
professor at King Saud University and deputy educational attaché at the Saudi embassy in 
Washington between 1980 and 1988, Al-Subaiy produced a seminal trilogy on change in the 
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Eastern Province 1933–60. The trilogy included the titles The Discovery of Oil and Its 
Influence on Social Life and The Discovery of Oil and Its Influence on Economic Life.64 
While the state sponsored his research through scholarships and employment, Al-
Subaiy, like al-Askar, also turned against the prevailing historiography. In The Discovery of 
Oil and Its Influence on Social Life, he complained that ‘historians, who set out to write the 
history of Saudi Arabia or parts of it, have confined themselves to traditional history writing 
without attempting to embark upon social historiography’.65 In his work on oil and economic 
life, he strengthened his criticism of ‘traditional historiography’. This genre, according to him, 
did not ‘analyse social, economic, and cultural aspects, and produce a comprehensive 
historical study presenting various historical, environmental, and social information’. 
Traditional historiography thus failed to ‘put a great economic event’ like the discovery of oil 
‘in its wider perspective’.66 
Al-Subaiy’s social and economic perspective also led him to distance himself from 
dynastic historiography. Instead of focusing on political and military events relating to Saudi 
kings, such as Abdulaziz’s capture of Riyadh in 1902, he put the production of oil at the 
centre of national history. Al-Subaiy contended that the discovery of oil ‘was probably among 
the biggest events, which this century has witnessed in Arabia or even in the whole world’. 
He merely conceded to the unification narrative that ‘perhaps’, this event was ‘only 
surpassed in importance for the modern history of the country by the unification of the 
kingdom itself’.67 
Al-Subaiy’s social and economic histories of the Eastern Province also departed from 
many particularistic and contribution histories of towns and regions. He neither expressed 
the historical independence of al-Aḥsāʾ from the Al Saud nor singled out its contribution to 
national achievements. Instead, he treated the Eastern Province as a case study for a 
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‘theory of social change’.68 According to him, his results ‘can be—unreservedly—generalized 
regarding other regions, in which the exploration of oil was conceded to other companies 
later.’ Al-Subaiy selected the Eastern Province primarily because it was the location in which 
oil had first been discovered. ‘Its first effects, particularly in social terms, became clearly 
visible there before they did so in the other regions of the country.’69 
Besides continuing to undertake social and economic research after their return to the 
kingdom, some Saudi historians who were partly trained abroad also called for the 
strengthening of social and economic history in the university curricula. They included 
Ghithan Jrais, who had completed a PhD on the social and economic history of the Hejaz at 
the University of Manchester in 1989.70 In 1997, Jrais published an article entitled ‘An 
Opinion about the Teaching of History at University’. He complained that ‘most of what we 
taught and teach is history related to political personalities and military leaders.’ He urged 
his colleagues instead to teach history according to ‘the modern view’. This view ‘is not 
restricted to political history but comprises all aspects of society and the factors affecting it, 
whether cultural, social, economic, or spiritual, et cetera’. He also sought to contextualize 
individuals within their societies and argued for the primacy of the ‘people’ in history, stating 
that ‘peoples are the ones, who made and make history.’ According to him, ‘the individual or 
hero is the product of his society’. Such an individual appears ‘in response to social needs, 
be they religious, political, economic or military’.71 
The activities by Jrais, Al-Subaiy, al-Askar and other Saudi social historians trained at 
Saudi, American and British universities contributed to a growing acceptance of social and 
economic studies produced in the kingdom in the 1990s and 2000s. The King Abdulaziz 
Foundation for Research and Archives even published a few dissertations in social history 
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produced inside the kingdom. They included a book on Social and Economic Life in the 
Second Saudi State, 1824–91 by Ḥiṣṣah al-Zahrānī. The book was based on an MA thesis 
completed at the Girls’ College of Education in Riyadh in 1999.72 Al-Zahrānī, like her 
colleagues, promoted social and economic history, stating that ‘the study of society with its 
customs, traditions, transformations and economic developments is important for 
understanding the history of nations and states’.73 
Al-Zahrānī relied on documents in the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and 
Archives and other archives as well as foreign sources, such as William Palgrave’s Narrative 
of a Year’s Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia (1862–63). On that basis, she 
argued that the geographical and economic environment greatly influenced Najdi traditions 
and customs. Contact with India, for instance, affected popular games and arts in al-Aḥsāʾ 
and al-Qaṭīf, while women’s clothes in Ḥāʾil displayed northern Arabia’s proximity to Syria. 
However, al-Zahrānī also considered religious factors. She concluded that Islamic doctrines 
shaped not only celebrations, such as such as Eid ul-Fitr and Eid ul-Adha. Through zakat, 
alms and endowments, they were also crucial for social solidarity.74 
Contextualizing the Wahhabi mission 
A number of Saudi social and economic historians educated in the United States also 
challenged takfīrist narratives of dynastic historiography. In particular, they developed a 
‘contextualist’ approach towards the emergence of the Wahhabi mission in the eighteenth 
century. One of the first Saudi historians using this approach was Uwaidah Al Juhany, 
another King Saud University graduate who turned to social history during his state-
sponsored studies in the United States. After awarding him a BA in history and English in 
1973, KSU provided him with a scholarship to undertake graduate research. At the 
University of Washington, Al Juhany’s initial dissertation topic was eighteenth-century 
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Islamic movements. This fitted the pan-Islamic orientations of the Saudi government in the 
1960s and 1970s.75 However, in the course of his studies under the social and economic 
historian of the Middle East Jere Bacharach (b. 1938), Al Juhany came to understand the 
Wahhabi mission as a social rather than religious movement.76 He thus set out to investigate 
its background beyond the accounts of pre-Wahhabi heresies and jāhilīyah that had 
characterized many dynastic histories since the production of Ibn Ghannām’s chronicle. 
Through his state-sponsored studies in the United States, Al Juhany also read two 
articles on eighteenth-century Arabia by the American historian of Islam John Voll, which 
influenced his arguments. The two articles contextualized Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and 
challenged the notion that his teachings had been preceded by an ‘age of ignorance’.77 In 
the first article, from 1975, Voll departed from previous studies that had mainly demonstrated 
how the Wahhabis influenced other revivalist movements. Instead, he studied the 
background out of which the Wahhabi mission grew. He argued that a circle of scholars 
influenced Ibn Abd al-Wahhab during his studies in Medina.78 In his second article, from 
1980, Voll contended that the eighteenth century in Islamic history was not a ‘dark age of 
ignorance and intellectual stagnation’. It was, in fact, ‘a period of major developments in the 
key aspects of the Islamic tradition’.79 
While Al Juhany received inspiration on his topic and argument in the United States, 
he still depended on Saudi sources for his inquiry into the pre-Wahhabi past. This made his 
research a transnational enterprise rather than a project carried out in the West and based 
on Western literature alone. One of his most important sources was a chronicle by ʿAbd 
Allāh ibn Muḥammad al-Bassām (1851–1927), a Najdi scholar and merchant. It was entitled 
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The Masterpiece of the One Longing for the History of Najd, the Hejaz and Iraq. Al-Bassām, 
who had had travelled to India, Iraq, Egypt and the Hejaz, had a more cosmopolitan outlook 
than the chroniclers of the Ibn Ghannām School. His chronicle was one of the first histories 
of Najd to include European events, like the invention of the printing press and the discovery 
of electricity.80 Rather than setting Ibn Abd al-Wahhab against an ahistorical background, al-
Bassām provided his readers with an account of numerous Arabian events since the 
fifteenth century that were absent from other Najdi works.81 The text itself reached Al Juhany 
after a transnational journey. A Palestinian teacher copied the manuscript in the town of        
ʿUnayzah in 1956 after having borrowed it from the judge ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-
Bassām. A professor at the University of Haifa then acquired this copy, from where the text 
made its way to Canada and finally to Al Juhany’s supervisor Jere Bacharach.82 
Through his dependency on Saudi primary and secondary sources, two dynastic 
historians incidentally facilitated Al Juhany’s inquiry into the social and economic 
background of the Wahhabi mission. Of special significance was the article ‘Najd from the 
Tenth/Sixteenth Century until the Rise of Sheikh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’. ʿAbd 
Allāh al-ʿUthaymīn had published it in four parts between 1975 and 1978. This pioneering 
article on pre-Wahhabi Najd had already caused a controversy by questioning the religious 
descriptions by Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr. It thus formed a major reference for Al 
Juhany.83 Ironically, ʿAbd Allāh al-Shibl of Imam University, one of the proponents of the idea 
of the pre-Wahhabi jāhilīyah, provided the graduate student with another crucial source for a 
rejection of this idea. Out of professional courtesy, he lent the student a private manuscript 
that included accounts by the pre-Wahhabi Najdi historians Ibn Yūsuf, Ibn Rabīʿah, al-
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Manqūr, and Ibn ʿAbbbād. These chronicles did not draw an image of an ‘age of ignorance’. 
On the contrary, they gave the impression of a vivid intellectual life by recording the activities 
of numerous religious scholars.84 
In addition to Najdi chronicles not belonging to the Ibn Ghannām School, biographies 
of central Arabian scholars led Al Juhany to conceive the rise of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in a 
context in which Islam and religious learning were present. One of the social historian’s main 
sources was The Rain Clouds over the Tombs of the Ḥanbalīs by Muḥammad ibn Ḥumayd 
(1820/21–78), a Ḥanbalī mufti of Mecca and opponent of the Wahhabi mission. The Rain 
Clouds included biographies of many pre-Wahhabi Najdi scholars while excluding Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab and his descendants. Using state-provided academic infrastructure, Al Juhany 
accessed a manuscript of The Rain Clouds in the library of King Saud University.85 
Moreover, the graduate student relied on The Ulema of Najd during Six Centuries, an 
anthology published in 1978 by the judge ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Bassām. This 
three-volume work was the most comprehensive collection of biographies of Najdi scholars 
hitherto.86 Besides covering both Wahhabi scholars and their enemies, al-Bassām included 
the biographies of 109 pre-Wahhabi scholars, drawing on manuscripts in the possession of 
his family.87 He found that before Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the four Sunni legal schools ‘were all 
present in Najd, while the most widespread school was the Ḥanbalī school’.88 
The accounts of pre-Wahhabi Najd by Ibn Ḥumayd and the Bassām family provided Al 
Juhany and subsequently other social historians with material for a contextualist explanation 
of the Wahhabi mission as resulting from a growth of religious learning rather than an ‘age of 
ignorance’. Al Juhany offered this explanation in his 1983 doctoral dissertation entitled ‘The 
History of Najd Prior to the Wahhābīs: A Study of Social, Political and Religious Conditions 
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During Three Centuries Preceding the Wahhābī Reform Movement’. Rejecting formist 
narratives about the uniqueness of the rise of the Wahhabi mission, Al Juhany contended 
that this rise ‘did not occur by mere coincidence’.89 Between the sixteenth century and the 
eighteenth, Najd witnessed urbanization and large population growth, which caused 
competition over the region’s limited resources and, thus, conflicts. These conflicts in turn 
required an increasing number of judges and other ulema for mediation and hence fuelled a 
‘growth in religious learning’. This growth was evident in the numbers of scholars treated in 
The Rain Clouds and The Ulema of Najd.90 Al Juhany concluded that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
‘was a product of that new society and the cream of that growth of religious learning’.91 
Al Juhany’s attempt to turn the notion of the pre-Wahhabi jāhilīyah on its head was of 
similar sensitivity as al-Askar’s regionalist interpretation of Arabian history. Hence, the 
historian did not publish his thesis for years after his return to King Saud University. Fearing 
that his arguments would not be acceptable in Saudi Arabia, Al Juhany even required that 
the microfilm of his thesis should not be reproduced for five years.92 After the centenary in 
1999, the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, however, included the 
dissertation in its scheme to publish Saudi theses. With slight adaptations, like the 
replacement of ‘Wahhābī’ by ‘Salafi’, ‘The History of Najd Prior to the Wahhābīs’ appeared in 
2006 under the title Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement.93 However, perhaps due to 
continued sensitivities, just like al-Askar, the foundation published Al Juhany’s work only in 
English. 
Even before Al Juhany’s dissertation was published, however, other social historians 
trained at the state’s expense in Riyadh and the United States made use of it. They included 
Mohammed Al-Freih, another graduate from King Saud University. Two years after the 
                                                   
89 Al-Juhany, “The History” (1983), 2. 
90 Ibid., 240, 300. 
91 Ibid., 2. 
92 Ibid., i. Uwaidah Al Juhany, interview, 13 February 2010. 
93 Al Juhany, Najd (2002). 
  
252 
completion of his BA in 1974, the university hired him as a graduate assistant and sent him 
with a scholarship to the US. Like al-Askar, Al-Freih received his postgraduate education at 
UCLA under the Middle East social historian Michael Morony and the sociologist Georges 
Sabagh. The graduate student received further inspiration and guidance from the chair of his 
doctoral committee Afaf Marsot (b. 1933), an Egyptian social historian and former student of 
Albert Hourani. Under her, Al-Freih developed an interest in social as well as economic 
history, which was then the ‘history du jour’.94 Al-Freih remembered that at the time, he 
‘didn’t have a strong background in socioeconomic interpretations’. However, he ‘learned 
about socioeconomic issues’ in Marsot’s lectures.95 With this approach, he worked on a 
dissertation that he completed in 1990 on ‘The Historical Background of the Emergence of 
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and His Movement’.96 
Like Al Juhany, Al-Freih offered a contextualist explanation of the rise of the Wahhabi 
mission. Rejecting formist approaches, he asserted that ‘great men’, like Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, 
and their movements ‘neither emerge nor operate in a vacuum’.97 He criticized previous 
studies for a ‘lack of deeper analysis’ of pre-Wahhabi politics and for neglecting an 
‘economic crisis within settled Najd’.98 Al-Freih explored these contexts relying not only on Al 
Juhany’s thesis, but also on a similar set of sources as his colleague’s, including ʿAbd Allāh 
al-Bassām’s Masterpiece and Ibn Ḥumayd’s Rain Clouds.99 
While their topics and primary sources were similar, Al-Freih contextualized Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab within the wider Muslim world in contrast to Al Juhany’s focus on Najd. In 
particular, the historian connected the Wahhabi mission to an eighteenth-century revivalist 
movement in Mecca and Medina, in which many Indian ulema had been involved. This 
movement centred on Koran and Hadith studies through which the scholars sought to 
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provide ‘solid and practical solutions to real problems facing their own societies’.100 Relying 
on the American historian John Voll—as Al Juhany had done—, Al-Freih argued that the 
revivalist movement had ‘greatly influenced and inspired’ Ibn Abd al-Wahhab during his stay 
in the Hejaz. There, rather than in Najd, the sheikh had gained his ‘universal vision of 
reforming Islam’.101 
Like Al Juhany, Al-Freih conceived conflicts resulting from settlement and urbanization 
in Najd as a major factor behind the Wahhabi mission. Yet, he explained the conflicts from a 
global perspective. He argued that the European attempt to control the ‘lion’s share of the 
eastern trade’ after the sixteenth century had led to a decline in trans-Arabian trade. 
Facilitated by abundant rainfalls, Najdis began to ‘invest internally’, especially in agriculture, 
and to establish settlements.102 This process exacerbated abusive relationships between the 
established members of towns, namely the landowners and merchants, and new settlers 
lacking property. These relationships were marked by usury, ‘loans with high interest rates 
and perpetual indebtedness’, and ‘the maximum exploitation of the labor of the poor’. Thus, 
Al-Freih argued that pre-Wahhabi Najd was not characterized by an ‘age of ignorance’, but 
by ‘a socio-economic crisis’, which ‘was begging for a solution’.103 
Al-Freih thus presented Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a social reformer solving the crisis of 
exploitation. Inspired by the Hejazi revivalist movement, the sheikh rejected un-Islamic taxes 
and usury and offered the concept of a state with a ruler ‘whose legitimacy was based on 
religion rather than the ownership of land’. For his success, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not rely 
on the princes—as in dynastic narratives—but, according to Al-Freih, on the proletariat. It 
was ‘the destitute masses, who supported him’, and ‘it was only the elite that had deeply 
established interests in maintaining the status quo who opposed him’.104 
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After the completion of his doctorate in 1990, Al-Freih, like al-Askar and Al Juhany, 
was appointed assistant professor at KSU’s department of history. Yet, his thesis also 
remained unpublished. He attributed this mainly to his teaching responsibilities and the 
revisions that his thesis would have required prior to publication. However, he also found it 
sensitive to argue that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab ‘was a politician first and then a sheikh’. 
According to him, this sensitivity has remained because senior members of the royal family 
and officials, like Prince Salman ibn Abdulaziz, considered the ‘religious legitimacy of the 
royal family’ more important than its ‘political legitimacy’.105 The King Abdulaziz Foundation 
for Research and Archives thus did not publish Al-Freih’s dissertation alongside those by al-
Askar and Al Juhany.106 
Al Juhany and Al-Freih formed part of a group of Saudi social and economic historians 
who were educated at King Saud University and in the United States and who investigated 
pre-Wahhabi Arabia. Another scholar within this group and a colleague of Al-Freih at KSU 
and UCLA was Abdullah Mutawa (b. 1956). Following the usual pattern, he did his 
undergraduate studies in history, joined KSU as a graduate assistant and then moved to 
UCLA, where he gained a PhD in 1989.107 In Los Angeles, Afaf Marsot, Michael Morony and 
Georges Sabagh formed his doctoral committee.108 Under their supervision, Mutawa rather 
incidentally came to study pre-Wahhabi Najdi society. At first, he had intended to write a 
dissertation solely on the ulema under the first Saudi state. In the course of his research, 
however, he found that this topic ‘was too restricted’, and that ‘it was necessary to look into 
the roots of the Wahhabi reform movement’. A chapter on pre-Wahhabi religious scholars, 
which was intended to form an introduction, then turned into the whole dissertation, while he 
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consigned the ulema of the first Saudi state to ‘a separate study’.109 His dissertation was 
entitled ‘The Ulama of Najd: From the Sixteenth Century to the Mid-Eighteenth Century’. 
In his doctoral dissertation, Mutawa consolidated Al Juhany’s contextualization of Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab within a growth of religious learning related to settlement in Najd. Like Al 
Juhany and Al-Freih, he used the principal sources of pre-Wahhabi Najdi history, namely      
ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad al-Bassām’s Masterpiece, ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-
Bassām’s Ulema of Najd, and the pre-Wahhabi chronicles by al-Manqūr, Ibn Rabīʿah, Ibn 
Yūsuf and Ibn ʿAbbād. On this basis, Mutawa conceived a rise in the number of religious 
scholars in the central region between the tenth century and the eighteenth. This rise 
resulted from the process of settlement, which led ‘to a greater desire for learning, since 
literacy and legal training was necessary for urban life’. In the second half of the eighteenth 
century, the ulema were ‘participants in the new religious-political order which emerged in 
Najd’.110 
While his dissertation, like Al-Freih’s, remained unpublished, Mutawa continued to 
undertake research into Najdi social history even after his return to King Saud University. As 
a professor in the department of history, he used state-financed academic infrastructure for 
the production of several studies. He benefitted from increasing funding for research 
generally with higher oil revenues in the 2000s. Notably, Mutawa was able to use a 
subsidized series of monographs named Historical Studies, which the Saudi Historical 
Society had launched on the centennial in 1999. This series alleviated some of the financial 
difficulties from which social historians had suffered in trying to publish their research during 
the time of low oil prices in the 1980s and 1990s. Until 2008 alone, twenty-six monographs 
appeared within the series, including six on social and economic history.111 
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In the series Historical Studies, Mutawa published a volume in social history entitled 
The Society of al-Dirʿīyah during the Time of the First Saudi State. It gave an overview over 
the different quarters of the former Saudi capital and its different groups, including the rulers, 
ulema, merchants, peasants, and artisans.112 In 2005, the historian also published an article 
on ‘Political and Social Transformations in al-Dirʿīyah, 1446–1744’, in the Journal of King 
Saud University.113 Both texts were an indirect product of the state-sponsored student 
missions, of which Mutawa was part. He was inspired to write them by the article ‘The Social 
Organization of Mecca and the Origins of Islam’ by the Marxian anthropologist Eric Wolf 
(1923–99).114 This seminal essay, which Mutawa had read during his doctoral studies at 
UCLA, had featured on students’ reading lists at Western universities for decades after its 
publication in 1951.115 
Mutawa’s work contributed to the gradual acceptance of social and economic history 
gained in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s and 2000s. After Mutawa had presented a copy of his 
book on The Society of al-Dirʿīyah to Fahd al-Semmari ‘as a colleague’,116 the foundation’s 
secretary general published a positive review of the work in the newspaper al-Riyāḍ. Al-
Semmari acknowledged that ‘many studies in the history of Saudi Arabia’ treated ‘political 
and military aspects’, while ‘neglecting many other aspects, notably social and cultural 
aspects’. Hence, he congratulated ‘the Saudi historical school for specialized academic 
studies like this one, which move away from comprehensiveness and political aspects and 
concentrate on specific topics and social aspects’.117 For his article on ‘Political and Social 
Transformations’, the foundation even awarded Mutawa the Prince Salman ibn Abdulaziz 
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Prize for Studies in Arabian History, one of the most prestigious awards for historical 
scholarship in the kingdom.118 
While contextualist theses on the rise of the Wahhabi mission were initially restricted 
to scholars trained at King Saud University and the United States, historians at Imam 
University also started to investigate the pre-Wahhabi Najdi past in the 1980s. One of them 
was ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-ʿUraynī (b. 1952), who had gained his entire higher education at the 
university. In 1984, he completed one of the first MA dissertations in social history at a Saudi 
university. It was entitled ‘The Social Life among the Bedouin of Najd and the Influence upon 
it of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s Mission: From the Fifteenth Century to the Fall 
of al-Dirʿīyah’.119 Based on recommendations by his examiners, al-ʿUraynī submitted a 
complementary PhD thesis to Imam University in 1989: ‘The Social Life among the Settled 
People of Najd from the Fifteenth Century to the Rise of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab’s Mission: 1494–1744’. Thereby, al-ʿUraynī sought an ‘integration of the study of the 
social life of the two main groups in Najd, so that a comprehensive study of social life among 
the sedentary people and Bedouin of Najd emerges’.120 In introducing this approach, he also 
criticized dynastic historians. According to him, ‘these historians were no more innovative 
than previous chroniclers, whose interests focused on political issues and the history of 
rulers and the beginning and end of dynasties’.121 
In contrast to Al Juhany and Al-Freih’s theses, al-ʿUraynī’s contextualist explanation of 
the rise of Wahhabi mission still contained elements of the notion of the pre-Wahhabi 
jāhilīyah. This was probably helped by the fact that his supervisor in both dissertations was    
ʿAbd Allāh al-Shibl, who upheld the notion of an ‘age of ignorance’ in his own writings. Yet, 
al-ʿUraynī was also influenced by Al Juhany’s unpublished dissertation, which he had 
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received from his colleague.122 In ‘The Social Life among the Settled People’, he argued that 
in Najd, the ‘theological aberrations before Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
movement did not amount to the level of some neighbouring and more distant Muslim 
societies. They also did not reach that of the Bedouins of Najd during this period.’ Relying on 
al-Bassām’s Masterpiece and other works, al-ʿUraynī characterized his own region, Najd, as 
a place of relative religious observance, in contrast to the accounts of the Ibn Ghannām 
School. He stated that the heresies in Najd were only ‘echoes of those known in the 
neighbouring lands’. This made the central region ‘suitable’ for the creation of the Wahhabi 
mission. However, despite this partial revision of Najdi history, al-ʿUraynī still made a 
concession to the notion of the pre-Wahhabi jāhilīyah. He stated that ‘if there had not been 
those deviations and heresies, the sheikh’s mission would not have played this great and 
effective role’.123 
Although al-ʿUraynī’s theses remained unpublished, other researchers at Imam 
University followed him in exploring pre-Wahhabi social history. Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-
Bassām, a younger member of the Bassām family, found that by about 1990, the university’s 
history department even openly encouraged students to choose topics ‘related to the 
situation in Najd before the establishment of the Saudi state’ as an underresearched area.124 
Al-Bassām thus wrote a PhD dissertation on the intellectual contexts of the Wahhabi mission 
under the supervision of ʿAbd Allāh al-Shibl and with the help of his relative and biographer 
of Najdi ulema ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Bassām. In 2005, the King Abdulaziz 
Foundation for Research and Archives published the revised dissertation under the title 
Scholarly Life in Central Arabia in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries and the Effect 
upon it of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.125 Criticizing the notion of the pre-
Wahhabi ‘age of ignorance’, Aḥmad al-Bassām considered Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr’s 
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descriptions of a ‘bad religious situation’ before Ibn Abd al-Wahhab an ‘exaggeration’. 
According to al-Bassām, the descriptions mainly applied to Bedouin, while there were also 
‘people adhering to the provisions of the sharia’.126 However, he still argued that the 
appearance of the Wahhabi mission had brought an increase in religious learning. Whereas 
Najdi scholars had restricted themselves to fiqh earlier, they subsequently ventured into 
Koranic exegesis (tafsīr), Hadith, and beliefs.127 
The rise of contextualist social histories even led a man at the centre of the Wahhabi 
establishment to revise some of the prevailing notions about the pre-Wahhabi economy and 
society. In 1991, Muḥammad al-Shuwayʿir, an advisor to ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Bāz, published an 
article in the journal al-Dārah. It was entitled ‘The Cultural Features of Central Arabia 250 
Years Ago’. Al-Shuwayʿir still upheld that Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab agreed in 1744 to ‘spread God’s religion, show the truth, and rescue the people 
from the pits into which they had fallen as many Muslims had done everywhere’. However, 
al-Shuwayʿir turned against ‘those, most of whom are Westerners, who state that only a few 
nomadic Bedouin lived in Najd who fought each other for trivial reasons and who were 
stricken by ignorance and poverty’.128 He argued that one of the features of Najdi history 
between the fourteenth and the eighteenth century was the ‘foundation of towns’, some of 
which were ‘famous for their industry and agriculture’. Relying on Ibn Ḥumayd’s Rainclouds 
and al-Bassām’s Ulema of Najd during Six Centuries, he also noted an increase in the 
number of Najdi religious scholars during the same period.129 
From the beginning of the 1990s, the idea of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab emerging in the 
context of a growth of religious learning entered further studies, albeit not textbooks. These 
studies included a book by Mayy al-ʿĪsá who, rather incidentally, found her way to social 
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history. Originally, she had set out to write a doctoral dissertation on political history at King 
Saud University in the 1990s. Her professors considered this field not ‘suitable’ for women, 
however, and she thus turned to social history. One of her professors, the Sudanese 
economic historian Izzud-din Mousa, also encouraged her to use statistics.130 Yet, her 
supervisor, the dynastic historian ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿUthaymīn, rejected ‘mathematics’ in history. 
Thanks to the encouragement of the historian and later minister Abdul-Aziz Khowaiter, 
however, she still submitted her thesis, which used statistical evidence, and passed her final 
examination.131 In 1996/97, al-ʿĪsá was even able to publish her study as a book through the 
King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives and at the expense of Prince Salman 
ibn Abdulaziz. It was entitled The Scholarly Life in Najd from the Rise of Sheikh Muhammad 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s Mission until the End of the First Saudi State.132 
Drawing on the previous research by other scholars from King Saud University, al-      
ʿĪsá’s study consolidated the view of a growth in religious learning rather than an ‘age of 
ignorance’ in pre-Wahhabi Najd. In her Scholarly Life, she relied on the dissertations by Al 
Juhany, Al-Freih, and Mutawa. She concluded that the ‘scholarly life in Najd witnessed a 
gradual positive growth from the fifteenth until the eighteenth century’. This growth was 
represented in ‘a rise in the number of scholars from one period to another and a relative 
increase in the migrations of scholars and their travels to study inside and outside of Najd’. 
The growth was also represented in ‘a rise in the number of centres of learning and a surge 
in the number of authors and works’.133 
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Theorizing the Saudi state 
Since the 1970s, political scientists and sociologists as much as historians have studied past 
Arabian societies. Working in the field of historical sociology, they also challenged the 
narratives of dynastic historiography on key processes in Saudi history, such as the 
establishment of the Saudi state. Although these social scientists often built on the works of 
historians and had historians as supervisors, they tended to be more theoretical than the 
contextualist historians. Rather than discovering new primary sources, such as pre-Wahhabi 
Najdi chronicles, many of the social scientists put greater efforts into developing new 
theoretical understandings and situating their findings within the global literature on Saudi 
and Middle Eastern societies. Focusing on social and economic factors, they frequently 
challenged the notion of the Saudi state as an essentially religious project. This put them in 
opposition not only to individual dynastic authors but also to the King Abdulaziz Foundation 
for Research and Archives. Although the foundation published a considerable number of 
social and economic histories, it viewed the historical legitimacy of the Saudi regime as 
religious rather than social or economic.134 
Nevertheless, the Saudi state, in its global context, incidentally supported social and 
economic theorizing about its history by organizing and financing the training of indigenous 
political scientists and sociologists in the kingdom and abroad for the sake of national 
‘development’. Since its foundation in 1957, King Saud University taught political science, at 
first jointly with economics and since 1972 in a separate department.135 In 1971, KSU 
established a department of social studies to ‘educate national cadres in order to cope with 
the requirements of comprehensive development in the kingdom’.136 
As the first teachers in these departments were non-Saudis, Saudi universities were 
eager to send indigenous students abroad for postgraduate training. Between 1964 and 
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2005, sixty-seven Saudis gained a PhD in political science and ninety-two achieved a 
doctorate in sociology from American universities alone. Most of them wrote their 
dissertations on Saudi Arabia. While some undertook empirical research in confined areas of 
contemporary social work and welfare, others theorized about wider social and political 
change in the past.137 This was helped by the rise of historical sociology in Western area 
studies after World War II. The rise was reflected in the establishment of the journal 
Comparative Studies in Society and History in Chicago in 1958.138 One of its editors was 
Gustave von Grunebaum, who made UCLA a hub for the study of Middle Eastern social 
history.139 
Besides granting scholarships, state agencies also published studies in historical 
sociology, as long as they did not perceive them as Marxist. In order to celebrate 
development achievements in religious terms, the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research 
and Archives and the General Secretariat for the Celebration of the Centenary of the 
Kingdom’s Foundation hired sociologists from Imam University, who were more inclined to 
practice sociology within a religious framework than their colleagues at King Saud 
University.140 One of the foci of the five-day centennial conference organized by both 
agencies was ‘social development in the kingdom’.141 The conference comprised several 
papers by sociologists, including Continuities and Changes in Saudi Society by Abdullah 
Khalifah (b. 1955) from Imam University. Not surprisingly, Khalifah conceived Islam as a 
major factor behind the ‘stability, balance, development, and integration’ in Saudi society.142 
He argued that ‘the Islamic religion contributed to the establishment of the Saudi state and to 
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the fusion of culturally diverse social groups in one melting pot’. Moreover, Islam through its 
scholars created ‘social acceptance of policies of development and modernization’.143 
While some texts by mainly Imam University scholars championed religious factors, a 
few historical sociologists and political scientists educated at King Saud University and in the 
United States privileged economic factors. At least one Saudi scholar, Mishary Al-Nuaim (b. 
1957), even came to consider himself a Marxist. Incidentally, he read about Marx during 
undergraduate studies in political science at King Saud University in the 1970s. He 
remembered that ‘at King Saud University, we got exposed to Marxism in the political 
philosophy course, but only to Marx’. Subsequently, he undertook his own readings on 
Marxism.144 He had no recollection of any ‘censorship’ during his undergraduate studies in 
political science.145 
Following his undergraduate studies, King Saud University sent him—like al-Askar, Al-
Freih, and Mutawa—to the University of California, Los Angeles. There, he continued his 
readings in Marxist theories and came to apply them to Saudi state formation. He 
remembered that ‘reading traditional studies about Wahhabism was dull. It was all about the 
Bedouin and the true religion. I thought, why not look for Marxism?’146 Under the supervision 
of Michael Lofchie, a development theorist, as well as the social historian Afaf Marsot, who 
also supervised the historical PhDs by Al-Freih and Mutawa, Al-Nuaim completed a PhD 
dissertation in 1987. Making the Marxist approach clear in its terminology, its title was ‘State 
Building in a Non-Capitalist Social Formation: The Dialectics of Two Modes of Production 
and the Role of the Merchant Class, Saudi Arabia 1902–1932’.147 
Employing a materialist perspective, Al-Nuaim challenged the idea of the Saudi state 
as a religious project, which was so prominent in dynastic historiography. He argued that the 
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Wahhabi mission was an ‘urban ideology’, which ‘catered to the commercial interests’.148 
The Wahhabi mission ‘carried with it the aspirations of the urban dominating class toward 
stabilizing and expanding the materialist bases of their domination’. The merchants ‘were an 
integral part of that class and Wahhabi doctrines legitimized a fairly reasonable degree of 
commercial freedom’.149 Hence, the Saudi state was not simply the product of the 
agreement between Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, but of the 
‘alliance of an indigenous trio, political leadership, merchants, and ulama’.150 Speaking about 
twentieth-century history, Al-Nuaim even removed the religious scholars from the picture. He 
argued that ‘the alliance between the political leadership and the merchant class was at the 
very basis of the establishment and consolidation of the state’.151 
While he was also offering a social and economic explanation for the emergence of 
the Saudi state, Al-Nuaim, as a political scientist, laid greater emphasis on the construction 
of a theoretical framework than the historians Al-Freih and Al Juhany did. Within the context 
of the global theoretical literature, he especially argued against the notion of the Saudi state 
as a tribal creation. This notion was, according to Al-Nuaim, influenced by Western travellers 
who associated Arabia and the Saudi state in a ‘romantic’ way with the Bedouin. Their views 
were combined with the social theories produced by the North African scholar Ibn Khaldūn 
(1332–1406). Ibn Khaldūn, in his Introduction to history, or Muqaddimah, had considered the 
strong group feeling (ʿaṣabīyah) of nomadic tribes central to the establishment of new 
dynasties.152 
In his theoretical discussion, Al-Nuaim mainly criticized contemporary writings by non-
Saudis who considered the Saudi state to be the product of tribalism and Islam. He thus 
rejected the influential views of ‘Muslim Society’ held by Ernest Gellner (1925–95). Al-Nuaim 
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conceded to Gellner that ‘nomadic structures and Islam have been characteristic features of 
Arabian and North African life’. However, to consider them as ‘the primary drives behind 
Middle Eastern history’ is ‘a misrepresentation’.153 Al-Nuaim also complained that a 
monograph by the Lebanese writer Waddah Charara ‘has not escaped the Khaldunian 
paradigm’.154 Thus, the Saudi political scientist called for the Khaldūnian theory to ‘be laid to 
rest after long centuries of overuse and misapplication to different socio-historical 
contexts’.155 
Instead of relying on Ibn Khaldūn, Al-Nuaim’s theory of the emergence of the Saudi 
state drew on historical materialism. The social scientist made the Marxist concept of the 
‘mode of production’ central to his inquiry. He rejected, however, Marx’s notion of the Asiatic 
mode of production, in which private property was unknown, and called it one of the 
‘Orientalists’ ethnocentric misconceptions’. In contrast, Al-Nuaim argued that privately 
owned land ‘has been a striking feature of the Arabian economy’.156 Yet, he did not view the 
Arabian mode of production as capitalist. Relying on Louis Althusser (1918–90), Étienne 
Balibar (b. 1942), and Nicos Poulantzas (1936–79), he identified pastoral/tribal and 
tributary/urban modes of production within a non-capitalist Arabian society.157 
While Al-Nuaim used Marxist theoretical concepts, he still argued against Western 
Marxists who interpreted the Saudi state as a product of capitalism or imperialism. Instead, 
he conceived it as an indigenous, pre-capitalist creation. He criticized a monograph on the 
Saudi political economy by Helen Lackner for leaving out the ‘urban factor’ and portraying 
modern Saudi Arabia as ‘the result of British imperialist interference in the local inter-tribal 
struggle’.158 Al-Nuaim also refuted an argument in the widely read work Arabia Without 
Sultans by Fred Halliday (1946–2010). Al-Nuaim disagreed with Halliday’s view that the 
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expansion of capitalism since 1500 was responsible for transformations in Arabia. He stated 
that ‘the trade patterns associated with the emergence of the Saudi state were primarily 
noncapitalist with very little connections with capitalist firms or products’.159 Thanks to ‘local 
precapitalist merchant capital’, the Saudi state was ‘structurally established on relatively 
stable grounds before the infiltration of the capitalist mode of production’. This infiltration 
happened only with the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the 1930s.160 
Al-Nuaim’s doctoral research was a transnational enterprise, not only in terms of 
theoretical inspiration but also primary sources. Like the historian Al Juhany, Al-Nuaim drew 
on Western as well as Saudi sources. After he had pondered the role of internal socio-
economic forces in the formation of the Saudi state, his research in the British diplomatic 
archives in London established ‘the pattern of the merchant’s participation’ in the creation of 
Saudi Arabia. Subsequent fieldwork in Najd and his home region al-Aḥsāʾ consolidated this 
picture, as he interviewed a number of people who ‘had direct knowledge of the merchants’ 
dealing with the political leadership’.161 Al-Nuaim’s many conversations with social and 
economic historians at UCLA presumably encouraged him further in developing his 
arguments. He remembered that he ‘used to have social gatherings’ with Mohamed Al-Freih 
and others, in which he talked about his dissertation.162 
Al-Nuaim also took up an assistant professorship at King Saud University after his 
PhD. Yet, his thesis remained unpublished, although the author expressed the hope to 
publish it after his ‘retirement’. Al-Nuaim stated that it would require many ‘changes’ and 
deletions of some quotations, such as those by Mao Zedong.163 Turki al-Hamad (b. 1952), 
another political scientist, undertook further research on Saudi state building. He also 
undertook doctoral research in Los Angeles. While he studied at the University of Southern 
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California, he also used the rich library of UCLA, where he met the social and economic 
historian Abdullah al-Askar and his colleagues.164 In 1985, al-Hamad completed a 
dissertation entitled ‘Political Order in Changing Societies, Saudi Arabia: Modernization in a 
Traditional Context’. This dissertation sought to provide another sociological explanation of 
the contemporary history of the Saudi state.165 
Like Al-Nuaim, al-Hamad positioned his thesis within international sociological 
literature. He primarily argued against the influential book Political Order in Changing 
Societies by the American political scientist Samuel Huntington (1927–2008). Huntington 
himself contended that modernization breeds instability in developing countries.166 Al-
Hamad, in contrast, proposed that modernization in Saudi Arabia, thanks to the surge in oil 
prices after 1973, led to political stability.167 With its high oil revenues, the Saudi monarchy 
was able to ‘follow the line of modernization and economic development without threatening 
the existing traditional institutions and structures and, hence, without finding itself pressured 
to meet rising social and political demands from new and traditional groups’.168 The state 
assimilated many people into an enlarged bureaucracy and enhanced its support for the 
military and the religious establishment. Thereby, it ‘decreased social mobilization and the 
level of political consciousness’.169 
After his state-sponsored graduate studies and while working as assistant professor at 
King Saud University, al-Hamad turned from modernization theory to the study of 
ideology.170 In this process, he came to perceive the Wahhabi mission as an ideology rather 
than religion. In order to avoid Saudi censorship, he placed several articles in the journal al-
Mustaqbal al-ʿArabī, ‘The Arab Future’. This leftist journal has been published by the Centre 
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for Arab Unity Studies (Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-ʿArabīyah) in Beirut since 1978 and has 
been open to social theorizing. One of al-Hamad’s articles, published in 1986, was entitled 
‘The Unification of Arabia: The Role of Ideology and Organization in the Breaking of Social 
Structures Hindering Unity’.171 
In his article on ‘The Unification of Arabia’, al-Hamad proposed a theory that Saudi 
state formation was a social rather than religious process and followed earlier European 
models. According to him, ‘the Wahhabi ideology and the organization based on it (the 
Ikhwān movement) played a pivotal role in breaking down the barriers and obstacles that 
stood in the way of a nation state with a unified central authority and comprehensive 
sovereignty’.172 Hence, the Wahhabi mission and its ‘understanding of unity and equality’ 
played ‘the same role in Saudi Arabia as the ideology of the social contract (especially 
Thomas Hobbes’s contract) did in Europe’. In this role, the emergence of the Wahhabi 
mission was marked by ‘the destruction of all groups, loyalties, alliances’ and their new 
mobilization through a ‘new ideology and a different system of values’. In this way, the 
establishment of the central state in Najd in the eighteenth century ended the ‘war of all 
against all’, especially between the ‘sedentary farmer’ and the ‘nomadic Bedouin’. These two 
groups competed with one another in either cultivating the land or using it as a grazing 
ground for cattle.173 
In 1995, al-Hamad retired from his position at KSU. Yet, Abdulaziz Al-Fahad, a Saudi 
lawyer trained at American universities, built on the research of the political scientist. While 
practicing as an attorney in Riyadh, he wrote a paper entitled ‘The ‘Imama vs. the ‘Iqal: 
Hadari–Bedouin Conflict and the Formation of the Saudi State’. He considered it a response 
to previous literature about the kingdom, and published it in a collection of Counter 
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Narratives in 2004. Its editors were Madawi Al-Rasheed and Robert Vitalis, two scholars 
who also challenged narratives of dynastic historiography.174 
Abdulaziz Al-Fahad built on the studies by al-Hamad and the social historian Uwaidah 
Al Juhany and argued that the Saudi state was a project of the settled communities (ḥaḍar) 
‘with profound anti-tribal and anti-Bedouin tendencies’. This contradicted the widespread 
identification of the Saudi state with the Bedouin. According to him, ‘the Wahhabi revivalist 
movement, and the state that emerged therefrom, had been conceived, spearheaded, and 
manned’ by the ḥaḍarīs. It appeared in the eighteenth century, when the ḥaḍarī population of 
southern Najd ‘had lost its tribal organization’ and ‘Najdi pastoral nomadism had been 
characterized by a high degree of flux resulting in instability in inter- and intra-tribal as well 
as Bedouin–Hadari relations’. The sedentary population exploited this crisis by building the 
Saudi state with its aim ‘to end Bedouin historical hegemony throughout pre-modern 
Arabia’.175 
Khalid al-Dakhil (b. 1952), who also benefitted from state-financed education and 
employment, made another theoretical enquiry into the emergence of the Saudi state.176 
Initially, he wanted to study philosophy, but no Saudi university offered such a course. He 
thus studied sociology at King Saud University as the ‘nearest thing to philosophy’ that he 
liked. After his BA in 1977, King Saud University provided him with a scholarship for 
graduate studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. Under the supervision of 
Georges Sabagh and the social historian Afaf Marsot, al-Dakhil gained a PhD in sociology in 
1998. During his studies, he remembered that he was ‘preoccupied with the question, ‘where 
did this state come from?’’ The ‘official’ answer to the question involved, according to him, 
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‘just religion’. He asked, ‘What about the people?’ ‘What about the tribes?’177 Among his 
readings at UCLA, one book ‘influenced’ him in particular, namely Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy by the American political sociologist Barrington Moore (1913–
2005). Borrowing from the book’s title, al-Dakhil gave his PhD thesis the title ‘Social Origins 
of the Wahhabi Movement’.178 After he had returned to KSU as assistant professor, he 
published the results of his doctoral research in the journal al-Mustaqbal al-ʿArabī in 2000. 
Signifying a departure from both Saudi and foreign writings on the kingdom’s history, al-
Dakhil called his essay ‘A Different Reading on the History of the Saudi State’.179 
Building on previous contextualist research into the social history of pre-Wahhabi 
Najd, al-Dakhil developed the most elaborate theory of the emergence of the Wahhabi 
mission so far. The historical sociologist acknowledged Al Juhany and Al-Freih’s ‘attempts’ 
to ‘situate this movement within its own historical context’ in contrast ‘to the dominant and 
ahistorical theses’. Yet, he considered their links between urbanization, religious learning, 
and the Wahhabi mission an ‘assumption more than an argument’.180 Criticizing their lack of 
sociological theory, he stated that their dissertations offered ‘a historical sequence, but 
without any analytical link’.181 Based on their results, however, al-Dakhil was able to develop 
three arguments. First, in rejection of the notion of the pre-Wahhabi jāhilīyah, the 
background of the emergence of the Wahhabi mission was not characterized by ‘a 
deterioration of religious beliefs, but by turbulent social and political conditions’. Second, 
refuting notions of the state as a tribal project, al-Dakhil argued that ‘the first Saudi state 
came after the structure of the sedentarized tribe disintegrated’. Third, Saudi state building 
underwent three phases, namely ‘tribal collective settlement’, ‘the decline of the tribe and the 
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rise of the towns’, and ‘the central state which was based on the principles of 
Wahhabism’.182 
Like Al-Nuaim, who was his colleague at UCLA and KSU, al-Dakhil engaged with the 
global literature, turning against foreign scholars who conceived the Wahhabi mission in 
Khaldūnian terms. To him, a book by the Lebanese historian Masʿūd Ḍāhir on the state in 
the eastern Arab lands, for instance, formed ‘an example of weak history’. This book 
described the Saudi state, as a ‘modern realization of the ancient Khaldūnian formula’. Tribal 
group feeling (ʿaṣabīyah) under the Saud tribe allied itself with religion in order to establish a 
state.183 Similarly, the Saudi sociologist reproached the Syrian scholar Aziz Al-Azmeh for 
‘repeating once again the cliché’ that Wahhabi ideology served tribal solidarity and for 
considering ‘raiding and looting’ the only means for Arabian society to reproduce itself.184 Al-
Dakhil concluded his literature review with a criticism of the Lebanese political scientist 
Ghassan Salamé. To al-Dakhil, Salamé offered a ‘superficial reading of the history of the 
Wahhabi movement’, in which he stuck ‘literally to what Ibn Khaldūn stated in his 
Muqaddimah’.185 
Apart from the Ibn Khaldūn–based theories about tribal group feeling, al-Dakhil also 
argued against seeing religious factors as behind the establishment of the Saudi state. 
Interestingly, he did not attack Saudi dynastic historians explicitly but the British historian 
Michael Cook (b. 1940). In 1989, Cook had published a chapter on ‘The Expansion of the 
First Saudi State’. He argued that the ‘forces for and against the creation of a Najdi state 
were very evenly balanced’ and that ‘the factor which eventually tipped the balance in favor 
of the Saudis may well have been faith’. Thus, he described the emergence of the Saudi 
state as ‘an act of God’.186 Al-Dakhil dismissed this argument entirely. The historical 
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sociologist considered this ‘metaphysical explanation’ as either ‘a cynical position’ or ‘an 
expression of the author’s despair’.187 
Although al-Dakhil mainly engaged in theoretical debates, his arguments—unlike 
those Al-Nuaim or Al-Hamad—did not remain confined to academic platforms, but also 
entered newspapers. In the daily paper al-Riyāḍ in 2001, Abdullah al-Askar recommended 
al-Dakhil’s article to a broad audience and lauded his friend and colleague for combining 
history with sociology. Al-Askar wrote that the essay in al-Mustaqbal al-ʿArabī ‘will please 
neither Michael Cook’ nor ‘the local textual and narrative historians’, but ‘it pleases us’.188 Al-
Dakhil himself published two articles in the Emirati newspaper al-Ittiḥād, ‘The Union’, in 
2006. The first article was entitled ‘Why Did the Saudi State Arise in al-ʿĀriḍ?’, al-ʿĀriḍ being 
the central Arabian region around Riyadh and al-Dirʿīyah. The second article made its 
argument clear in the title: ‘The Disintegration of the Tribe and Not Idolatry Was behind the 
Appearance of the Wahhabi Movement’. Transnational networks were important in bringing 
about this debate. Al-Dakhil’s articles responded to a question that the London-based Saudi 
anthropologist Madawi Al-Rasheed had originally posed via e-mail to Saad Sowayan (b. 
1944), a Riyadh-based anthropologist.189 
Relying on al-Askar, Al Juhany and Al-Freih, al-Dakhil’s articles argued again that the 
Wahhabi mission had social and not religious roots. Challenging the takfīrist narratives of 
dynastic histories, al-Dakhil stated that the appearance of the mission ‘was not related to the 
deterioration of religious life or the spread of idolatry [shirk] in Najd, as is widely believed’. 
Instead, the historical sociologist explained the mission ‘as the culmination of processes of 
settlement and urbanization, which had continued for centuries after the fall of the 
Ukhayḍirid state in the eleventh century’. Al-Dakhil considered this case in line with a 
general theory about the rise of states. ‘All states, which emerged in human history, 
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appeared in regions that had previously witnessed processes of settlement and societies 
characterized by urbanization’. Hence, the Saudi state arose in al-ʿĀriḍ of all the regions of 
central Arabia, because ‘al-ʿĀriḍ had been the oldest or at least one of the oldest regions of 
settlement and urbanization in Najd since the time before Islam’.190 
By publicizing his theories about the social basis of the Wahhabi mission in 
newspapers rather than restricting them to his thesis and academic publications, al-Dakhil 
had apparently crossed a red line. Within weeks of their publication in al-Ittiḥād, Fahd al-
Semmari, the secretary general of the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and 
Archives, published a response. Like al-Dakhil, he used international Arabic media, namely 
the Emirati newspaper al-Khalīj, ‘the Gulf’, and al-ʿArabīyah, ‘The Arabic’, channel. Al-
Semmari’s article was entitled ‘Reply to Dr Khalid al-Dakhil: The Saudi State Did Not Arise 
That Way’.191 He maintained that ‘the truth is that the foundation of the Saudi state is religion 
and nothing else’. According to him, al-Dakhil’s view ‘reduces events and connects them 
within an illogical frame’. Al-Semmari pointed out that the Saudi state had not appeared in 
Najrān or al-Aḥsāʾ, although both regions had been more urbanized than al-ʿĀriḍ was. He 
also asserted the primacy of dynastic historiography, calling upon the historical sociologist to 
‘to stop this arbitrary theorizing and to turn to the study of the history of the Saudi state in its 
three stages in depth’. The return ‘to the literature of the Saudi state, its imams, and religious 
scholars’ should make the ‘extent of the religious connection to the state’s establishment 
and expansion clear to him’.192 
Al-Semmari also used the occasion to warn against historical sociology generally. He 
contended that ‘the danger in some new readings of historical events from a sociological or 
economic perspective lies in the domination of theory’. ‘In order to prove the intended view, 
the focus is on specific events supporting this theory, while most other events are ignored’. 
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In particular, the foundation’s secretary general rejected ‘the materialist school of historical 
interpretation’, claiming that its members ‘inflated and emphasized terms’ and ‘raised 
controversial questions with pre-determined answers’. ‘In this kind of reading, one 
recognizes the suppression of historical facts and the rejection of a religious basis.’193 
Coming from one of the central authorities on historiography in the kingdom, this opposition 
forced al-Dakhil to discontinue his series of newspaper articles. Al-Ittiḥād asked him to stop 
writing on the subject and put him on leave for several months.194 
In his criticism of al-Dakhil’s approach, al-Semmari considered himself in agreement 
with Prince Salman ibn Abdulaziz.195 The prince was deeply concerned with the religious 
legitimacy of the state. In 2008, Salman gave a lecture at Umm al-Qura University in Mecca, 
in which he reinforced the notion of his family’s state as a religious project. He maintained 
that ‘the Saudi state was based on the Koran and the Sunna. It was not based regionally, 
tribally, or ideologically (on human thought).’196 Salman’s view was probably shaped by his 
personal religious belief and his education under Wahhabi ulema.197 Presumably, however, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union also strengthened his view that secular ideologies and 
materialist narratives were incapable of protecting and legitimizing the state. In his lecture, 
Salman stated that ‘we witnessed the breakup of the Soviet Union, when it abandoned its 
communist thought, although it is a materialist thought and belief’. Hence, he called upon 
citizens to embrace Islam, ‘this divine belief, on which the state is based, and not allow 
anyone to damage this basis. This is the supreme legitimacy, which transcends the region, 
group feeling [ʿaṣabīyah] and the tribe.’198 
While this opposition to social and economic understandings of the Wahhabi mission 
and the Saudi state persisted, Khalid al-Dakhil, however, was able to use the internet and 
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foreign publishers to continue the debate. In 2006, the sociologist reacted to al-Semmari’s 
criticism with an article on two websites, al-Tajdīd al-ʿArabī, ‘The Arab Renewal’, and 
SaudiDebate.com. SaudiDebate.com was a platform on which the London-based Saudi 
scholar Madawi Al-Rasheed and the KSU anthropologist Saad Sowayan had also published 
critical comments on contemporary Saudi affairs. In his rejoinder, al-Dakhil defended 
‘theorizing’, considering it ‘the main objective, and in the final analysis the natural outcome of 
any scientific research’. Consequently, he decried al-Semmari’s comments as being ‘anti-
scientific, and openly so’.199 In 2009, al-Dakhil also published his research in a conference 
volume on Wahhabism and the State edited by the US-based scholars Mohammed Ayoob 
and Hasan Kosebalaban. He repeated his argument that the roots of the Wahhabi mission 
‘were political and social in character’ and that the mission ‘was the product of processes of 
settlement and state formation that characterized the history of Najd until the first half of the 
eighteenth century’.200 
Conclusions 
Although not a professional historian in a narrow sense, the historical sociologist Khalid al-
Dakhil joined the historians al-Askar and Al-Freih to form a group that privileged social and 
economic factors in narratives of the Saudi past. The group offered a sophisticated and 
sustained challenge to the narratives of dynastic historiography from the 1970s onwards. 
This challenge was different from the challenges of many local, tribal and Shiite histories and 
thus broadened the spectrum of narrative plurality in the kingdom. The studies in social and 
economic history, as well as historical sociology, transcended the role of specific individuals 
and communities and analysed the key processes of the rise of the Wahhabi mission and 
the Saudi state with a focus on wider social and economic factors. Some scholars 
contended that the Wahhabi mission had not emerged against the background of an 
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ahistorical ‘age of ignorance’, but in the context of a growth in religious learning in Najd 
between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. Other researchers developed theories that 
conceived the Saudi state as a social and economic rather than religious project. 
 A combination of factors related to the expansion of the Saudi state and 
globalization gave rise to this group of social and economic histories. The broad social and 
economic transformations since the discovery of oil provided fertile ground for studies going 
beyond political and military events and the actions of individuals. More importantly, the 
state’s support for higher education, particularly through programmes to send students to the 
United States, was a major factor in the formation of the first generation of Saudi social and 
economic historians and historical sociologists. Governmental agencies opposed some of 
the narratives produced by members of this generation. At the same time, however, 
globalization provided this generation with possibilities to avoid censorship by publishing 
abroad and online.
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7. Conclusion 
A plurality of narratives emerged in historiography in Saudi Arabia from the early twentieth 
century. An important, but not the only, group of histories focused on the Al Saud and 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab since the eighteenth century. From the production of the 
chronicle by Ibn Ghannām under the first Saudi state onwards, many of these dynastic 
histories were characterized by a takfīrist paradigm that assumed that Muslims who were not 
reached by the Wahhabi mission were infidels. The histories presented the Al Saud as 
waging jihad against its neighbours, and as spreading Islam against the background of a 
pre-Wahhabi ‘age of ignorance’ or jāhilīyah. Between the 1920s and 1960s, dynastic 
histories developed two further characteristics. In an exclusivist manner, they narrated the 
history of the country essentially as the history of the Al Saud. Moreover, in the context of 
strong Arab nationalism in the region, they presented the Al Saud as leaders of the Arab 
struggle for independence. After the 1960s, however, an important shift of emphasis 
occurred. With emerging Saudi nationalism and an ideology of development, dynastic 
historians came to present Saudi kings primarily as founders, unifiers and developers of the 
Saudi nation. Narratives of national foundation, unification and development thus 
complemented and sometimes replaced jāhilīyah and jihad in many texts. 
One loose group of histories diverging from, and challenging, this dynastic 
historiography dealt with the past towns, regions, tribes and the Shiites. Until the 1970s, 
these texts confined themselves to cities, like Mecca, and major regions, including al-Aḥsāʾ 
and Asir. They were mostly particularistic, expressing historical independence from the Al 
Saud. In a perennialist manner, they portrayed towns and regions as passing through many 
centuries of history and surviving the coming and going of different dynasties. Thereby, they 
fostered the enduring identity of a place independent from the fate of specific rulers. 
Moreover, local authors characterized the people of Mecca or the Shiites of al-Qaṭīf as 
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Muslims even before the Wahhabi mission had reached them, in contrast to the idea of 
takfīrism. Since the 1970s, not only did many historians of tribes join these local authors. A 
new kind of narrative strategy also appeared. With the growth of Saudi nationalism, many 
local and tribal histories abandoned particularistic stances and adopted a national framework 
along with the narratives of unification and development. However, they did not become 
subservient to dynastic histories. Instead, and in contrast to dynastic exclusivism, many 
local, tribal and Shiite authors wrote ‘contribution histories’, underlining the contribution of 
their communities to national history. 
Another group of texts forming part of Saudi narrative plurality consists of distinct 
social and economic histories as well as studies in historical sociology. These histories 
departed from most dynastic as well as many local and tribal writings that focused on unique 
political, religious, and military events. Investigating the social developments in pre-Wahhabi 
Arabia, several historians contested the widespread notion in dynastic histories of the pre-
Wahhabi jāhilīyah. They contended that the Wahhabi mission did not emerge against the 
background of an ahistorical ‘age of ignorance’ but in the context of a growth in religious 
learning. Other scholars, who were mainly political scientists and sociologists, developed 
theories that conceived of the Saudi state as a social and economic rather than, as in most 
dynastic histories, a religious project. 
The coverage of Saudi historiography in this thesis has been far from complete. 
Dynastic, local, tribal, Shiite, social, and economic histories do not represent all historical 
writing that has been produced in the kingdom. Research into the history of other Arab and 
Muslim countries as well as other regions of the world also developed. Out of 168 master 
theses and doctoral dissertations in modern and contemporary history examined at colleges 
and universities in Saudi Arabia between 1978 and 2000, only 46 (or 27.4 per cent) were on 
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the history of Saudi Arabia, while the remaining 72.6 per cent covered other countries.1 
Despite analysing the effects of globalization, my thesis has thus largely remained within the 
‘paradigm of the nation state’,2 focusing on histories written in Saudi Arabia on Saudi Arabia. 
My thesis has also been limited in at least one other way. Due to restrictions on 
meetings between unrelated men and women, I could interview only a few female 
professional historians. The Saudi historian ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Ḥumayd rightly pointed out that I 
had omitted the contribution of Saudi women historians in a presentation in Riyadh in 2009. 
In the chapters of this thesis, I have mentioned a number of female scholars, but I am aware 
that my study does not give the full picture of the activities of female scholars in the Saudi 
historical profession.3 The 1990s witnessed, for instance, the emergence of a small but 
growing field of women’s history in Saudi Arabia, pioneered by Dalal al-Harbi among others.4 
Despite the lack of full coverage of Saudi historiography, my thesis has analysed 
several important trends that, taken together, exemplify narrative plurality in Saudi Arabia. I 
consider my analysis of dynastic, local, tribal, Shiite and social and economic histories 
sufficient to answer the principal question of this study, that is, why and how narrative 
plurality emerged in Saudi Arabia. Arguably, the factors I have discerned might also be 
applicable to those streams within Saudi historiography that I have not covered in my thesis. 
An empowering state 
One of the main factors shaping Saudi historiography has been the expansion of the state 
since the early twentieth century. As would be expected, this expansion, combined with the 
lack of formal political pluralism, brought restrictions to historiography. Until the 1950s, Saudi 
kings themselves or members of their courts censored historical works. Until the present, 
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Saudi monarchs also retained, and occasionally made use of, the right to ban publications. 
As historical production increased, more specialized agencies, like the Ministry of 
Information and more recently the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, 
also started to examine historical works prior to publication. Moreover, rather than engaging 
in a straight-forward struggle of ‘state vs. society’,5 a number of historians themselves made 
use of the censorship apparatus of the expanding state in order to suppress histories written 
by their colleagues and competitors. 
Despite censorship, however, I argue that the expansion of the Saudi state 
incidentally contributed to the development of Saudi narrative plurality. Unsurprisingly, the 
state allocated a large part of its support to dynastic historical production. Even before oil 
revenues soared after World War II, King Abdulaziz Al Saud sponsored the publication of 
several nineteenth-century chronicles. With increasing resources, the state also subsidized 
new monographs, textbooks, and conferences commemorating dynastic achievements. In 
1999 and 2001, this support reached two peaks in jubilees celebrated by universities and 
ministries alike: the centenary of the kingdom’s foundation and the twentieth anniversary of 
King Fahd’s accession to the throne. 
Apart from dynastic histories, however, the expanding state also incidentally also 
funded the publication of histories that did not conform to the dynastic narratives. While the 
King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives primarily supported dynastic 
historiography, it also published a few texts on social and economic history. As the 
expanding Saudi state ‘fragmented’ into various ministries and other agencies with 
increased oil revenues in the decades after World War II,6 some of these agencies were also 
able to engage in their own historiographical and wider cultural policies. The General 
Presidency of Youth Welfare, which shared a vision of the nation more inclusive of local 
communities, paid for the publication of a number of local histories that employed 
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contribution arguments. These histories challenged the dynastic conception of Saudi history 
as being essentially the history of the royal family. 
Besides direct support for publications, the government incidentally enabled many 
members of local and tribal communities to write their own histories as it sought to ‘develop’ 
the country. From the early twentieth century onwards, the state provided an increasing 
number of its citizens with free education. This education was initially restricted to primary 
and secondary schools. After World War II, however, new universities taught Saudis 
advanced skills in research and writing. People belonging to formerly largely illiterate groups, 
like nomadic tribespeople, thus became able to produce sophisticated texts about the past. 
Moreover, in order to enhance the level of education in the country, the Saudi state 
provided thousands of students from a variety of backgrounds with scholarships to study 
abroad. These student missions began on a modest level in the late 1920s and expanded 
with increasing oil revenues after 1945. While some holders of master’s and doctoral 
degrees from American and British universities subsequently questioned the extent of the 
pre-Wahhabi jāhilīyah, others went further in challenging dynastic historiography. Trained in 
social and economic history or sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles, and 
other universities, they developed social and economic explanations of the Wahhabi mission 
and the Saudi state. 
The state not only educated a broad range of historians in the kingdom or sponsored 
their education abroad. It also employed a considerable number of them so that they 
replaced foreign teachers and educated new generations for the sake of national 
‘development’. Several authors of local contribution histories enjoyed tenure as professors at 
public universities. Similarly, although some social and economic historians and historical 
sociologists challenged dynastic narratives in their theses at UCLA, they were still employed 
as faculty members at KSU after their return to the kingdom. 
Government employment was not restricted to the higher education sector. As part of 
state expansion, an increasing number of people acquired positions in various parts of the 
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bureaucracy. These positions provided them with a middle class standard of living and an 
income that allowed them to fund their own research. Already before the oil boom of the 
1970s, at least a dozen local historians worked as administrators, teachers, and judges in 
various towns and provinces for at least parts of their lives. These positions funded their 
research and provided them with the connections necessary to access private historical 
documents. With the expansion of the bureaucracy after the 1970s, the public payroll 
increased and came to comprise some tribal historians. At the same time, the distribution of 
oil revenues, combined with the rise in literacy, created a market for local and tribal 
publications. 
Finally, the state shaped particularistic and ‘contribution’ narratives in more indirect 
ways. The establishment of the state, with its borders and national and provincial 
administrations, gave rise to new territorially defined as opposed to kinship-defined 
communities, such as Asir. These facilitated the perennialism that described a region as 
passing through centuries of multi-dynastic history. In the case of some Shiite authors, state 
repression also helped foster historical narratives which asserted that members of the sect 
were Muslims, in contrast to the narratives of takfīrist dynastic histories. In other cases, 
formal equality between Saudi citizens, combined with differential access to the state’s 
resources, encouraged some authors to argue for their groups’ contribution to national 
history. They did so in order to increase their communities’ share of the oil wealth or to gain 
symbolic capital located in past tribal glories. In other instances, local historians sought to 
establish themselves as cultural brokers between local and national institutions. 
Globalization and pluralization 
The second major factor behind Saudi narrative plurality is globalization. Dynastic and, to a 
smaller extent, social and economic historiographies were shaped by the influx of foreigners, 
which global integration facilitated. Non-Saudi Arab officials in the court and Foreign Ministry 
not only served the Saudi government in its international relations. Some of them also 
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published some of the first major histories of the Saudi dynasty. As men who had few 
loyalties to local and regional communities, they strengthened dynastic exclusivism, the 
tendency to conceive the country’s history essentially as the history of the Al Saud. A 
number of non-Saudi professional historians also built up the first departments of history at 
Saudi universities. 
Globalization encouraged the state’s empowerment of an increasing number of 
citizens through education and the distribution of oil revenues. Awareness of global 
competition as well as the adoption of the global ideology of development contributed to 
efforts to develop the national human resources. They included the introduction of free 
public education at all levels, as well as scholarships for studies abroad. Furthermore, 
policies to ‘Saudize’ the workforce emerged in reaction to the overwhelming reliance on 
foreign labour and unemployment among Saudis. While these policies failed in the private 
sector, they were relatively successful in the public sector.7 This contributed to an expansion 
of the middle classes and increasing numbers of amateur historians. 
Globalization also encompassed global diffusion of knowledge, which influenced a 
variety of historiographical approaches. Studies and research trips abroad and the influx of 
foreigners and foreign literature brought Saudi historians into contact with a variety of 
ideologies prevalent elsewhere in the world. The strong Arab nationalism in the region 
between the 1920s and 1960s affected a number of later dynastic historians who arrived in 
the kingdom from Greater Syria and Egypt. These historians subsequently introduced a pan-
Arab frame to Saudi dynastic historiography while still maintaining elements of the takfīrism 
of earlier Najdi chronicles. After the 1960s, the global ideology of development also affected 
a variety of writings. Dynastic historians presented Saudi kings as leaders of national 
development, while other scholars argued for the contribution of local, tribal and Shiite 
communities to this process. 
                                                   
7 Hertog, Princes (2010), 186–87. 
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Apart from ideologies, contact with foreign literature also inspired different 
historiographical approaches in the kingdom. Through reading books in Arabic and Western 
languages about Arabia and the Gulf, many Saudis perceived misrepresentations of their 
hometowns and home regions. Such perceptions encouraged them to write local histories. 
During their studies in the United States, some Saudis engaged with global sociological 
theories about Saudi Arabia and the Middle East. In seeking to gain new understandings of 
the kingdom’s social and economic development, they challenged narratives of the Saudi 
state as a primarily religious project. Saudi historians not only took inspiration from global 
literature, but also used it as source material. Many amateurs used books by Arab and 
European travellers for the writing of local and tribal history. Some professional historians 
found information on regional pasts in French, British, and Ottoman archives. In disputed 
matters, some scholars also drew on foreign scholars to lend authority to their claims. 
Finally, the growth in the kingdom’s transnational connections also gave residents of 
Saudi Arabia opportunities to publish histories abroad and online. Not only did dynastic 
historians publish texts in Cairo and Beirut, where they benefitted from foreign expertise in 
editing and printing, but social and economic historians also used foreign publishers for the 
dissemination of new interpretations of the rise of the Saudi state. They used prestigious 
foreign platforms to gain a global, Arabic-speaking audience, and to avoid censorship. The 
introduction of public internet access in 1999 further facilitated the avoidance of official 
controls. This necessary step in the context of the globalizing economy allowed the 
establishment of tribal websites on which several authors published controversial historical 
accounts. 
Narrative plurality beyond Saudi Arabia 
The development of narrative plurality has been a global phenomenon in historiography in 
the twentieth century. This has certainly been the case in democracies. In the United States, 
for instance, the histories of women and racial and ethnic minorities have questioned older 
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narratives of national history that focus on the male White Anglo-Saxon Protestant elite. 
These histories expressed a general scepticism towards any single narrative of the 
American past. This plurality of historical narratives has resulted not only from the American 
democratic system and its civil liberties generally. A more specific factor has been the 
‘democratization’ of higher education, that is, the broadening of access to university places 
and positions for women and members of minorities.8 
Outside the Western world, narrative plurality has also been evident, especially in ‘full’ 
or ‘flawed’ democracies. In independent India, frequently considered the ‘largest democracy 
in the world’, numerous approaches have developed, including secular nationalist and Hindu 
nationalist histories, as well as various kinds of histories rooted in Marxism and post-colonial 
theories, among them Subaltern Studies.9 In Thailand, local history, regional history, 
economic history, the history of gender, and post-modernist history have flourished since a 
democratic transformation in the 1970s.10 
Far less research has been undertaken on modern Arab historiography than on its 
European and American counterparts. My thesis suggests that we revisit this research in 
order to find out whether narrative plurality may have also been a wider phenomenon in 
historiography in the Arab world, despite the persistence of authoritarianism. A few studies 
indicate that contestation has been a feature of historiography in Egypt and perhaps other 
countries. Anthony Gorman has shown that in late twentieth-century Egypt, besides the 
official secular-nationalist and Islamic currents, feminist, and Coptic historiographies also 
‘contested the nation’.11 Other researchers have pointed to the rise of tribal writings in 
Jordan, Syria and Iraq, where they challenged the absence of tribes from official textbooks.12 
                                                   
8 Appleby et al., Telling (1994). 
9 Lal, The History (2005). 
10 Reynolds, Seditious Histories (2006), ix. 
11 Gorman, Historians (2003). 
12 Shryock, Nationalism (1997). Buessow, “Writing” (2010). Davis, Memories (2005), 238. 
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Much more research still needs to be undertaken before we can provide a 
comprehensive picture of the extent and form of narrative plurality in modern Arab 
historiography. My case study of Saudi Arabia is only a small contribution to this wider 
picture. However, its approach may be useful for future studies. It invites other researchers 
to study to what extent the expansion of the state brought about a pluralization, if not 
‘democratization’, of higher education in general and professional historiography in particular 
in the Arab world. Beyond professional historiography, much more research needs to be 
undertaken on amateur writings, especially on local and tribal topics. Here, I propose that we 
pay special attention to the effects of globalization, including the spread of internet access, 
on these writings. 
Previous studies have not made this combination of state expansion, globalization 
and narrative central to their inquiry. However, as I re-read studies in the light of my own 
findings, they offer some instances indicating that a similar combination might have been at 
work elsewhere. The growth in state provision of higher education and the establishment of 
an indigenous historical profession seems to have been a general phenomenon in Arab 
countries—as it was elsewhere in the world. In this field, Saudi Arabia developed rather late 
compared with Egypt and other countries. The Egyptian University, later renamed Cairo 
University, was founded in 1908, almost fifty years before the establishment of the first Saudi 
university, King Saud University.13 An indigenous Egyptian historical profession emerged in 
the 1920s and 1930s. Its Saudi counterpart only appeared in the 1960s and 1970s. Yoav Di-
Capua has shown that this professionalization in Egypt limited historiography through a 
‘founder paradigm’.14 Gorman, however, indicates that historians from a variety of 
backgrounds—including women—and with divergent interests and allegiances also 
benefitted from the growth in education.15 
                                                   
13 Iggers and Wang, A Global History (2008), 195. 
14 Di-Capua, Gatekeepers (2009). 
15 Gorman, Historians (2003). 
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In some instances, direct state sponsorship for professional historical publications in 
other Arab countries benefitted historians who were not following the dominant ideologies. 
Ulrike Freitag has shown that a project to re-write history by the Syrian Ministry for Culture 
and National Guidance in 1965 included a ‘wide spectrum of participants whose opinions 
were published’. This spectrum comprised Marxist and ‘more conservative members of the 
Baʿth party’ and even a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Freitag, ‘this 
pluralism of views’ might have served a legitimizing purpose by being ‘attractive to the 
public, although it was mediated by a careful selection of divergent views’.16 Even the Iraqi 
Baʿthist state once sponsored a study of The Iraqi Working Class by Kamal Mazhar Ahmad, 
a leftist Kurdish professor at Baghdad University. According to Eric Davis, Ahmad ‘treated an 
extremely sensitive topic without conforming to Baʿthist precepts’.17 
Besides state expansion, globalization also seems to have shaped the development 
of modern historiography in Arab countries other than Saudi Arabia. If we see European 
colonialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century as part of globalization and the 
establishment of global empires,18 then globalization had tremendous effects on the 
emergence of anti-colonial histories in the Maghrib, for instance. James McDougall traces 
the beginnings of modern Algerian historiography back to Tawfiq al-Madani (1899–1983) 
and other scholars. These were founding members of the Algerian branch of the wider 
movement for Islamic ‘reform’ or Salafīyah movement—which itself became a global 
movement in the twentieth century.19 Although al-Madani sought to refute the arguments of 
French scholars about Algerian history, he took his sources, categories, modes of 
argumentation, and conception of ‘valid history’ from colonial scholarship.20 This enabled 
him to develop a new language of history and nationalism even under the conditions of a 
                                                   
16 Freitag, “In Search” (1999), 4. 
17 Davis, Memories (2005), 216. 
18 On ‘global colonialism’, see Darwin, After Tamerlane (2008). 
19 McDougall, “Martyrdom” (2006), 52. 
20 Ibid., 54–55. For a similar phenomenon in Indian historiography, see Prakash, “Writing” (1990), 388. 
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colonial authoritarianism.21 Similarly, several prominent Arab historians, including 
Muhammad Kamil Ayad from Syria and Sultan Bin Muhammad al-Qasimi from Sharjah, 
criticized Western conceptions of Arab history. Yet they had originally gained their 
doctorates from Western universities.22 
In my thesis, I have considered the employment of foreigners by the Saudi state for 
the writing of history as part of globalization. This employment has also not been unique to 
Saudi Arabia. Although he did not conceptualize it as part of globalization, Yoav Di-Capua 
shows the importance of foreigners for the development of Egyptian historiography. In the 
first decades of the twentieth century, a significant part of the faculty of Egyptian universities 
was European.23 Only after the 1930s did history become ‘Egyptianized’, as indigenous 
historians writing in Arabic replaced foreigners.24 Similarly, well-educated Palestinians 
contributed to the development of historical studies in Kuwait and Libya.25 During the 
founding phase of Syrian professional historiography between 1948 and 1960, visiting 
professors from Lebanon and Egypt were invited to teach history at the University of 
Damascus because of a lack of indigenous professional historians.26 These foreigners may 
at least have laid the basis for the subsequent development of a ‘plurality’ of approaches in 
Syrian studies of Ottoman history.27 
Finally, the development of indigenous historical professions in other countries 
depended on people who—facilitated by globalization—had studied abroad, and often in the 
former colonial metropolises. Shafik Ghorbal, who led the ‘Egyptianization of history’ in his 
own country, had himself undertaken graduate research at the University of London under 
                                                   
21 McDougall, History (2006). McDougall also demonstrates al-Madani’s ability to transgress the colonial 
boundaries and move all across the Mediterranean in his lifetime. This ability can also be seen as part of 
globalization, even though McDougall does not explicitly identify it as such. 
22 Freitag, “Die Entwicklung” (1993), 84–85. Choueiri, “Arab Historical Writing” (2011), 503.  
23 Di-Capua, “‘Jabarti” (2004), 434. 
24 Ibid., 435. 
25 Choueiri, “Arab Historical Writing” (2011). 
26 Freitag, “Die Entwicklung” (1993), 85. 
27 Ibid., 87. Freitag does not see a plurality in Syrian studies of contemporary Syrian history, however. Ibid., 
90–91. 
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the English historian Arnold Toynbee. Similarly, leading professional historians from Jordan, 
Sudan, Libya, Iraq and other Arab countries in the twentieth century had all studied at British 
or American universities. In the case of Iraq, several of these foreign-educated historians, 
including Abd al-Aziz al-Duri and Ali al-Wardi played a crucial role in introducing social and 
economic history to the country.28 The Syrian historical profession also comprised graduates 
with divergent interests from universities in Egypt, Spain, Germany, the Soviet Union, 
Turkey, and other countries.29 Numerous Moroccan historians also received their doctorates 
from French universities, where they were influenced by the Annales School.30 
These examples, taken from research on historiography in other Arab countries, 
perhaps seem rather arbitrary. They are certainly insufficient to make a general argument 
about modern Arab historiography. Much more research needs to be undertaken. 
Nevertheless, previous research does suggest that a relationship between narrative plurality, 
state expansion and global integration might not have been confined to Saudi Arabia. 
Epilogue: The Saudi opening and historiography 
As stated earlier, state expansion and globalization drove the emergence of narrative 
plurality even in the absence of formal political pluralism. Yet, they also contributed to a 
political opening of Saudi Arabia in the early twentieth-first century, which may allow for 
future historiographical plurality within the frame of political pluralism. In the 2000s, the 
Saudi government embarked on a series of political reforms. They included the organization 
of the first municipal elections for decades in 2005. Although the government appointed half 
of the members of municipal councils, international observers generally considered the 
election of the other half of members as free and fair.31 Since 2003, the state has also 
sponsored the King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue. It held public discussions on a 
                                                   
28 Choueiri, “Arab Historical Writing” (2011). 
29 Gombár, “Contemporary Historiography” (2000), 68. Freitag, “Die Entwicklung” (1993), 84. 
30 El Mansour, “Moroccan Historiography” (1997), 116. 
31 Kraetzschmar, “Electoral Rules” (2010). 
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number of sensitive issues, including religious extremism, women’s rights, and the situation 
of youth. In unprecedented moves, the Center invited not only women but also Shiites as 
discussants.32 
The Saudi opening has sometimes been interpreted as the result of the shock of the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 combined with the moderate personality of King 
Abdullah (r. since 2005). Robert Lacey argues that ‘9/11 gave Abdullah the chance to 
introduce the reforms that he had long wished to implement’.33 Yet, the long-term 
empowerment of citizens through state-financed education and new technologies also 
contributed to this opening. Already in spring 2001, that is, before, the events of 11 
September, the Saudi government had introduced a new press and publication law that 
allowed ‘constructive criticism’, sending a message to society that the state allowed ‘wider 
discussion of issues affecting the kingdom’.34 One Saudi minister considered education to be 
the most important factor behind the political change under King Abdullah. He stated that 
even ‘religious education in universities obliged students to learn about the thoughts of 
religious schools other than the writings of the Wahhabis’. This led, according to him, to 
increased tolerance for alternative views. He added that rather than Abdullah ‘driving the 
change’, it was the change of society ‘driving Abdullah’ in his reforms.35 
During the Saudi opening, a number of Saudi historians, who were all educated at the 
state’s expenses, publicly turned against censorship. The historian Dalal al-Harbi argued in 
the newspaper al-Jazīrah in 2006 against the retraction of books because of ‘sensitivity’, 
‘dissatisfaction’ with contents or ‘disagreement with the author’. Instead, she called for an 
‘opening of the floor for academic criticism’ and for discussions of sensitive works in 
periodicals. This would ‘give the author of the criticized work the right to respond and defend 
                                                   
32 Drewes, “Das Nationale Dialogforum” (2010). See also Menno Preuschaft‘s research on the National 
Dialogue. 
33 Lacey, “Has 9/11” (2010). 
34 Ehteshami, “Reform” (2003), 68. 
35 Interview, 5 November 2009. 
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his point of view’.36 Two years later, Rāshid ibn ʿAsākir, a Najdi local historian, complained in 
the newspaper al-Riyāḍ that ‘researchers, professors, and amateurs still suffer from the 
censor’s scissors and from demands for deletions and changes’. ‘Such difficulties’, he 
stated, ‘make many Saudis turn to foreign publishers to complete their work and to print a 
book fast’. In order to benefit local publishers and save the authors travelling time and costs, 
he called upon the Ministry of Culture and Information to ‘remove the various problems’ of 
censorship.37 
These calls for an end to censorship already enjoyed some success. Saudi 
newspapers have even published reviews of controversial books. They include a work 
published by the journalist ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Khiḍr (b. 1968) in 2010. It is entitled Saudi Arabia, 
History of a State and Society: A Reading of a Third of a Century of Intellectual, Political and 
Developmental Transformations. In this social history, al-Khiḍr described sensitive topics, 
including the religious awakening, or ṣaḥwah, since the 1960s, the development of the 
media and religious censorship, the position and rights of Saudi women, and opposition to 
the Saudi regime. Moreover, he frequently used Marxist terminology, speaking of a Saudi 
‘bourgeoisie’ and the ages of ‘feudalism’ and ‘capitalism’. Thus, it was not surprising that the 
book appeared outside of Saudi Arabia, namely in Beirut.38 Yet, the work found widespread 
acclaim in the kingdom. A reviewer in the newspaper al-Waṭan praised it as ‘the undisputed 
book of the year’, while a colleague in al-Riyāḍ called it a ‘foundational text of modern social 
history’.39 
In an unprecedented move, the newspaper al-Waṭan even published a review of a 
history of the Saudi Shiites in 2010. The well-known television presenter Turkī al-Dakhīl (b. 
1973) reviewed a book titled Saudi Shiites by Ibrahim Al-Hatlani, a human rights activist. He 
commented upon this extraordinary event, stating that ‘after the technological revolution’, 
                                                   
36 Dalāl al-Ḥarbī, “Al-bawāriḥ” (2006). 
37 Ibn ʿAsākir, “Dawr” (2008). 
38 Al-Khiḍr, Al-suʿūdīyah (2010), 757–58.   
39 Al-Qāsim, “Sīrat “al-khiḍr”” (2010). Mushʿān, “Al-suʿūdīyah” (2010). 
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‘there are no longer restrictions or prohibitions in historical writing’. Although al-Dakhīl had 
himself been educated as a Sunni theologian, he commended Al-Hatlani for ‘overcoming 
extremism’ and ‘the bias of some of those whose sectarian belonging crept into 
historiography’. To him, Al-Hatlani’s work was an ‘objective research experiment’ without 
‘superficiality and agitation’.40 
The pluralization of Saudi politics and a potentially freer publishing environment has of 
course not stopped senior princes or governmental agencies from attempting to influence 
historical writing. Governmental influence has continued to stretch beyond curricula in state 
schools and has even reached academic research. Paradoxically, the liberalization of higher 
education allowed the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives under Prince 
Salman ibn Abdulaziz to make inroads into Saudi universities. In line with governmental 
policies to change Saudi Arabia into a ‘knowledge-based society’, King Saud University and 
other higher education institutions started in 2007 to accept private funding for the creation 
of research chairs. Two years later, Salman endowed the Prince Salman ibn Abdulaziz Chair 
of Historical Studies at KSU. While the director of the university headed the chair’s 
supervisory board, the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives remained 
influential in appointing the holder of the chair and determining its agenda. Fahd al-Semmari, 
the foundation’s secretary general, headed the chair’s academic committee and worked as 
its executive advisor.41 Also in 2009, Salman endowed the King Abdulaziz Chair of Studies 
in the Kingdom’s History at Imam University. Marking a continuation of dynastic 
historiography, one of the first plans of this chair was to organize a new conference on King 
Abdulaziz.42 
Through the universities, governmental agencies also attempted to influence amateur 
writings on topics other than dynastic history. In 2009, Prince Naif, the minister of interior, 
                                                   
40 Turkī al-Dakhīl, “Al-tārīkh” (2010). 
41 Dārat al-Malik ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, Al-tārīkhīyah 29 (2010), 13. 
42 Jāmiʿat al-Imām Muḥammad ibn Suʿūd al-Islāmīyah, “Al-amīr” (2009). 
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endowed another research professorship at Imam University, the Prince Naif Chair for 
National Unity Studies. This chair sought to co-opt the hundreds of Saudi tribal websites into 
spreading nationalism instead of tribalism. Thus, one of the chair’s first initiatives was to hold 
a conference in order to discuss programmes to ‘incentivize tribal websites to contribute to 
strengthening national belonging’. The conference also sought to encourage the placing of 
nationalist adverts on these sites.43 
While members of the royal family have remained influential, an opening to 
historiographical trends in other countries is likely to contribute to further narrative 
pluralization. With shifts in global alliances, this opening may well be eastwards as well as 
westwards. In 2006, King Abdullah became the first Saudi monarch to visit China. On that 
occasion, the social and economic historian Abdullah al-Askar published an article on ‘Saudi 
History in China’ in al-Riyāḍ. He argued that in order to ‘consolidate strategic relations with 
China’, Saudi Arabia could not depend on ‘economic interests only’ but also needed to 
‘strengthen scientific and cultural relations’. He thus proposed the establishment of a Saudi 
centre for Chinese studies that would bring ‘Muslim Chinese scholars’ to work with Saudis 
on Chinese language, culture, and history. Moreover, al-Askar stressed the need to ‘explore 
the valley of Chinese historical writing’ in order to ‘get to know the Chinese ways of thinking 
when they deal with our history’.44 
What narratives future Saudi historiography in its global context will produce, is, of 
course, impossible to foresee. In 2009, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Wābilī, a lecturer at King Khalid 
Military Academy in Riyadh, however, offered a glimpse into the kinds of new interpretations 
of the past that may result from a connection of Saudi history to global history. On the Saudi 
National Day on 23 September, he published an essay in al-Waṭan on ‘The Saudi Revolution 
and the Three Revolutions of the Modern World’. He called the agreement between 
Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1744 the ‘Saudi Revolution’. 
                                                   
43 Jāmiʿat al-Imām Muḥammad ibn Suʿūd al-Islāmīyah, “Kursī” (2009). 
44 Al-ʿAskar, “Al-tārīkh” (2006). 
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This revolution ‘first introduced the organization of the modern state, rather than that of an 
empire, to the Arab region, and influenced the other countries of the region’. He thus put the 
‘Saudi Revolution’ in line with the other two revolutions that formed the ‘beginning of modern 
world’: the American Revolution and the French Revolution.45 
Seeking to place Saudi history prominently within global history, al-Wābilī even 
speculated about connections between the Saudi, French, and American revolutions. 
According to him, the European geographical discoveries as contributors to the American 
and French revolutions were also a reason behind the ‘Saudi Revolution’. They allowed the 
Europeans to bypass the Arab countries in the trade from east to west, which led to the 
‘impoverishment of the Arab region’. Subsequently, the Ottomans neglected the Arabian 
peninsula, which gave Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab the leeway 
to establish their state. Moreover, al-Wābilī argued that ‘the American Revolution supported 
the French Revolution’. In turn, the French revolution ‘communicated with the Saudi 
Revolution in an attempt to coordinate their positions, but they did not reach a point of 
understanding’. Al-Wābilī ended his article with a call for Saudis to be conscious of the 
global dimension of their past: ‘Are we allowed to abandon our global historical depth, to 
which we have contributed by formulating and forming modern and contemporary global 
history?’46 
Whether Saudi historiographical pluralization will continue within a framework of 
political pluralism remains, of course, to be seen. This study, however, has shown that 
narrative plurality developed even in the absence of formal political pluralism and as the 
result of state expansion in a globalizing context. Thus, even if the Saudi opening does not 
continue and censorship again becomes strict, narrative pluralization may well continue.
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46 Ibid. 
  
295 
Appendix 
 
Figure 5: Map of Saudi Arabia 
(produced by the Central Intelligence Agency, in the public domain) 
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Figure 6: Provinces of Saudi Arabia 
(public domain) 
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Figure 7: Ban of The Entertainer’s Pleasure (page 1) 
(copy of a memorandum to the Ministry of Higher Education, handed to me by a Saudi 
historian in 2010) 
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Figure 8: Ban of The Entertainer’s Pleasure (page 2)
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